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PREFACE
The powers of the Executive relating to war have received
surprisingly little attention in treatises and commentaries on
the Constitution. They are usually passed by with little more
than a repetition of the constitutional provision making the
President the Commander-in-Chief of the armed forces of the
nation. This study is an attempt to describe these war powers
more fully and systematically than has heretofore been done.
For this purpose, the term "war powers" has been interpreted
somewhat liberally, so as to include not only the powers that
may be exercised during the actual conduct of war, but also
those that relate to the initiation and termination of war and to
the reconstruction period following war. It has been necessary,
in great measure, to work over old material and to make use of
familiar historical incidents. Nevertheless, it is hoped that
something has been contributed to show more clearly the com-
prehensive scope and the almost unlimited nature of this phase
of the President's power.
The writer is indebted to members of the Political Science
Seminar of the University of Illinois, and more especially to
Professors Garner and Fairlie, for valuable suggestions and
kindly criticism. He is alone responsible for any errors of fact
or conclusion.
UNIVERSITY OF ILLINOIS

"It is difficult to describe any single part of a
great governmental system without describing the
whole of it. Governments are living things and
operate as organic wholes."
Woodrow Wilson.
Constitutional Government
in the United States

CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION
"The executive power shall be vested in a President of the
United States of America." 1 The language here used by the
Constitution in describing the executive power in the govern-
ment of the United States is strikingly different from that
describing the general power of either of the other two great de-
partments. The article dealing with the legislative department
uses the words,
' ' All legislative powers herein granted . .
"2
showing that the following specified powers clearly constitute a
limitation on the possible claims of that department to power;
while the article devoted to the judiciary also expressly states
that the judicial power of the United States "shall extend to"
certain enumerated cases, 3 thereby obviously excluding all other
cases over which the judiciary might otherwise claim jurisdiction.
The lack of such express limitations in the article dealing with
the Executive has led to some difference of opinion as to whether
the executive power vested in the President by the Constitution
is defined and limited by the following specified powers, or
whether it includes other powers not enumerated but naturally
executive in character. Even if the former interpretation of the
Constitution is accepted as correct, the conception of the term
"executive power" still remains somewhat vague, since several
of the expressly enumerated powers of the President, such as his
powers as Commander-in-Chief and his power to see that the
laws are executed, are in themselves undefined 'in the Constitu-
tion, uncertain as to their limits, and therefore subject to va-
rious interpretations.
1 Constitution, Art. II, Sec. 1.
2 Ibid., Art. I, Sec. 1.
s Ibid., Art. Ill, Sec. 2.
11
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The article dealing with the Executive has therefore been char-
acterized as "the most defective part of the Constitution," its
loose and general expressions enabling the President, by impli-
cation and construction, "either to neglect his duties or to en-
large his powers.
" * A distinguished historian says that while
our Constitution in the main is of the rigid type, its flexible char-
acter is shown in the provisions conferring the powers and de-
fining the duties of the Executive. "Everything is clearly stat-
ed, but the statements do not go beyond the elementary.
' '
Point-
ing out that while the Constitution did not authorize certain
of Lincoln's acts, neither did it expressly forbid them, he holds
that there is ' ' room for inference, a chance for development, and
an opportunity for a strong man to imprint his character upon
the office. ' ' 5 Somewhat the same idea was expressed by Presi-
dent Wilson some years ago when he wrote: "The President
is at liberty, both in law and conscience, to be as big a man as
he can. His capacity will set the limit.
' ' 6
A doctrine of constitutional construction the so-called Wil-
son-Eoosevelt doctrine with regard to the control of matters
within the "twilight zone" between the national and state jur-
isdictions 7 was translated by President Roosevelt into terms
of inherent executive power. He said: "The most important
factor in getting the right spirit in my Administration, next
to insistence upon courage, honesty, and a genuine democracy
of desire to serve the plain people, was my insistence upon the
theory that the executive power was limited only by specific
restrictions and prohibitions appearing in the Constitution or
imposed by Congress under its constitutional powers. My view
* View of Secretary of State Upshur. See his more extended state-
ment, quoted in Taft, Our Chief Magistrate and His Powers, 141.
e Rhodes, Historical Essays, 204, 214.
6 Constitutional Government in the United States, 70.
* First enunciated by James Wilson in 1785, recently advocated by
President Roosevelt, and stated as follows: "That when a subject has
been neither expressly excluded from the regulating power of the Feder-
al Government, nor expressly placed within the exclusive control of the
States, it may be regulated by Congress if it be, or become, a matter the
regulation of which is of general importance to the whole nation, and at
the same time a matter over which the States are, in practical fact, unable to
exercise the necessary controlling power.
' '
Willoughby, Constitutional Law,
I. 47.
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was that every executive officer in high position was a steward
of the people bound actively and affirmatively to do all he
could for the people, and not to content himself with the nega-
tive merit of keeping his talents undamaged in a napkin. I
declined to adopt the view that what was imperatively necessary
for the Nation could not be done by the President unless he
could find some specific authorization to do it. My belief was
that it was not only his right but his duty to do anything that
the needs of the Nation demanded unless such action was for-
bidden by the Constitution or by the laws. Under this inter-
pretation I did and caused to be done many things not pre-
viously done by the President and the heads of the departments.
I did not usurp power but did greatly broaden the use of execu-
tive power. In other words, I acted for the public welfare, I
acted for the common well being of all our people, whenever
and in whatever measure was necessary, unless prevented by
direct constitutional or legislative prohibition.
' ' 8
Roosevelt's theory of executive power is disputed, however,
by equally eminent authority. Senator Rayner, one of the
leading constitutional lawyers of his time, contended that the
clause dealing with the executive power relates simply to the
distribution of governmental functions, and should not be con-
sidered as a grant of power at all. 9 Professor Goodnow says that
the holder of executive power "is for the most part to exercise
the powers which have clearly been given to him by the Con-
stitution, and the Constitution itself is regarded as a grant of
power not otherwise possessed, rather than as a limitation of
power already in existence.
' ' 10
The Supreme Court has likewise not only repudiated the
Wilson-Roosevelt doctrine of constitutional construction as being
contrary to the 10th Amendment, 11 but it has also definitely re-
futed the Roosevelt theory of executive power. "We have no
officers in this government," says the Court, "from the Presi-
8 Roosevelt, Autobiography, 388-389.
a Speech in U. S. Senate, Jan. 31, 1907. Cong. Record, XLI, Pt. II
(59 Cong., 2 Sess.)', 2010.
10 Principles of Constitutional Government, 89.
11 Kansas v. Colorado, 206 U. S., 46, 89-90 (1907). The 10th Amend-
ment reads as follows: "The powers not delegated to the United States
by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the
States respectively, or to the people.
' '
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dent down to the most subordinate agent, who does not hold
office under the law, with prescribed duties and limited author-
ity."
12 It would therefore seem that ex-President Taft reflect-
ed the better opinion when he stated the true view of executive
power to be "that the President can exercise no power which
cannot be fairly and reasonably traced to some specific grant of
power or justly implied and included within such express grant
as proper and necessary to its exercise. Such specific grant must
be either in the Federal Constitution or in an Act of Congress
passed in pursuance thereof. There is no undefined residuum
of power which he can exercise because it seems to him to be
in the public interest .... The grants of Executive pow-
er are necessarily in general terms in order not to embarrass the
Executive within the field of action plainly marked for him,
but his jurisdiction must be justified and vindicated by affir-
mative constitutional or statutory provisions or it does not
exist." 13
Altho the weight of authority upholds the contention that
executive power in the United States is limited definitely to the
powers enumerated in the Constitution, or clearly implied there-
from, the interpretation of those enumerated powers is frequent-
ly such as to give to the President an extraordinary and prac-
tically undefined range of authority. Thus, for example, it
has been authoritatively held that the President, under his pow-
er "to take care that the laws be faithfully executed," may un-
dertake measures and exercise authority, for the enforcement
of the law or the protection of federal rights, not specifically
granted by Constitution or statute.14 Other of the President's
enumerated powers, such as his power as Commander-in-Chief
12 The Floyd Acceptances, 7 Wall., 666, 676 (1868).
is Our Chief Magistrate and His Powers, 139-140.
i*/n, re Neagle, 135 U. 8., 1, 63-64, 67 (1890). Cf. dissenting opinion,
which held that such enforcement or protection "must proceed not from
the President, but primarily from Congress," and that if Congress does
not pass laws in reference to such matters, "there is not the slight-
est legal necessity out of which to imply any such power in the Presi-
dent." Ibid., 82, 83. See also view of W. W. Willoughby: "The obli-
gation to take care that the laws of the United States are faithfully exe-
cuted, is an obligation which is to be fulfilled by the exercise of those
powers which the Constitution and Congress have seen fit to confer."
Constitutional Law, II, 1151.
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and his power to receive and send ambassadors and ministers,
are likewise subject to the same broad interpretation.
If the general conception of executive power in the United
States is somewhat vague and open to various interpretations,
that is especially true of the nature and extent of executive
power with regard to war. It has rightly been said that "the
domain of the executive power in time of war constitutes a sort
of 'dark continent' in our jurisprudence, the boundaries of which
are undetermined. ' ' 15
From the very beginning of our history as a nation, states-
men and commentators have held that since it is impossible to
foresee what may be the exigencies or circumstances endanger-
ing the public safety, therefore "no constitutional shackles can
wisely be imposed," and none are imposed upon the so-called
war powers.
16 They have held that there are two distinct classes
of powers under the Constitution the peace powers, which are
subject to the restrictions of the Constitution, and the war pow-
ers, which are limited only by the laws and usages of nations, 17
15 J. W. Garner, in Eevue du Droit Public et de la Science Politique,
XXXV, 13 (Jan.-Mar., 1918).
16 See argument of Hamilton, in The Federalist, No. 23 (Goldwin
Smith ed., pp. 119-120). Cf. Speech of Senator Sumner, in U. 8. Senate,
June 27, 1862 :
' '
Pray, Sir, where in the Constitution is any limitation of
the War Powers? Let Senators who would limit them mention a single
section, line, or phrase, which even hints at any limitation. . . . The War
Powers are derived from the Constitution, but, when once set in motion,
are without any restraint from the Constitution; so that what is done
in pursuance of them is at the same time under the Constitution and out-
side the Constitution. It is under the Constitution in the latitude with
which it is conducted; but, whether under the Constitution or outside the
Constitution, all that is done in pursuance of the War Powers is consti-
tutional. ' ' Works of Charles Sumner, VII, 131-132. See also Fisher, Trial
of the Constitution, 199.
" ' ' There are, then, in the authority of Congress and of the Execu-
tive, two classes of powers, altogether different in their nature and often
incompatible with each other the war power and the peace power. The
peace power is limited by regulations and restricted by provisions pre-
scribed within the Constitution itself. The war power is limited only
by the laws and usages of nations. This power is tremendous; it is strict-
ly constitutional, but it breaks down every barrier1 so anxiously erected
for the protection of liberty, of property and of life. . . The powers of
war are all regulated by the laws of nations, and are subject to no other
limitations. ' ' Speech of John Quincy Adams, in House of Representatives,
May 25, 1836. Cong. Debates, XII, Pt. IV (24 Cong., 1 Sess.), 4038, 4039.
16 WAR POWERS OF THE EXECUTIVE IN UNITED STATES [16
and under which the rights of peace may even be disregarded
or curtailed.18 They have asserted that the war power implies
the right to do anything that may seem necessary to carry on
the war successfully, even to the extent of performing otherwise
unconstitutional acts.19
These claims with regard to the extent of the war power have
also been sanctioned by the Supreme Court. Thus, in uphold-
ing the Confiscation Acts of the Civil War, the Court said :
' ' If
the statutes were not enacted under the municipal power of Con-
gress to legislate for the punishment of crimes against the sov-
ereignty of the United States; if, on the contrary, they are an
exercise of the war powers of the government, it is clear they
are not affected by the restrictions imposed by the 5th and 6th
Amendments. ... Of course the power to declare war
is ' ' But in bestowing upon the Government War Powers without limi-
tation, they [the makers of the Constitution] embodied in the Con-
stitution all the Eights of War as completely as if those rights had been
severally set down and enumerated; and among the first of these is the
right to disregard the Eights of Peace." Works of Charles Sumner,
VII, 136-137.
"It seems to be pretty well settled by the common sense of mankind
that when a nation is fighting for its existence it cannot be fettered by all
the legal technicalities which obtain in time of peace." Ehodes, Histor-
ical Essays, 214.
"What is the effect of our entering upon the war? The effect is that
we have surrendered and are obliged to surrender a great measure of that
liberty which you and I have been asserting in court during all our lives;
power over property, power over persons. This has to be vested in a
military commander in order to carry on war successfully." Speech of
Elihu Eoot at Saratoga Springs, Sept., 1917, quoted in Va. Law Rev.,
V, 179.
19 < < When the Constitution conferred upon Congress the right to
declare war, it by necessary implication conferred upon Congress the
right to do anything that in its judgment is necessary to carry that war
to a successful conclusion." Senator P. C. Knox, in U. S. Senate, May
29, 1917. Cong. Eeoord, 65 Cong., 1 Seas., 3276.
"I felt that measures otherwise unconstitutional might become law-
ful by becoming indispensable to the preservation of the Constitution
through the preservation of the nation." Letter of Lincoln to A. G.
Hodges, Apr. 4, 1864. Nicolay & Hay, Complete WorTcs of Abraham
Lincoln, II, 508.
"If the Union and the Government cannot be saved out of this terrible
shock of war constitutionally, a Union and a Government must be saved un-
constitutionally.
' '
Fisher, Trial of the Constitution, 199.
17] INTRODUCTION 17
involves the power to prosecute it by all means and in any man-
ner in which war may be legitimately prosecuted.
' ' 20 Even the
dissenting justices in this case admitted that legislation found-
ed upon the war power is subject to quite different considera-
tions from that based upon the municipal power of the govern-
ment, and "is subject to no limitations, except such as are im-
posed by the law of nations in the conduct of war . . . The
war powers of the government have no express limitations in
the Constitution, and the only limitation to which their exercise
is subject is the law of nations. ' ' 21 The same principle has also
been upheld by the Court in other cases.22
Tho authorities thus seem to agree regarding the nature
and unlimited extent of the "war powers" as such, the extent
to which the exercise of these war powers is vested in the Presi-
dent or in Congress is a matter of some dispute. For example,
Senator Browning, during the Civil War, asserted the complete
authority of the Executive in determining upon the measures
necessary to meet any war emergency, denying that Congress
had even coordinate power with the President in that respect.
"It is not true," he said, "that Congress may decide upon the
measures demanded by military necessities and order them to
be enforced. . . These necessities can be determined only by
the military commander, and to him the Constitution has in-
trusted the prerogative of judging of them. When the Constitu-
tion made the President ' Commander-in-Chief of the Army and
Navy of the United States,' it clothed him with the incidental
powers necessary to a full, faithful and sufficient performance
of the duties of that high office ; and to decide what are military
necessities, and to devise and execute the requisite measures to
meet them, is one of these incidents. It is not a legislative, but
an executive function, and Congress has nothing to do with it.
' ' 23
On the other hand, Senator Sumner disputed this claim to
executive power, and held that the exercise of the war powers
*o Hitter v. United States, 11 Wall., 268, 304-305 (1870).
21
Ibid., 315.
22 Stewart v. Kahn, 11 Wall., 493, 506-507 (1870); Mechanics and
Traders Bank v. Union Bank, 22 Wall., 276, 295 (1874); McCormick et
al. v. Humphrey, 27 Ind., 144, 154 (1866).
23 Speech in U. 8. Senate, June 25, 1862. Cong. Globe, 37 Cong., 2 Seas.,
2919, 2920, 2922.
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rested with Congress. "Of the pretension that all these enor-
mous powers belong to the President, and not to Congress, I
try to speak calmly and within bounds. I mean always to be
parliamentary. But a pretension so irrational and unconstitu-
tional
;
so absurd and tyrannical, is not entitled to respect. Such
a pretension would change the National Government from a
government of law to that of a military dictator . . .
" 24
As a matter of fact, the growth of executive power into a
practical dictatorship in time of war, does not seem to have been
especially feared in this country. During the Eevolution, at-
tempts were made, both in New York and Virginia, to create a
dictator, who in the latter state was to be "invested with every
power legislative, executive, and judiciary, civil and military,
of life and death over our persons and over our properties,
' ' 25
a proposal apparently approved by such a democrat as Patrick
Henry.
26
Washington was actually given the power of a dictator
on three separate occasions;
27
while Lincoln has been referred
to by impartial writers as exercising
' '
more arbitrary power than
any Englishman since Oliver Cromwell," and as one whose acts
were "worthy of a Tudor.
' ' 28
During the recent World War, the
necessity of making the President the supreme dictator in order
to win the war was seriously suggested in Congress.29
z* Speech in U. S. Senate, June 27, 1862. Worts of Charl&s Sumner,
VII, 139-140. But of. Sumner 's remarks in a speech at Boston, only a
few months later (Oct. 6): "In war there is no constitutional limit to
the activity of the executive, except the emergency. The safety of the
people is the highest law. There is no blow the President can strike;
there is nothing he can do against the> Rebellion, that is not constitution-
al. Only inaction can be unconstitutional." Ibid., 217.
25 Elliot 's Debates, II, 357-361; Writings of Thomas Jefferson, III,
231.
26 It was, however, bitterly opposed by Jefferson. Elliot's Debates,
III, 160; Writings of TJwmas Jefferson, III, 231.
27 See resolves of Dee. 27, 1776, Sept. 17 and Nov. 14, 1777. Jour. Cont.
Cong., VI, 1045-1046; VIII, 752; IX, 905. See also Elliot's Debates,
III, 79.
28 Rhodes, Historical Essays, 213; cf. Bryce, American Commonwealth,
I, 65-66, 72 ; Ford, Eise and Growth, of American Politics, 280.
29 Senator Harding (Ohio) made the suggestion in August, 1917:
"What the United States needs and what it must have if it is to win
the war is a supreme dictator, with sole control of and sole responsibility
for every phase of war activity, and this today means practically every
phase of Government. Not only does this country need such a dictator,
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That the President can of his own accord constitutionally as-
sume dictatorial power in time of war has been denied by the
courts as "an extravagant assumption ;
" 30
altho most au-
thorities hold that the war powers of the President constitute
a
" latent power of discretionary action" capable of almost un-
limited expansion in times of emergency and making the Presi-
dent practically absolute within a certain sphere of action.
31
The exact limits of this sphere of action for the President and
the line of demarcation between his war powers and those of
Congress, are difficult to determine. An attempt to draw such
a line and to delimit such a sphere of action was made in a fam-
ous case in the following language: "Congress has the power
not only to raise and support and govern armies, but to declare
war. It has, therefore, the power to provide by law for carrying
on war. This power necessarily extends to all legislation essen-
tial to the prosecution of war with vigor and success, except
such as interfere with the command of the forces and the conduct
of campaigns. That power and duty belong to the President as
Commander-in-Chief. Both these powers are derived from the
Constitution, but neither is defined by that instrument. Their
extent must be determined by their nature and by the principles
of our institutions. The power to make the necessary laws is in
Congress; the power to execute in the President. Both powers
imply many subordinate and auxilliary powers. Each includes
all authorities essential to its due exercise. But neither can the
President in war more than in peace, intrude upon the proper
authority of Congress, nor Congress upon the proper authority
of the President. Both are servants of the people, whose will
is expressed in the fundamental law.
' ' 32 Other authorities have
in my opinion it is sure to have one before the war goes much further. . .
The sooner it conies the better for all of us. ... For supreme dictator
at the present moment there is but one possible man, the President of the
United States." N. Y. Times, Feb. 10, 1918.
so Jones v. Seward, 40 Barb. (N. Y.), 563, 571 (1863).
31 Goodnow, Comparative Administrative Law, I, 32; Watson, On the
Constitution, II, 914; Baldwin, Modern Political Institutions, 91-92;
Channing, History of the United States, III, 513; W. A. Dunning, "The
War Power of the President," New Republic, XI, 76-79 (May 19, 1917).
For a somewhat extravagant claim as to the absolute nature of the Presi-
dent's war powers, see remarks of Senator Lewis, in U. S. Senate, June
30, 1917. Cong. Eecord, LV, Pt. 5 (65 Cong., 1 Sess.), 4552, 4553.
32 Ex parte Milligan, 4 Wall., 2, 139 (1866).
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attempted a briefer and simpler delimitation by saying that
"
Congress regulates whatever is of general and permanent im-
portance, while the President determines all matters temporary
and not general in their nature.
' ' 33
The main source of the President's war powers is of course
the Constitution. Besides certain powers relating directly to
war that are expressly conferred upon the President by that in-
strument,
34 other powers and duties are vested in him that may
have an important bearing on the conduct of war;
35 while still
other clauses of the Constitution not referring directly to the
President may by necessary implication add to his war powers. 36
Other. of the President's powers with regard to war are derived
from international law and practise, are conferred by statute,
or are established as a result of custom and usage. To define
more clearly these war powers of the President, to determine
their nature and source, and to discover the manner of their ex-
ercise, is the purpose of this study.
The most common forms through which the President in per-
son exercises his powers, are by proclamations and executive
orders, the former generally containing announcements and de-
cisions of the widest interest and broadest scope, the latter usual-
ly concerning matters not of such general interest. Either may
be issued as a result of express or implied statutory authoriza-
tion, or by virtue of the President's constitutional position as
Chief Executive. The great increase in the number of these
proclamations and executive orders issued in war time is also
an excellent indication of the growth of the war powers of the
Executive over his power in time of peace.
Other forms of presidential action include rules and regula-
tions issued under statutory authority or by virtue of the Presi-
dent 's constitutional power; directions, instructions, or orders
to heads of departments and other agencies; and decisions on
lie, National Administration of the United States, 33; of. Von
Hoist, Constitutional Law of the United States, 193.
s* Art II, Sec. 2, 01. 1 (commander-in-chief).
as Art I, Sec. 7, Cl. 2, 3 (sign and veto bills); Art II, Sec. 1, Cl. 8
(oath of office) ; Sec. 2, 01. 1 (power of pardon) ; Sec. 2, 01. 2 (power
with regard to foreign relations and appointment of officers) ; Sec. 3
(recommend measures, call special session, and execute the laws).
so Art. I, Sec. 9, 01. 2 (habeas corpus); Art IV, See. 4 (guaranty of
republican government and of protection).
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matters requiring his approval or coining to him through ap-
peals from the decisions of subordinate officials. Finally, the
commissioning of officers appointed by him with or without the
consent of the Senate, the recommendation of measures to Con-
gress, and the signing or vetoing of bills, may be included among
the means through which the President exercises his authority,
and which must be considered in connection with this study of
his powers.
37
Not all of the acts required of the President can possibly be
performed by him personally, and the courts have definitely
recognized that he may act through the heads of departments.
' ' The President speaks and acts through the heads of the several
departments in relation to subjects which appertain to their
respective duties," and the acts of the heads of departments are
"in legal contemplation the act of the President." 38
It has also been held that heads of departments may in turn
act through subordinate officials in the departments;39 but the
question as to how far this delegation of power may be carried
and still be considered the act of the President seems as yet to
be unsettled by the courts. It has been pointed out that most
orders and regulations are in fact prepared by subordinate of-
ficials in the several departments, altho issued in the name
of the head of the department or in the name of the President;
and also that in some cases, and especially during the recent war,
such orders and regulations have been issued by subordinate of-
ficials, acting by authority of the head of the department, in
matters where the statutes vested the power in the President.40
This practise, undoubtedly becoming more common, opens up a
vast new field for a study of the exercise of Presidential pow-
ers. Since, however, as has been suggested, it is still an open
question how far such exercise of authority by subordinate of-
ficials can be considered as the act of the President, this study
makes no attempt to include any exercise of power but by the
President himself, or for which he may clearly be immediately
responsible.
37 Cf. Fairlie, National Administration of ihe United States, 41-42.
as Wilcox v. Jackson, 13 Pet, 498, 513 (1839) ; United States v. Eliason,
16 Pet., 291 (1842).
39 United States v. Warfield, 170 Fed. Eep., 43 (1909).
40 J. A. Fairlie, in Michigan Law Bev., XVIII, 188 (Jan., 1920).

I. Powers Relating to the Beginning of War

CHAPTER II
CONTROL OF FOREIGN RELATIONS
The function of managing the foreign relations may be classi-
fied into two distinct branches: (1) the power of intercourse,
intercommunication, and negotiation; (2) the power of entering
into formal or binding international compacts. 1 The latter pow-
er is shared by the President with the Senate,2 but the former
belongs exclusively to the President.
' ' The President is the sole
organ of the nation in its external relations, and its sole repre-
sentative with foreign nations.
' ' 3
Altho diplomatic negotiations and intercourse are regular-
ly conducted through the Department of State, the acts of that
department are in legal contemplation the acts of the President,4
and, in fact, the Department of State has generally been recog-
nized as having a special status, as being more directly sub-
ject to the control of the President than any other department.
This was clearly set forth by Senator John C. Spooner in a
speech before the United States Senate on January 23, 1906,
when he said: "The act creating the Department of State in
1789, was an exception to the acts creating the other Depart-
ments of the Government. . . . It is a Department which
from the begining the Senate has never assumed the right to
direct or control, except as to clearly defined matters relating
to duty imposed by statute and not connected with the conduct
of our foreign relations. We direct all the other heads of De-
1 Pomeroy, Constitutional Law (Bennett's ed.), 564; Fairlie, National
Administration of the United States, 29-30.
2 Constitution, Art. II, Sec. 2, Cl. 2.
a John Marshall, in House of Eepresentatives, Mar. 7, 1800. Annals of
Cong., 6 Cong., 613; cf. Pomeroy, op. cit., 564; Corwin, The President's
Control of Foreign Relations, 33.
* Jones v. United States, 137 U. S., 202, 217 (1890) ; Crandall, Treaties:
Their Making and Enforcement (2nd ed.), 93.
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partments to transmit to the Senate designated papers or in-
formation. We do not address directions to the Secretary of
State. We direct requests to the real head of that Department,
the President of the United States, and, as a matter of courtesy,
we add the qualifying words, 'if in his judgment not incompat-
ible with the public interest.
' " 5
This control which the President exercises over our foreign
relations has, with regard to his war power, several principal
phases. In the first place, it gives the President the whole pow-
er of initiating and formulating the foreign policy of the govern-
ment, and virtually of committing the nation to its execution.
Jefferson expressed this idea in a letter to M. Genet, November
22, 1793: "He (the President) being the only channel of com-
munication between this country and foreign nations, it is from
him alone that foreign nations or their agents are to learn what
is or has been the will of the nation
;
and whatever he communi-
cates as such, they have the right, and are bound to consider as
the expression of the nation.
' ' 6 Ex-President Taft, referring
to the President's power of conducting the diplomatic corres-
pondence, expressed the same thought in the following words:
"He is bound in such correspondence to discuss the proper con-
struction of treaties. He must formulate the foreign policies
of our government. He must state our attitude upon questions
constantly arising. While strictly he may not bind our govern-
ment as a treaty would bind it, to a definition of its rights, still
in future discussions foreign Secretaries of other countries are
wont to look for support of their contentions to the declarations
and admissions of our Secretaries of State in other controversies
as in a sense binding upon us. There is thus much practical
framing of our foreign policies in the executive conduct of our
foreign relations.
' ' 7 President Wilson has put the case for the
President even more strongly :
' ' One of the greatest of the Presi-
dent 's powers (is) . . . his control, which is very absolute,
of the foreign relations of the nation. The initiative in foreign
affairs, which the President possesses without any restriction
whatever, is virtually the power to control them absolutely. The
e Cong. Record, 59 Cong., 1 Sess., 1420; cf. Ogg & Beard, National
Governments and the World War, 97.
Am. State Papers, For. Eel., I, 184.
7 Our Chief Magistrate and His Powers, 113.
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President cannot conclude a treaty with a foreign power without
the consent of the Senate, but he may guide every step of dip-
lomacy, and to guide diplomacy is to determine what treaties
must be made, if the faith and prestige of the government are
to be maintained. He need disclose no step of negotiation until
it is complete, and when in any critical matter it is completed
the government is virtually committed. Whatever its disinclina-
tion, the Senate may feel itself committed also.
' ' 8
This power of the President has also been definitely upheld by
the Supreme Court,9 and there can thus be no question as to his
right and power under ordinary circumstances to initiate and
formulate such diplomatic policies as he may deem proper, and
virtually commit Congress and the country to their execution.
It is also freely conceded by authorities that the Executive De-
partment, by means of this branch of its power over foreign re-
lations, "holds in its keeping the safety, welfare and even per-
manence of our internal and domestic institutions. ' ' 10 This
fact, that policies leading to disturbed relations with other pow-
ers and even endangering the peace and safety of the country
may be, and in fact have been, adopted at the will of the Execu-
tive, has led to considerable discussion as to the propriety of en-
trusting the sole responsibility for these matters to the President.
The question has been raised whether, in view of the power of
Congress to declare war, the President is under a constitutional
obligation not to formulate and prosecute such diplomatic pol-
icies as might incur the risk of war, or whether, in case grave
consequences are feared, he should not at least advise and con-
sult with Congress.
The idea that the President is under some such obligation has
been brought forward on several occasions. It was raised in
1826, when the proposal of President Adams to send representa-
tives to the Panama Congress11 aroused the opposition of such
senators as Hayne, Woodbury, White, Van Buren, and Benton,
s Constitutional Government, 77-78; See also President Wilson's let-
ter to Senator Fall, Dec. 8, 1919. Infra, 35-36; S. E. Baldwin, in Yale
Eev., IX, 407.
Foster v. Neilson, 2 Pet., 253, 309 (1829); Williams v. Suffolk In-
surance Company, 13 Pet., 415, 420 (1839).
10 Pomeroy, op. cit., 565.
11 Richardson, Messages and Papers of the Presidents, II, 318-320.
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largely on the ground that this Congress was to be really a con-
gress of belligerents, and that the United States, by taking part,
would compromise its neutrality, become involved in
' '
entangling
alliances," and incur the risk of war with Spain. 12 Their senti-
ments were expressed by Van Buren (later President), when he
said: "It is, then, the design of the Executive to enter into an
agreement at the Congress . . . that if the powers of Eur-
ope make common cause with Spain, or otherwise attempt the
subjugation of Spanish America, we shall unite with the latter,
and contribute our proportion to the means necessary to make
the resistance effectual; and further, that we shall bind our-
selves, at that Congress, as to the manner in which we shall re-
sist any attempts, by the European powers, to colonize any por-
tion of this continent." Such a proposal he characterized as
"a measure by which the the peace of the country is to be ex-
posed to a contingency beyond the control of our Government
by which the great question of peace or war will be taken from
the Representatives of the people by which, instead of re-
taining that freedom of action which we now possess, we shall
bind ourselves, in a certain event, to pursue a certain course,
whatever those, to whom the Government of the country may
have been committed, shall think the honor or interest of the
country may require." 13
In the House of Representatives there was likewise consider-
able opposition to the President's proposal on the same grounds.
Thus Mr. Rives spoke of the result of our participation in the
Congress as "most probably the adoption of measures endanger-
ing the future peace of the country,
' '
and of the President 's dec-
laration with regard to foreign interference in the affairs of
South America as "a conditional, or, to use a more diplomatic
phraseology, a provisional declaration of war ;
" 14
while Mr.
Hamilton remarked, "We have become, at the exclusive will
of the President, the arbitrator of the New World, and, in that
character, have sent bullying protests to the old. The Cabinet
has, in our name, made two solemn contracts, to go to war in two
contingencies, without,
'
as a matter of preliminary advisement,
'
even condescending to consult us.
" 15 Others spoke to the same
izBenton's Debates, VIII, 423, 425, 435, 436, 441, 446, 450, 462.
"/MA, 446-447.
i* Ibid., IX, 107, 111.
Ibid., 136.
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effect, and an attempt was even made to instruct the envoys to
the Congress by attaching conditions to the resolution provid-
ing for the mission.
16
These conditions were vigorously opposed in the House by
Webster and others as an invasion of the power of the President
to instruct ministers,
17 and were eventually voted down.18 There
was, however, considerable sentiment to the effect that while
there was no power in the House to issue instructions either to
the President or to ministers, still the House, through its power
of granting or refusing appropriations, might exercise a re-
straint upon foreign diplomatic intercourse a power which
should, however, be exercised only when the policy of the Execu-
tive was clearly tending to involve the country in war.19 Sena-
tor Johnston (of Louisiana) probably best summed up the posi-
tion of the President and his supporters when he said: "There
is nothing peculiar in the present case. The President has, at
all times, the power to commit the peace of the country, and
involve us in hostilities, as far as he has power in this case. To
him is confided all intercourse with foreign nations. To his dis-
cretion and responsibility is intrusted all our delicate and dif-
ficult relations: all negotiations and all treaties are conducted
and brought to issue by him.
' ' 20 Even Van Buren, who had
spoken against the mission, admitted that, no matter what ac-
tion the Senate or Congress might take, the President could still
constitutionally provide for such mission on his own author-
ity.
21
Whether or not the Panama mission of 1826 actually carried
with it the dangers attributed to it by its opponents may still
iBenton's Debates, IX, 91.
IT Ibid., 94-95, 101, 115, 150.
is Ibid., 217, 218.
i See, for example, remarks of Mr. Thompson. Ibid., 182.
20 Ibid., VIII, 439.
21 Ibid., 441.
' ' But though neither Congress nor the court may direct
the President in the discharge of his constitutional powers, yet either the
Senate or the House separately, or both concurrently, may pass resolutions
expressive of their desires in relation to questions of an international
character, and the President may give such resolutions any weight he
chooses, notwithstanding that they have no legal effect. Indeed, it is a part
of the President's discretion to pay heed to such resolutions or not, as he
elects." Corwin, The President's Control of Foreign Eelations, 40.
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be a matter of some dispute, but is of little consequence to this
study. The important point to be noted, on which both advo-
cates and opponents of the mission were agreed, is that, if it was
within the power of the President alone to decide upon a cer-
tain diplomatic policy, such as this mission, it was likewise
within his power, and his alone, to determine whether or not its
consequences might involve the peace and safety of the country.
The President having made his decision and carried out his
policy, Congress and the country would be committed to it, re-
gardless of consequences.
This power of the President has been demonstrated in actual
practise again and again. During a period of about twenty-five
years (1823-1849), the Cuban policy of the Executive was con-
sistently friendly to Spain and a guaranty of Spanish sover-
eignty; after the Mexican War that was changed to a policy
whose chief end was the acquisition of Cuba by the United
States, and in the development of which American diplomacy
has been characterized as "aggressive and intolerant;" while
during the period after the Civil War, it was again changed to a
policy of commercial and humanitarian interest, culminating
finally in actual intervention and war.22
President Grant's handling of the Virginius incident in 1873,
President Cleveland's of the Venzuelan affair of 1895, and Presi-
dent Wilson's of the Mexican situation throughout the entire
course of his administration, illustrate the power of the Presi-
dent both to bring on and to avert diplomatic crises.23 Mention
need only be made of such events as Washington's neutrality
22 Benton, International Law and Diplomacy of the Spanish-Ameri-
can War, 14-20; Rhodes, History of the United States, II, 350-354. See
message of President Cleveland to Congress, Dee. 7, 1896; and President
McKinley's statement of the grounds for intervention, in his message of
Apr. 11, 1898. Eichardson, op. cit., IX, 719-721; X, 147.
23 Rhodes, op. cit., VII, 29-36 ; Chadwick, Relations of the United
States and Spain: Diplomacy, 314-357. "In an hour, by this executive act
(Cleveland's action in the Venezuelan affair), we are brought face to face
with a question of war with the leading power in Europe, and the danger
of it passes away through a diplomatic correspondence, for the issue of
which the President was again alone responsible. The very ground of our
interference in this quarrel of Venezuela what was it but a doctrine
proclaimed, and indeed invented, by a President of the United States? The
Monroe Doctrine has laid down the law for our hemisphere, and it was the
single act of the executive department." Baldwin, Modern Political In-
stitutions, 105-106.
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policy, the Monroe Doctrine, the annexation of Texas, the Mexi-
can War, the Alabama Claims settlement, the acquisition of the
Panama Canal, the Big Stick doctrine, our entrance into the
war with Germany "all these, and many more," says Cor-
win, "must be set down to the credit of executive leadership in
the field of foreign relations.
' ' 24
It may therefore be asserted that the President, through his
control of diplomatic intercourse, holds in his keeping the peace
and safety of the United States, that he may initiate such dip-
lomatic policies and so conduct diplomatic negotiations as to
force the country into a war, "without any possibility of hin-
drance from Congress or the Senate.
' ' 25
A second phase of the President's control of foreign relations
that should be considered in this connection is his power to rec-
ognize the belligerency or independence of new states and gov-
ernments. This power of recognition is not expressly granted
by the Constitution, but is implied from the general power to
enter into diplomatic relations with foreign countries through
the making of treaties and the exchange of accredited envoys.26
It is not conferred in terms upon any one department of the
government, but is now generally conceded as belonging to the
Executive. 27 In practise, recognition has always been extended
as the exclusive act of the President.28
24 The President 's Control of Foreign Relations, 126 ; cf. Ford, Rise
and Growth of American Politics, 279, 280.
25 Fairlie, National Administration, 30 ; Pomeroy, Constitutional Law,
565.
26 Constitution, Art. II, Sec. 2, Cl. 2 ; Sec. 3 ; cf. Taft, Our Chief Mag-
istrate and His Powers, 112-113; Story, Commentaries on tlie Constitution,
II, 370-371. For a more extended discussion of this question, see an ar-
ticle by the writer, ' ' The Power of Recognition, ' ' in Am. Jour. Int. Law,
XIV, 519-539 (Oct., 1920).
27 In several cases the courts have declared the power of recognition
to be vested in the ' ' political department
' ' of the government, without
indicating clearly whether the executive or legislative department, or both,
was meant. Rose v. Himely, 4 Cr., 241 (1801) ; Gelston v. Hoyt, 3 Wheat.,
246, 324 (1818); Foster v. Neilson, 2 Pet., 253, 307 (1829); Jones v.
United States, 137 U. S., 202, 212 (1890). However, in other cases, both
the language and tone of the decisions are such as to show that the exe-
cutive department is meant. United States v. Hutchings, 2 Wheeler 's Crim-
inal Cases, 543, cited in Sen. Doc. No. 56, 54 Cong., 2 Sess., 24; Williams
v. Suffolk Insurance Company, 13 Pet., 415, 420 (1839) ; Eennett v. Cham-
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New states generally come into existence by breaking off from
an actually existing state, and altho recognition even in such
cases is
"
a normal act, quite compatible with the maintenance of
peaceful intercourse with the mother-country," provided the
new community has actually won its contest and successfully
maintained its independence and separate existence,29 author-
ities agree that premature recognition is a wrong done to the
parent state, that it amounts to an act of intervention, and may
properly be considered by the parent state as a cause for war.30
Through the exercise of this power the President is thus upon
occasion enabled to determine the question of peace or war for
the United States.
l>ers, 14. How., 38, 46, 50-51 (1852); United States v. Trumbull, 48 Fed.
Eep., 99, 104 (1891) ; The Stata, 56 Fed. Eep., 505, 510 (1893).
See also Senate Document No. 56, 54 Cong., 2 Sess., containing a report
of the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, presented to the Senate Jan.
11, 1897, in which, after an exhaustive investigation into the whole sub-
ject of recognition, it was held that the power of recognition rested prop-
erly with the President. In 1864, the Mexican situation brought about
the passage of a House resolution declaring that
' '
Congress has a con-
stitutional right to an authoritative voice in declaring and prescribing the
foreign policy of the United States, as well in the recognition of foreign
powers as in other matters ;
' ' and in 1896, a concurrent resolution was
passed recognizing a state of war in Cuba and offering the good offices of
the United States for the recognition of Cuban independence. These reso-
lutions were ignored by Presidents Lincoln and Cleveland, respectively, on
the ground that recognition was a matter for the Executive alone. Cong.
Globe, XXXV, Pt. I, 65, 67; LatanS, America as a World Power, 9.
The joint resolution of 1898 authorizing intervention in Cuba, declared
"That the people of the island of Cuba are, and of right ought to be,
free and independent ; ' ' but authorities hold that this is a mere state-
ment of policy and not to be regarded as a claim by Congress to the pow-
er of recognition. Benton, International Laiv and Diplomacy of the Span-
ish-American War, 99; Corwin, The President's Control of Foreign Eela-
tions, 80-81.
Senator King (Utah) proposed a Senate resolution, May 23, 1919, for the
recognition of the Omsk government of Eussia, which seems to have been
buried in committee. Cong. Record, 66 Cong., 1 Sess. (May 23, 1919), 154.
28 For the manner in which recognition has been extended to other
countries by the United States, see Senate Document No. 40, 54 Cong., 2
Sess.
z Lawrence, Principles of International Law (6th ed.), 88.
so Ibid.; Hall, International Law (6th ed.), 83; Moore's Digest of
International Law, I, 73.
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The serious responsibility thus resting upon the President
has been recognized on several occasions. When the South
American provinces were clamoring for recognition in 1817,
President Monroe, altho sympathetic with their aspirations,
evidently feared possible complications with Spain,31 and in
spite of pressure from Clay and his following in Congress,32 de-
clined to recognize these new states until he was satisfied that
Spain would not resent the act with war.33
President Jackson, curiously enough, was likewise extremely
cautious about arousing the hostility of Mexico through a pre-
mature recognition of Texas, declined to receive the Texan com-
missioners sent to Washington in March, 1836, to ask for rec-
ognition,
34 and apparently was unwilling to take the sole re-
sponsibility in cases involving possible international complica-
tions. Eeferring to the Texas situation in his message of De-
cember 21, 1836, he spoke of the acknowledgment of a new state
as independent as "at all times an act of great delicacy and re-
sponsibility, but more especially so when such state has forcibly
separated from another of which it had formed an integral part
and which still claims dominion over it. A premature recognition
under these circumstances, if not looked upon as a justifiable
cause of war, is always liable to be regarded as proof of an un-
friendly spirit to one of the contending parties." He therefore
si See memorandum of questions submitted to his Cabinet, Oct. 25, 1817.
Writings of James Monroe, VI, 31.
82 Clay in 1817 mounted what John Quincy Adams called "his South
American great horse," and by means of resolutions proposed by himself
and his followers, kept the question of recognition of these provinces con-
stantly before Congress from 1818 to 1822, in an effort to force the hand
of the President. Memoirs of John Quincy Adams, IV, 28; Annals of
Cong., 15 Cong., 1 Sess., II, 1468, 1569, 1646, 1652, 1655; i~bid., 16 Cong.,
1 Sess., II, 2223, 2229-2230; 2 Sess., 1071, 1077, 1081, 1091-1092; ibid.,
17 Cong., 1 Sess., I, 854, 982.
sa ' < The delay which has been observed in making a decision on this
important subject will, it is presumed, have afforded an unequivocal proof
to Spain, as it must have done to other powers, of the high respect enter-
tained by the United States for her rights and of their determination not to
interfere with them. . . It may be presumed that the successful progress of
the revolution through such a long series of years. . . will reconcile the parent
country to an acommodation with them on the basis of their unqualified inde-
pendence.
"
Message to Congress, Mar. 8, 1822. Eichardson, op. cit., II,
116-118.
34 Beeves, American Diplomacy under Tyler and Polk, 78.
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announced that he considered it "with the spirit of the Con-
stitution and most safe," that the power of recognition, when
probably leading to war, should be exercised "with a previous
understanding with that body by whom alone war can be de-
clared, and by whom all provision for sustaining its perils must be
furnished. ' ' 35
The Senate Committee on Foreign Kelations, in its report
of January 11, 1897, already mentioned,
36 altho strongly up-
holding the President's right to the power of recognition, em-
phasized also the dangers involved in the exercise of that power,
since the older nation might regard such recognition as a cause
of war. The question whether a nation should recognize an-
other, and thus risk going to war with a third, was stated to be
largely a question of expediency, of which the Executive was
the best qualified to judge, tho it was added that "if recogni-
tion of such independence is liable to become a casus belli with
some foreign power, .... it is most advisable as well
as proper for the Executive first to consult the legislative branch
as to its wishes and postpone its own action if not assured of
legislative approval. If, on the other hand, the Executive did
not consider that the time had arrived to act, expressions of
opinion by the legislature should be made with some caution."
It seems therefore to be the general consensus of opinion that,
while the power of recognition belongs properly to the President,
it is a power that may easily involve serious complications with
foreign nations, and in such cases should be exercised with due
regard for the wishes of that branch of the government whose
function it is to declare war. It should be noted, however, that
any action of Congress would be merely advisory, that the whole
power rests with the President alone. "It is the proper prov-
ince of the Executive to refuse to be guided by a resolution on
the part of the legislature, if, in his judgment, to do so would
be unwise. The legislature may express its wishes or opinions,
but may not command.
' ' 37
ss Eichardson, op. cit., Ill, 266-267.
so Senate Document No. 56, 54 Cong., 2 Sess., 2.
37 Willoughby, Constitutional Law, I, 462 ; cf. Corwin, op. cit., 82. "It is
not, indeed, a power likely to be abused, though it is pregnant with conse-
quences often involving the question of peace or war. And, in our own short
experience, the revolutions in France, and the revolutions in South America,
have already placed us in situations to feel its critical character, and the
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From his power to receive and send accredited envoys, the
President also derives the power to withdraw the diplomatic
representatives of the United States at his pleasure, or dismiss
those of foreign powers, and thus sever all relations with any
particular country a power which a distinguished authority
has said "may be so exercised as to produce most momentous
results." 38
This power to sever diplomatic relations is a power that has
always been considered as peculiarly within the province of the
President, and until very recently no attempt was ever made
by Congress to assert any authority in that respect. However,
the unsettled condition of affairs in Mexico, and the opinion of
some people that President Wilson was being too patient in his
handling of Mexican affairs, led to the introduction by Senator
Fall (New Mexico), on December 3, 1919, of a concurrent reso-
lution requesting the President to withdraw recognition from
the Carranza Government and "to sever all diplomatic relations
now existing between this Government and the pretended Gov-
ernment of Carranza. ' ' 39
Tho this resolution clearly went oeyond the traditional
view that the President alone has the entire responsibility for
deciding whether or not diplomatic relations should at any time
be severed, there seemed to be a disposition on the part of the
Foreign Relations Committee of the Senate to recommend it
favorably and push it to a vote. President Wilson, however,
in a letter of December 8, 1919, to Senator Fall, vigorously as-
serted the power and responsibility of the Executive in this mat-
ter, expressing himself as follows: "I should be gravely con-
cerned to see any such resolution pass the Congress. It would
constitute a reversal of our constitutional practice, which might
necessity of having at the head of the government an executive of sober
judgment, enlightened views, and firm and exalted patriotism. ' ' Story, Com-
mentaries, II, 371.
SB Burgess, Political Science and Comparative Constitutional Law, II, 251.
Hamilton did not seem to appreciate the tremendous possibilities in the ex-
ercise of this power, especially to receive ministers, for he passed it by with
this brief comment: "This, though it has been a rich theme of declamation,
is more a matter of dignity than of authority. It is a circumstance which will
be without consequence in the administration of the government.
' ' The Fed-
eralist, No. 68 (Goldwin Smith ed., pp. 383-384).
39 See text of resolution in N. Y. Times, Dec. 4, 1919.
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lead to very great confusion in regard to the guidance of our
foreign affairs. I am convinced that I am supported by every
competent constitutional authority in the statement that the
initiative in directing the relations of our Government with
foreign Governments is assigned by the Constitution to the
Executive, and to the Executive only. Only one of the Houses
of Congress is associated with the President by the Constitution
in an advisory capacity, and the advice of the Senate is provided
for only when sought by the Executive in regard to explicit
agreements with foreign Governments and the appointment of
diplomatic representatives who are to speak for this Govern-
ment at foreign capitals. The only safe course, I am confident,
is to adhere to the prescribed method of the Constitution. We
might go very far afield if we departed from it.
' ' 40
Upon receipt of this letter, Senator Lodge, chairman of the
Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, immediately announced
that the committee would not push the Fall resolution, but would
leave the entire responsibility for the Mexican situation with the
President, thus virtually acknowledging the soundness of the
President 's position. 41
The breaking of diplomatic relations, while not in itself an act
of war, and not necessarily resulting in war, is meant to be a
marked protest and generally does lead to war.42 President Wil-
son thus understood very well, as did the whole country, that his
action, on February 3, 1917, in dismissing the German ambassa-
. T. Times, Dec. 9, 1919.
41 ' ' Of course the committee will do nothing now. The President de-
sires complete responsibility for the Mexican situation to rest on him. Let it
rest there. We desired only to assist him ; he does not wish us to do so. He
does not even allow us to express our support or make a suggestion. The
committee will not again consider the resolution. We are through. ' ' State-
ment of Senator Lodge. N. T. Times, Dec. 9, 1919.
42 See T. S. Woolsey, "The Beginning of War," Proc. Am. Pol Soi.
Assn., I, 54-68, esp. 57-60.
Diplomatic relations with Brazil were severed in 1827 and with Mex-
ico in 1858, but in each case were very shortly restored without any in-
tervening complications; with Mexico they were broken off also in 1836,
and continued broken for three years, without war ; relations between
Turkey and the United States were severed Apr. 20, 1917, but war was
never declared between the two countries. Beeves, American Diplomacy
under Taylor and Polk, 76; Moore's Digest, VII, 103-105; N. Y. Times
Current Hist. Mag., VI, 437.
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dor to the United States and recalling Ambassador Gerard from
Berlin, was very likely the first step towards actual war, al-
tho in his address to Congress on that date he expressed him-
self as hopeful that further complications might be avoided.43
Finally, the President may to a considerable extent determine
questions relating to the peace of the United States through his
power to enter into so-called executive agreements with other
powers. The Constitution requires that treaties can only be made
by the President by and with the advice and consent of the Sen-
ate,
44 but "treaties" by no means include every sort of interna-
tional arrangement entered into. Agreements of various sorts,
some concerning only minor and routine matter, others on mat-
ters of considerable importance and delicacy, are frequently
made by the President without the knowledge or consent of the
Senate, and are by long practise considered to be within the
range of his authority.
45 Such agreements, altho not a part
of the "supreme law of the land," as are treaties, nevertheless
are considered binding upon the administration making them,
but not upon succeeding administrations.
46 As a matter of fact,
most of these agreements covering matters of any considerable
importance have been respected by the successors of those mak-
ing them, and have by general consent come to have the effect of
a settled law.
Such executive agreements take the various forms of a protocol,
a modus vivendi, an exchange of notes or memoranda, or a mere
"gentlemen's agreement," and are entered into by the Presi-
dent by virtue of his power as Commander-in-Chief or of his
diplomatic powers.
47 As an example of executive agreements
based upon the first class of powers may be mentioned the agree-
ment of 1817 with Great Britain for the limitation of naval
armaments on the Great Lakes.
This agreement was brought about by an exchange of notes
43 gee text of address in McKinley, Collected Materials for the Study
of the War (1st ed.), 11-12.
44 Art. II, Sec. 2, 01. 2.
45 J. B. Moore, in Pol. Sci. Quar., XX, 388-390; Ogg & Beard, Na-
tional Governments and the World War, 102.
46 Butler, The Treaty-Making Power of the United States, II, 370;
Angarica v. Bayard, 127 U. S., 251, 261 (1888).
47 Corwin. The President's Control of Foreign Eelations, 116.
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between the British minister at "Washington (Mr. Bagot) and the
Acting Secretary of State (Mr. Rush), and provided that neither
party should keep in service on Lakes Champlain and Ontario
more than one, and on Lake Erie and the upper lakes more than
two armed vessels, none of these to be armed with more than one
cannon, and all other armed vessels of both parties to be dis-
mantled. 48 Altho President Monroe nearly a year later submit-
ted the arrangement to the Senate for its approval,
49 this action
was merely perfunctory, since the agreement had become ef-
fective immediately after the date of the original exchange of
notes (April 28-29, 1817), through orders issued by the Secretary
of the Navy to the naval officers commanding on the Great
Lakes. 50 The arrangement was definitely undertaken as a meas-
ure to preserve the peace between the two countries,51 and re-
mains to this day as a striking example of what may be done
towards that end by purely Executive action.
Another agreement between these two countries of somewhat
similar import with respect to armament was entered into by
means of a protocol signed at London, December 9, 1850, by the
United States minister (Abbott Lawrence) and Lord Palmer-
ston, under which the British government ceded Horseshoe Keef
in Lake Erie to the United States, the latter agreeing to erect a
48 Am. State Papers, For. Eel, IV, 205-206.
49 Message to the Senate, Apr. 6, 1818. Ibid., 202. John Quincy Adams
says on Jan. 14, 1818, that the President did not think it necessary
to communicate the arrangement to Congress. Memoirs, IV, 41. The
Senate gave its approval Apr. 16, 1818, following which the President
issued a formal proclamation April 28, announcing that the agreement
was in effect. Am. State Papers, For. Eel., IV, 207.
eo The terms of the agreement were communicated by Mr. Bush to
Secretary of the Navy Crowninshield on Apr. 30, 1817, and the necessary
orders were issued by the latter May 2. Ibid., 206-207.
5i "The President (Madison), being satisfied that, if each nation
should maintain on the lakes a naval force, it would expose both to con-
siderable and useless expense, while it would multiply the risks of col-
lision between them, instructed Mr. Adams, shortly after the peace, to
make the proposals. . .in the hope that it might be carried into immediate
effect." Monroe to Bagot, Aug. 2, 1816. Ibid., 203. "This arrange-
ment for mutual disarmament on the lakes has undoubtedly been the great-
est single factor in the continuance of peaceful relations between the
United States and Great Britain during the last one hundred years."'
Updyke, Diplomacy of the War of 1812, 465-466.
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light-house but to maintain no fortifications. The agreement
was ratified by an exchange of notes in London, February 10,
1851, with no formal ratification on the part of either country,
and the light-house was erected in 1856 upon the appropriation
of the necessary funds by Congress.52
In 1859 a dispute between the United States and Great Britain
over the island of San Juan off the Pacific coast, which threat-
ened to cause serious difficulty between the two countries, was
settled by an agreement, reached through an exchange of notes,
for joint military occupation of the island.53 This arrangement
which continued until the entire island was given over to the
United States under an arbitral decision in 1873, was upheld by
the courts as a proper exercise of Executive authority, even to
the extent of modifying, in the interest of peace, existing sta-
tutes for the government of the disputed territory.54
Perhaps the most remarkable exercise of the President's power
to make international agreements without the consent of the
Senate, by virtue of his authority as Commander-in-Chief, is
the protocol concluded September 7, 1901, between China and
the Allied Powers that had intervened during the Boxer upris-
ing. This protocol required reparation for the murder of the
German minister, and punishment of the principal authors of
the outrages committed against foreigners during the uprising;
prohibited to China the importation of arms and ammunition or
of materials used exclusively for their manufacture; demand-
ed an indemnity of 450,000,000 taels; constituted an extrater-
ritorial quarter for the foreign legations in Peking; permitted
temporary occupation by the Powers of certain strategic points ;
62 J. B. Moore, in Pol. Sci. Quar., XX, 390.
ss Crandall, Treaties: Thevr Making and Enforcement, 106; Foster, Prac-
tice of Diplomacy, 321.
r, i ' < The power to make and enforce such a temporary convention
respecting its own territory is a necessary incident to every national gov-
ernment, and adheres where the executive power is vested. . . This par-
ticular convention should be allowed to modify for the time being the
operation of the organic act of this Territory, so far forth as to exclude
to the extent demanded by the political branch of the government of the
United States, in the interest of peace, all territorial interference in the
government of that island." Watts v. United States, 1 Wash. Terr., 288,
294 (1870), quoted in Crandall, op. tit., 106-107.
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and required numerous undertakings on the part of China, es-
pecially with regard to the conduct of her foreign relations.
55
This protocol was signed on the part of the United States by
W. W. Kockhill, whose appointment as special commissioner to
China had not been submitted to the Senate
;
it went into effect
without any further ratification, the whole matter thus being
carried on and concluded by authority of the Executive alone.
It is now authoritatively recognized that the President, with-
out legislative authority, but solely by virtue of his powers as
Commander-in-Chief, may permit or refuse the entry of foreign
troops into the United States.
56 By virtue of the same authority,
arrangements were made with Mexico in 1882, through an ex-
change of notes, for the reciprocal passage of troops across the
border in pursuit of hostile Indians. It is worthy of note that
the Mexican Executive was distinctly authorized by the Mexican
Senate to permit such crossing of troops, while in the United
States the terms of the agreement were referred, not to the Sen-
ate, but to the General of the Army, and approved by him and
the Secretary of War. 57 These arrangements were renewed at
various times,
58 and form the basis for the attempted agreements
of like nature during the border troubles in 1916.59 A similar
65 See text of protocol in For. Eel. 1901, App., 312-318. Foster calls
this
"probably the broadest exercise of executive authority in foreign
matters without the concurrence of the Senate." Practice of Diplomacy,
318.
ee Tucker v. Alexandra/, 183 U. S., 424, 435 (1902). Cf. Washington's
refusal to permit British troops to cross United States territory in 1790,
and the opinions of his Cabinet on the question. Writings of George
Washington, XI, 497, n. ; Writings of Thomas Jefferson, V, 238-239 ; Works
of Alexander Hamilton, IV, 20-49; Life and Works of John Adams, VIII,
497-500.
57 For. Bel. 1882, 396-397, 405, 419-426. The memorandum signed by
Secretary Frelinghuysen and Minister Eomero stated that since the Mexi-
can Senate had authorized the President of Mexico to allow the passing
of Mexican troops into the United States and of United States troops into
Mexico, "and the Constitution of the United States empowers the Presi-
dent of the United States to allow the passag6 without the consent of the
Senate, this agreement does not require the sanction of the Senate of either
country, and will begin to take effect twenty days after this date
(July 29, 1882)."
88 June 28, 1883; Oct. 31, 1884; Oct. 16, 1885; June 25, 1890; Nov.
25, 1892; June 4, 1896.
59 N. Y. Times Current Hist. Mag., IV, 403, 616, 618-619, 627.
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arrangement with Great Britain for the reciprocal crossing of
the Canadian boundary was proposed by Secretary Frelinghuy-
sen in 1883, but was rejected by Canada on the ground that it
involved the "risk of complications worse than that of Indian
raids." 60
Among executive agreements entered into by virtue of the
President 's diplomatic powers, and dealing with matters causing
considerable dispute, difficulty, and possible complications, may
be mentioned an agreement of 1885 with Great Britain, reached
by an exchange of memoranda, with regard to the fisheries
question ;
61 a modus vivendi with the same country in 1899 fix-
ing a provisional boundary between Alaska and Canada;62 the
protocol of 1873 settling the Virginius affair with Spain ;63 Sec-
retary of War Taft's adjustment of the boundaries of the
Panama Canal Zone
;
64 and the Root-Takahira and Lansing-
Ishii agreements of 1907 and 1917, respectively.65
The action of President Roosevelt in 1905 with regard to
e See report of the Indian Commissioner for the Northwest Territories
(Canada). For. Eel. 188S, 528.
ei For. Eel. 1885, 460-469.
' ' This agreement proceeds from the mu-
tual good-will of the two governments, and has been reached solely to
avoid all misunderstandings and difficulties which might otherwise anse
from the abrupt termination of the fishing of 1885 in the midst of the
season." Statement of Secretary Bayard. Ibid., 460.
62 For. Eel. 1899, 328-330.
esCrandall, op. cit., 107-108.
6* " I had no power to make a treaty with Panama, but I did have,
with the authority of the President, the right to make rules equivalent
to law in the Zone. I therefore issued an order directing the carrying
out of the plan agreed upon, in so far as it was necessary to carry it out
on our side of the line, on condition that, and as long as, the regulations
to be made by Panama were enforced by that government. This was ap-
proved by Secretary Hay and the President, and has constituted down
until the present day, I believe, the basis upon which the two govern-
ments are carried on in this close proximity. It was attacked vigorously
in the Senate as a usurpation of the treaty-making power, and I was
summoned before a committee in the Senate to justify what had been
done. There was a great deal of eloquence over this usurpation by Mr.
Morgan and other Senators, but the modus vivendi continued as the
practical agreement between the nations for certainly more than seven
years, and my impression is that it is still in force in most of its pro-
visions." Taft, Our Chief Magistrate and his Powers, 111-112.
as for. Eel. 1908, 510-512; Am. Jour. Int. Law, XII, Supp., 1-3.
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Santo Domingo is especially noteworthy in this connection, in
that a treaty was first negotiated providing that the United
States should guarantee the integrity of that country, take
charge of its customs, and settle its obligations; and when this
treaty failed of ratification in the Senate, President Roosevelt
nevertheless put its terms into effect through a modus vivendi.
For two years the affairs of that island were administered under
the sole authority of this executive agreement, until in 1907 the
Senate yielded and ratified a slightly revised treaty.68
The President is thus enabled, through his power of entering
into these executive agreements which do not require the sanc-
tion of the Senate, to assume complete responsibility for the
handling of matters of almost every variety in the field of
foreign relations, many of which involve complications and deli-
cate questions that might, easily affect the peace and safety of
the United States.
66 Latane, America as a World Power, 280-281 ; J. B. Moore, in PoL
Sci. Quar., XX, 386-387; Roosevelt, Autobiography, 551-552.
CHAPTER III
MILITARY MEASURES SHORT OF WAR
By virtue of his position as Commander-in-Chief, as well as
by authority of other constitutional and statutory provisions, the
President may undertake numerous military measures that are
short of actual war. In the first place, there are many instances
in which he may employ the armed forces to aid the civil au-
thorities within the United States. Thus, for example, the con-
stitutional clause guaranteeing to every state a republican form
of government and protection against domestic violence,1 is held
to give the President power to use troops, without special legis-
lative sanction, when needed for those purposes, and even to an-
ticipate and prevent local disturbances by a show of force. 2
In 1878 an attempt was made to restrict the President 's power
to use the armed forces in executing the laws of the United
States through an act of Congress forbidding the employment of
the army as a posse comitatus, except as expressly authorized by
the Constitution or by statute. 3 It has been held, however, in
spite of that statute, that the provisions of the Constitution vest-
ing the President with the executive power and making it his
duty to
' ' take care that the laws be faithfully executed,
' ' 4
must be construed as giving to the President the general power
of enforcing the laws and the "peace of the United States" by
any means that he may find necessary. 5
' '
Congress may, by dis-
1 Art. IV, Sec. 4.
2 Lieber, The Use of the Army in Aid of the Civil Power, 30-37,45;
Winthrop, Abridgment of Military Law, (2nd ed.), 336-337. Cf. the send-
ing of troops under Gen. Wood to Gary in 1919 to prevent disorder dur-
ing the steel strike.
3 Act of June 18, 1878. 20 Stat. at L., 145, 152 (Sec. 15).
* Art II, Sec. 1, Cl. 1 ; Sec. 3.
5 Lieber, op. tit., 14, 37, 40, 55; Ex parte Siebold, 100 U. 8., 371,
394-395 (1879); In re Neagle, 135 U. S., 1, 63-64, 67, 69 (1890). Cf.
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banding the Army, render it impossible for the President to
resort to his constitutional power as executive and commander-
in-chief of employing the Army in aid of the civil power, in the
execution of the laws, or may couple an appropriation for the
support of the Army with a condition as to the use of the
money appropriated ; but, if it be true that the Constitution di-
rectly vests the President with (this) duty and power . . .
Congress cannot make the exercise of such power illegal. It may
prevent its exercise, but it cannot make it illegal.
' ' 6
These constitutional powers are also reinforced by statutory
authorization to use the armed forces in aid of the civil power in
several specific instances. Thus the President is expressly em-
powered to employ the land or naval forces to such extent as
may be necessary for the protection of civil rights ; for carrying
out the guarantees to the Indians; for the preservation of the
public lands and forests; and for the enforcement of the laws
with respect to quarantine, extradition, and neutrality. 7
In none of these instances should the exercise of his powers
by the President cause any difficulties or complications with
foreign nations, except in the case of the enforcement of the neu-
trality laws of the United States. In this connection, mention
need only be made of such incidents as Washington's famous
neutrality proclamation of 1793,
8 the Fenian invasion of Canada
President Cleveland's use of troops in Chicago during the railroad strike
of 1894, over the protest of Gov. Altgeld.
6 Lieber, op. tit., 56-57. See also opinions of ex-Attorney General
Miller and Senator Edmunds. Ibid., 15 n., 43; cf. Pomeroy, Constitution-
al Law (Bennett ed.), 537-538.
iU. S. Rev. Stats., Sees. 1984, 1989; 2118, 2147, 2150-2152; 2460,
5596; 4792, 5275; 23 Stat. at L., 322; 31 ibid., 618; 35 ibid., 1088,
1089. These are conveniently listed in Army Regulations (ed. 1917),
106-109.
8 The first neutrality law of the United States was not passed until
1794, hence Washington's proclamation was based not on statutory au-
thority, but on the obligations of neutrality as defined in the law of
nations. Writings of George Washington, XII, 281-282. Cf. with Wilson's
proclamations of neutrality in 1914. U. S. Stats., 63 Cong., 2 Sess., Pt.
2, Procs., 62 ff. The right of the President to commit the country to a
policy of neutrality wa's vigorously condemned and defended by Madison
and Hamilton, respectively, in the famous Helvidius and Pacificus letters.
For pertinent extracts of these letters, as well as for comment upon them,
see Corwin, The President's Control of Foreign Relations, ch. 1.
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in 1866,
9 the numerous filibustering expeditions against Cuba
and other countries,10 and the strong feeling of the Central Pow-
ers against the manner in which the neutrality of the United
States was enforced during the the first years of the recent
World "War, to indicate the delicate nature of the President's
responsibility in this regard, and the possible international com-
plications that may result.11
The President has also been empowered on some occasions,
and on other occasions has exercised the power without specific
authority, to undertake military measures for the protection of
the so-called ''inchoate" interests of the United States meas-
ures that involve a considerable interference with the rights of
other nations and are therefore fraught with serious possibilities.
As early as January 15, 1811, a resolution of Congress asserted
the peculiar interest of the United States in the Spanish province
of Florida and declared, "That the United States, under the
peculiar circumstances of the existing crisis, cannot, without
serious inquietude, see any part of the said territory pass into the
hands of a foreign Power; and that a due regard to their own
safety compels them to provide, under certain contingencies,
for the temporary occupation of the said territory ; they, at the
same time, declare that the said territory shall, in their hands,
remain subject to future negotiation. ' '
Following out the sentiment of this resolution, an act of the
same date authorized the President, by means of the military
and naval forces, to take possession of, hold, and occupy the terri-
For an excellent account of this incident, together with the compli-
cations it involved, see Oberholtzer, History of the United States since
the Civil War, I, 524-537, esp. 528, 532, 534-535.
10 Latane, America as a World Power, 8-9 ; Chadwick, Relations of the
United States and Spain: Diplomacy, 411-426; Smith, Parties and Slav-
ery, 251-256.
11 President Polk in 1848 found it difficult to reconcile his frank
sympathy for the Irish with his duty to enforce the neutrality laws against
American citizens aiding the Irish revolt, and when called upon by the
British government to act, hesitated in the hope that the issue might be
evaded. With regard to the expedition of the so-called ' ' Buffalo Hunt-
ers" against Mexico in the same year, he had no such qualms, but im-
mediately sent instructions to Gen. Taylor to use such military force as
was necessary to check the movement. Diary of James K. Polk, IV, 104-
106, 109, 112.
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tory of East Florida, if necessary to prevent its occupation by
any foreign government, and to establish a temporary govern-
ment over that region ; while another act of February 12, 1813,
authorized him to take similar action with regard to West Flor-
ida.12
As a result of these acts, Amelia Island in East Florida, cap-
tured from the Spanish in 1811 by a party of so-called "pa-
triots," assisted by a few American troops and gun-boats, was
held by the United States and subject to regulations imposed
by American officers for more than a year ; while in West Flor-
ida, the city of Mobile was seized by General Wilkinson in 1813,
under orders from the President, and never surrendered. 13
Again in 1819, the treaty ceding Florida to the United States
having been signed, but not yet ratified by Spain, President Mon-
roe suggested to Congress that the interests of the United States
in Florida were such that he should be authorized to occupy that
territory and carry out the provisions of the treaty as if it
were in effect. 14 Military measures for the occupation of Flor-
ida were contemplated, even to the extent of reducing St. Au-
gustine by "regular siege," if necessary,15 but fortunately for
the peace of the two countries, Congress did not see fit at that
time to authorize such action.16
12 These are the famous ' ' secret laws ' ' referred to by John Quincy
Adams as ' ' those singular anomalies of our system which have grown
out of that error in our Constitution which confers upon the legislative
assemblies the power of declaring war." He also says that there are
four of these secret laws and one resolution; "and one of the laws, that
of 25th June, 1812, is so secret that this day it could not be found among
the rolls at the Department." Memoirs, TV, 32 (Dee. 30, 1817). The act
of 1812 referred to by Adams has apparently not yet been found or pub-
lished, while the fourth law to which he refers is probably that of Mar. 3,
1811, which placed the ban of secrecy on these acts, including itself. The
injunction of secrecy was removed July 6, 1812, but the laws were not
published until 1818. See Annals of Cong., 15 Cong., 1 Sess., II, App.,
2601-2604.
is Thomas, Military Government in Newly Acquired Territory of the
United States, 55-56.
i* Message of Dec. 7, 1819. Richardson, Messages and Papers of the
Presidents, II, 57; cf. Memoirs\ of John Quincy Adams, IV, 480.
i* Jameson,
' ' Calhoun Correspondence,
' ' in Eeport, Am. Hist. Assn.,
1899, II, 164-165, 165-166.
1 The act for carrying the treaty into effect was passed Mar. 3, 1821,
while the exchange of ratifications occurred in February.
47] MILITARY MEASURES SHORT OF WAR 47
The right of the President to undertake military measures
for the protection of these "inchoate interests" of the United
States, even without legislative sanction, was apparently first
asserted in 1844. In that year President Tyler, having entered
into negotiations with Texas for its annexation to the United
States, ordered such a concentration of the land and naval forces
as to protect Texas against the danger of a Mexican invasion
while the treaty of annexation was under consideration in the
Senate. 17 In response to a Senate resolution of inquiry, the Presi-
dent defended his action by declaring it as his opinion "that
the United States having by the treaty of annexation acquired a
title to Texas which required only the action of the Senate to
perfect it, no other power could be permitted to invade and by
force of arms to possess itself of any portion of the territory of
Texas pending your deliberations upon the treaty without plac-
ing itself in a hostile attitude to the United States and justifying
the employment of any military means at our disposal to drive
back the invasion. ' ' 18
In spite of vigorous denunciation of this action in Congress
and a threat of impeachment against President Tyler,19 the
same doctrine of an inchoate interest in Texas was advocated by
President Polk. He declared that "the moment the terms of
annexation offered by the United States were accepted by Texas
the latter became so far a part of our country as to make it our
duty to afford such protection and defense ;
" 20 and therefore,
IT Corwin, The President's Control of Foreign Eelations, 156; Beeves,
American Diplomacy under Tyler and Polk, 169; Eichardson, op. tit.,
IV, 317.
is Message to Senate, May 15, 1844. Richardson, op. cit., IV, 317.
i Beeves, op. cit., 163. Senator Benton replied to the President's
message as follows :
' ' This is a reversal of the power of the Senate, and
a reading backwards of the Constitution. It makes an act of de-
feasance from the Senate necessary to undo a treaty which the President
sends to us, instead of requiring our assent to give it validity. It as-
sumes Texas to be in the Union, and protected by our Constitution from
invasion or insurrection, like any part of the existing States or Terri-
tories; and to remain so till the Senate puts her out by rejecting the
treaty! This, indeed, is not merely reading, but spelling the Constitution
backwards! It is reversing the functions of the Senate and making it
a nullifying, instead of a ratifying body." Cong. Globe, XIII, App.,
498 (28 Cong., 1 Sess., June 1, 1844).
20 Message to Congress, Dec. 2, 1845. Bichardson, op. cit., IV, 388.
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in May, 1845, he ordered General Taylor to cross into Texas to
protect it pending annexation. 21 Clearly, the action of Presi-
dent Polk had more basis than that of President Tyler. Tyler
considered himself empowered to protect territory whose acquisi-
tion was merely proposed in a treaty not yet ratified, and which,
in fact, failed of ratification; while Folk's action had at least
the justification that the annexation of Texas was then an as-
sured fact, altho at that time not formally in effect.
President Grant's policy with regard to Santo Domingo (1869-
1871) likewise involved the principle of an inchoate interest on
the part of the United States which the President was empow-
ered to protect. Having negotiated with President Baez a treaty
of annexation by a most unusual method and almost without the
knowledge of his Cabinet, Grant sent a strong naval force to the
island to protect it from invasion and from internal disorder,
not only during the consideration of the treaty by the Senate,
but even after its rejection,22 on the ground that "the Govern-
ment of the United States is peculiarly interested in the exemp-
tion of the Dominican Republic both from internal commotions
and from invasions from abroad. ' ' 23
The President's action was severely condemned on the floor
of the Senate, especially by such men as Sumner and Schurz.
Schurz declared the doctrine that the President could, by mak-
ing a treaty, create an inchoate right to some foreign territory,
and then, without authority from Congress, commit acts of war
for the enforcement of that inchoate right, to be "the hugest
absurdity, the most audacious preposterosity, the most mischie-
vous, dangerous, and anti-republican doctrine that ever was
broached on the floor of the Senate. ' ' 24
Senator Sumner likewise bitterly scored the action of the
President, and offered a resolution condemning the employment
of the Navy without the authority of Congress against a friendly
foreign nation or in belligerent intervention in the affairs of a
21 Bichardson, op, cit., IV, 388-389 ; Beeves, op cit., 277.
22Bhodes, History of the United States, VI, 346-354; Corwin, op. cit.,
158. For Grant's instructions to the U. S. naval officers, see Moore's
Digest of International Law, I, 278.
23 Secretary of State Fish to Mr. Bassett, minister to Hayti, Nov. 16,
1870. Moore's Digest, I, 279. The treaty had been rejected June 30, pre-
ceding.
24 Cong. Globe, 42 Cong., 1 Sess., Pt. II, App., 52.
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foreign nation, as "an infraction of the Constitution of the
United States and a usurpation of power not conferred upon the
President." The resolution further declared, "That while the
President, without any previous declaration of war by act of
Congress, may defend the country against invasion by foreign
enemies, he is not justified in exercising the same power in an
outlying foreign island, which has not yet become part of the
United States
;
that a title under an unratified treaty is at most
inchoate and contingent, while it is created by the President
alone, in which respect it differs from any title created by act
of Congress ; and since it is created by the President alone, with-
out the support of law, whether in legislation or a ratified treaty,
the employment of the Navy in the maintenance of the Govern-
ment there is without any excuse of national defense, as also
without any excuse of a previous declaration of war by Con-
gress."
25
However, other Senators, such as Harlan (Iowa) and Morton
(Indiana) came to the defense of the President, and Sumner's
resolution was laid on the table by a large majority (38-16),26
so that there would seem to be some point to Professor Corwin's
remark about Harlan 's argument that it "at least demonstrated
the futility of attempting to confine the President's protective
function to the mere duty of repelling invasion or immediate
physical attack.
' ' 27
President Roosevelt's action in 1903 in preventing the inter-
ference of Colombia in the Panama revolution was likewise based
on the ground of an inchoate interest on the part of the Uni-
ted States in the Panama Canal and therefore in the success
of the revolution. 28
The President may also on his own authority undertake mili-
25 Cong. Globe, 42 Cong., 1 Sess., Pt. II, 294.
26/fetU, 329.
27 The President 's Control of Foreign Relations, 160. President JRoose-
velt's action with regard to Santo Domingo in 1905 was similar to that
of President Grant in that the contemplated measures were undertaken
even after a treaty authorizing them had been rejected. Roosevelt's ac-
tion, however, was not based on the doctrine of inchoate interest, but
seems to be more properly classified under the policy of police super-
vision. Infra, 54; cf. also supra, 41-42.
28 See Jones, Carribbean Interests of the United States, 199-203;
Roosevelt, Autobiography, 553-569.
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tary measures for the protection of American rights and inter-
ests abroad.29 This power was exercised in 1853 in the famous
Koszta incident, when Martin Koszta, a native of Hungary who
had become an American declarant (not yet fully naturalized),
but who had been seized at Smyrna at the instigation of the Aus-
trian authorities, was released through the vigorous action of an
American naval captain in training his guns upon the Austrian
vessel on which Koszta was held. The incident caused consid-
erable excitement and was protested by the Austrian govern-
ment; but Captain Ingraham's action was sustained by public
opinion, by Congress, and by the Executive, Secretary of State
Marcy laying down the principle that any individual "clothed
with our national character" is entitled to claim the protection
of this government, "and it may respond to that claim without
being obliged to explain its conduct to any foreign power; for
it is its duty to make its nationality respected by other nations
and respectable in every quarter of the globe.
' ' 30
Another demonstration of this power occurred a year later
(1854), when Greytown (San Juan), in Nicaragua, was bom-
barded ' ' until the town was laid in ashes,
' ' in default of repara-
tion demanded for an attack on the United States consul.31 This
action was approved and defended before Congress by President
Pierce,
32 and later upheld by the courts, Justice Nelson declar-
ing that it is to the President, as the Executive head of the Na-
tion, that citizens abroad must look for protection of person and
property, and that, for this purpose, "the whole Executive power
of the country is placed in his hands, under the Constitution,
and the laws passed in pursuance thereof ; and different Depart-
ments of government have been organized, through which this
power may be most conveniently executed, whether by negotia-
tion or force a Department of State and a Department of the
Navy." He further declared that the duty of such interposi-
tion abroad, for the protection of the lives or property of the
2 Corwin, op. cit., 142 ; Boot, Military and Colonial Policy of the Uni-
ted States, 157-158.
so Rhodes, History of the United States, I, 416-419. The Supreme Court
also referred to this incident with approval in a decision rendered some
years later. In re Neagle, 135 U. S., 1, 64 (1890).
si Ehodes, op. cit., II, 9-10.
32 Message to Congress, Dee. 4, 1854. Eichardson, op. cit., V, 280-284.
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citizen, ''must, of necessity, rest in the discretion of the Presi-
dent." 33
The attack by American war vessels upon the Barrier forts
of China in 1856, in order to avenge an alleged insult to the
flag,
34 undertaken without authority of Congress, was apparent-
ly approved even by the cautious Buchanan, altho further
active participation in a military expedition into Chinese terri-
tory was declined as beyond the authority of the President alone
to undertake. Secretary Cass thus stated the position of the
administration : ' ' Our naval officers have the right it is their
duty, indeed to employ the forces under their command, not
only in self-defense, but for the protection of the persons and
property of our citizens when exposed to acts of lawless outrage,
and this they have done both in China and elswhere, and will
do again when necessary. But military expeditions into the
Chinese territory can not be undertaken without the authority of
the National Legislature.
' ' 35
President Buchanan also, without authority from Congress,
ordered a naval force to Cuban waters with directions "to pro-
tect all vessels of the United Statesmen the high seas from search
or detention by the vessels of war of any other nation.
' ' A con-
flict with Great Britain was avoided only by the latter 's aban-
donment of her claim to the right of visit and search in time
of peace.
36
Even the qualification upon the President's powers admitted
by Secretary Cass in 1857 was abandoned in 1900, when Presi-
dent McKinley, without any express authorization from Con-
gress, sent a naval force under Admiral Kempff and an army
of about 5000 men under General Chaffee to China, not merely
334 Blatchford, 451, 454, quoted in Corwin, op. cit., 144.
s* For account of this affair, see Foster, American Diplomacy in the
Orient, 225-227.
SB Cass to Lord Napier, Apr. 10, 1857. Moore 's Digest, VII, 164.
36 Richardson, op. cit., V, 507. Buchanan was, however, curiously in-
consistent, deeming it necessary to appeal to Congress for authority to
protect American citizens in Nicaragua, New Grenada, and Mexico, and
to keep the Panama and Tehuantepec routes of transit open and safe for
them. "The executive government of this country," he said, "in its
intercourse with foreign nations is limited to the employment of diplo-
macy. When that fails it can proceed no further. It can not legitimately
resort to force without the direct authority of Congress, except in re-
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for the purpose of rescuing and protecting the lives and property
of American citizens in China, but also to cooperate with the
forces of the other Powers in avenging and punishing the mur-
der of the representatives of these Powers that had been killed
during the Boxer uprising. Altho the ensuing campaign
involved hard fighting and many casualties, the President said
that our declared aims "involved no war against the Chinese
nation. We adhered to the legitimate office of rescuing the im-
periled legation, obtaining redress for wrongs already suffered,
securing wherever possible the safety of American life and prop-
erty in China, and preventing a spread of the disorders or their
recurrence.
'w
A still more recent example of this exercise of the President's
power is the action of President Wilson in April, 1914, in or-
dering a force of sailors and marines to capture Vera Cruz
by way of reparation for Huerta 's affront to the flag of the Uni-
ted States. This measure, characterized by an eminent histor-
ian as "an act of war ' ' which looked to Latin-American countries
like "the beginning of a war of conquest" and which was
"fiercely resented in Mexico," was undertaken without author-
ity from Congress, 38 the city, moreover, being occupied for a
period of seven months (until November 23, 1914) by an army
of 6000 men under General Funston.39
The power of the President to employ the land and naval
forces on his own authority, whether for the purpose of protect-
sisting and repelling hostile attacks. . . Without the authority off
Congress the Executive can not . . . , without transcending his con-
stitutional power, direct a gun to be fired into a port or land a seaman or
marine to protect the lives of our countrymen on shore or to obtain re-
dress for a recent outrage on their property. . . Without the au-
thority of Congress the President can not fire a hostile gun in any case
except to repel the attacks of an enemy." Richardson, op. tit., V, 516,
539, 570.
37 Message to Congress, Dec. 3, 1900. For. Eel. 1900, xiv. For an ac-
count of the expedition, see Boot, Military and Colonial Policy of the Uni-
ted States, 333, 336-347; cf. Taft, Our Chief Magistrate and His Powers,
114-115.
ss Vera Cruz was captured Apr. 21, 1914. The next day Congress passed
a resolution declaring the use of troops justifiable and disclaiming any
purpose to make war. 38 Stat. at L., 770.
39Qgg, National Progress, 293-295.
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ing the so-called "inchoate interests" and honor of the United
States, or the rights and property of American citizens abroad,
has thus been demonstrated in actual practise again and again,
and seems also to have been approved by Congress, by the courts,
and by public opinion. It seems scarcely necessary to suggest
the possibilities of international complications and conflicts that
may result from an unwise exercise of this power, and hence the
enormous responsibility for the peace of the United States that
rests in this way upon the shoulders of the President.
But in addition to these powers of protection, which are,
after all, inherent in government, a more recent development of
American foreign policy has vested in the President considerable
power with respect to intervention and police supervision over
the affairs of other nations. The so-called "zone of the Carib-
bean," because of its proximity and strategic importance to the
United States, the unsettled character of the governments in
that zone, and the inclination of the United States under the
Monroe Doctrine to look with disfavor upon action by any for-
eign power, is now considered as being under the general police
supervision of the United States ; the policy of this country hav-
ing undergone a gradual change from one of sympathetic inter-
est but absolute non-interference in the affairs of these Carib-
bean states to one of direct and active intervention in their in
ternal affairs.40
This power of intervention and police supervision was prob
ably first exercised by President Cleveland in 1885, when dur-
ing the course of a civil war in Colombia, he sent troops to keep
open the transit across the Isthmus of Panama. Altho this
action was taken under authority of a provision (Article 35) in
the treaty of 1846 with Colombia, its execution, as the President
informed Congress, "necessarily involved police control where
the local authority was temporarily powerless, but always in
aid of the sovereignty of Colombia.
' ' 41
The doctrine upon which the exercise of such police control
40 Jones, Caribbean Interests of the United States, 17-23. See also
several articles by P. M. Brown "Our Caribbean Policy," Proc. Acad.
Pol. Set., VII, 418-422; "American Diplomacy in Central America,"
Am. Pol. Sci. Eev., VI, supp., 152-163 ;
' ' American Intervention in Cen-
tral America," Am. Jour. Race Development, IV, 409-426.
41 Message to Congress, Dee. 8, 1885. Richardson, op. cit., VIII, 326.
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might be justified was laid down by President Roosevelt in his
message to Congress, December 6, 1904, when he said :
' ' Chron-
ic wrongdoing, or an impotence which results in a general loos-
ening of the ties of civilized society, may in America, as else-
where, ultimately require intervention by some civilized nation,
and in the Western Hemisphere the adherence of the United
States to the Monroe Doctrine may force the United States, how-
ever reluctantly, in flagrant cases of such wrongdoing or im-
potence, to the exercise of an international police power.
' ' 42
The doctrine here laid down has since been developed into a
definite policy largely through numerous military measures
undertaken on the sole authority of the President. Thus, in
1905, even before he entered into the executive agreement with
Santo Domingo already referred to,43 President Roosevelt di-
rected United States naval forces to interfere and prevent any
fighting in that country which might menace the custom-
houses.44 United States marines have since been landed on sev-
eral occasions both in Hayti and Santo Domingo to preserve
order and to maintain the customs service; since 1912 the lat-
ter country has been favored with at least one visit a year from
United States cruisers
;
and in 1916 a military occupation of the
island was established that has apparently not yet been aban-
doned (June, 1920).*5
42 For. Eel. 1904, xli.
43 Supra, 41-42, 49n.
44 ' ' Santo Domingo had fallen into such chaos that once for some weeks
there were two rival governments in it, and a revolution was being car-
ried on against each. . . The situation had become intolerable by the
time that I interfered. There was a naval commander in the waters whom
I directed to prevent any fighting which might menace the custom-houses.
He carried out his orders, both to his and my satisfaction, in thorough-
going fashion. On one occasion, when an insurgent force threatened to
attack a town in which Americans had interests, he notified the com-
manders on both sides that he would not permit any fighting in that town,
but that he would appoint a certain place where they could meet and fight
it out, and that the victors should have the town. They agreed to meet
his wishes, the fight came off at the appointed place, and the victors,
who if I remember rightly were the insurgents, were given the town. ' '
Roosevelt, Autobiography, 549.
45 Ogg, op. <At., 261 ; Am. Jour. Int. Law, XI, 394-399 ; see also infra,
note 53. Since the above was written, there has been much severe criticism
of the continued American occupation of Hayti. See especially a series
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In February, 1907, during the course of a war between Nic-
aragua and Honduras, American warships actively intervened in
order to protect life and property from needless destruction and
to prevent the spreading of the war, and the American charge
(Philip Marshall Brown) even assumed temporary authority in
Honduras when the government fled.46 In 1909-1910, by the
use of naval vessels and marines, the resignation and flight of
an obnoxious president of Nicaragua (Zelaya) was forced and
the success of a revolution assured;47 while in 1912 and 1914,
United States marines again actively intervened in Nicaragua,
but on these occasions on the side of the government, to put down
revolutions that might otherwise have succeeded.48 In Hon-
duras, the joint intervention of American and British marines
prevented fighting between the two factions in that country,
and secured the election of a provisional president agreeable
to both factions
;
49
while only recently an American naval force
was again landed in that country to preserve order during a
change of government.50
In all these numerous instances of intervention and police
supervision in the Caribbean zone, the use of the marines has
been so common as to warrant the suggestion of a new consti-
tutional principle, that the landing of marines may be consid-
ered as a "mere local police measure," while the use of regulars
for the same purpose would be an act of war.51 Intervention is,
however, defined in a recent official publication as "an inter-
ference by a nation in the affairs of another without the inten-
of articles by James Weldon Johnson in The Nation, Aug. 28, Sept. 4, 11,
1920.
46 For. Eel. 1907, II, 627-628 ; P. M. Brown, op. cit., in Am. Jour. Race
Development.
"For. Eel. 1909, 452-459; ibid., 1910, 738-767.
48 Jones, op. cit., 176-178; Ogg, op. cit., 261-262. President Taft men-
tions the intervention of 1912 as "the landing of marines and quite a
campaign, which resulted in the maintenance of law and order and the
elimination of the insurrectos. " He says this was "not an act of war,
because it was done at the request and with the consent of the lawful au-
thorities of the territory where it took place." Owr Chief Magistrate and
His Powers, 96.
49 P. M. Brown, op. cit., in Am. Jour. Eace Development, Am. Pol. Sd.
Eev.
so N Y. Times, Sept. 12, 1919.
si See Taft, Our Chief Magistrate and His Powers, 95.
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tion of waging war. It is commonly defended as a police meas-
ure by the intervening power, but is often followed by war,
and may always be regarded by the second power as an act of
war.
' ' 52
Hence, even tho the suggestion of a constitutional
principle may be accepted in the United States as justifying the
President in his frequent resort to such measures of police con-
trol in the zone of the Carribbean, as it apparently has been ac-
cepted, this exercise of the President's power may not be so
readily accepted by the other countries concerned, but may, on
the other hand, be resented by them and lead to serious difficul-
ties and entanglements, if not to actual war.53
Kecent events have also shown the possibilities involved in an
extension of these powers of intervention and police supervision,
even beyond the zone of the Carribbean. The landing of United
State bluejackets at Trau in September, 1919, in order to pre-
vent a conflict between the Italians and the Serbs, altho ap-
parently done at the request of the Italian authorities,54 was
entirely without the previous knowledge or consent of Congress
or the Senate.
This use of American forces for police purposes in Dal-
matia, and the report that troops were also to be sent to super-
vise the plebiscites in Silesia and to preserve order in Armenia
and elswhere, 55 aroused a storm of criticism in Congress. The
action in Dalmatia was denounced as against law and preced-
52 War Cyclopedia (1st ed.), 138.
ss Cf. Jones, op. cit., 190. In the fall of 1919, a commission from
Santo Domingo issued a plea for self-government and the abandonment
of the American military government; while at about the same time the
Spanish government transmitted to Washington a letter from the heads of
all the Spanish parliamentary parties, suggesting that the time had come
for a termination of the American military occupation of that island.
N. T. Times, Sept. 11, 12, 1919.
54 See statement of Admiral Knapp, transmitted by Secretary Daniels
to the Senate, Oct. 2, 1919, in response to a Senate resolution. Z&td., Oct.
3, 1919.
55 N. T. Times Current Hist. Mag., XI, 225-226 (Nov., 1919). Accord-
ing to press reports a force of American troops was sent to Coblenz with
a view to their possible use ultimately to help police the plebiscite in
Upper Silesia; but Secretary of War Baker announced that these troops
would remain at Coblenz as a part of the garirson there, unless the Sen-
ate should ratify the treaty and thus make American participation in the
plebiscite strictly legal. See N. Y. Times, Nov. 21, 1919.
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ent, and Senator Sherman (Illinois) introduced a resolution de-
claring that the assignment of foreign territory to be policed
or guarded by United States forces was beyond the power of the
Supreme War Council or the Executive, without the consent of
the Senate. 50
Such a conception of the President's power with regard to the
use of the armed forces might have some weight, had the action
under criticism been taken in time of peace. Under the cir-
cumstances, however, of a continuing state of war, the correct
view was undoubtedly stated by Senator Hitchcock (Nebraska)
when he said that the action taken with regard to the Dalma-
tian coast was within the war powers of the President and dele-
gated by him to the Supreme War Council. 57 The failure of
the Senate to take any action on the Sherman resolution would
seem to indicate its approval of this view. The incident serves
at least to illustrate the possibilities involved in an extension of
the sphere within which the President may undertake these mili-
tary measures without the authority of Congress.
56 N. Y. Times, Sept. 27, 30, 1919.
ST Ibid., Sept. 30, 1919.
CHAPTER IV
POWER OF DEFENSE
A formal declaration is not necessary to constitute a state of
war, and is a comparatively unimportant factor in dating the
beginning of a war, because it does not necessarily precede hos-
tilities, nor has it in fact often done so. Until recently, a formal
declaration of war was not, as a matter of international law,
necessary or usual.
1 Most wars during the eighteenth and nine-
teenth centuries were fought "under the rule of a word and a
blow, with the blow coming first and the word possibly left un-
said." 2 A declaration of war, says Woolsey*3 is "a warning
issued by a state to its own people, or to the neutral, that war
has begun, and not a warning to the enemy that war will begin
at a certain future date. Marking thus a status already exist-
ing, it cannot itself originate that status. The outbreak of war
gives rise to the declaration, not the declaration to the outbreak.
It is the fact of violence, then, and not the declaration of a stat-
us, upon which we must really fix our eyes, if we should ask
when war begins."
The question then arises, under what circumstances may a
war be begun before a formal declaration is made, or even with-
out a formal declaration, and with what branch of the govern-
ment the power rests to begin such a war.
Authorities agree that the power to begin an offensive war,
or a war of aggression, rests in the United States only with
Congress, and should properly be preceded by a declaration made
18. E. Baldwin, in Am. Jour. Int. Law, XII, 1; Woolsey, Internation-
al Law, sec. 120; Moore's Digest of International Law, VII, 171.
2 For a list of wars begun without a declaration, see Am. Jour. Int. Law,
II, 57-62.
3 T. S. Woolsey, "The Beginnings of War," Proceedings, Am. Pol.
Sci. Assn., I, 54-68.
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by that body.* The Constitution establishes the mode in which
this government shall commence wars of its seeking, but the
Constitution has no power to prescribe the manner in which oth-
ers should begin war against us. There is in every nation an in-
herent power of self-defense, and it is to be presumed that,
tho the power to declare a war is by our Constitution clearly
vested in Congress, in the absence of such a declaration the Con-
stitution does not leave the nation powerless for defense against
attack. Hence it follows, as Whiting says, "that when war is
commenced against this country by aliens or citizens, no declara-
tion of war by the government is necessary.
' ' 5
Whiting also contends that the power to begin and wage a
war of defense rests clearly with the President. "The fact
that war is levied against the United States," he says, "makes
it the duty of the President to call out the army or navy to
subdue the enemy, whether foreign or domestic. . . If the
commander-in-chief could not call out his forces to repel an in-
vasion unless the Legislative department had previously made a
formal declaration of war, a foreign enemy, during a recess of
Congress, might send out its armed cruisers to sweep our com-
merce from the seas, or it might cross our borders and march,
unopposed, from Canada to the Gulf before a majority of our
Representatives could be convened to make that declaration."
He claims that the Constitution, which gives the Legislature au-
thority to declare war whenever initiated by the United States,
also imposes upon the President the duty, as commander-in-
chief, "to engage promptly and effectually, in war, or, in other
words, to make the United States a belligerent nation without a
declaration of war or any other act of Congress, whenever he
is legally called upon to suppress rebellion, repel invasion, or to
execute the laws against armed public resistance thereto.
' ' 6 This
* Whiting, War Powers under the Constitution, 39; Burgess, Political
Science and Comparative Constitutional Law, II, 261; Taft, Our Chief
Magistrate and His Powers, 95; Prize Cases, 2 Black, 635, 668 (1862).
5 Whiting, op. cit., 39 ; cf. amendment proposed by the Hartford Con-
vention of 1814, providing for a two-thirds vote of both houses to declare
war or authorize hostilities,
' '
except such acts of hostility be in defense
of the territories of the United States when actually invaded." The
Federalist (Ford ed.), Appendix, 689.
6 Whiting, op. cit., 39-40 ; cf. Birkhimer, Military Government and Mar-
tial Law (2nd ed.), 48.
60 WAR POWERS OF THE EXECUTIVE IN UNITED STATES [60
view is supported by Birkhimer, 7 who admits that a formal dec-
laration of war can be made only by Congress, but says that it
is necessary sometimes to prosecute hostilities without such a
declaration, and that the President then must act, for the time
being, at least, independently of Congress. "When the authori-
ties of the Union are assailed, either by foreign foes, . . or by
domestic ones, . . it is the duty of the President to repel
force with force without waiting for any formal declaration."
The power of the President to begin and carry on a defensive
war without a declaration by Congress is also vigorously upheld
by the Supreme Court of the United States. In handing down
the decision of the court in the famous Prize Cases,8 Justice
Grier, after admitting the full constitutional power of Congress
to declare a national or foreign war, said :
' ' The Constitution
confers on the President the whole Executive power. He is bound
to take care that the laws be faithfully executed. He is Com-
mander-in-Chief of the Army and Navy of the United States,
and of the militia of the several states when called into the actual
service of the United States. He has no power to initiate or
declare a war either against a foreign nation or a domestic State.
But by the Acts of Congress of February 28th, 1795, and 3d of
March, 1807, he is authorized to call out the militia and use the
military and naval forces of the United States in case of in-
vasion by foreign nations, and to suppress insurrection against
the government of a State or of the United States. If a war be
made by invasion of a foreign nation, the President is not only
authorized but bound to resist force by force. He does not in-
itiate the war, but is bound to accept the challenge without
waiting for any special legislative authority. And whether
the hostile party be a foreign invader, or States organized in
rebellion, it is none the less a war, although the declaration of it
be 'unilateral.' " 9
7 Military Government and Martial Law, 47 ; cf. also Chambrun, The
Executive Power, 120.
82 Black, 635 (1862).
Prise Cases, 2 Black, 635, 668 (1862). Cf. Talbot v. Johnson, 3 DalL,
133, 160 (1795): "War can alone be entered into by national authority;
it is instituted for national purposes, and directed to national ob-
jects. . . Even in the case of one enemy against another enemy, there-
fore, there is no color of justification for any hostile act, unless it be
authorized by some act of the government giving the public constitution-
al sanction to it."
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That defensive wars are clearly contemplated by the Con-
stitution is shown by the provision which gives to Congress the
power "to provide for calling forth the militia to execute the
laws of the Union, suppress insurrections, and repel inva-
sions.
' ' 10 Under that provision, Congress has, by the acts re-
ferred to in the Supreme Court decision, and other acts, vested
the President with authority to call out and use the militia in
the cases contemplated, and in that sense wage a defensive war
without further declaration by Congress.
The Supreme Court need not have rested its case, however,
solely on those Acts of Congress, but might have gone back to
the language and intent of the Constitution itself. The action
of the Convention of 1787 is significant in this connection. The
Committee on Detail had reported a clause giving to Congress
the power "to make war." 11 During the discussion over this
proposition, it was suggested that the wording of the clause gave
Congress practically unlimited control over all the operations of
war. Hence Madison and Gerry moved to strike out the word
"make" and insert "declare," with the avowed purpose of
"leaving to the Executive the power to repel sudden attacks." 12
The suggested change in language was adopted with little op-
position, and there would here seem to be some constitutional
sanction for the power of the President to wage defensive wars
without direct authorization from Congress.
That power of the President is now at least a generally recog-
nized and well established principle of American constitutional
law, the validity of which was vigorously asserted in 1907 by
our delegates at the Hague Conference. When the proposal was
made for an article requiring that hostilities should not begin
without a previous warning, in the form of a declaration of war
or of an ultimatum accompanied by a conditional declaration of
war, the American delegation expressed its entire sympathy with
the purport of the article. It called attention, however, to the
fact that Congress under the Constitution had exclusive power to
declare war, and that the delegation could enter into no agree-
10 Constitution, Art. I, Sec. 8, Cl. 15.
11 Madison's Journal (Hunt ed.), II, 82.
12 Ibid., 188.
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ment to modify that power in any way. The statement of the
delegation then went on to say :
' ' While this is true as to aggres-
sive military operations, it is proper to say, however, that it has
been the unbroken practise of the Government of the United
States for more than a century to recognize in the President, as
the Commander-in-Chief of the constitutional land and naval
forces, full power to defend the territory of the United States
from invasion, and to exercise at all times and in all places the
right of national self-defense." The delegation announced its
willingness to support a proposition favoring a formal declara-
tion of intent to engage in hostilities, providing it were nonman-
datory in character. 13
The power of the President to wage a defensive war without
a formal declaration and without specific authorization by Con-
gress is thus, according to all authority, clearly granted, if not
in so many words, at least by implication and the inherent pur-
pose of the Constitution. The questions still remain as to what
constitutes a defensive war, and to what extent the President
may exercise these powers of defense. They are best answered
by some references to history.
President Washington had appointed General Wayne to suc-
ceed St. Clair in command of the western department, and in
the spring of 1794 Wayne was ready to move against the Indians.
Meanwhile, the British had established a fort at the rapids of
the Miami, twenty miles within American territory, near which
the Indians took their stand. The action of the British was,
of course, entirely unjustified, and technically constituted an
invasion of American territory ; but it is not clear that any ag-
gressive act of war was intended. Washington recognized that
an attempt to dislodge them would probably bring on a conflict,
which he was especially anxious to avoid. He seemed, however,
to have no doubts as to his power in that regard, for, after weigh-
ing carefully the expediency of such action, and without con-
sulting Congress, the following instructions were issued to
Wayne by General Knox, the Secretary of War: "If, therefore,
in the course of your operations against the Indian enemy, it
should become necessary to dislodge the party at the rapids of
is See article by George B. Davis, ' ' The Amelioration of the Eules of
War on Land," in Am. Jour. Int. Law, II, 63-77.
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the Miami, you are hereby authorized, in the name of the Presi-
dent of the United States, to do it.
' ' 14
Fortunately, Wayne was
able to defeat the Indians without becoming officially involved
with the British, and a conflict was for the time being averted.
The question of the extent of the President's powers in the
case of a war begun by another nation was more clearly raised
in Jefferson's administration, with regard to Tripoli. Tripoli
had declared war on the United States because of the latter 's
failure to comply with demands which Jefferson said were "un-
founded either in right or in compact." Jefferson apparently
had no doubt of his power to take certain defensive measures
without special authority from Congress, for he immediately
despatched a small squadron of frigates into the Mediterranean,
with orders to protect our commerce against attack. A conflict
ensued, as a result of which one of the Tripolitan cruisers was
captured together with what remained of her crew. But further
than to fight in the strictest defense, Jefferson felt that he had
no constitutional authority, and so, as he explained in his mes-
sage to Congress, "Unauthorized by the Constitution, without
the sanction of Congress, to go beyond the line of defense, the
vessel, being disabled from committing further hostilities, was
liberated with its crew. The Legislature will doubtless consider
whether, by authorizing measures of offense also, they will place
our force on an equal footing with that of its adversaries. I
communicate all material information on this subject, that in
the exercise of this important function confided by the Consti-
tution to the Legislature exclusively their judgment may form
itself on a knowledge and consideration of every circumstance
of weight." 15
It is not strange that such a timid attitude should have arous-
ed the wrath of Hamilton, who attacked the President's inter-
pretation of his war powers in his usual vigorous style. He
called it a "very extraordinary position" that, tho Tripoli
had made a formal declaration of war against the United States
and had performed acts of actual hostility, yet there was no pow-
er, for want of the sanction of Congress, to capture and detain
her crews. That position meant nothing less, he said, than
' ' that
between two nations there may exist a state of complete war on
n Fish, American Diplomacy, 83-84.
is Richardson, Messages and Papers of the Presidents, I, 327.
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the one side of peace on the other." Such a position was to
him ridiculous. ' ' It is impossible,
' ' he maintained,
' '
to conceive
the idea, that one nation can be in full war with another, and
this other not in the same state with respect to its adversary.
The moment that two nations are, in an absolute sense, at war,
the public force of each may exercise every act of hostility,
which the general laws of war authorize, against the persons and
property of the other. As respects this conclusion, the distinc-
tion is only material to discriminate the aggressing nation from
that which defends itself against attack. The war is offensive
on the part of the state which makes it ; on the opposite side it
is defensive
;
but the rights of both, as to the measures of hostil-
ity, are equal." Hamilton then went on to explain the consti-
tutional phrase granting to Congress the power to declare war,
' ' the plain meaning of which,
' ' he said,
' '
is that it is the peculiar
and exclusive province of Congress, when the nation is at peace,
to change that state into a state of war, whether from calcula-
tions of policy, or from provocations, or injuries received: in
other words, it belongs to Congress only, to go to War. But
when a foreign nation declares, or openly and avowedly makes
war upon the United States, they are then by that very fact al-
ready at war, and any declaration on the part of Congress is
nugatory; it is at least unnecessary. This inference is clear
in principle, because it is self-evident, that a declaration by one
nation against another, produces at once a complete state of war
between both, and that no declaration on the other side can at
all vary their relative situation ; and in practice, it is well known,
that nothing is more common than when war is declared by one
party, to prosecute mutual hostilities without a declaration by
the other." 16
Congress felt somewhat as did Hamilton, that a declaration of
war would be a useless formality against a horde of pirates, as
the Barbary Powers were considered; but to remove the Presi-
dent's scruples, an act was passed empowering him to proceed
with hostilities.17
Jefferson himself was evidently not convinced by the argu-
ment of Hamilton, for in 1805, in a confidential message to Con-
gress with regard to the Spanish depredations on United States
is Works of Alexander Hamilton, VII, 201-204.
"McMaster, History of the People of the United States, III, 201; Act
of Mar. 26, 1804. Annals of Cong., 8 Cong., 1 Sess., App., 1301.
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territory, he again asserted the doctrine that only by authority
of Congress could any hostile act be performed, beyond the
strictest necessities of self-defense. Altho the Spaniards had
authorized the inference that it was their intention to advance
on our possessions, Jefferson wrote :
' '
Considering that Congress
alone is constitutionally invested with the power of changing
our condition from peace to war, I have thought it my duty to
await their authority for using force in any degree which could
be avoided. I have barely instructed the officers stationed in the
neighborhood of the aggressions, to protect within the borders
actually delivered to us, and not to go out of them but when
necessary to repel an inroad, or to rescue a citizen, or his proper-
ty."
18
Congress took no action beyond referring the message to
a committee, and hence the inactive and undecided attitude of
the government continued.19
In 1818 the question as to the extent of the power of defense
came before the administration in a different and more extreme
form. President Monroe strongly asserted his right to take
defensive measures against the Indians in the South, even to
the extent of pursuing them across the border into Florida, at
that time a Spanish possession. "The inability of Spain," he
said, "to maintain her authority to fulfill the treaty (of 1795 ),20
ought not to expose the United States to other and greater in-
juries. When the authority of Spain ceases to exist there, the
United States have a right to pursue their enemy on a principle
of self-defense. . . To the high obligations and privileges of
this great and sacred principle of self-defense will the move-
ment of our troops be strictly confined.
' '
Acting on these prin-
ciples, the President had given General Jackson orders which
clearly authorized him to enter Florida, but only in the pursuit
of the Indians, and had carefully instructed him in that case
"to respect Spanish authority wherever it is maintained," and
"to withdraw his forces from the province as soon as he shall
have reduced that tribe to order. . ," 21
18.4m. State Papers, For. Bel., II, 613; Annals of Cong., 9 Cong.,
1 Sess., 18-19.
is Annals of Cong., 9 Cong., 1 Sess., 947.
20 Spain had bound herself in this treaty to restrain the Indians from
committing hostilities against the United States.
21 Message to Congress, Mar. 25, 1818. Am. State Papers, Mil. Affairs,
I, 681; cf. Jackson's defense of himself. Ibid., 755-757.
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General Jackson accordingly carried the campaign against
the Indians into Florida, but in so doing came into conflict with
the Spanish authorities, and even stormed a Spanish fort and
occupied Pensacola. When the subject of his transaction came
before the Cabinet for deliberation, John Quincy Adams argued
strenuously in support of the proposition that Jackson's acts
were justified as purely defensive measures. "My opinion is,"
he said, "that there was no real, though an apparent, violation
of his instructions; that his proceedings were justified by the
necessity of the case, and by the misconduct of the Spanish
commanding officer in Florida. The question is embarrassing
and complicated, not only as involving that of actual war with
Spain, but that of the Executive power to authorize hostilities
without a declaration of war by Congress. There is no doubt
that defensive acts of hostility may be authorized by the Execu-
tive; but Jackson was authorized to cross the Spanish line in
pursuit of the Indian enemy. My argument is that the question
of the constitutional authority of the Executive is precisely
there
;
that all the rest, even to the order for taking the Fort of
Barrancas by storm, was incidental, deriving its character from
its object, which was not hostility to Spain, but the termination
of the Indian war." Jackson's justification was the eminently
practical one that an imaginary boundary line could not afford
protection to our frontiers from the Indians in Florida, that the
Spanish authorities had interfered with the success of his cam-
paign, and that all his operations were founded on those con-
siderations. This argument appealed to Adams, who said that
"everything he did was defensive; that as such it was neither
war against Spain nor a violation of the Constitution.
' ' 22
This seemed to be a rather extreme view of what constitutes a
"defensive measure," and Adams was unable to convince the
President and the other members of the Cabinet, all of whom
were of the opinion that Jackson had acted not only without,
but against his instructions; and that he had committed war
22 Memoirs of John Quincy Adams. IV, 108, 111. About a year later,
Adams advised the President that the occupation of Florida, a measure
then proposed, would be "in itself an act of war. It may very probably
involve us in a real and very formidable war. ' ' He very frankly admits,
however, that this opinion did not reflect his real views, but was given
in order to secure just that result, since he had discovered that his ad-
vice usually resulted in the opposite action being taken. Memoirs, IV, 450.
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upon Spain, which could not be justified and must be disavow-
ed by the administration. The President supposed, however,
that there might be circumstances which would have justified
such measures as Jackson had taken, but that he had not made
out his case. 23
President Wilson's despatch of a punitive expedition into
Mexico after the Columbus raid in March, 1916, involved the
exercise of powers of defense similar to those claimed by Mon-
roe in 1818. The expedition was thought to be necessary in or-
der to protect the United States against bandit raids which
events had apparently shown the Mexican government too weak
to suppress. In a statement to the press, President Wilson an-
nounced that the expedition would have the "single object" of
capturing Villa and putting a stop to his forays. "This," he
said, "can and will be done in entirely friendly aid of the con-
stituted authorities in Mexico and with scrupulous respect for
the sovereignty of Mexico." 2 * Tho the expedition later in-
volved threatening complications with the Mexican authorities,
and even some encounters with Mexican troops that resulted in
bloodshed,
25 it has been justified on the ground that "the
President was in this instance but performing his constitutional
function of repelling invasion."
26
The President has also in another way shown himself able
to exercise important powers of defense without express author-
ization from Congress. When the difficulty with France reach-
ed a crisis in 1798, President Adams announced to Congress that
he had revoked his former instructions to collectors not to per-
mit the sailing of armed merchant vessels, and thereby indirect-
ly authorized the arming of such vessels as a measure of de-
fense. 27 This exercise of executive power was opposed by Jef-
ferson, who looked upon it as a measure leading to war and pro-
posed that there should be "a Legislative prohibition to arm
vessels instead of the Executive one which the President informs
them he has withdrawn. ' ' 28
23 ibid., 108.
2* See Am. Jour. Int. Law. X, Supp., 180, 184.
25 For a brief account, see Ogg, National Progress, 297-299.
26 Corwin, The President 's Control of Foreign Relations, 163, n.
" Message of Mar. 19, 1798. Richardson, op. cit., I, 265.
28 Jefferson to Monroe, Mar. 21, 1798. Writings of Thomas Jefferson,
VII, 221.
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That suggestion was favored also by Madison, who denounc-
ed the action of the President as a usurpation of power. "The
first instructions," he said, "were no otherwise legal than as
they were in pursuance of the Law of Nations, and consequently
in execution of the law of the land. The revocation of the in-
structions is a virtual change of the law, & consequently a
usurpation by the Ex. of a legislative power. It will not avail
to say that the law of Nations leaves this point undecided, &
that every nation is free to decide for itself. If this be the case,
the regulation being a Legislative not an Executive one, belongs
to the former, not the latter Authority; and comes expressly
within the power, 'to define the law of Nations/ given to Con-
gress by the Constitution." 29
While the right of the President to authorize the arming of
merchant vessels for defense was thus disputed, the seriousness
of such action was not questioned even by his supporters, but
on the other hand, it was frankly admitted to be a step leading
to war.30
More recently the President's right to exercise this power of
arming merchant vessels for defense again became a sharp is-
sue. Germany having announced the renewal of her ruthless
submarine warfare, President Wilson went before Congress
February 26, 1917, and asked for authority "to arm our mer-
chant vessels with defensive arms should that become necessary,
and with the means of using them, and to employ any other in-
strumentalities or methods that may be necessary and adequate
to protect our ships and our people in their legitimate and peace-
ful pursuits on the seas." While thus requesting express au-
thority, the President at the same time announced that he con-
sidered himself as already possessing that authority "without
special warrant of law, by the plain implication of my consti-
tutional duties and powers." He said, however, that he pre-
ferred under the circumstances not to act upon such general
implication, but wished to feel "that the authority and power
29 Madison to Jefferson, Apr. 2, 1798. Writings of James Madison, VI,
313. Cf. Constitution, Art. I, See. 8, Cl. 10.
so William Vans Murray, minister at The Hague, wrote as follows to
John Quincy Adams, June 1, 1798: "I have seen the circular, it permits
arming in defence. It was all that the President could authorize, but it is
war." Eeport, Am. Hist. Assn. 1912, 416.
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of the Congress are behind me in whatever it may become neces-
sary for me to do.
' ' 31
The bill granting the authority asked for was favored by an
overwhelming majority in both houses of Congress, but was de-
feated by a filibuster in the Senate, the measure being opposed
principally on the ground that it was a step leading to war, and
therefore a delegation of the war-making power of Congress to
the President. The view of this "little group of willful men"
as they were characterized by President Wilson in a public
statement was perhaps best expressed by Senator Stone (Mis-
souri), when he said: "This bill, if enacted, would confer pow-
er upon the President to initiate war, if he should so desire or
determine, and to do that supremely solemn thing without first
submitting the choice of war or peace to Congress." Re-
garding the President's claim to that power without express
authorization, he said: "I can not consent that this clause (i. e.,
the clause "of the Constitution giving the President power to
execute the laws) confers, or was ever intended to confer, power
upon the President to determine an issue between this Nation
and some other sovereignty an issue involving questions of in-
ternational law and to authorize him to settle that law for
himself, and then proceed to employ the Army and Navy to
enforce his decision. ' ' 32
In spite of the failure of Congress to grant his request for ex-
press authority, President Wilson, still convinced of his own
power, and fortified not only by the known sentiments of the
majority in Congress but also by the advice of his Secretary of
State and Attorney General,33 gave formal notice on March 12
si N. T. Times Current Hist. Mag., VI, 48.
32 Cong. Record, LIV, Pt. 5 (64 Cong., 2 Sess.), 4878, 4884.
33 N. Y. Times Current Hist. Mag., VI, 55-56. An act of Mar. 3, 1819,
provided that any merchant vessel of United States registry might, by
armed force, oppose or defend against ' ' any aggression, search, restraint,
depredation, or seizure," attempted by any other merchant vessel or "any
armed vessel whatsoever, not being a public armed vessel of some
nation in amity with the United States." This act, still in force, was
held by some to forbid) the action contemplate^ by the President, since
Germany was still officially a nation "in amity with the United States."
Secretary Lansing and Attorney General Gregory advised the President,
however, that the statute had been enacted with reference to protection
against the pirates of that time and could not be held to apply to the pres-
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of his determination "to place upon all American merchant
vessels sailing through the barred areas an armed guard for the
protection of the vessels and the lives of the persons on board.
' '
Accordingly, a large number of merchant vessels were equipped
with six-inch guns and gunners from the United States Navy
were assigned to man them, supposedly with instructions not
to await an attack by a submarine, but to fire at sight, the pres-
ence of a submarine presupposing its hostile intent.34
The expedient of armed neutrality so adopted by the Execu-
tive as a measure of defense merely, was later acknowledged by
President Wilson himself, in his war address of April 2, to be
not only "impracticable" and "ineffectual enough at best," but
under the circumstances even "worse than ineffectual" and
"practically certain to draw us into the war without either the
rights or the effectiveness of belligerents.
' ' 35
In 1846, the question of the President's powers of defense
was raised in an even more complicated and contentious form.
The events leading up to the Mexican War involved the question
of the President's power to recognize a state of war as already
existing, and thereby begin defensive measures without author-
ization from Congress. They also illustrate to what extent hos-
tile acts may be performed by a vigorous President in bringing
about such a state of war, and how far operations may be con-
ducted in the name of "defense."
General Taylor had been sent, after the annexation of Texas,
to occupy the disputed territory beyond the Nueces River, with
instructions, however, so the President said "to abstain
from all aggressive acts toward Mexico or Mexican citizens, and
ent circumstances. See the act in Annals of Cong., 15 Cong., 2 Sess., II,
App., 2523.
a* N. Y. Times Current Hist. Mag. VI, 56. "Because submarines are in
effect outlaws when used as the German submarines have been used against
merchant shipping, it is impossible to defend ships against their attacks
as the law of nations has assumed that merchantmen would defend them-
selves against privateers or cruisers, visible craft giving chase upon the
open sea. It is common prudence in such circumstances, grim necessity, in-
deed, to endeavor to destroy them before they have shown their own in-
tention. They must be dealt with upon sight, if dealt with at all. ' ' Ad-
dress to Congress, Apr. 2, 1917. McKinley, Collected Materials for the Study
of the War (1st ed.), 13.
so McKinley, op. cit., 14.
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to regard the relations between that Republic and the United
States as peaceful unless she should declare war or commit acts
of hostility indicative of a state of war.
' ' 36 President Polk,
however, had also, in the fall of 1845, instructed Taylor that the
crossing of the Del Norte by the Mexican army was to be regard-
ed as an act of war, and in that event he should not wait to be
attacked, but should attack first. Moreover, he was not only to
drive the invaders back across the river, but he was vested with
discretionary authority to pursue the Mexican army into Mexi-
can territory, and to take Matamoras or any other post on that
side of the river, with only the caution "not to penetrate any
great distance into the interior of Mexican Territory." Like-
wise Commodore Conner, commanding the American squadron
in the Gulf of Mexico, was instructed in a similar event to block-
ade all the Mexican ports on the Gulf, and to attack and take
them if practicable, excepting only Yucatan and Tobasco, which
had been reported as against the threatened war with the Uni-
ted States.37
The President evidently held none of Jefferson's timid views
with regard to the Executive's powers of defense. Polk expect-
ed war, he was indeed fully determined on war, but meant that
the war should be ' ' defensive ' ' on the part of the United States.
He had no intention, however, of limiting such a war of defense
to merely repelling invaders. Polk did make inquiry of one of
his friends in Congress (Senator Bagby of Alabama) as to the
necessity or propriety of calling Congress, in the event of a
declaration of war or an invasion of Texas by Mexico, and was
plainly relieved when the Senator gave it as his "clear opin-
ion" that Congress should not be called.38
Having thus manipulated the situation so that actual hostil-
ities were finally precipitated on the morning of April 25, Presi-
dent Polk thus summed up the situation in his message of May
11, 1846: "After reiterated menaces, Mexico has passed the
boundary of the United States, has invaded our territory, and
shed American blood upon the American soil. She has pro-
claimed that hostilities have commenced, and that the two na-
tions are now at war. As war exists, and, notwithstanding all
36 Eiehardson, op. tit., IV, 441.
37 Diary of James E. Polk, I, 9, 12.
I 13.
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our efforts to avoid it, exists by the act of Mexico herself, we
are called upon by every consideration of duty and patriotism
to vindicate with decision the honor, the rights, and the interests
of our country. . . In further vindication of our rights and
defense of our territory, I invoke the prompt action of Congress
to recognize the existence of war, and to place at the disposition
of the Executive the means of prosecuting the war with vigor,
and thus hastening the restoration of peace.
' ' 39
Even before the President asked Congress thus to
"
recognize
the existence of war," his instructions of the year before had
been carried out, two battles had been fought,40 and the war
was already being carried on without any declaration or au-
thorization by Congress. In Congress, in fact, the President's
statement that "war exists by act of Mexico," and his conse-
quent assumption that the war would be a "defensive" one,
were not accepted without dispute. Senator Benton, for exam-
ple, was willing to vote men and money for defense of American
territory, but was not prepared to make aggressive war on Mex-
ico. He left it to be inferred that he did not think the territory
of the United States extended west of the Nueces Eiver, and
therefore he had not approved Taylor's occupation of the re-
gion.*
1
Mr. Morehead (of Kentucky) denied that war could exist
without some prior action on the part of Congress.
' ' If war does
now exist," he said,
"
if the people of the United States now
find themselves in a state of war with Mexico, it is a war which
has not been brought about or declared by the legislative de-
partment of the United States, to which constitutionally the pow-
er of declaring war belongs. The President of the United States
has no constitutional power to involve the nation in war. But
if war does exist at this time between the United States and
Mexico, it may follow that the President of the United States
may involve the country in war without the assent of the legis-
39 Eichardson, op. tit., IV, 442, 443.
* Palo Alto and Resaca de la Palma, on May 8 and 9, respectively.
*i Diary of James K. Polk, I, 390. Benton also suggested that a peace-
able adjustment might be had, referring to the proclamation of the Presi-
dent ad interim of Mexico denying his own right to declare war but leav-
ing it to the consideration of the Mexican Congress. See Benton 's Abridg-
ment of the Debates of Congress, XV, 499.
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lative department of the Government." 42 Mr. Archer (of Vir-
ginia) likewise declared that the intervention of Congress was
absolutely indispensable to constitute war, that the existence of
hostilities on one of the frontiers of the United States did not
necessarily put us in a state of war with a foreign power; that
the President's statement could not alone be accepted as indicat-
ing a state of war, since an investigation might show the state
of things on the Rio Grande to be misunderstood and the Mexican
authorities to have acted justifiably; that if the President's
statement were to be accepted as a legal and constitutional ac-
ceptation of a state of war, then the officers and men on the Rio
Grande might involve the country in war at their pleasure.43
The most vigorous assailant of the President 's declaration was
Calhoun, who insisted that ' ' in the sense of the Constitution war
could be declared only by Congress," that only through its au-
thority could the state of things called "war" be announced to
the country and the world. "War must be made," he said, "by
the sovereign authority, which in this case, were the Mexican
Congress, on the one side, and the American Congress, on the
other. The President of Mexico could not make war. It could
be done only by the two countries. Even if the two Presidents
had declared war, the nations could disavow the act." He de-
clared it was "monstrous" that he should be asked to affirm
"that a local rencontre, not authorized by the act of either Gov-
ernment, constituted a state of war between the Government of
Mexico and the Government of the United States to say that,
by a certain military movement of General Taylor and General
Arista, every citizen of the United States was made the enemy
of every man in Mexico. . . It stripped Congress of the
power of making war; and, what was more and worse, it gave
that power to every officer, nay, to every subaltern commanding
a corporal 's guard.
' ' 44
The President was, of course, not lacking in supporters,
among them General Cass, who took direct issue with Calhoun.
"There can be no hostilities undertaken by a government," he
said, "which do not constitute a state of war. War is a fact,
created by an effort made by one nation to injure another. One
"Benton's Debates, XV, 489, 492.
Ibid., 489, 490.
" Ibid., 491, 497, 500.
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party may make a war, though it requires two parties to make a
peace.
' ' While admitting that Congress alone has a right to de-
clare war, and that "no authority but Congress can commence
an aggressive war," yet he asserted that another country "can
commence a war against us without the co-operation of Con-
gress," that it can, "at its pleasure, terminate the relations of
peace with us, and substitute for these the relations of war, with
their legitimate consequences. War may be commenced with or
without a previous declaration. It may be commenced by a
manifesto announcing the fact to the world, or by hostile attacks
by land or sea." Whether or not the disputed territory right-
fully belonged to the United States or to Mexico made no differ-
ence, in the opinion of Cass. The ultimate claim to the country
was a matter for diplomatic adjustment, but the United States
was meanwhile in possession, and any attempt to dislodge her
forces was an act of aggression and an act of war. Hence he
argued that the war became for the United States one of
defense.45
Under the stress of the patriotic feelings aroused by the shed-
ding of American blood, and under the plea that the war was
strictly one of defense, Congress sustained the President, rec-
ognized a state of war as already existing by act of Mexico, and
authorized the carrying on of hostilities.
46 The House of Rep-
resentatives, about two years later, passed a resolution
' ' that the
war was unnecessarily and unconstitutionally begun by the
President of the United States." 47
Lincoln's proclamation of blockade of the Southern ports in
April, 1861, again raised the question of the President's power
to recognize the existence of a state of war without a declaration
by Congress. The situation was all the more peculiar, in that
this was not a foreign war, but an insurrection, and therefore a
blockade of the Southern ports was really a blockade of the na-
tion's own ports, something unknown to international law.
Nevertheless, the Supreme Court, in the decision of the Prize
*sBenton's Debates, XV, 503, 504.
46 Act of May 13, 1846. 9 Stat. at L., 9.
See amendment! of Mr. Ashmun to resolution of thanks to Gen. Tay-
lor, adopted Jan. 3, 1848. On Feb. 14, 1848, the House tabled a motion to
expunge this amendment from the Journal. Cong. Globe, 30 Cong., 1 Sess.,
95, 343-344.
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Cases already referred to, sustained the validity of the Presi-
dent's action, and asserted his right to recognize a state of war
as already existing, and to take measures of defense in advance
of Congressional authority. "A civil war is never solemnly de-
clared,
' '
said the Court,
' '
it becomes such by its accidents the
number, power, and organization of the persons who originate
and carry it on. . . As a civil war is never publicly pro-
claimed eo nomine against insurgents, its actual existence is a
fact in our domestic history which the Court is bound to notice
and to know. The true test of its existence . . . may be
thus summarily stated: When the regular course of justice is
interrupted by revolt, rebellion, or insurrection, so that the
Courts of Justice cannot be kept open, civil war exists and hostil-
ities may be prosecuted on the same footing as if those opposing
the Government were foreign enemies invading the land." The
Court held that the question of fact as to when an insurrection
hasweached such alarming proportions as to be called a war and
the insurgents to be accorded the character of belligerents, is a
question to be decided by the President in his capacity as Com-
mander-in-Chief . The Court would be governed by the decisions
and acts of the political department to which the power was en-
trusted. "The proclamation of blockade," said the Court, "is
itself official and conclusive evidence to the Court that a state
of war existed which demanded and authorized a recourse to
such a measure under the circumstances peculiar to the case.
' ' 48
The Court thus in effect held that, while the existence of a state
of war was necessary to the validity of a blockade, the fact that
a blockade had been proclaimed was proof that a state of war
existed; and the President having authority to proclaim the
blockade, was thereby empowered to declare the existence of a
war, and bind the Court and the country to his declaration.
Four justices, including Chief-Justice Taney, dissented
vigorously from this opinion. They argued that, altho Con-
gress had conferred upon the President authority to meet sud-
den emergencies to repel invasions and suppress insurrec-
tions that authority did not invest him with the war power.
If so, they maintained, then we are in a state of war every time
a military force is called out, "for the nature of the power can-
** Prize Cases, 2 Black, 635, 666, 667, 670 (1862).
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not depend upon the numbers called out." "The Acts of 1795
and 1807,
' '
they said,
' ' did not, and could not under the Consti-
tution, confer on the President the power of declaring war
against a State of this Union, or of deciding that war existed. . .
This great power is reserved to the legislative department by
the express words of the Constitution, and cannot be delegated
or surrendered to the Executive." The minority held, there-
fore, that if the insurrection were to be placed on the footing
of a war, within the meaning of the Constitution, and be accord-
ed belligerent rights under international law, it must be recog-
nized or declared as a war by the war making power of the Gov-
ernment, that is, by Congress. "There is no difference in this
respect," said the justices, "between a civil and a public war."49
Such an eminent authority as Professor Willoughby is inclin-
ed to agree with the minority rather than with the majority of
the Court. He says that while all nations have the power and
right, in case of a civil contest in another State, to determine
whether the struggle is to be treated as a war and the contestants
as belligerents, yet the State concerned is not bound by such
action and may continue to treat the insurgents as rebels. There-
fore, he says, "it would seem that, in the United States, from the
constitutional viewpoint, it should lie with the war-declaring
power, that is, with Congress, to determine when the civil strug-
gle should be recognized as a war.
' ' 50
Whether or not we agree with Professor Willoughby and the
minority of the Court as presenting the most logical argument
from a strictly constitutional standpoint, the decision of the
majority stands as law in the United States, as it also represents
the more practical point of view. The Constitution, made as it
was by practical men who had just emerged from a long, hard
struggle of defense, must be construed as giving the power to
take measures for defense as quickly as those measures may be
needed. While the decision of the Court in this case upheld
particularly the President's power to recognize an insurrection
as a "state of war" and undertake the necessary defensive meas-
ures in that case without authority from Congress, the principle
has also been held to apply to foreign wars as well. "In fact,"
says one authority, "according to the terms of the judicial de-
Prize Cases, 2 Black, 688-689, 690-693.
co Willoughby, Constitutional Law, II, 797.
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cision just cited, a President who conducts affairs with a foreign
power, so as skillfully to lead it to attack the United States, can
always engage the action of the country and inaugurate defen-
sive war. In a word, his remaining on the defensive is all that
is required to authorize him to act.
' ' 51
It has been noted how the power of defense has been assumed
and asserted by the Executive, in varying degree, as a necessary
and inherent function of his office. The law and practise are
thus in accord as to the nature and location of the power. With
regard to the extent to which the President may constitutionally
exercise this power of defense, Professor Corwin draws an
analogy between this Presidential power and the right of a state
under international law to self-preservation, and concludes that
while the power is theoretically reserved for
"
grave and sud-
den emergencies," in practise it is limited only by the "powers
of Congress and public opinion.
' ' 52
si Chambrun, The Executive Power, 121-122. Cf. McClain, Constitutional
Law in the United States, 190; Schouler, Constitutional Studies, 139; Ogg
& Beard, National Governments and the World War, 102; Senate Document
No. 56, 54 Cong., 2 Sess., 5.
52 The President's Control of Foreign Relations, 156.
CHAPTER V
POWERS WITH REGARD TO A DECLARATION OF WAR
The Constitution gives to Congress the power "to declare war,
grant letters of marque and reprisal, and make rules concern-
ing captures on land and water.
' ' x Those functions were not
granted to Congress as a matter of course, but only after much
serious thought and discussion. The Congress under the Con-
federation had the "sole and exclusive right and power of de-
termining on peace and war ;
" 2 but the decision in the Con-
vention of 1787 to create separate and distinct departments of
government in pursuance of Montesquieu's theory of the sep-
aration of powers, opened up anew the whole matter of the prop-
er functioning of each department, including the question of
the proper depository for the war-making functions.
Hamilton had suggested, in his plan presented quite early
in the course of the Convention,3 that the power of declaring
war should be vested exclusively in the Senate,
4 but the report
of the Committee of Detail gave to the Legislature as a whole
the power
' '
to make war. ' ' 5 When this clause came up for
consideration on August 17, it became a subject for warm de-
bate. Mr. Pinkney opposed vesting the power in the Legislature,
whose proceedings he said were too slow ; the House of Represen-
tatives he thought too numerous a body for such deliberations;
and hence he agreed with Hamilton that the Senate was the best
depository.
6 Mr. Butler thought the objections against the Leg-
1 Art. I, Sec. 8, 01. 11.
2 Articles of Confederation, Art IX, in Macdonald's Documentary
Source-Book of American History, 199.
s June 18.
* Madison's Journal (Hunt ed.), I, 163.
s Ibid., II, 82.
6 Pinkney had earlier in the Convention (June 1) expressed his fear of
extending the
' '
powers of peace and war
' ' to the Executive, which he said
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islature would operate in great degree also against the Senate,
and favored vesting the power in the President, "who will have
all the requisite qualities and will not make war but when the
nation will support it." Mr. Sherman, on the other hand,
thought the Executive should not be able to commence war ; and
Mr. Gerry "never expected to hear in a republic a motion to
empower the Executive alone to declare war." Mr. Mason like-
wise thought the Executive was not safely to be trusted with
the war power, nor was the Senate in his opinion so constructed
as to be entitled to it. "He was for clogging rather than fa-
cilitating war ; but for facilitating peace.
" As a final conclusion,
the word "declare" was substituted for the word "make," and
the power "to declare war" was entrusted to the Legislative
body. 7
It seemed evident to the makers of the Constitution that a
power involving such tremendous consequences must in a repre-
sentative government rest with the body most directly repre-
sentative of the people. To vest the power of declaring war in
the Executive savored too much of monarchy and of old-world
institutions. Few have disputed the wisdom of that theory, few
would do so today. Nevertheless, such an intense American as
John Quincy Adams, spoke in 1817 of the provision which con-
fers upon the legislative the power of declaring war as "that
error in the Constitution" and a piece of "clumsy political ma-
chinery." He thought that, in the theory of government ac-
cording to Montesquieu and Rousseau, the power of declaring
war is
"strictly an Executive act." 8
It is believed that a brief examination will show, that tho the
power to begin war through a formal declaration is clearly and
definitely framed to Congress, the President is by no means
excluded from all share in such declaration. A declaration of
war is a simple legislative act, going through the same proced-
ure as any other legislative measure, and requiring no extraor-
dinary majority for its passage. 9 The President has therefore
would render the Executive a ' ' monarchy of the worst kind, to wit, an
elective one." Madison's Journal (Hunt ed.), II, 49.
7 For the debate on this entiro proposition, see Ibid., II, 187-189; Far-
rand's Eecords of the Federal Convention, II, 318-320.
8 Memoirs of John Quincy Adams, IV, 32; but cf. XII, 51.
9 It is rather curious to note that Jefferson was for a time under the
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all the rights and powers in connection with a declaration of
war that he has with regard to matters of ordinary legislation.
Judge Baldwin 10 remarks that there may be said to be three
stages in a declaration of war: (1) Doings of the President in
informing Congress of the state of relations with the Power
against which war may be declared; (2) doings of Congress in
making the declaration; and (3) approval of the declaration by
the President.
In the first place, then, the President, under the constitutional
provision requiring that he "shall from time to time give to
the Congress information of the state of the Union, and recom-
mend to their consideration such measures as he shall judge
necessary and expedient,
" " is empowered to recommend a
declaration of war, first communicating to Congress the facts
and circumstances that in his opinion call for such declaration.
The President, through this power of giving information to
Congress and of recommending measures to be taken, may large-
ly influence that body in determining upon war or peace. He
may withhold certain information, the disclosure of which would
vitally affect the action of Congress. He may, if he is desirous
of war, reveal only such information as will tend to inflame
congressional opinion, or he may select a moment for his dis-
closures and recommendations when opinion is excited and ready
to hear the worst.
Thus Jefferson charged that President Adams ''kept out of
sight in his speech" (of May 16, 1797) 12 Spanish protests and
demands, and "thereby left it to be imagined that France is the
only power of whom we are in danger ; ' ' that the Executive had
war in contemplation, with the expectation that the legislature
"might catch the flame;" that the convocation of Congress13
impression that a two-thirds majority was required to pass a declaration of
war. He later admitted his error on this point. Writings of Thomas Jef-
ferson, VII, 220, 222, 243-244. The New York ratifying convention of
1788 proposed an amendment requiring a two-thirds majority of each house
to declare war, and a similar amendment was proposed by the Hartford
Convention in 1814, neither of which received any serious consideration.
See The Federalist (Ford ed.), Appendix, 643, 689.
10 S. E. Baldwin,
' ' The Share of the President in a Declaration of War, ' '
Am. Jour. Int. Law, XII, 1-14.
11 Art. II, Sec. 3.
12 Richardson, Messages and Papers of the Presidents, I, 233-239.
is Congress had been summoned to meet in special session May 15, 1797.
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was in fact only "an experiment on the temper of the Nation,
to see if it was in unison. ' ' 14 Both Jefferson and Madison charg-
ed that the X Y Z correspondence was laid before Congress for
the particular purpose of arousing the war temper of that body
and of the country. In his message of March 19, 1798,15 the
President, without revealing the content of the famous despatch-
es, spoke pessimistically about the accomplishments of the mis-
sion to France, urged the adoption of defensive measures, and
announced the action he himself proposed to take. Referring to
this message, Madison wrote :
' ' The Constitution supposes, what
the History of all Governments demonstrates, that the Executive
is the branch of power most interested in war, and most prone
to it. It has accordingly with studied care, vested the question
of war in the Legislature. But the Doctrines lately advanced 16
strike at the root of all these provisions and will deposit the
peace of the Country in that Department which the Constitu-
tion distrusts as most ready without cause to renounce it. For if
the opinion of the President,17 not the facts and proofs them-
selves, are to sway the judgment of Congress in declaring war,
. . . it is evident that the people are cheated out of the best
ingredients in their Government, the safeguards of peace which
is the greatest of their blessings.
' ' 18
Madison was equally vigorous in referring to the actual revela-
tion of the famous papers. "It is easy to foresee," he wrote,
"the zeal and plausibility with which this part of the despatch-
es will be inculcated, not only for the general purpose of en-
forcing the war measures of the Executive, but for the particu-
i* Writings of Thomas Jefferson, VII, 126, 138-139, 146, 148-149.
is Kichardson, op. cit., I, 264-265.
* 6 Madison evidently refers here to the proposed measures of defense,
especially the announcement of Adams that armed merchantmen of the
United States would now be permitted to sail, whereas before the collec-
tors had instructions to hold such vessels in port. See Richardson, op. cit.,
I, 265; also supra, 67-68.
" Adams had expresed his opinion, formed from an examination of the
correspondence, that the objects of the mission to France could not be
accomplished ' ' on terms compatible with the safety, the honor, or the es-
sential interests of the nation,
' ' and that the nation should prepare for
defense. Eichardson, op. cit., I, 264. It should be remembered that the
correspondence had not yet been laid before Congress.
Writings of James Madison, VI, 312-313.
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lar purpose of diverting the public attention from the more im-
portant part, which shows the speech and conduct of the Presi-
dent to be now the great obstacle to accommodation. . . The
readiness with which the papers were communicated and the
quarter proposing the call for them, 19 would be entitled to praise
if a mass of other circumstances did not force a belief that the
view in both was more to inflame than to inform the public
mind." 20
A study of the debates in Congress shows that Jefferson and
Madison were not alone in their contention that the President
was manipulating the situation and molding Congress to war.
Mr. Livingston suggested that since Congress had been practical-
ly called upon to decide between peace and war, it was entitled to
see the whole correspondence.
' ' The right to judge what it was
proper to publish in consideration of the public safety and in-
terest, should not be transferred to the President, as he might
withhold such parts of the papers as might prevent a correct
judgment being formed upon them. ' ' 21 Mr. Gallatin had op-
posed the call for the papers and favored going ahead at once
to determine on peace or war, since, as he said, "if it had first
been determined to call for further information, how did he
know that it would be given, or, if given, whether, it would be in
a mutilated state, rather than which he would choose to act with-
out it upon the Message of the President alone. . . It was true,
when the concessions were made known, it was possible that he
might differ in opinion from the President as to their reasonable-
ness; but this House has no control over the President in this
respect. Therefore, the information which he has given to the
House is sufficient for them
;
and they ought now to say whether
they will go to war or remain in peace.
' ' 22 Many members ex-
pressed their belief that the President 's message was tantamount
to a declaration of war against France.
23
! The X Y Z correspondence was submitted to Congress April 3, 1798,
in response to a resolution of the House calling for the same, passed April
2. See Annals of Cong., 5 Cong., II, 1370, 1371.
20 Writings of James Madison, VI, 316; cf. Writings of Thomas Jeffer-
son, VII, 235-236.
21 Annals of Cong., 5 Cong., II, 1359.
22 Ibid., 1363.
23 See, for example, the remarks of Giles and Gallatin. Annals of Cong.,
5 Cong., II, 1323, 1364.
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In fact, the messages and actions of the President were con-
sidered as so inflammatory of the war passions, that Mr. Sprigg
of Maryland, in order to counteract that effect, proposed a reso-
lution "that it is not expedient for the United States to resort
to war against the Republic of France.
' ' 24 Such a negative
resolution was very unusual, and its propriety was strongly ques-
tioned, both in Congress and out. 25 Madison admitted that it
was "in ordinary cases . . . certainly ineligible," but he
thought that cases might obviously arise for which it was prop-
er: "1. Where nothing less than a declaration of pacific in-
tentions from the department entrusted with the power of war,
will quiet the apprehensions of the constituent body, or remove
an uncertainty which subjects one part of them to the speculat-
ing arts of another; 2. where it may be a necessary antidote to
the hostile measures or language of the Executive Depart-
ment . . .
;
3. where public measures or appearances may mis-
lead another nation into distrust of the real object of them, the
error ought to be corrected; and in our Government where the
question of peace or war lies with Congress, a satisfactory ex-
planation cannot issue from any other Department.
' ' 2G Madison
and a large number in Congress were convinced that an obvious
case had arisen, that the President was deliberately trying to
lead Congress into a declaration of war.
Whatever the truth in these charges against Adams, the above-
mentioned resolution failed of passage, and it is clear that when
the crisis was at its height in 1798, the President had brought
matters to a point where "both Houses were safely committed to
any policy of vigor which he would recommend. '
' 27 The senti-
ment of Congress was perhaps best expressed by Mr. Otis when
he said that "the President having declared his opinion that
there is no hope of success from that mission, he wished for noth-
ing further to convince him of the propriety of going into the
different defensive measures proposed.
' ' 28 Under the Presi-
dent 's leadership, therefore, acts of hostility were authorized,
29
24 Annals of Cong., 5 Cong., II, 1319.
25 See the debate on the resolution. Ibid., 1319-1357.
26 Writings of James Madison, VI, 317-318.
27
Bassett, The Federalist System, 237.
28 Annals of Cong., 5 Cong., II, 1370.
29 Acts of May 28 and July 9, 1798. Ibid., 5 Cong., Ill, App., 3733,
3754.
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and for more than two years a ''limited or imperfect war" was
carried on.30 Even so, peace was undoubtedly "the first
object of the nation," as Jefferson had grudgingly acknowledg-
ed,
31 no formal declaration was asked for or made, and Adams is
generally credited with having "probably saved the country
from war and from internal dissensions." 32 Certainly there
was not a moment during his entire administration when Adams,
by a word, might not have secured from Congress a declaration
of war. He refrained from speaking the word, and a disastrous
war was avoided.
President Jefferson was also able to prevent a declaration of
war during his administration, tho under somewhat different
circumstances. The long series of incidents arising from
the strained relations with Great Britain had culminated on
June 22, 1807, in the attack of the Leopard upon the Chesapeake.
The country was aroused as it had not been since the battle of
Lexington.33 "Never," says an eminent historian, "had a more
just cause for war been given to any people. Never had a people
called more loudly for war.
' ' 34
Jefferson believed that it was strictly within the province of
Congress to determine whether the outrage was a proper cause
of war, and that the Executive should be careful not to perform
any act that would commit Congress to a particular course. He
might therefore have summoned Congress at once to meet in
special session to consider the extraordinary situation that had
arisen. Jefferson and his Cabinet knew, however, that were
Congress to meet while the excitement was at its height, it would
be difficult to prevent an immediate declaration of war, or at
least some action that would hopelessly embarrass the negotiations
about to begin at London. He hoped that a delay would bring
cooler counsels and some chance for adjustment, that, "having
taught so many useful lessons to Europe, we may . . . add
that of showing them that there are peacable means of repress-
ing injustice, by making it to the interest of the aggressor to do
so Bos v, Tingy, 4 Ball., 37 (1800) ; Gray v. United States, 21 Ct. of CL,
340 (1886), in Scott's Cases on International Law, 452.
si Writings, VII, 149.
32 Bassett, op. cit., 251; cf. also Bascom, Growth of Nationality, 26.
33 Writings of Thomas Jefferson, IX, 105.
SyncMaster, History of the People of the United States, III, 262.
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what is just, and abstain from future wrong.
' ' 35 He therefore
issued a proclamation setting forth the grievances of the United
States and declaring the ports closed to the armed ships of Eng-
land;
36
but, under the pretence that Washington was too sickly
a place for Congress to come to in the summer, its date for as-
sembling was fixed at October 26. 37
The delay proved useful. The British government sent a
minister to adjust the Chesapeake affair, recalled the Admiral
who gave the order for the attack, and disavowed his act. 38 Thus
Jefferson, if he did not succeed in finally averting a war with
Great Britain, at least, by refusing to summon Congress at the
moment of excitement, delayed the war for several years.
President Madison aroused the war passion of Congress in
1812 by submitting to it the "Henry correspondence," which
aimed to show that Great Britain was attempting to sever the
New England states from the Union. 39 The British Government
denied any connection with the Henry mission ; no evidence was
produced to show that the New England states had contemplated
any plan of secession ; and the Federalists charged that the en-
tire affair had been trumped up by Madison in order to augment
the feeling for war, evidence being produced to show that the
President had paid $50,000 for the papers. 40 Madison, however,
was slow in taking advantage of the war passion he had thus
aroused. Congress, now thoroly in favor of war, fumed and fret-
ted at the delay, but hesitated to act without a recommendation
from the President. Finally, a delegation from Congress, headed
by Clay, waited upon the President and declared the readiness
of the majority in Congress to vote the war, if recommended. 41
ss Writings, IX, 87-88.
so Richardson, op. tit., I, 422.
37 Ibid., 424.
ss McMaster, op. tit., Ill, 263, 269-270.
30 For the Henry correspondence, see Annals of Cong,, 12 Cong., I, 1162-
1181; for Madison's message, Richardson, op. tit., I, 498.
*o Updyke, Diplomacy of the War of 1812, 126-127.
*i Writings of James Madison, VIII, 192, n; Joseph Gale's account in
Am. Hist. Eev., XIII, 309; cf. also accounts in Hildreth, History of Hie
United States, VI, 298; VonHolst, Constitutional and Political History of
the United States, I, 230 ;. McMaster, op. tit., Ill, 448 all to the effect
that Madison was promised a renomination if he would send Congress a war
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Thereupon Madison sent a special message June 1, 1812, recom-
mending war,42 to which Congress responded by passing the dec-
laration on June 18.
The significance of this is not so much in the apparent domina-
tion of the President by the majority element in Congress, as in
the fact that Congress, even tho fully convinced of the necessity
for war and fully determined upon such action, yet found itself
unwilling to act without first securing the recommendation of
the President. Had the President been less hasty in passing
judgment upon, and submitting to Congress, the Henry corres-
pondence, the authenticity of which had at least not been thoroly
established; had he delayed his war message a little longer, the
new conciliatory attitude of the British Government might have
been met and the war of 1812 very likely altogether averted.
These are the facts that John Adams probably had in mind when
he wrote in 1815: "Mr. Madison's administration has proved
great points, long disputed in Europe and America.
1. He has proved that an administration under our present
Constitution can declare war.
2. That it can make peace. . .
" 43
President Polk came into office in 1845 with the avowed pur-
pose of acquiring California and, later, also New Mexico. He
tried first to secure them peacefully by purchase, and for that
purpose sought an appropriation of a million dollars from Con-
gress, concealing the real object under the euphemistic phrases
of "effecting an adjustment of our differences with Mexico,"
and ' ' the conclusion of a Treaty of boundary.
' ' 44
Failing in
this, Polk, as early as February, 1846, declared himself in favor
of "strong measures" against Mexico, and from that time was
steadily determined on war. 45 The sending of a war message
was postponed, however, partly because of the unsettled state of
the negotiations with Great Britain over the Oregon question,
but probably rather because Polk was seeking something that
might serve as a plausible cause for war.
*z Writings, VIII, 192-200 ; Bichardson, op. tit., I, 499-505.
*3 Life and Works of John Adams, X, 167-168.
*4McMaster, op. cit., VII, 432, 439; Beeves, American Diplomacy under
Tyler and Polk, 272 ; Diary of James E. Polk, I, 34-35, 303, 306-308, 310-
313, 317.
46 Beeves, op. cit., 284, 287, 288, 294; Bhodes, Historical Essays, 211;
Diary of James K. Polk, I, 233-234, 319, 337, 343.
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Certain sundry claims of American citizens upon Mexico had
been a matter of difficulty and negotiation between the two gov-
ernments since 1836,
46 and were still largely unsettled. The
President now hit upon these claims as the "aggravated wrongs"
which should be the basis for the complaints against Mexico,41
altho "many of the claims were exorbitant and some of them
fraudulent. ' ' 48 Meanwhile, General Taylor had been sent to
occupy the disputed territory beyond the Nueces River, had ad-
vanced to a position opposite Matamoras where a strong Mexi-
can force was located, and Polk seemed to think there was some
hope of a collision in the near future,49 which would give him
more satisfactory ground for his war message.
For some time, however, no hostilities occurred, the President
became impatient of delay, and on May 9 the Cabinet agreed that
a message recommending war should be prepared and submitted
by the following Tuesday (May 12), whether the Mexican forces
had committed any act of hostility against Taylor or not. Bu-
chanan, the Secretary of State, had already drawn up a state-
ment of the causes of complaint, the President had decided to
substitute practically the precise language he himself had used
in dealing with the Mexican claims in his annual message of the
year before, when suddenly the situation was changed by the re-
ceipt of news that same evening from Taylor that the Mexicans
had attacked and hostilities had begun. The Cabinet was immed-
iately summoned again, and it was agreed that a message should
be sent recommending
' '
vigorous and prompt measures to enable
the Executive to prosecute the war." 50
Folk's opportunity had come. He recognized that "public ex-
citement in and out of Congress was very naturally very great ;
' '
unlike Jefferson, he determined to play upon that feeling, so he
spent Sunday in writing his message, and on Monday, May 11,
it was submitted to Congress. There was now no mention of the
long-unsettled claims as the "aggravated wrongs" borne by the
United States
;
the entire emphasis was laid on the fact that the
Mexicans had attacked American forces and shed American blood
* Beeves, op. tit., 76, 86, 93, 96, 107-108.
47 Diary of James K. Polk, I, 363, 377, 382.
Beeves, op. cit., 86.
4 Diary of James K. Polk, I, 380 (May 6, 1846).
so Ibid., 384-386.
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on American soil, and that since war had thus been begun by
Mexico, the issue must be accepted and hostilities carried on with
vigor.
51
In spite of the fact that there had been, and still was, bitter
opposition in Congress to a war with Mexico,52 the President's
message was quickly responded to. In two hours, of which time
one and a half hours were occupied in reading the documents ac-
companying the President's message, the House of Representa-
tives passed the bill reciting that war existed by act of Mexico
and providing for the support of hostilities. 53 The Senate could
not be hurried quite so rapidly, but by evening of the next day
(May 12), it had also given its sanction; and the President's ac-
tions were sustained.
Whether or not Congress would have sustained the President
and authorized hostilities, had not the news from Taylor changed
the situation from an admitted war of aggression to an osten-
sible war of defense, it is impossible to say with any degree of
certainty. Certainly, as Reeves suggests, "Taylor's skirmish
with the Mexicans was an occurrence that saved Polk from a
dangerous situation.
' ' 54
Nevertheless, Polk had been able to so
handle matters as to make an armed collision almost inevitable,
and he took advantage of the excitement thus aroused to secure
from an unwilling Congress a strong backing for his war policy.
His actions, says Rhodes, "illustrate the power inherent in the
executive office. ' ' 55 Certainly, but for the action of the President,
the war would not have been sanctioned by Congress ; because of
the action of the President, the war was sanctioned, and the
objects sought by the President were obtained.
Had President Grant been eager for war with Great Britain,
a mere message and recommendation from him to that effect
would undoubtedly have brought on such a conflict. The unani-
mous passage by the House of Representatives in 1866 of a bill
modifying the neutrality laws in such a way as to permit the
si Richardson, op. cit., TV, 437-443.
62 A motion in the House of Representatives for a formal declaration of
war was rejected by a large majority. Cong. Globe, 29 Cong., 1 Sess., 792,
794.
53 Statement of Senator Benton. Diary of James K. Polk, I, 392.
54 Reeves, op. cit., 298.
55 Historical Essays, 212.
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sale of war-ships and munitions to other powers ;56 the sympathy
and support given to the Fenian movement aginst Canada ; the
resolution proposed in the Senate in 1867 for the recognition to
Abyssinia during its war with Great Britain of the same rights
which Great Britain had recognized to the Confederacy;57 the
action of the Senate in 1869 in rejecting by a vote of 54-1 the
treaty providing for a joint high commission to pass upon the
claims of subjects of either government against the other ; 58
speeches such as that of Senator Sumner delivered during the
consideration of the above-mentioned treaty;59 the angry and
excited discussion in the press of the two countries these vari-
ous incidents showed that the bitter feeling aroused against Great
Britain during the Civil War had assumed hostile form ;60 that,
as an eminent authority has expressed it,
' ' in the opinion of the
majority, the country had just cause for war in the escape of the
Alabama and the Florida. ' '61
The President and his wise Secretary of State, Hamilton Fish,
chose to disregard this sentiment of the country and of Congress
for an unyielding and belligerent attitude towards Great Britain.
On the other hand, the two points in the American case which
had given special offense to the British were allowed to recede
into the background, if not conceded altogether,62 negotiations
were persistently carried on for the arbitration of the Alabama
and Florida claims, and the peace was preserved.
President Cleveland, on the other hand, very nearly precipita-
ted war with England, when in his special message of December
17, 1895,
63 he made his strong declaration with regard to the
Venezuelan boundary situation. The President stated that arbi-
56 Cong. Globe, 39 Cong., 1 Sess., Pt. V, 4194, 4197. See See. 10, which
was the addition. The debate on the bill shows that it was aimed particu-
larly at Great Britain.
57 Ibid., 40 Cong., 1 Sess., 810.
58 Sen. Ex. Jour., XVII, 163.
59 On April 13, 1869. Works of Charles Sumner, XIII, 53-93.
eo Cf. Dunning, Reconstruction: Political and Economic, 160-162.
ei Rhodes, Historical Essays, 218-219.
62 These were the claim that wrong had been done to the United States
by the recognition of the Confederates as belligerents, and the demand for
compensation for
' ' national " or " indirect ' ' losses. See Dunning, op. cit.,
167.
es Eichardson, op. cit., IX, 655-658.
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tration had been declined by Great Britain, and proposed an
independent inquiry and report by a strictly American commis-
sion. ''When such report is made and accepted," he said, "it
will, in my opinion, be the duty of the United States to resist
by every means in its power, as a willful aggression upon its
rights and interests, the appropriation by Great Britain of any
lands or the exercise of any governmental jurisdiction over any
territory which after investigation we have determined of right
belongs to Venezuela.
' ' 64 Tho the country had up to this time
been ignorant of the peremptory demands of the administration,
and the message threatening war came therefore as an unexpect-
ed shock;65 tho Congress and the President had heretofore
quarreled over almost every question of consequence, Congress
now sustained the President in his demands and passed almost
without debate, the bill for the appointment of the commission
asked for.66
It is not important in this connection whether or not the Presi-
dent had made a valid interpretation and a correct application
of the Monroe Doctrine. The important thing to notice is that
he had raised an issue which meant simply this, that if arbitra-
tion were refused by Great Britain, the United States would mark
the boundaries of one of her colonies and compel the mother-
country to accept the limits so prescribed ; that a hostile Congress
had accepted without question the issue so raised ; and that the
President had thereby placed the United States and Great Brit-
ain unexpectedly in a position where one or the other must open-
ly recede from its announced intention, if a conflict was to be
averted. A conflict was averted, but only by reason of England's
conciliatory agreement to arbitrate ; and it is worthy of note that,
as one authority has expressed it, "only in the case where he
(Cleveland) was led, by whatever influences, to offer a gross in-
sult to Great Britain, such as would not have been borne for a
moment by this country from any other without prompt resent-
ment, did he receive the unanimous support of both houses.
' ' 67
* Bichardson, op. cit., IX, 658.
65 Dewey, National Problems, 308; Latane, From Isolation to Leader-
ship, 49.
eCong. Record, XXVIII, Pt. I (54 Cong., 1 Bess.), 234-235, 255-265;
Dewey, op. cit., 310.
67 Bradford, TJte Lesson of Popular Government, I, 358, n. Other au-
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In the case of the difficulties with Spain over the Cuban ques-
tion, it has been said that "Presidents Cleveland and McKinley
kept the national legislature from a declaration of hostilities for
more than two years before final action was taken.
" 68 It is true
that the temper of Congress was for war long before the Presi-
dent was ready to recommend such a step ; it is likewise undoubt-
edly true that the President might have delayed such recommen-
dation still longer, and possibly almost certainly have avert-
ed war altogether.
Congress in 1890 had, by concurrent resolution, requested the
President ' ' to invite from time to time, as fit occasions may arise,
negotiations with any government with which the United States
has or may have diplomatic relations, to the end that any differ-
ences or disputes arising between the two governments which can-
not be adjusted by diplomatic agency may be referred to arbitra-
tion, and be peaceably adjusted by such means. ' '69 In the spring
of 1898 Spain had made several concessions, which, according to
eminent authority, "fully covered" the expressed wishes of the
United States for Cuba,70 and on March 31, she proposed arbitra-
tion of the Maine controversy. 71 General Woodford, the Amer-
ican minister to Spain, evidently did not consider the situation
hopeless, for he wrote : "I know that the Queen and her present
ministry sincerely desire peace and that the Spanish people de-
sire peace, and if you can still give me time and liberty of action
I will get for you the peace you desire so much and for which
you have labored so hard ;
" 72 and on April 10, in a personal
appeal to the President : "I hope that nothing will now be done
to humiliate Spain, as I am satisfied that the present Government
is going, and is loyally ready to go, as fast and as far as it
can." 73
thorities say that President Cleveland, in this instance, recommended "de-
mands Great Britain could hardly regard as anything but unfriendly."
Ogg & Beard, National Governments and the World War, 102.
68 Young, The New American Government and Its Work, 27.
69 Yale Eev., IX, 402.
70 For these concessions of March 30, March 31, and April 9, see For.
Eel. 1898, 725, 762, 750; cf. also Benton, International Law and Diplomacy
of the Spanish American War, 83-91.
71 Benton, op. cit., 85.
" For. Eel. 1898, 732.
id., 747.
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But neither the above-mentioned resolution of Congress, the
overtures of Spain, the proffered mediation of the Powers,74 nor
the pleading of the American minister, had any effect on the
President. No reply was made to the offer of arbitration, 75 and on
April 11, the message recommending war went to Congress, with
the usual and natural response. The vital question, says Benton,
is ''whether the President did not yield prematurely and whether
he had exhausted the resources of diplomacy ;
" 76 he answers
that question by saying that in the opinion of nearly all writers
on international law the particular form of intervention in 1898
was "unfortunate, irregular, precipitate, and unjust to Spain." 77
The influence of President Wilson with regard to the events of
the recent world war, and the readiness of Congress to follow
his recommendations to be a "peace Congress" when the
President desired peace, to be a "war Congress" when the
President recommended war are too evident to require any ex-
tended comment. Altho basing his claim for re-election in 1916
largely on the ground that he had
' '
kept us out of war,
' '
with the
presumption that he would continue to do so in the future, and
carrying with him a Congress presumably committed to the same
policy; and altho standing, as late as January, 1917, for
' '
peace without victory,
' ' 78 President Wilson felt compelled by
the turn of events to recommend war upon Germany in his ad-
dress of April 2, a recommendation at once adopted by the
"peace Congress" with very little opposition.
79
Altho the governments allied with Germany could with diffi-
culty be distinguished in method and policy from the government
of Germany the Austro-Hungarian government especially
having openly avowed its endorsement of Germany's submarine
policy, and its ambassador having been implicated in plots to des-
i* On April 6, the Ambassadors of Great Britain, Germany, Austria,
France, Italy, and Russia, united in a personal appeal to President Mc-
Kinley for a peaceful adjustment. Two days later, even stronger repre-
sentations were made at Madrid. Benton, op. tit., 89-90.
75 President McKinley, in his message to Congress, dismissed this offer
of arbitration with these laconic words: "I made no reply."
76 Benton, op. tit., 95.
TT Ibid., 108.
78 gee his address to the Senate, Jan. 22, 1917. MeKinley, Collected Ma-
terials for the Study of the War (1st ed.), 9-11.
79 Joint Eesolution of Apr. 6, 1917. Ibid., 137.
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troy our factories , the President was not at that time ready
to make war upon any of them, because, as he said, "they have
not made war upon us or challenged us to defend our right and
our honor. ' ' 80 Congress therefore took no action towards de-
claring war against these countries.
However, by December of the same year, President Wilson had
discovered that "one very embarrassing obstacle that stands in
our way is that we are at war with Germany, but not with her
allies." He therefore recommended a declaration of a state of
war with Austria-Hungary, that nation being "not her own mis-
tress, but simply the vassal of the German Government." The
President admitted that the same logic would seem to demand a
declaration of war also against Turkey and Bulgaria, since "they
also are the tools of Germany," but he declined to recommend
such action against these countries, because "they are mere
tools, and do not yet stand in the direct path of our necessary ac-
tion." 81 In each case Congress followed the recommendation of
the President without question, declaring war upon Austria-
Hungary, 82 and, despite some feeling that Turkey and Bulgaria
should have been included, 83 no declaration was ever made against
those countries.84
These examples and incidents from the history ,pf our own
country illustrate clearly the very important position conceded
to the President with regard to a declaration of war. They would
seem to bear out the statement of one of our congressmen, when
he said in a recent speech: "History shows . . that while
Congress does possess that power (to declare war), in reality, the
President exercises it. Congress has always declared war when
the President desired war, and Congress has never attempted to
declare war unless the President wanted war. That was true of
the war of 1812. It was true of the Mexican war. It was true
of the Spanish-American war. It was true of this war. It will
so Address to Congress, Apr. 2, 1917. McKinley, op. cit., 15.
81 Address to Congress, Dec. 4, 1917. N. Y. Times Current Hist. Mag.,
VII, 66-67 (Jan., 1918). For further reasons why Turkey and Bulgaria
were omitted, see ibid., 74.
82 Joint Eesolution of Dec. 7, 1917. Ibid., 69.
ss Cf. attitude of Senator Lodge. Ib id., 75.
8* Diplomatic relations were broken off with Turkey, Apr. 20, 1917, but
the initiative had been taken by that country; with Bulgaria relations were
not even severed during the entire course of the war.
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probably be true of every war in which the nation engages so
long as the present method of declaring war continues.
' ' 85
The power of the President to recommend war and to com-
municate facts as a basis for such recommendation gives him also
an opportunity to set forth the grounds and to explain the pur-
poses of the nation in entering upon war. Since the ratifica-
tion of the Hague Convention of 1907, such a statement of rea-
sons is required before the beginning of hostilities. These are the
terms of the article in question :
' ' The Contracting Parties rec-
ognize that hostilities between them must not commence without
a previous and unequivocal warning, which shall take the form
either of a declaration of war, giving reasons, or of an ultima-
tum with a conditional declaration of war. " 86 It would seem,
from the language of the article, that the body in any country to
which is entrusted the power of declaring the war was considered
the proper body to specify the reasons for such declaration.
As a matter of fact, the uniform practise in the United States
has been otherwise. Even before the adoption of the Hague Con-
vention, the President, in his messages to Congress recommend-
ing war, has always stated what seemed to him to be the reason-
able grounds for such action. There is no doubt that Congress,
under its power to pass the declaration, might likewise have ex-
pressed its reasons,
87 which might agree with those of the Presi-
dent, or might differ, either wholly or in part. The President
85 Congressman Dill. Cong. Record, 65 Cong., 3 Sess. (Jan. 21, 1919),
1824; see also an editorial in The Nation, Mar. 1, 1919; ef. Finley & San-
derson, The American Executive and Executive Methods, 280 ; Bryce, Amer-
ican Commonwealth, I, 54; Bradford, The Lesson of Popular Government,
I, 359; Case, Constitutional History of the United States, 232-233; Young,
The New American Government and Its Worlc, 27; Sehouler, Constitutional
Studies, 138.
se Convention relative to the Commencement of Hostilities, Art. 1. Hig-
gins, The Hague Peace Conferences, 198.
ST "It may be said. . . that this power (of declaring war) naturally
includes the right of judging whether the nation is or is not under obliga-
tions to make war. . . However true this position may be, it will not
follow that the executive is in any case excluded from a similar right of
judgment, in the execution of its own functions." Works of Alexander
Hamilton, IV, 142.
' ' The power to judge of the causes of war, as involved
in the power to declare war, is expressly vested, where all other legislative
powers are vested, that is, in the congress of the United States.
' '
Writings
of James Madison, VI, 154 ; cf. ibid., 153, 161.
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would be bound to accept or reject the declaration as passed by
Congress, as a whole.
88 He could not accept the conclusion and
disapprove of the grounds given for the action. Congress has,
however, contented itself with a mere formal declaration of war
or a formal recognition of a state of war as already existing,
without adding any specific statement of reasons or objects. Long
reports have been made in every case by the Foreign Relations
committees of each house, justifying the action about to be taken,
but in no case has the statement of reasons embodied in these re-
ports been incorporated into the declaration itself, not even since
the adoption of the Hague Convention. Congress, in thus refus-
ing or neglecting to give a specific statement of its own, has ap-
parently recognized the President as having the right and as be-
ing the most suitable authority to set forth to the world the griev-
ances of the nation. At all events, the President, rather than
Congress, is now regarded, both at home and abroad, as the
spokesman of the nation with regard to the reasons and objects of
a war, and his statements have been generally accepted as com-
mitting the nation to the policies therein laid down.
The power of the President with regard to a declaration of war
does not end with the functions of communication of informa-
tion, and of recommendation. A declaration of war, like any
other bill, order, resolution, or vote requiring the concurrence of
both houses of Congress, must be submitted to the President for
his approval or disapproval.
89 If it were possible to imagine
Congress as passing a declaration of war without first being cer-
tain of the President's approval, or in direct opposition to his
known views (as is often done with other measures), the Presi-
dent could exercise his power of veto and thus prevent the dec-
laration from going into effect. Theoretically, Congress might
in turn, by a two-thirds majority, declare war even against the
wishes of the President. 90 Strictly speaking, it is true, as an em-
inent senator has said, that "the President not only cannot de-
clare war, and it is not only conferred in terms upon Congress,
ss 8. E. Baldwin, op. tit., Am. Jour. Int. Law, XII, 10.
89 Constitution, Art. I, Sec. 7, Cl. 2, 3. The declarations in the cases of
the War of 1812, the Mexican War and the Spanish-American War were
passed in the form of Acts of Congress; those against Germany and Aus-
tria-Hungary in the form of joint resolutions.
See Schouler, Constitutional Studies, 137.
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but even if the President should be opposed to a proposed war,
two-thirds of each Branch can declare war. It would not require
his approval. There is the most important of all foreign rela-
tions. It does not belong to the President.
" 91 In practise, how-
ever, such a situation cannot be imagined. The successful prose-
cution of a war would be impossible without the hearty coopera-
tion of that department of the government which has in its sphere
the actual direction and management of the war. Consequently,
tho Congress technically has the power, it has chosen to fol-
low rather than to lead with respect to a declaration of war. It
always has sought, and it is safe to assume that it always will
seek, to assure itself of the President's approval before passing
or even proposing a declaration of war.92
After the enactment and approval of a declaration of war, it
becomes the right and duty of the President to give public no-
tice of it to all neutral powers.
93 The Hague Convention of 1907
requires such notice to neutrals, without specifying by whom it
is to be given.
94 The President, however, as the sole organ of
communication with foreign powers, is the natural authority for
the exercise of that function, and there has been no dispute as to
his right or duty in that respect. The exercise of the function is
of considerable importance, since by the article referred to a
state of war is to be regarded as of no effect towards neutrals
until they have received such notification,95 and hence a delay or
neglect in fulfilling the requirement of the Convention might af-
9i Senator Bacon. Cong. Record, XL, Pt. 3 (59 Cong., 1 Sess.), 2132.
92 ' ' Certain it is that the war with France was begun that way, Con-
gress following the lead of, and seeking knowledge from, the President at
every step.
' ' Sen. Doc. No. 56, 54 Cong., 2 Sess., 17. A recent newspaper
dispatch with regard to the Mexican situation is significant as illustrating
the absolute subserviency of even a hostile Congress in such matters :
' ' Presi-
dent Wilson is in complete control of the direction of American, policy in
dealing with Mexico. . . If President Wilson should indicate that Con-
gress should adopt the Fall resolution requesting a severance of diplomatic
relations with Mexico and withdrawal of recognition of Carranza, there
would be little opposition to the passage of the measure. If, however, he
should oppose such a step, the resolution will be nlbdified to conform to his
views or shelved." Chicago Tribune (Staff Correspondence), Dec. 8, 1919.
93 S. E. Baldwin, op. ait., Am. Jour. Int. Law, XII, 11.
* Convention relative to the Commencement of Hostilities, Art. 2. Hig-
gins, op. cit., 199.
5 Ibid.
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feet the validity of captures at sea and other warlike operations
involving neutral rights. The chief ends of such announcement
to neutrals are, therefore, to give formal notice of the fact of the
declaration and the time of its going into effect.
In addition to notifying neutrals, the President usually also
gives official notice of the existence of a state of war to the citi-
zens of this country. This he does by means of a public procla-
mation. Presidents Madison and Polk both issued such proclama-
tions, merely announcing to the country that war existed by act
of Congress and exhorting the people to exert themselves "in
preserving order, in promoting concord, in maintaining the au-
thority and the efficacy of the laws, and in supporting and in-
vigorating all the measures which may be adopted by the con-
stituted authorities for obtaining a speedy, a just, and an hon-
orable peace.
' ' 96
There does not appear to be any express constitutional or stat-
utory authority for the issuance of such proclamations, tho
if any were needed, it might be implied from the power to "take
care that the laws be faithfully executed.
' '" It may also be in-
ferred from an act passed in 1798. This act provided, among
other things, for the removal of enemy aliens "whenever there
is declared a state of war between the United States and any for-
eign nation or government, or any invasion or predatory incur-
sion is perpetrated, attempted, or threatened against the territory
of the United States, by any foreign nation or government, and
the President makes public proclamation of the event.
' '
It fur-
ther authorized the President,
' ' in any such event, by his procla-
mation thereof, or other public act," to establish the necessary
regulations for the conduct, restraint, residence, or removal of
such aliens.98 President Wilson, in his proclamation of April 6,
1917, anouncing the state of war with Germany,99 referred
specifically to this section of the Revised Statutes for his author-
ity, tho he was probably referring rather to the authorization
to proclaim alien enemy regulations than to the mere announce-
ment of a state of war. President McKinley issued several proc-
96 Eichardson, op. tit., I, 512; IV, 470.
7 Constitution, Art. II, Sec. 3.
98 Act of July 6, 1798. Annals of Cong., 5 Cong., Ill, App., 3753. See
also U. S. Bev. Stats., sec. 4067.
99 Text in McKinley, Collected Materials for the Study of the War, 169.
98 WAR POWERS OF THE EXECUTIVE IN UNITED STATES [98
lamations after the declaration of war against Spain, but none
announcing the existence of a state of war. It was probably
thought unnecessary since the war had already been going on
for several days before the retroactive declaration was adopt-
ed. 100 The President can hardly be said to be under any obliga-
tion to issue such a proclamation, since the passage of the dec-
laration should be sufficient notice to the country of the existence
of a state of war. He has generally deemed it wise to do so, how-
ever, and there can be no question of his power in that respect,
even without express authority. The statute mentioned may be
said to confer the authority by implication, and, indeed seems
to expect from the President that action.
100 The joint resolution authorizing the President to use the armed forces
in compelling Spain's withdrawal from Cuba was passed April 20, hostile
measures were taken at once, and the formal declaration, passed April 25,
declared the war to have existed since the 21st.
II. Military Powers in Time of War

CHAPTER VI
POWER TO RAISE AND ORGANIZE THE
ARMED FORCES
It has come to be an axiom in public law that the power to
raise and support the armed forces of a democratic state should
be confided exclusively to the popular branch of the govern-
ment. 1 The Constitution of the United States accordingly gives
to Congress the power "to raise and support armies," and "to
provide and maintain a navy.
' ' 2
Raising armies includes such
matters as the determination of the number of men to be enlist-
ed
;
their enlistment qualifications ; their oganization into the dif-
ferent arms of the service
;
the number and arrangement of the
various units
;
the number and rank of officers
;
the term of ser-
vice for officers and men. Providing a navy includes the deter-
mination of the same class of subjects relating to the seamen and
naval officers
;
the number, size, character, and cost of vessels of
war, navy and dock yards, and other similar matters. 3
Over all these matters the power of Congress is complete and
exclusive. The President is vested with no constitutional power
in regard to the raising and organization of the armed forces. He
derives none from his position before international law. Hence
such powers as he does possess in this respect must rest wholly
upon the authority of custom and statute. Congress in this field is
supreme, but Congress has from the first recognized the wisdom
and necessity of entrusting the President with some statutory
authority, which has at times amounted to the exercise of a con-
siderable discretionary power.
The common method of raising armies under ordinary circum-
stances that of voluntary enlistment has generally been ex-
1 Pomeroy, Constitutional Law (Bennett's ed.), 382.
2 Art. I, See. 8, Cl. 12, 13.
3 Pomeroy, op. cit., 383.
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ercised in peace time in accordance with detailed statutes, leaving
to the President little or no real power. Congress is ordinarily
careful to prescribe definitely the number of men to be enlisted,
their enlistment qualifications, the term of their service, and
other details, merely authorizing the President
' '
to accept,
"
"to
call for," "to call for and accept," or "to employ," within these
well-defined limits. Occasionally the statutes have prescribed
only the maximum number of men to be raised, giving to the
President some little discretion in determining upon the size of
the forces within that number. Likewise when providing for the
navy, the statutes generally prescribe in detail the number and
kind of ships to b# constructed, contracted for, or purchased, the
cost and details of equipment and armament, and other corres-
ponding matters, leaving to the President only the duty to see
that the provisions of the statutes are carried out.
In times of war or emergency, however, and occasionally even
in peace time, the President has been vested with more or less
discretion in these matters. Thus the foundation of the army
under the Constitution had scarcely been laid,4 when by the Act
of March 3, 1791, which added another regiment to the regular
forces, the President was given power, "if of opinion that it will
be conducive to the public service," to employ "levies" (volun-
teers) in addition to the number of 2000, for six months, as a
supplementary force, obviously to be used only for emergency
purposes.
5 An act of the next year (March 5, 1792), passed as a
result of St. Clair's defeat by the Indians, provided three addi-
tional regiments for the protection of the frontier to be enlisted
for three years, but gave the President the power "to forbear to
raise, or to discharge after they shall be be raised,
' '
the whole or
any part of these forces, "in case events shall, in his judgment
render his so doing consistent with the public safety.
' ' The Presi-
dent was further authorized to call into service ' ' for such period
as he may deem requisite, such number of cavalry as, in his judg-
ment, may be necessary for the protection of the frontiers ;
' '
and
* By the Act of Sept. 29, 1789, the army existing under the Confedera-
tion was "recognized to be the establishment for the troops in the service
of the United States; " and by the Act of Apr. 30, 1790, the beginning was
made of a permanent military establishment. Annals of Cong., 1 Cong., II,
App., 2199, 2222.
5 Ibid., 2350.
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also to employ ''such number of Indians as he may think prop-
er .. in case he shall deem the measure expedient.
' ' 6
The crisis with France resulted also in the granting of consid-
erable discretionary power to the President. The Act of May 28,
1798, authorized the President to raise a Provisional Army of
10,000 men,
' ' in the event of a declaration of war against the Uni-
ted States, or of actual invasion of their territory by a foreign
Power, or of our imminent danger of such invasion, discovered,
in his opinion, to exist, before the next session of Congress ;
' '
and
also to create a sort of reserve force by accepting,
"
if in his opin-
ion the public service shall require,
' '
volunteers liable to service
at any time within two years.
7 Other acts during the same period
likewise vested the President with some discretionary power,
such as to prescribe the enlistment qualifications for the forces
provided and to discharge the troops at his discretion. 8
The Acts of February 24, 1807 and February 6, 1812, passed in
anticipation of trouble with England, each again provided a sort
of reserve force, of 30,000 and 50,000 men, respectively, to be
liable for duty at any time the President might deem proper,
within two years from the date of their acceptance into the ser-
vice
;
9
while another act passed during the war (Act of January
29, 1813) authorized the raising of such a force "as in the opin-
ion of the President may be necessary for the public service,
' '
up
to twenty additional regiments.10
During the Mexican "War very little real discretionary author-
ity was granted to the President in the matter of raising the
necessary forces, altho the Act of May 13, 1846, recognizing
a state of war, empowered him to employ the militia, naval, and
military forces, and "to call for and accept" up to 50,000 volun-
teers; while another act of the same date authorized him to in-
crease the companies in the regular army to 100, to be reduced
again to 64 when the exigency should cease.11
e Annals of Cong., 2 Cong., App., 1343 (Sees. 11, 13, 14).
1 1bid., 5 Cong., Ill, App., 3729 (Sees. 1, 3). It was under authority
of this act that Washington was appointed Lieutenant-General and Com-
mander-in-Chief of the forces to be raised for the expected war with France.
3 Acts of July 16, 1798 and Mar. 2, 1799. Ibid., 3785, 3933.
9/fcwZ., 9 Cong., 2 Sess., App., 1259; ibid., 12 Cong., II, App., 2235.
lo/fctd., 12 Cong., 2 Sess., App., 1322-1325.
11 9 Stat. at L., 9, 11.
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The earliest acts for the raising of volunteers and for the in-
crease of the regular army during the Civil War were similar in
character, the President being authorized to accept volunteers,
"in such numbers as the exigencies of the public service may, in
his opinion, demand,
"
up to 500,000 for three years or the dura-
ton of the war; and to increase the regular army by 11 regi-
ments, such increase to be only for the period of the emer-
gency.
12 The Act of July 17, 1862, however, vested the Presi-
dent with somewhat larger powers, in that, besides authorizing
him to accept an additional 100,000 volunteers for nine months,
it empowered him to accept volunteers as replacements,
' ' in such
numbers as may be presented for that purpose;" and also to
employ persons of African descent, without limit as to number,
for any labor, or military or naval service, for which they might
be found competent.13 Considerable power was also given with
regard to increasing the navy by an act which authorized the
Secretary of the Navy to hire, purchase, or contract for such ves-
sels
' '
as may be necessary.
' '14
The most sweeping grant of power with regard to the raising
of forces by voluntary enlistment came during the Spanish-
American War, when no limit was placed on the numbers the
President might call for in that way. Both the Joint Resolu-
tion of April 20, presenting the ultimatum to Spain, and the Act
of April 25, formally declaring war, empowered the President,
in identical language, "to use the entire land and naval forces
of the United States, and to call into the actual service of the
United States the militia of the several States, to such exent as
may be necessary to carry these resolutions [and this Act] into
effect." 15 The Act of April 22, 1898, authorizing the Volun-
teer Army, apparently contemplated some legal limit, as it pro-
vided that when necessary to raise a volunteer army, ' ' the Presi-
dent shall issue his proclamation stating the number of men de-
sired, within such limits as may be fixed by law.
' ' 16 With the
exception of provisions regarding special organizations, 17 no lim-
12 Acts of July 22, July 25, and July 29, 1861. 12 Stat. at L., 268, 274,
279.
1312 Stat. at L., 597 (Sees. 3, 4, 12).
i* Act of July 24, 1861. Ibid., 272.
is 30 Stat. at L., 364, 738.
lej&td., 361 (Sec. 5).
n Ibid. (Sec. 6); see also Act of May 11, 1898. Ibid., 405.
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it to the number of troops to be raised was ever made. Under the
provisions of this act, President McKinley issued two proclama-
tions, one on April 23, calling for 125,000 volunteers, and the
other on May 25, calling for 75,000.18
During the recent war with Germany, the principle of raising
troops by voluntary enlistment was almost entirely abandoned,
altho the President was at the beginning of the war empowered
in that way to raise the increments of the Regular Army provid-
ed for by the National Defense Act of 1916, to recruit all Regu-
lar Army organizations to their maximum strength, and to raise
and maintain at his discretion four infantry divisions. 19
Tho considerable power has thus on many occasions been grant-
ed to the President to raise forces by the process of voluntary
enlistment, the adoption of conscription has carried with it a still
larger grant of power and a wider range of discretion. There is
no longer any doubt as to the constitutional right of Congress to
provide for the raising of armed forces by conscription as well
as by voluntary enlistment,20 and this method has been used,
less commonly than the other, but on occasions of greater emer-
gency.
Conscription was recommended by Congress, and used to some
extent by the states during the Revolution, 21 and was first pro-
posed under the Constitution in 1814. Other methods having
failed to bring forth the required number of troops, Secretary of
18 Eichardson, Messages and Papers of the Presidents, X, 203-204, 205-
206.
is Selective Service Act of May 18, 1917. The authorization of the vol-
unteer infantry divisions was in response to the offer of ex-President Roose-
velt to raise this number of troops from the country at large. President
Wilson declined to exercise the authority granted him under this provision.
20 Arver v. United States, 245 U. S., 366(1918), in Wigmore, Source-
Book of Military Law and War-Time Legislation, 617-626. The general
understanding that the Constitution contemplated and permitted conscrip-
tion was indicated by the following amendment proposed by the Rhode
Island ratifying convention, May 29, 1790: "That no person shall be com-
pelled to do military duty otherwise than by voluntary enlistment, except in
cases of general invasion; anything in the second paragraph of the sixth
article of the Constitution, or any law made under the Constitution, to the
contrary notwithstanding." Elliot's Debates, I, 336. The arguments for
and against conscription are well summed up in Pomeroy, Constitutional
Law, 391-392.
21 Upton, Military Policy of the United States, 27-28, 29, 35-36, 42.
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War Monroe, in a report submitted October 17, suggested to Con-
gress several alternative plans of raising men by draft. 22 Some
sort of conscription measure would undoubtedly have been adopt-
ed, had not its necessity been obviated by the termination of the
war.
The Enrollment Act of March 3, 1863, is notable as being the
first instance of resort to conscription in the United States under
the Constitution. This act constituted all able-bodied male citi-
zens and declarants between the ages of 20 and 45 into the ''na-
tional forces," made certain classifications, divided the country
into enrollment districts, and empowered the President to assign
to each district the quota of men to be furnished and to call forth
these " national forces" by draft.23 Amendments added in 1864
made it clear that the President's power to call for men by this
means was to be practically unlimited, he being authorized,
' '
whenever he shall deem it necessary, during the present war, to
call for such number of men for the military service of the Uni-
ted States as the public exigencies may require ;
' '
and further,
at his discretion, to call for volunteers for one, two, or three
years, deficiencies in quotas to be filled by draft.24
Under the provisions of these acts, President Lincoln issued
five separate calls for men by proclamation of October 17,
1863, a call for 300,000 volunteers for three years or the war, to
serve as replacements for those whose term of service expired
during the year, and any deficiencies in the quotas of any state
to be made up by draft on January 5, 1864; by executive order
of February 1, 1864, a draft for 500,000 for three years or the
war, with deductions for men furnished under the call of Octo-
ber 17, and therefore in reality a call for only 200,000 ; by execu-
tive order of March 14, 1864, an additional draft for 200,0000 to
supply a force for the Navy and an adequate reserve ; by procla-
mation of July 18, 1864, a call for 500,000 volunteers, deficien-
cies to be filled by draft on September 5 ; and by proclamation of
December 19, 1864, a call for 300,000 volunteers for one, two, or
three years, to supply deficiencies and to provide for casualties. 25
22 Am. State Papers, Mil. Affairs, I, 514-517.
23 12 Stat. at L., 731.
24 Acts of Feb. 24 and July 24, 1864. 13 ibid., 6, 390.
25 Richardson, Messages and Papers of the Presidents, VI, 169, 226-227,
232, 235, 271-272.
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The Spanish War was fought principally with volunteers, but
it has already been noted that the President was given practic-
ally unlimited power with respect to the raising of those. 26 The
threatening situation that had been developed by the great Eu-
ropean War led, however, to the passage in 1916 of the so-called
National Defense Act, 27 into which was incorporated to a certain
extent the principle of conscription, in that the President was
empowered, among other things, to draft the National Guard
and the National Guard Reserve created by that act, into the
federal service, whenever Congress should authorize the use of
armed forces for any purpose requiring troops in excess of the
Regular Army.
This act increased considerably the President's powers to use
the militia forces at his discretion, since the troops so "federal-
ized ' ' were by that action automatically discharged from the mi-
litia and taken over bodily into the national forces, and might
therefore be used, not merely as militia, but for any purpose for
which the regular military and naval forces might be used.28
Under the provisions of this act, the National Guard was "fed-
eralized" and drafted by the President into the service of the
United States during the Mexican border troubles of 1916, and
at the beginning of the war with Germany in 1917.29
Finally, the principle of conscription was adopted in the Se-
lective Service Act of May 18, 1917,30 as the one means for rais-
ing the immense number of men required in the war with Ger-
many, and the President was vested with wide powers in con-
nection therewith. He was authorized to draft into the service
of the United States the various National Guard organizations,
in accordance with the National Defense Act of 1916; to raise
26 Supra, 104.
27 Public No. 85, 64 Cong., in Wigmore, Source-Book of Military Law
and War-Time Legislation, 384-444.
28 It was under the provision of this act that the President was enabled
to send the National Guard organizations overseas during the recent war,
practically intact, and thus add in short order an immense number of al-
ready organized and at least partly trained men to the fighting forces.
29 N. Y. Times Current Hist. Mag., IV, 617; see proclamation of July
3, 1917. U. S. Stats., 65 Cong., 1 Sess., Procs., 37.
so Public No. 12, 65 Cong., in Wigmore, op. cit., 460-468. This act was
amended at various times Apr. 20, May 16, May 20, Aug. 31, 1918. Ibid.,
469-474.
108 WAR POWERS OF THE EXECUTIVE IN UNITED STATES [108
immediately by draft 500,000 men in addition to the Regular
Army and the National Guard; to raise and begin training, "in
his discretion and at such time as he may determine," an addi-
tional 500,000; and to raise by draft such additional units "as
he may deem necessary
' ' for the maintenance of the above forces
at the maximum strength.
Tho an army of nearly 2,000,000 men was thus provided for,
President Wilson was not satisfied with the powers granted, and
on May 2, 1918, through Secretary Baker, he requested Congress
to remove all limit on the number of men that might be drafted
for military service and to give him authority to summon as
many as he might find necessary. 81 Congress acceded to this re-
quest, and in the Army Appropriations Act of July 9, 1918,32
extended the authority of the President "so as to authorize him
during each fiscal year to raise by draft . . . the maximum
number of men which may be organized, equipped, trained, and
used during each year for the prosecution of the present war
until the same shall have been brought to a successful con-
clusion.
' '
The President has thus from the very earliest period of our na-
tional history exercised a considerable power in connection with
the raising of armed forces, a power that has been increased
with the needs of the emergency, but a power based generally
on definite statutory authority. It is beyond dispute that with-
out such authority the President has no right to raise armies or
provide for the navy. Nevertheless, there have been occasions
when such power has been exercised without any legal sanction.
Thus, during the Seminole War of 1818, the military command-
ers (Generals Gaines and Jackson) took the responsibility of rais-
ing and organizing a force of volunteers and Indians without
statutory authority, and of formally mustering them into the
service of the United States. General Jackson, on taking com-
mand, had been ordered by the War Department to call on the
executives of adjoining states for such additional militia as
might be required for the termination of the war, but instead he
levied an army from the people of Tennessee and Kentucky by
private circular letters, accepted the services of two regiments of
volunteers as well as a considerable body of friendly Indians,
31 N. Y. Times, May 3, 1918.
32 Public No. 193, 65 Cong., in Wigmore, op. cit., 587, 600.
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organized and officered them on his own authority, and placed
at their disposition United States funds under his control. Al-
together he was reported to have raised an army of about 2500
men, appointed 230 officers, and established rank from an Indian
brigadier-general down to the lowest subaltern of a company.33
Jackson's action was vigorously condemned in reports by both
Senate and House committees, as a violation of the Constitution
and a dangerous infringement on the powers of Congress. 34
Jackson defended his action with equal vigor, claiming that he
had been in effect charged with the management of the war and
vested with the powers necessary to carry it to a "speedy and
successful" termination; that the call for volunteers was abso-
lutely necessary to avoid delay and disaster; and that "every
measure touching the raising and organizing this volunteer
corps was regularly communicated to the Secretary of War, and
received his unqualified approbation.
' ' 35 The records appear
to sustain Jackson's contention. Secretary of War Calhoun, in
reply to Jackson's announcement of what he had done, ex-
pressed to him the "entire approbation of the President of all
the measures which you have adopted to terminate the rupture
with the Indians. ' ' 38 Responsibility for the violation of the
Constitution must therefore rest finally in this instance with the
Executive.
In 1845 occurred another instance of this exercise of power
without statutory authority. Anticipating war with Mexico,
the Adjutant General, by direction of the Secretary of War,
wrote General Taylor on August 6, directing him to learn from
the authorities of Texas what additional forces could, in a case
of need, be placed at his disposal, and giving him authority to
call them into service. "Such auxiliary volunteer force from
Texas, when events, not now revealed, may justify their em-
ployment, will be organized and mustered under your orders,
and be received into the service of the United States when ac-
tually required in the field to repel invasion, actual or menaced,
33 Am. State Papers, Mil. Affairs, I, 740 ; II, 99-100.
s* See report of the Senate committee, Feb. 24, 1819 ; of the House com-
mittee, Feb. 28, 1820. Ibid., I, 739-741 ; II, 101.
35 nid., I, 755, 758.
so See letters of Jackson to Calhoun, Jan. 12 & Jan. 20, 1818; and of
Calhoun to Jackson, Jan. 29 & Feb. 6, 1818. Ibid., I, 696-697, 743-744.
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and not before. ' ' 37 This order to Taylor was entirely without
authority of statute, tho it was expected that provision would be
made to cover the case.
President Lincoln, immediately after the outbreak of the
Civil War, took it upon himself to raise a great army without
awaiting the sanction of Congress. By proclamation of May 3,
1861, based on no authority except the "existing exigencies" and
his own position "as President and Commander-in-Chief , " he
ordered the increase of the Regular Army by 22,714 officers and
men and of the Navy by 18,000 seamen, and in addition called
for 42,034 volunteers to serve for three years an aggregate in-
crease in the armed forces of 82,748 officers and men.38 By the
time of the special session of Congress, beginning July 4, the
response to these calls had brought forth a total of 220,000 men
accepted for service besides 80,000 militia for three months
without any constitutional or statutory authority.39 The Presi-
dent further, without statutory authority, ordered a total of
19 vessels added to the Navy, and directed the Secretary of the
Treasury to advance, without security, $2,000,000 to private in-
dividuals, to be used in meeting requisitions made necessary by
these military and naval measures.40
Rhodes characterized these acts of the President as "clearly
beyond the President 's authority,
' ' 41 and Upton says of them
that "No usurpation could have been more complete." 42 The
President himself recognized and admitted that he had acted
beyond his constitutional or statutory powers, but justified him-
self on the grounds of necessity, saying to Congress in his mes-
sage of July 4, 1861: "These measures, whether strictly legal or
not, were ventured upon under what appeared to be a popular
demand and a public necessity, trusting then, as now, that Con-
gress would readily ratify them. It is believed that nothing has
37 House Ex. Doc. No. 60, 30 Cong., 1 Sess., 83, 84, quoted in Upton,
Military Policy of the United States, 195-196.
ss Richardson, op. tit., VI, 15-16. See also Lincoln 's executive order of
May 7, 1861. Ibid., 18-19.
39 Upton, Military Policy of the United States, 230.
40 Richardson, op. cit., VI, 78. The individuals were John A. Dix, George
Opdyke, and Richard H. Blatchford.
*i History of the United States, III, 395.
42 Military Policy of the United States, 229.
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been done beyond the constitutional competency of Congress.
' ' 43
To this Congress responded by the Act of August 6, 1861, legal-
izing all the acts, proclamations, and orders of the President af-
ter March 4, 1861, respecting the Army and Navy and calling
out militia and volunteers, "as if they had been issued and done
under the previous and express authority and direction of the
Congress of the United States.
' '**
It is not within the scope of this study to speculate upon the
question whether, in these instances of unauthorized exercise of
power, the President was justified by the necessities in each case.
It is sufficient to note that, when he considered the emergency ser-
ious enough, the President has acted, and presumably will again
act, as he thinks the situation demands, and trust to Congress
to grant him the proper legal sanction afterwards. If these
steps appear necessary to save the government, as they were said
by Lincoln to be necessary in 1861, popular opinion will undoubt-
edly sustain the President, as it did then.
In the matter of the organization of the armed forces, the
statutes have generally been careful to provide the details, but
the President has frequently been granted considerable power
in this respect also, especially in time of war or public emergency.
The Act of March 3, 1791, authorizing the President to employ
emergency "levies" at his discretion, empowered him also "to
organize the said levies,
' '
apparently as he should see fit ;45 while
the Act of March 5, 1792, prescribed in detail the organization
of the enlarged army, but with the distinct proviso, "That it
shall be lawful for the President of the United States to organ-
ize the five regiments of infantry and the said corps of horse and
artillery as he shall judge expedient, diminishing the number of
corps, or taking from one corps and adding to another, as shall
appear to him proper.
' ' 4e
Under the authority of this act, President Washington, on De-
cember 27, 1792, announced to Congress that the Legionary plan
of organization had been adopted for the troops, the whole force
of about 5,000 men being given the name of the Legion of the
*a Bichardson, op. tit., VI, 24. See also Lincoln's statement in his mes-
sage of May 26, 1862. Ibid., 78.
12 Stat. at L., 326 (See. 3).
45 Annals of Cong., 1 Cong., II, App., 2350 (Sec. 9).
46/fctd., 2 Cong., App., 1343 (Sec. 2).
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United States, and divided into four Sub-Legions, each with its
staff and more detailed division into dragoons, artillery, infantry,
and riflemen. 47 The plan so adopted continued under executive
authority until 1795, when it was given definite statutory recog-
nition, the Sub-Legions still to be organized, however, "in such
manner as the President of the United States shall direct. ' ' 48
The Provisional Army provided for the expected war with
France was to be organized by the President into corps of artil-
lery, cavalry, and infantry,
' '
as the exigencies of the service may
require ;
" 49 the largest portion of the troops provided in view
of the threatening relations with England was to be organized by
him into battalions, squadrons, regiments, brigades, and divisions
as expedient;50 while the forces raised particularly for the pro-
tection of the frontier were to be armed, equipped, and organ-
ized "in such manner ... as the nature of the service, in
his opinion, may make necessary. ' ' 51
The organization of the forces raised for the prosecution of the
Mexican "War was prescribed in considerable detail in the stat-
utes, leaving to the President very little discretionary authority.
The same was true of those authorized during the Civil War,
except that the Act of July 17, 1862, empowered the President
to establish and organize army corps according to his discre-
tion.52 The organization of the forces raised by the proclama-
tion of May 3, 1861, was, however, undertaken by the President
without definite authority, as was the actual levying, and it was
done in a most extraordinary manner, in that it was entrusted by
the President to the Secretary of the Treasury instead of to the
Secretary of War.53 Secretary Chase was to be assisted by a
*7 Am. State Papers, Mil. Affairs, I, 40-41.
48 Act of Mar. 3, 1795. Annals of Cong., 3 Cong., App., 1515 (Sec. 3).
4 Act of May 28, 1798. Ibid., 5 Cong., Ill, App., 3729 (Sec. 2).
eo Acts of Feb. 24, 1807 and Feb. 6, 1812. Ibid., 9 Cong., 2 Sess., App.,
1259 (Sec. 3); 12 Cong., II, App., 2235 (Sec. 3).
si Act of Jan. 2, 1812. Ibid., 12 Cong., II, App., 228 (Sec. 1).
5212 Stat. at L., 597 (See. 9). For an example of how President Lin-
coln organized the army of the Potomac under this provision see his Gen-
eral War Order No. 2, Mar. 8, 1862. WorTcs of Abraham Lincoln (Federal
ed.), V, 443-444.
' ' The Secretary of War is the regular constitutional organ of the
President for the administration of the military establishment of the na-
tion." United States v. Eliason, 16 Pet, 291, 302 (1842).
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board of three army officers (Colonel Thomas, the Adjutant Gen-
eral, Major McDowell, the Assistant Adjutant General, and Cap-
tain Franklin, of the Topographical Engineers), who were free
to make propositions, altho their acceptance or rejection rest-
ed wholly with the Secretary of the Treasury. The scheme of
organization agreed upon by this board and accepted by Secre-
tary Chase was adopted by the War Department and published
to the army in General Orders,54 later being incorporated by
Congress into statute.
55
For the Spanish War, the Act of April 22, 1898, altho pre-
scribing rather fully the organization of the volunteers into brig-
ades and divisions, again authorized the President to organize
the army corps.56 In the National Defense Act of 1916, the or-
ganization was likewise carefully prescribed up to and including
brigades and divisions, but the President was empowered, "in
time of actual or threatened hostilities, or when in his opinion
the interests of the public service demand it," to organize the
forces into "such army corps or armies as may be necessary,"
with the further provision that "nothing herein contained . .
shall prevent the President from increasing or decreasing the
number of organizations prescribed for the typical brigades, di-
visions, and army corps, or from prescribing new and different
organizations and personnel as the efficiency of the service may
require.
' ' "
This blanket authority was continued in almost identical lan-
guage in the Selective Service Act of 1917,
58 and made it possible
for the President, upon the advice of the General Staff, so to
adjust the organization of the army and to add such new units
as the character of the war showed to be necessary. It was under
this authority, for example, that all distinctive appellations as
Regular Army, National Guard, and National Army, were dis-
54 Nos. 15 and 16, May 4, 1861. See also Special Order No. 218, A. G. O.,
Sept. 2, 1862, by which President Lincoln ordered all the clerks and em-
ployees of the departments in Washington to be organized into companies
and supplied with arms and ammunition, "for the defense of the capital."
Richardson, op. cit., VI, 122.
ss See Upton, Military Policy of ihe United States, 233-235; Acts of
July 22, 25 and 29, 1861. 12 8tat. at L., 268, 274, 279.
se 30 Stat. at L., 362 (Sec. 9).
57 Sec. 3. Wigmore, op. cit., 385.
58 See. 1. Ibid., 461.
114 WAR POWERS OF THE EXECUTIVE IN UNITED STATES [114
continued, and all the land forces merged into one United States
Army. 59 It was likewise under this authority that such an or-
ganization as the Students' Army Training Corps was added to
the military forces;60 that new services were added, such as the
Motor Transport Corps, Chemical Warfare Service, Air Service,
and Tank Corps ; and that the new plan of organization for the
army, as recently announced by General March, was put into
effect without any further action on the part of Congress.
61
59 See Summary of Annual Report of Adjutant General of the Army, in
Official U. S. Bulletin, Jan. 8, 1919. The Selective Service Act provided
that the National Guard organizations drafted into the federal service
should retain their State designations,
' '
as far as practicable.
' '
eo See Official U. 8. Bulletin, Oct. 1, 1918.
6i Ibid., Mar. 29, 1919. The new Navy reorganization that of main-
taining two separate major fleets instead of only one was likewise an-
nounced as going into effect June 30, 1919. N. T. Times Current Hist. Mag.,
X, 253 (Aug., 1919).
CHAPTER VII
POWERS OF COMMAND
The Constitution makes the President the Commander-in-Chief
of the army and navy of the United States and of the state mil-
itia when called into the actual service of the United States.1
Under this provision the President is vested with a function than
which, according to a well known writer, there is none "more
significant as indicating his independent and exalted position.
' ' 2
Strangely enough, in spite of this extraordinary grant of
power, this clause of the Constitution appears to have aroused
very little discussion and scarcely any serious opposition in the
Convention of 1787. Some objections were evidently made, but
rather to the idea of the President's assuming active command
in the field than to his exercise of the general powers of com-
mand. 3 The members of the Convention probably had not for-
gotten the trouble and embarrassment caused during the Revolu-
tion by congressional interference and the lack of a centralized
control over the army. They were very likely influenced also by
the precedents in the practise of European states, in former
plans of union for the colonies, and in the recently established
state constitutions. As students of political theory they were
also undoubtedly impressed with the notion that the inherent
nature of the executive office made it the proper repository for
the chief command of the military and naval forces.*
1 Art. II, Sec. 2, Cl. 1.
2 McClain, Constitutional Law in the United States, 210.
3 See Luther Martin 's letter to the Maryland legislature. Elliot 's De-
lates, I, 378; Farrand's Eecords, III, 217-218.
* This idea was expressed quite recently by Senator Bacon as follows :
"I want to give my idea as to why the constitution vests in the President
the office of commander-in-chief. The President is an Executive. Upon
him devolves the execution of the law and the enforcement of the law; and
the enforcement of the law must necessarily be, in its last analysis, through
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116 WAR POWERS OF THE EXECUTIVE IN UNITED STATES [116
There was more discussion and more opposition in the state
ratifying conventions. Thus Mr. Miller, in the North Carolina
convention, expressed himself as fearful that the influence of the
President, particularly over the military, would be too great, that
he was given extensive powers too easily liable of abuse. "He
considered it as a defect in the Constitution, that it was not ex-
pressly provided that Congress should have the direction of the
motions of the army.
' ' 5 On the whole, however, the propriety
of such a power in the President, so far as to give orders and ex-
ercise a general supervision over military and naval movements,
was not seriously questioned even in the state conventions, the
opposition again being largely to the possibility of the President 's
assumption of personal command of the forces. 6
The general feeling throughout the country was undoubtedly
expressed by Hamilton when he wrote : ' ' The propriety of this
provision is so evident in itself, and so consonant to the preced-
ents of the State constitutions in general, that little need be said
to explain or enforce it. Even those of them which have, in oth-
er respects, coupled the chief magistrate with a council, have
for the most part concentrated the military authority in him
alone. Of all the cares or concerns of government, the direction
of war most peculiarly demands those qualities which distin-
guish the exercise of power by a single hand. The direction of
war implies the direction of the common strength ; and the power
of directing and employing the common strength forms a usual
and essential part in the definition of executive authority.
' ' 7
Altho there has been some contention that Congress, by virtue
of its power to declare war and to provide for the support of the
armed forces, is a superior body, and that the President, as Com-
mander-in-Chief, is "but the Executive arm, . . in every de-
tail and particular, subject to the commands of the lawmaking
the military arm. Of course the President can not be the Supreme Execu-
tive unless he has the supreme command of that through which the execu-
tion of the law must be enforced." Cong. Record, XLIII, Pt 3 (60 Cong.,
2 Bess.), 2542-2543.
B Elliot's Debates, IV, 114.
Story, Commentaries on the Constitution, II 315 ; cf. remarks of Pat-
rick Henry. Elliot's Debates, III, 58-60.
7 The Federalist, No. 73 (74), (Goldwin Smith ed., p. 409); cf. also
reply of Mr. Spaight to Mr. Miller. Elliot 's Debates, IV, 114-115.
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power,
' ' 8
practically all authorities agree that the President, as
Commander-in-Chief, occupies an entirely independent position,
having powers that are exclusively his, subject to no restriction
or control by either the legislative or judicial departments. 9
The line of demarcation between the war powers of the Presi-
dent and those of Congress is not clearly drawn in the Consti-
tution,
10 nor are the President's powers as Commander-in-Chief
specifically described or defined by that instrument. Hence au-
thorities in general hold that the President as Commander-in-
Chief may constitutionally do what any military commander may
do in accordance with the usual practise of carrying on war
among civilized nations; that he must be guided in the exercise
of such power wholly by his own judgment and discretion, sub-
ject to his general responsibility under the Constitution.11 Ac-
cording to the Supreme Court, the extent of these powers must
be determined "by their nature and by the principles of our in-
stitutions.
' ' 12 For a closer definition we must therefore look to
the law and usage of the military service, to international law
and custom, and to the general practise under the Constitution
and statutes of the United States. 13
From these sources we find that the first great power of the
President as Commander-in-Chief of the armed forces in time of
war is the general direction of the military and naval operations.
s Senator Bacon in U. S. Senate, Feb. 6, 1906. Cong. Eecord, XL, Pt. 3
(59 Cong., 1 Sess.), 2135. On a later occasion, Senator Spooner replied
very aptly to a similar suggestion, that such a construction would mean
that ' ' the Constitution did not constitute the President Commander-in-
Chief of the Army and Navy, but constituted him the Adjutant-General of
the Congress." Cong. Record, XLI, Pt. 2 ( 59 Cong., 2 Sess.), 1131.
Pomeroy, Constitutional Law (Bennett's ed.), 71; Davis, Treatise on
the Military Law of the United States, 323; Mississippi v. Johnson, 4 Wall.,
475, 497 (1869) ; Ogg & Beard, National Governments and the World War,
100-101; Secretary Seward in letter to Lord Lyons, 1861, quoted in Wat-
son, On ihe Constitution, II, 917; J. W. Garner, in Revue de Droit Public
et de la Science Politique, XXXV, 10.
10 It was attempted by the Supreme Court in Ex parte Milligan, 4 Wall.,
2, 139 (1866) ; see supra, 19.
11 Finley & Sanderson, The American Executive and Executive Methods,
267; Whiting, War Powers under the Constitution, 82-83.
12 0; parte Milligan, 4 Wall., 2, 139-140 (1866).
is Cf. J. W. Garner, in Revue de Droit Public et de la Science Politique,
XXXV, 13 (Jan-Mar., 1918).
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It is the President who wages war. Congress declares war and
provides the means for carrying it on, but the President decides
how the war is to be conducted and directs the campaigns. This
is "a despotic power," says Burgess,14 but nevertheless must be
confided by a sound political science to the President. "The
President must have despotic power when he wages war. The
safety, the life perhaps, of the state requires it.
' ' Other author-
ities also hold that in the field of military operations there are no
limitations prescribed by the Constitution and the President's
power is therefore exclusive. Thus Lieber says that the direction
of military movement "belongs to command, and neither the
power of Congress to raise and support armies, nor the power to
make rules for the government and regulation of the land and
naval forces, nor the power to declare war, gives it the command
of the army. Here the constitutional power of the President as
commander-in-chief is exclusive. ' ' 15
It is an interesting question whether the President, under this
exclusive power, may assume active, personal command of the
army and navy, in time of war. Authorities do not all agree on
this point. Some claim that the President is essentially a civil
officer and that it is not intended that he shall take active com-
mand in time of hostilities
;
16
others say outright that the Presi-
dent "has all the powers of personal command;" 17 while still
others express themselves as doubtful. Thus Watson thinks it
by no means certain that the President has such power, since if
he should undertake to command the military and naval forces
in time of war, he would necessarily be prevented from executing
other important duties required of him by the Constitution.
Watson admits, however, that if the President insisted on assum-
ing personal command of the forces, it would be difficult and
probably impossible to restrain him.
18
While the expediency of such action on the part of the Presi-
dent may be doubted, there does not seem to be any ground for
i* Political Science and Comparative Constitutional Law, II, 261.
is Lieber, Eemarlcs on Army Regulations, 18 ; see also Watson, On the
Constitution, II, 913-914; Von Hoist, Constitutional Law of the United
States, 194.
is McClain, Constitutional Law, 210.
17 Finley & Sanderson, op. cit., 267.
is Watson, On tlie Constitution, II, 919 ; cf. Miller, On the Constitution,
163; Von Hoist, Constitutional Law of the United States, 197.
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questioning his power. The matter was specifically raised, dis-
cussed and determined in the Constitutional Convention of 1787.
Thus the New Jersey plan presented by Mr. Paterson on June
15 authorized the Executive to direct all military operations,
' '
provided that none of the persons composing the federal Execu-
tive shall on any occasion take command of any troops, so as
personally to conduct any enterprise as General or in any other
capacity."
19 Hamilton's plan likewise vested the chief com-
mand and direction of war in the Executive, but with the proviso
that "he shall not take the actual command, in the field, of an
army, without the consent of the Senate and Assembly.
' ' 20
The action of the Convention in refusing to adopt any of these
specific proposals,
21 and the further attempts in the state ratify-
ing conventions to secure amendments expressly forbidding such
exercise of command by the President,22 certainly make it clear
that the framers of the Constitution understood and intended
that the President should have the right. Hamilton but reflected
the general interpretation of the Constitution when he referred
to the President in this connection as the "first general and ad-
miral of the Confederacy.
' ' 2S
While there is therefore no doubt as to the constitutional right
of the President to assume personal command of the armed forces
19 Elliot's Debates, I, 176.
20 Ibid., V, 587.
21 See Luther Martin 's letter to the Maryland legislature : ' ' Objections
were made to that part of the article, by which the President is appoint-
ed Commander-in-Chief of the army and navy of the United States, and of
the militia of the several States, and it was wished to be so far restrained,
that he should not command in person ; but this could not be obtained. '
'
Ibid., I, 378; Farrand's Records, III, 217-218.
22 Thus the New York convention proposed an amendment, ' ' That the
President or person exercising his powers for the time being, shall not
command an army in the field in person, without the previous desire of
Congress ;
' '
while in the Maryland convention a similar amendment was
submitted, but negatived in committee and never reported..EWotf 's De-
bates, I, 330; II, 553. In the 1st Congress Mr. Tucker (S. C.) proposed an
amendment striking out the words "be Commander-in-Chief " from the
article defining the President's powers and substituting the phrase
"have power to direct (agreeably to law) the operations." This was
probably in line with the New York amendment; but on a vote to refer
to the Committee of the Whole, it was negatived. Annals of Cong., I, 762,
763.
23 The Federalist, No. 68 (Goldwin Smith ed., p. 381).
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at his discretion, the sound construction of the constitutional
provision is that no such action on his part was contemplated un-
less in an extraordinary emergency ; that the power of personal
command was vested in the President principallj for the pur-
pose of giving him that control over military and naval opera-
tions which is a necessary attribute of the executive branch of the
government.
24
No President has yet seen fit to exercise his right to take per-
sonal command of the forces in time of war, altho Washington
on one occasion during his administration did actually take the
field in command of militia forces called out to suppress an in-
surrection.25 President Polk also took a keen personal interest in
the military movements of the Mexican War, and at one time, in
order to carry his point against a refractory Adjutant-General,
insisted on his right as Commander-in-Chief to have his instruc-
tions regarded as a military order to be promptly obeyed.
26
President Lincoln, while never exercising actual personal com-
mand, frequently visited his generals in the field, advised with
them, drew up plans of campaign, and issued among others his
famous General War Order No. 1 (January 27, 1862), and Spe-
cial War Order No. 1 (January 31, 1862), the former ordering
a general movement of the land and naval forces to be begun
against the insurgents on February 22, the latter ordering an ex-
pedition against Manassas Junction.
27
Presidents McKinley and Wilson seem to have left the active
direction of military movements entirely to the military and nav-
al commanders, altho with the modern means of communica-
tion the President might, much more easily than before, assume
24 Cf. opinion of Secretary of War Monroe, given to a committee of
Congress, Feb. 11, 1815. Am. State Papers, Mil. Affairs, I, 606; see also
Story, Commentaries on the Constitution, II, 315 ; Elliot's Debates, II,
366.
25 Infra, 135.
26 Diary of James K. Polk, III, 31.
27 Works of Abraham Lincoln (Federal ed.), V, 423, 425; Rhodes, His-
tory of the United States, III, 581. But cf. Lincoln's letter to Gen. Grant,
Apr. 30, 1864: "Not expecting to see you before the spring campaign
opens, I wish to express, in this way, my entire satisfaction with what you
have done up to this time, so far as I understand it. The particulars of
your plans I neither know nor seek to know." McPherson, History of the
Rebellion, 425.
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active charge of military and naval operations. 28 Modern war
has, however, also added such a heavy burden of civil duties upon
the President as to make it practically impossible for him to de-
vote any time to the purely military side, and it is not likely
that any President will ever in the future attempt to exercise
his right of personal command.
As a necessary part of his power to direct the military and
naval operations, the President in time of war has entire control
of the movements of the army and navy. Congress has, under
the Constitution, the sole power to raise and support armies and
to provide and maintain a navy ; 29 but after the forces have been
provided and war has been begun, the President may order them
anywhere he will for the purpose of carrying on the war to a
successful conclusion.
An eminent authority thinks that Congress could probably by
law forbid the troops being sent out of the jurisdiction of the
United States in time of peace ;30 but in time of war the author-
ity of the President is recognized as being absolute as to where
the war is to be conducted, whether to await the onslaughts of
the enemy and wage a purely defensive war within the bound-
aries of the United States, or to send the armed forces of the Uni-
ted States out of the country to carry on an offensive war in the
enemy territory, in the territory of an ally, or perhaps even in
the territory of a neutral. "The power to use an army," says
a distinguished ex-Justice of the Supreme Court, "is co-exten-
sive with the power to make war; and the army may be used
wherever war is carried on, here or elsewhere. There is no lim-
itation upon the authority of Congress to create an army and it
is for the President as Commander-in-Chief to direct the cam-
paigns of that army wherever he may think they should be car-
ried on." 31
As a matter of fact, there never has been any serious doubt as
to the President's constitutional power to order the regular
28 See description of how President McKinley kept in touch with the
military operations during the Spanish war. Beard, Readings in Amer-
ican Politics and Government, 316.
20 Art. I, Sec. 2, 01. 12, 13.
30 Root, Colonial and Military Policy of the United States, 157.
31 Charles E. Hughes,
' ' War Powers under the Constitution, ' ' in Cen-
tral Law Jour., LXXXV, 206-214 (Sept. 21, 1917). See also Fleming v.
Page, 9 How., 603, 615 (1849).
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forces wherever he may think best in the conduct of a war, wheth-
er within or without the limits of the United States, nor has any
President hesitated to make use of that power in any foreign
war in which the United States has been engaged. Regular
troops were by order of the President sent to Canada in the War
of 1812,
32 to Mexico in 1846, to Cuba, Porto Eico, and the Philip-
pines during the war with Spain, and to France, Italy, and
Russia during the recent war with Germany.33
Just as the President decides when and where troops shall be
employed in time of war, so he alone likewise determines how the
forces shall be used, for what purposes,34 the manner and extent
of their participation in campaigns, and the time of their with-
drawal. Thus the troops ordered to France during the recent
war were sent for the general purpose of waging active war
against the German military forces and of bringing about their
defeat
;
were with that end in view instructed to cooperate with
the Allies even to the extent of being intermingled on occasion
with Allied troops and placed under the command of superior
32 The act of Feb. 6, 1812, authorized the President to accept 50,000
volunteers to do duty whenever he deemed proper, which President Madi-
son said was passed "with a view to enable the Executive to step at once
into Canada." Writings of James Madison, VIII, 176.
ss The constitutionality of the President 's action in sending troops to
France was upheld by Federal Judge Speer in a case decided Aug. 20, 1917.
See also address by ex-Senator Boot at Chicago, Sept. 14, 1917, in The War,
Rusian and Political Addresses, 68.
For an opposite view, see a somewhat bombastic open letter to the Secre-
tary of War by Hannis Taylor, in which he says : ' ' The unauthorized trans-
portation by the executive power of our conscripted National Militia to the
battlefields of Europe, in defiance of Section 8, Article I, of the Con-
stitution, will stand out in the time to come as the most stupendous act of
illegality in all our history." Cong. Eecord, 65 Cong., 3 Sess. (Jan. 20,
1919), 1728-1729.
A House resolution (H. J. Res. 166) was introduced July 29, 1919, pro-
posing an amendment to forbid Congress to conscript armies to serve out-
side the United States to execute orders of any international body or trib-
unal. Ibid., 66 Cong., 1 Sess., 3561.
34 < < The policy to be followed by our troops in any country is one to be
determined by the Executive." Statement of Maj. G-en. Graves in message
to his troops in Bussia, quoted in The Nation, CVIII, 853 (May 31, 1919).
The Nation comments as follows: "So much for Wilsonian Bealpolitik by
comparison with the old-fashioned theory that it is the business of Congress
to declare war."
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Allied officers
;
and were withdrawn from foreign soil as rapidly
as possible after that purpose had been accomplished.
The Siberian expedition, while of course intended to aid in a
general way in bringing about the defeat of the Central Powers,
had the more limited and particular purposes of saving the
Czecho-Slovak armies in Russia from destruction, and of steady-
ing the efforts of the Russians at self-defense and the establish-
ment of law and order. It was not withdrawn upon the defeat
of the Central Powers and the conclusion of the armistice, but
was continued for some time in order ' ' that we, with the concur-
rence of the great allied powers, may keep open a necessary ar-
tery of trade and extend to the vast population of Siberia the
economic aid essential to it in peace time, but indispensable un-
der the conditions which have followed the prolonged and ex-
hausting participation by Russia in the war against the Central
Powers." To that end, Major General Graves, in command of
the American troops in Siberia, was instructed "not to interfere
in Russian affairs, but to support Mr. Stevens" (the American
director of the Russian Railway Service Corps) in keeping open
the Siberian railway. 35 In contradiction to this policy of con-
tinuing the American troops in Siberia, the small contingent sent
to Murmansk and Archangel in Russia proper was entirely with-
drawn by July 1, 1919.36 The action in every case was deter-
mined solely by authority of the President, acting under his pow-
er as Commander-in-Chief of the army and navy.
There has been considerable bitter criticism in Congress of the
President 's Russian or Siberian policy ; there has also been some
question as to his power to send and continue troops there, es-
pecially since the signing of the armistice and the virtual ending
of the war
;
and there have been some attempts to assert for Con-
35 See statement of President Wilson, July 22, 1919, in response to a
Senate resolution of inquiry. Cong. Eecord, 66 Cong., 1 Sess. (Sept. 3,
1919), 5075. The President's statement is also printed as Senate Docu-
ment No. 607. See also statement of the Acting Secretary of State re-
garding the purposes of the Siberian expedition. Official Bulletin, Aug. 5,
1918. Secretary of War Baker announced on Jan. 13, 1920, that the Presi-
dent had authorized the withdrawal of the American forces from Siberia,
and that the movement of troops would begin at once.
s See statement of Gen. March, Chief of Staff, June 16, 1919.
Hearings before the Subcommittee of the Committee on Military Affairs,
U. S. Senate, 66 Cong., 1 Sess., 50.
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gress the right to control the movements of the forces and to com-
pel their withdrawal. Senator Borah (Idaho) in a recent speech
declared the presence of American troops in Siberia an unlawful
usurpation of power by the President and demanded their im-
mediate withdrawal. "We are utterly at sea," he said, "as to
why our armed forces are carrying on war in Russia, but what-
ever is being done in that country in the way of armed interven-
tion is without authority. . . There can be no plainer usurpa-
tion of power than to conscript men to war against Germany and
then to use them to take care of internal conditions in Russia. ' ' 37
Senator Edge (New Jersey) introduced a resolution June 23,
1919, not only declaring the state of war terminated, but order-
ing "That all American soldiers of the forces of the United
States now in Europe shall be withdrawn from such foreign ser-
vice without loss of time and be returned to the United States,
except such soldiers of the United States Regular Army as have
enlisted specifically for service in Europe.
' ' 38 Senator McCor-
mick (Illinois) introduced a similar resolution September 8, ex-
pressing it as the sense of the Senate
' ' that no additional troops
be sent overseas except by the express authority of Congress,"
and "that all troops serving in Europe and Siberia should be
brought home with the utmost dispatch.
' ' 39
Other similar resolutions were proposed from time to time,40
but only one was adopted, that by Senator Johnson (California),
which, however, was merely a request for information as to
the general policy respecting Siberia and the maintenance
of troops there.
41 It seems quite clear, therefore, that even
87 #. F. Times, Sept. 6, 1919; cf. also statement of Chairman Porter, of
the House Committee on Foreign Affairs, that the drafted men were sent
to Siberia with
''absolutely no justification in law." Ibid., Aug. 24, 1919.
But compare Senator Borah's remarks in the Senate, Feb. 16, 1909: "Con-
gress has not the power to say that an army shall be at a particular place
at a particular time or shall maneuver in a particular distance. That be-
longs exclusively to the Commander-in-Chief of the Army." Cong. Eecord,
XLIII, Pt. 3 (60 Cong., 2 Sess.), 2452. See also his speech of Nov. 4,
1919. Ibid., 66 Cong., 1 Sess., esp. 8465, 8466.
as Cong. Record, 66 Cong., 1 Sess., 1629.
39 Ibid., 5284.
40 By Senators Johnson and Poindexter, and Representatives Ehodes,
Wood, and Mason. Ibid., 65 Cong., 3 Sess., 3188, 3410-3417, 3786; 66 Cong.,
1 Sess., 64, 4336, 4704, 4937.
Ibid., 66 Cong., 1 Sess., 63, 1631, 1884, 1977.
125] POWERS OF COMMAND 125
under the stress of bitter partisanship and despite all its
mutterings and criticisms of executive policy, Congress will be
slow to deny the power of the President as Commander-in-Chief
to send and maintain troops of the army and navy abroad at his
discretion, or to assert any definite claim of control for itself.
On the other hand, the Executive has not hesitated to define its
policy or to assert its intention of adhering to and exercising its
powers under the Constitution with respect to the movement of
troops.
42
In connection with his control of military and naval opera-
tions, the President possesses numerous other powers. In fact, it
is generally held that, as Commander-in-Chief, he may do prac-
tically anything calculated to weaken and destroy the fighting
power of the enemy and bring the war to a successful conclusion,
subject of course to the rules of civilized warfare prescribed by
international law and custom.43 He may employ secret agents
to obtain information concerning the position, resources, and
general condition of the enemy ;44 he may establish a blockade of
the enemy's ports, including those of insurgent states as well as
of a foreign enemy ; 45 he may order an invasion of the enemy 's
42 President Wilson stated, in a letter to Fred McAver of Chicago, that
the drafted troops in Siberia were being withdrawn as rapidly as they
could be replaced by volunteers, but indictted that there was no intention
of withdrawing the entire expedition for some time. N. T. Times, Aug.
27, 1919. Secretary Baker, in a statement to the House Military Affairs
Committee, Sept. 15, 1919, insisted that the American soldiers in Siberia
could not be withdrawn because of "real military and humanitarian rea-
sons." Ibid., Sept. 16, 1919. "Representative Mason (111.) on this occasion
questioned the right of the President to send troops into a country with
which we are not at war, but was opposed by Representative Kahn (Cal.),
Chairman of the Committee, who cited as a precedent the sending of ma-
rines into Haiti. Ibid. See also statement of Gen. March, Chief of Staff,
before the Senate Subcommittee on Military Affairs, June 16, 1919. Hear-
ings before the Subcommittee, 50, 51.
43 Fairlie, National Administration of the United States, 33.
44 Tottera v. United States, 92 U. S., 105, 106 (1875).
45 Prize Cases, 2 Black, 635 (1862). Ordinarily such a blockade is es-
tablished by proclamation of the President. It may, however, be estab-
lished without this action by the President, but by the commander of
naval forces as an adjunct to naval operations against other blockaded
ports and the enemy's fleet. The Adula, 176 U. S., 361, 366-367 (1900).
President Lincoln established the blockade of the ports of the South by
proclamations of Apr. 19 and 27, 1861; President McKinley the Cuban
126 WAE POWERS OF THE EXECUTIVE IN UNITED STATES [126
country and establish the authority of the United States over it,
altho he cannot thereby enlarge the boundaries of the United
States nor extend the operation of our institutions and laws be-
yond the limits previously assigned to them;46 he may even set
up, on his own exclusive authority as Commander-in-Chief, a
temporary government in conquered territory.47
The appointment and dismissal of officers for the army and
navy is another of the President 's prerogatives as Commander-in-
Chief, but one which is subject to some control by Congress.48
In the first place, no officer can be appointed by the President
until Congress has created the grade and made provision for it.
President Polk complained bitterly because Congress refused to
create the grade of Lieutenant-General during the Mexican War
and thus permit him to appoint a commander to outrank Scott
and Taylor. "My situation," he said, "is most embarrassing. I
am held responsible for the War, and I am required to entrust
the chief command of the army to a General in whom I have no
confidence. ' ' 49 During the recent war, however, Congress gave
the President authority (with the consent of the Senate) "to ap-
point for the period of the existing emergency such general of-
ficers of appropriate grades as may be necessary. . ,
" 50 thus
vesting the President with wide discretionary powers, not only
of appointment but also of determining what higher grades
might be necessary. Under this provision, Pershing, Bliss, and
March were each appointed to the rank of full General, a grade
thus revived by the President for the period of the war.51
In the second place, the appointment of all officers of the army
and navy is subject to confirmation by the Senate, unless other-
wise provided by law. 52 As a matter of fact, confirmation by the
blockade by proclamations of Apr. 22 and June 27, 1898. Eichardson, Mes-
sages and Papers of the Presidents, VI, 14, 15 ; X, 202-203, 206.
*e Fleming v. Page, 9 How., 603, 615 (1849).
Infra, Ch. IX.
*/. Burgess, Political Science and Comparative Constitutional Law,
II, 261-262.
*9 Diary of James K. Polk, II, 393-394.
so Selective Service Act of May 18, 1917 (Public No. 12, 65 Cong.). See
Sec. 8.
si Gen. Pershing has since been commissioned permanent General, by
authority of act of Congress. See N. T. Times, Sept. 4, 1919.
52 Constitution, Art. II, See. 2, Cl. 2.
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Senate has generally been required only in the case of the higher
military and naval officers, the rule during the recent war being,
"That officers with rank not above that of Colonel shall be ap-
pointed by the President alone, and officers above that grade by
the President by and with the advice and consent of the Sen-
ate." 53
Finally, Congress, under its power "to make rules for the gov-
ernment and regulation of the land and naval forces,
' ' 5 *
may
prescribe rules of eligibility governing the appointment and pro-
motion of officers, and in that way limit to a considerable extent
the President's power of appointment. It has been held, how-
ever, that such rules can prescribe only the mode in which va-
cancies shall be filled, and hence do not confer upon the officer
next in the order of succession any right to the vacant place, nor
control the President in his discretionary power to appoint some
other individual. 55 Congress can in no way dictate what appoint-
ments shall be made; it can only determine how they shall be
made and limit somewhat the field of selection by prescribing
certain rules. Moreover, the President is entirely free to select
whom he will from among the officers for any particular duty or
command, without consulting the Senate and without regard
to seniority in rank. General Pershing was thus chosen to com-
mand the American Expeditionary Force in the recent war, altho
he was not the ranking officer in the army at the time. In fact,
any question that may arise as to the relative rank of officers in
the various branches of the service is understood to be within the
power of the President, as Commander-in-Chief, to settle without
legislation by or consultation with Congress.56
The power to dismiss or remove military and naval officers, es-
pecially in time of war, is likewise considered one of the prerog-
atives of the President as Commander-in-Chief, and a necessary
ss Selective Service Act, Sec. 1.
s* Constitution, Art. I, Sec. 8, CL 14.
ss 13 Op. Atty. Gen., 13, 14 ; 29 ibid., 254, 256. See also message of
President Monroe, Apr. 13, 1822, and veto message of President Harrison,
Feb. 26, 1891. Richardson, op. cit., II, 132, 133; IX, 138. Cf. Taft, Our
Chief Magistrate and His Powers, 127-128; and Story, Commentaries, II,
350, n. 2. During the recent war, the rules governing appointments, pro-
motions, and assignments were announced by General Order. Official U. S.
Bulletin, Sept. 20, 1918.
06 Diary of James K. Polk, I, 284-285.
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incident of his right to appoint them. 57 In fact, it has been held
by distinguished authority to be an absolute power, tho one that
ought to be exercised with great discretion, 58 and extends even
to the removal of officers appointed with the consent of the Sen-
ate.59 From the very organization of the government under the
Constitution till the Civil War, the power to dismiss officers of
the army and navy from the service was regarded as vested in
the President by the Constitution, was not questioned, and came
to be considered as one of the inherent powers of the Executive
office.60 Congress in 1862 specifically recognized this power of
the President in an act 61 which the Attorney-General later char-
acterized as "simply declaratory of the long-established law." G2
However, by the acts of March 3, 1865, and July 13, 1866, Con-
gress divested the President of his absolute power of removal at
all times, requiring that in time of peace an officer could be dis-
missed only upon sentence of a court-martial or as commutation
of such sentence. 63 In 1867, Congress went further, and in the
Army Appropriation Act of that year provided that all army
orders should pass through the General of the Army, who was
required to keep his headquarters at Washington and who should
not be removed, suspended, relieved from his command, or as-
signed to duty elsewhere, except at his own request or by the ap-
proval of the Senate.
64 President Johnson signed this act under
protest, holding that it in effect deprived the President of the
command of the army; and having obviously been passed as a
measure designed to control him in particular, its injustice and
inexpediency were soon recognized and it was soon repealed. 65
The Supreme Court further held, with regard to the act of 1866,
that it was in effect only a declaration that the power thereto ex-
ercised by the President of summarily dismissing officers with-
57 Burgess, op. tit., II, 262; Blake v. United States, 103 U. S., 227, 236
(1880).
68 Memoirs of John Quincy Adams, IV, 410.
wShurtleff v. United States, 189 U. S., 311, 314-315 (1903).
604 Op. Atty. Gen., 1, 609-613; 6 ibid., 5-6; 8 ibid., 230-232; 12 ibid.,
424-426. Cf. United States v. Outline, 17 How., 283, 306-307 (1854).
si Act of July 17, 1862. 12 8tat. at L., 594, 596 (Sec. 17).
62 15 Op. Atty. Gen., 421.
es 13 Stat. at L., 48-9; 14 ibid., 92.
6* Act of Mar. 2, 1867. 14 Stat. at L., 486-487 (Sec. 2).
es July 15, 1870.
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out the consent of the Senate, should not exist in time of peace.
' ' There was, we think, no intention to deny or restrict the power
of the President, by and with the advice and consent of the Sen-
ate, to displace them by the appointment of others in their
places.
' ' 66
The right of the President to make removals at his discretion
in time of war remained unimpaired by these acts of Congress,
and was again specifically recognized during the recent war by
the Selective Service Act. 67 Efficiency Boards for examining
into the qualifications of officers were provided for by that stat-
ute, but it was held that these were to be convened merely as a
matter of administrative convenience for the information of the
President, and
' ' do not impair or restrict the power of the Presi-
dent to discharge for any cause which, in the judgment of the
President, would promote the public service." It was further
held that, even tho the President dismissed an officer because of
the recommendation of an illegally and irregularly constituted
board, "the legality of an executed discharge by the President
cannot afterwards be questioned, because of the full and summary
powers conferred upon him by the statute. ' ' 68 Other opinions
have likewise upheld the inherent, as well as the statutory, pow-
er of the President to dismiss officers in time of war, without the
consent of the Senate, or the recommendation of a board, or trial
by court-martial.69 Having once dismissed an officer, however,
or accepted his resignation, the President cannot revoke that ac-
tion and thereby restore the officer to his rank and office, but
must make a new nomination and secure a new confirmation by
the Senate, if confirmation was required in the first instance.
70
In spite of the restrictions that have been noted, the Presi-
dent's power to appoint and dismiss officers is such as to give
him practically complete control of the army and navy, especial-
ly in time of war, and to add considerably to his powers and
so Blake v. United States, 103 U. S., 227, 236 (1880).
T Sees. 1, 9.
68 Opinions of Acting Judge Advocate General Mayes, May 10 and
July 15, 1918, in Wigmore, Source-Book of Military Law and War-Time
Legislation, 752-755, 790-794.
69 Cf. opinion of Acting Judge Advocate General Ansell, Apr. 9, 1918.
Ibid., 731-735.
loMimmacJc v. United States, 97 U. S., 426, 435, 437-438 (1888); Mem-
oirs of John Quincy Adams, VII, 14.
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prestige as Commander-in-Chief. It is a power that was feared
greatly at the beginning,
71 and it is a power that needs to be
exercised with due caution lest political expediency rather than
military fitness become the criterion for selection.72 On the
whole, it can be said that the President has in his exercise of this
tremendous power generally placed the winning of the war above
any thought of personal or political advantage to himself.
It might be well here to point out some distinctions between
the President's control over the army and navy, and his control
over the militia, for his powers of command with regard to the
latter are considerably more limited than those with respect to
the former. In the first place, the President is not at all times
the commander-in-chief of the militia, as he is of the regular
army and navy. The report of the Committee on Detail in the
Convention of 1787 (on August 6) had made the President "com-
mander-in-chief of the Army and Navy of the United States, and
of the militia of the several States,
' ' 73 thus making no distinc-
tion between the power of command over the militia and that
over the regular forces, but giving the President complete com-
mand of both at all times. When the report came before the
Convention, however (on August 27), objection was immediately
made and Mr. Sherman 's amendment giving 'the Executive com-
mand of the militia only "when called into actual service of the
United States" was adopted with but two dissenting votes.74
That change in language placed a very definite restriction on the
power of the President to command the militia only upon the
stated occasions, it being at other times under the command of the
executive of each particular state.
71 See Luther Martin 's letter to the Maryland legislature. Elliot 's De-
lates, I, 379.
72 For an interesting insight into the problem that sometimes confronts
the President in this connection, see Diary of James K. Polk, I, 412-413.
President Wilson has been accused of being guided chiefly by political
considerations in declining to give ex-President Boosevelt a command dur-
ing the recent war, and in refusing to assign Gen. Wood to overseas duty.
is Madison's Journal (Hunt ed.), II, 86.
74 Ibid., II, 255. The jealous care with which the states wished to pre-
serve the militia as distinctively state troops under the command of state
authorities is shown further by the various amendments proposed in the
state ratifying conventions. See Elliot's Debates, I, 331, 335; II, 545-546,
552; III, 660; IV, 108, 245.
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In the second place, the President cannot order the militia
into "the actual service of the United States" and thus become
its commander-in-chief, simply upon his own authority. The
Constitution gives the President no authority in that respect,
but vests in Congress the power "to provide for calling forth
the militia. " 75 It is true that Congress has carried out this con-
stitutional provision by giving the President in turn definite
statutory authority to call out the militia under certain circum-
stances; nevertheless it also remains true that while the Presi-
dent 's power to command the army and navy is complete and ex-
clusive, he has over the militia, in the words of Hamilton, "only
the occasional command of such part as by legislative provision
may be called into the actual service of the Union. '
' 78
Thirdly, the President is very definitely limited in the pur-
poses for which he may use the militia, even after it has been
lawfully called out and placed under his command. The Consti-
tution gives Congress the right to provide for calling forth the
militia only "to execute the laws of the Union, to suppress in-
surrections, and to repel invasions,
' ' 77 and of course Congress
cannot empower the President to use the militia for any other
purposes.
The President has, however, been granted as wide powers as
this constitutional provision will permit. By the Act of Septem-
ber 29, 1789, Congress authorized the President to call out the
militia to repel Indian invasions,78 and the Act of May 2, 1792,
extended that authority to include all the cases mentioned in the
Constitution. This act, as well as the Act of February 28, 1795,
broadened the power of the President still further by authoriz-
ing him to call out the militia not only in case of actual invasion,
but also whenever there is "imminent danger of invasion from
any foreign nation or Indian tribe,
' ' 79 thus introducing for the
first time the element of discretion. By means of amendments
75 Constitution, Art. I, Sec. 8, Cl. 15.
wTlw Federalist, No. 68 (69) (Goldwin Smith ed., p. 381). See also
Johnson v. Sayre, 158 U. S., 109, 115 (1895). Cf. President Fillmore's dis-
cussion of the distinction between the President's powers in this respect
in his message of Feb. 19, 1851. Richardson, op. cit., V, 104.
" Constitution, Art I, Sec. 8, Cl. 15.
78 Annals of Cong., 1 Cong., II, App., 2199 (Sec. 5).
" Ibid., 2 Cong., App., 1370 (Sec. 1); 3 Cong., App., 1508 (Sec. 1).
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and supplementary acts, the powers of the President in this re-
spect have been still further broadened and amplified.80
Several important constitutional questions as to the power of
the President have been raised under the provisions of these acts.
Thus, when President Madison called out the militia for service
in the War of 1812, the question immediately arose as to where
the power rested to determine when the emergency contemplated
by the Constitution existed. The governors of three states (Mas-
sachusetts, Connecticut, and Rhode Island) refused to respond to
the call, in part on the ground that it was within the power of the
executive of each state to determine whether the need for militia
was so great as to warrant its being called out, and that in their
opinion no such emergency existed at that time. In this opinion
they were supported by the Massachusetts Supreme Court and
the Hartford Convention.81 Secretary of War Monroe, however,
dissented vigorously from this view and held that it was within
the discretion of the President alone to determine the existence
of a constitutional exigency for calling out the militia.82 He was
supported at the time by the committee of Congress chosen to
investigate the situation,
83 and later by the Supreme Court,84 and
it is now generally recognized that the President has exclusive-
ly this discretionary authority.
Another much-disputed question concerns the extent to which
the President may use the militia outside the limits of the Uni-
ted States. In the War of 1812, in the Seminole War of 1818,
and in the Mexican War of 1846, the militia was ordered out and
actually used across the border of the United States,85 the action
so Acts of July 29, 1861; Dick Militia Act of 1903; National Defense
Act of 1916. 12 Stat. at L., 281; 32 ibid., 775, 776; 39 ibid., 166, 201.
si McMaster, History of the People of the United States, III, 544-546 ;
IV, 251; Am. State Papers, Mil. Affairs, I, 605, 610-612; 8 Mass., 548,
549.
82 Am. State Papers, Mil. Affairs, I, 605-606.
ss See its report, ibid., I, 604.
a* Martin v. Mott, 12 Wheat., 19, 31-32 (1827); Luther v. Borden, 7
How., 1, 43 (1848). The various occasions upon which the militia has been
called into the federal service are cited by Quincy Wright in
' '
Military
Administration,
' ' in Beport of the Efficiency and Economy Committee,
State of Illinois, 1915, 897-903.
85 McMaster, op. cit., Ill, 438 ; IV, 12-18 ; Quincy Wright, op. cit., 898,
899.
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in every case being based on the authority for its use in repelling
invasions. There was some attempt in Congress in 1812 to give
the President definite statutory authority to use the militia forces
outside the United States, but after a debate in which most of
the members seemed to think such use unconstitutional, the mat-
ter was left unsettled.86 In the Seminole War of 1818, specific
authority was given to use the troops (consisting largely of mil-
itia) across the Florida border in case of necessity,87 and in
the Mexican War the President was expressly authorized to call
out militia to serve during the war, which it was known would
be waged on enemy soil.88 Quite recently Congress again showed
its inclination to permit the use of militia outside the limits of
the United States when in the amendment of 1908 to the Dick
Militia Act of 1903, it was provided that when called out, "the
militia shall continue to serve during the time so specified, either
within or without the territory of the United States unless sooner
relieved by the order of the President. " 89 A similar provision
was included in the Act of February 16, 1914, with regard to
the naval militia.90
The constitutionality of these provisions has been in dispute.
A portion of the militia ordered into Canada in 1812 refused, on
constitutional grounds, to cross the border, and a high authority
thinks it doubtful whether any military court could have vindi-
cated its jurisdiction had it attempted to punish this disobedi-
ence.
91 A portion did cross, however, and the precedents of the
wars of 1812, 1818, and 1846, would seem to be authority for the
view that militia may be used outside the United States if neces-
sary to repel invasion. Attorney-General Wickersham took that
SB Annals of Cong., 12 Cong., I, 728-802; Elliot's Debates, IV, 459-460;
McMaster, op. cit., Ill, 438.
87 See message of President Monroe, Mar. 25, 1818. Am. State Papers,
Mil. Affairs, I, 681; letter of Sec. of War Calhoun to Gen. Gaines, Dec. 16,
1817. Ibid., 689.
ssQuincy Wright, op. cit., 899; cf. Upton, Military Policy of the United
States, 196-197; Act of May 13, 1846. 9 Stat. at L., 9 (Sees. 1, 2).
835 Stat. at L., 399, 400 (See Sec. 3).
9038 ibid-., 283, 284 (Sec. 4).
9i Ordronaux, Constitutional Legislation in the United States, 504. Mc-
Master seems to think the refusal of the militia to cross was due to
cowardice rather than to any constitutional scruples. History of the People
of the United States, IV, 12.
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view in an opinion rendered in 1912: "If the militia were
called into the service of the General government to repel an in-
vasion, it would not be necessary to discontinue their use at the
boundary line, but they might (within certain limits, at least)
pursue and capture the invading force, even beyond that line,
and just as the Regular Army might be used for that pur-
pose.
' ' 92
Pomeroy, however, holds that
' ' in no case can they be
compelled to serve without the territory of the Union. The laws
must be executed where they have force, and that is only within
the country itself. Insurrections and invasions must be internal.
We do not repel an invasion by attacking the invading nation
upon its own soil.
' ' The furthest he is willing to go is to admit
that the militia may be called out before the invaders have set
foot upon our territory. "It is a fair construction of language
to say that one means of
'
repelling
'
an invasion is to have a force
ready to receive the threatened intruders when they arrive.
' ' 93
While there may thus be some doubt as to whether, or to what
extent, the militia may be used outside the United States in
repelling invasions, practically all authorities seem to agree
that it cannot be used, as militia, for the purpose of invading a
foreign country or carrying on an offensive war outside the juris-
diction of the United States. Thus Attorney-General Wicker-
sham, in the same opinion in which he held that militia might be
taken across the border to repel an invasion, held the act of 1908
unconstitutional in so far as it authorized the use of the militia,
as such, for the purposes of warfare in foreign countries.
94 Judge
Advocate General Davis in 1908 had rendered an opinion to the
contrary, arguing that a declaration of war is a law for the ex-
ecution of which the militia may be called out and sent wherever
necessary to carry out its purposes ;
95 but the weight of authority
is in support of the view that the militia cannot as such be sent
out of the United States for the purposes of a foreign war.96
92 29 Op. Atty. Gen., 322, 324.
3 Pomeroy, Constitutional Law (Bennett's ed.), 387.
9* 29 Op. Atty. Gen., 329.
95 See Cong. Eecord, XLII (60 Cong., 1 Sess.), 6943; cf. opinion of
Asst. Atty. Gen. Boyd on the position of the militia in the Spanish War. 22
Op. Atty. Gen., 225, 227-228; 536, 540.
90 Pomeroy, Constitutional Law, 387; Von Hoist, Constitutional Law,
170; Ordronaux, Constitutional Legislation, 501-502; Dig. Ops. J. A. G.
(ed. 1901), 483.
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Finally, with regard to the appointment of officers for the com-
mand of the militia, the powers of the President are very much
limited. The Constitution definitely reserves to the states the
appointment of such officers,97 but the Constitution is not clear
as to what authority may appoint the commanding officers when
several different militia units, or militia from several different
states, are called into the service of the United States.
There is no doubt that the President himself may take personal
command on such occasions, since he is made commander-in-chief
of the militia "when called into the service of the United
States," as he is of the regular army and navy at all times.
President Washington was not only clear as to his right to take
personal command of the militia forces upon such occasions, but,
in the case of the Whiskey Rebellion in 1794, was also convinced
of the necessity of exercising that right. He assumed active com-
mand of the militia forces assembled to crush the insurrection,
visited the place of rendezvous, and personally directed the for-
ward movement of the troops, living and marching with them as
active commander in the field from September 25 to October 20,
when, as he informed Congress in his message of November 20,
' '
if the state of things had afforded reason for the continuance of
my presence with the army, it would not have been withholden.
But every appearance assuring such an issue as will redound to
the reputation and strength of the United States, I have judged
it most proper to resume my duties at the seat of Government,
leaving the chief command with the Governor of Virginia (Ma-
jor-General Henry Lee)." 98 There was apparently some criti-
cism of Washington's course at the time as being unconstitu-
tional, which the President denounced as
' '
impertinence,
' ' "
al-
tho he was careful to say that "imperious circumstance alone"
could justify his absence from the seat of government while Con-
gress was in session.
100
Washington's action in this case was not of course a case of
87 Art. I, Sec. 8, Cl. 16.
*Am. State Papers, Misc., I, 84; See also letters of Washington to
Maj. Gen. Daniel Morgan, Oct. 8, 1794, and to Maj. Gen. Lee, Oct. 20,
1794. Writings of George Washington, XII, 469-470, 479-480; cf. Oliver,
Alexander Hamilton, 346-347.
99 Writings of George Washington, XII, 474.
100 Ibid., 469.
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exercising personal command in time of actual war, but of domes-
tic trouble. Nevertheless it is significant as showing that Wash-
ington did not hesitate to leave his civil duties to take active
command of troops in the field, even when Congress was in ses-
sion, and it is not at all unlikely that he would have done the
same in case of more serious difficulties with foreign powers.
As a matter of fact, it was seriously asserted during the War
of 1812, that when the militia was called into the service of the
United States, the President could not delegate his right of com-
mand to any officer in other words, that he could under no
circumstances appoint any other officer to command militia
forces
;
but that whenever different detachments of militia
were called out, or militia from different states, the President
was under the obligation of assuming personal command. This
was the contention of the governors of^the three states refusing
to furnish militia, when, in reply to President Madison's call
upon the militia for service during that war, they gave as one
reason for objecting to letting the militia out from their juris-
diction, "That when the militia of a State should be called into
the service of the United States, no officer of the regular army
had a right to command them, or other person, not an officer of
the militia, except the President of the United States in
person."
101
This view of the governors was sustained at the time by the
Massachusetts Supreme Court,102 but was later vigorously con-
demned by Secretary of War Monroe, in an opinion given to a
committee of Congress, February 11, 1815, in which he said that
such a construction was one ' ' for which I can see nothing in the
Constitution to afford the slightest pretext." He maintained
that the President was under no greater obligation to command
the militia in person than the regular troops; that the power to
command both was vested in him principally for the purpose of
giving him that control over military and naval operations which
is a necessary attribute of the executive branch of the govern-
ment; that his actual presence with the troops, either militia or
regular forces, was under no circumstances necessarily contem-
101 Am. State Papers, Mil. Affairs, I, 605, 610-611.
102 Hid., 611-612 ; 8 Mass., 548, 550. Cf. also debate in Congress, Apr.
17, 1812. Annals of Cong., 12 Cong., 1 Sess., II, 1324.
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plated by the Constitution; that "in construction of law he is
commander-in-chief, though not present." 103
Monro&'s position with regard to the meaning of the Constitu-
tion was eminently sound. It can hardly be imagined that the
framers of the Constitution intended anything else than that the
President should be the judge as to the wisdom and necessity of
his personal presence with the troops ; still less can it be imagin-
ed that any distinction was intended between the President's ob-
ligations in that respect toward the militia and the regular
forces. The general practise on all occasions upon which the
militia has been called out, as well as authoritative opinion, would
therefore indicate that when the militia has been called into the
service of the United States, it comes under the control of the
President as Commander-in-Chief, and may be commanded by
him personally or by any officer designated by him, whether of
the regular or militia forces.
104
. State Papers, Mil Affairs, I, 606.
104 Ordronaux, Constitutional Legislation in the United States, 505; 2 Op.
Atty. Gen., 711; Story, Commentaries, II, 316 n; Am. State Papers, Mil.
Affairs, II, 102.
CHAPTER VIII
POWERS OF MILITARY JURISDICTION
For the exercise of military jurisdiction, two principal mili-
tary tribunals have come into being courts-martial, for the
trial of offenders against military law, and military commissions,
for the trial of offenders against the laws of war and under mar-
tial law. 1 The authority of the former is conferred and defined
largely by statute, under the power given to Congress "to make
rules for the government and regulation of the land and naval
forces
;
" 2 while the authority of the latter is derived principally
from the common law of war. 3
Altho the authorization of courts-martial is thus in the hands
of Congress, their control afterwards rests almost exclusively
with the executive branch of the government. They are created,
in every case, by military order issued by commanding officers
having authority under the Articles of War to call them into
being.
4
"They are creatures of orders, the power to convene
them, as well as the power to act upon their proceedings, being
an attribute of command. ' ' 5
1 For the distinction between military law and martial law, see Manual
for Courts-Martial, U. S. Army (ed. 1917),1-2; Davis, Treatise on the Mili-
tary Law of the United States (2nd ed.), 5; Birkhimer, Military Govern-
ment and Martial Law (2nd ed.), 371-391. See also an excellent tabular
statement in Davis, op. tit., 12.
2 Constitution, Art. I, Sec. 8, Cl. 14. The rules enacted by Congress un-
der this provision are for the most part included in what are called the
Articles of War. The latest revision of these may conveniently be found in
Manual for Courts-Martial, 305-329 (App. I) ; also a concise history of the
Articles in the same Manual, ix-xiii.
3 See Lieber 's Instructions for the Government of Armies of the United
States in Time of War, G. O. 100, A. G. O., 1863, in Birkhimer, op. cit.,
635.
* Davis, Treatise on Military Law, 16.
s Dig. Ops. J. A. G., (ed. 1901), 283.
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The President is expressly authorized by statute to convene
general courts-martial under certain circumstances.6 He is by
no means, however, limited to that specific case, nor dependent
upon statutory authority, but is empowered to convene such
courts-martial ' ' generally and in any case,
' '
by virtue of his con-
stitutional authority as Commander-in-Chief. 7 In an opinion
rendered June 6, 1877, Attorney General Devens, after reviewing
the law and precedents on this subject, said :
' * The authority of
the President to appoint general courts-martial, in cases wherein
he is not expressly authorized so to do by Congress, may there-
fore be regarded as well established. It rests directly upon the
provision of the constitution which makes him Commander-in-
Chief, as interpreted by the law and usage of the military service
existing when that instrument was framed ; it is sustained by the
doctrine laid down in American works of authority on courts-
martial, the views expressed by one of the standing committees
of the House (that on Military Affairs) whose special business it
is to make itself conversant with subjects of this character, and
an official opinion of the late distinguished head of the Bureau
of Military Justice, Judge Holt; and, moreover, it is confirmed
by long-continued practice, extending back nearly to the begin-
ning of the Government.
' ' 8
That power of the President has further been supported by
the Judiciary Committee of the Senate ; 9 and it has been exer-
cised on numerous occasions, both before and after the passage
of the statute in question, notably in the cases of Brigadier Gen-
eral Hull (1813), Major General Wilkinson (1814), Major Gen-
eral Gaines (1816), Major General Twiggs (1858), Brigadier
General Paine (1865), and many others.10 The power so exer-
cised is "a striking illustration," as was said by one authority,
"
of an undefined constitutional power, for it is nothing less than
the power to constitute tribunals with judicial jurisdiction ex-
tending even to trials for capital offenses."
lx
e Act of May 29, 1830. 4 Stat. at L., 417.
7 Swaim v. United States, 165 U. S., 553, 558 (1897) ; Dig. Ops. J. A, G.,
568; Davis, op. cit., 17.
s 15 Op. Atty. Gen., 302-303. See also ibid., 297-301.
Report No. 868, Mar. 3, 1879, 45 Cong., 3 Sess., cited in Davis, op. cit.,
17, n.
10 See list of courts-martial convened by order of the President in 15
Op. Atty. Gen., 301-302.
n Lieber, Remarks on Army Eegulations, 25.
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The fact that military commanders subordinate to the Presi-
dent may also upon occasion convene courts-martial, can in no
sense be understood as a limitation upon the President's consti-
tutional power to summon these courts at his discretion. "A
military officer cannot be invested with greater authority by Con-
gress than the commander-in-chief, and a power of command
devolved, by statute, on an officer of the Army or Navy is neces-
sarily shared by the President. . . Since the earliest legisla-
tion of our Government it has undoubtedly been understood and
intended that whatever powers were granted to general officers
were, at the same time, granted and intended to be shared by the
President . . . whose name is understood as written in
in every statute which confers upon a military officer military
authority." 12
The President may, however, act through his subordinates.
Thus, a convening of a general court-martial by the Secretary of
War is held to be in law a convening by the President, and as
legal as if the President himself had signed the order, such act of
the Secretary being purely administrative and in law the act of
the President whom he represents. 13
The constitution of general courts-martials is also subject to
the control of the Executive. The appointing authority,
whether it be the President or a subordinate commanding offi-
cer, designates the number of officers, between the statutory
maximum (13) and minimum (5), that are to constitute any
particular court in any case, and his decision is final. 14 Even
during a trial members of a court may be relieved from duty
with the court and ordered to other service, or new members
may be added, without affecting the functioning of the court or
the validity of its proceedings, provided merely that the mem-
bership is not reduced below the minimum nor increased beyond
the maximum. 15 Even the reduction of a court below the mini-
mum does not dissolve it, its sittings being merely interrupted
until sufficient new members are added, and the validity of its
proceedings being unaffected. "Thus the membership of the
12 Davis, op. cit., 17, n; cf. 8th Article of War, in Manual for Courts-
Martial, 309-310.
i3l%. Ops. J. A. G., 290, 568, 644-645.
14 Martin v. Mott, 12 Wheat,, 19, 34-35 (1827).
is Of course there are certain rules requiring the reading of the previous
record to the new members, etc., but there is in no sense a retrial.
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court, both as to numbers within statutory limits and as to per-
sonnel, is entirely within the control of the appointing or
superior military authority at all times.
' ' 1G
The President also has entire control over the methods and
procedure of courts-martial. 17 The procedure for preferring
charges and bringing the accused to trial is prescribed almost
exclusively by regulations and the customs of the service, while
the rules of evidence are those of the federal courts as modified
by executive regulations.
Likewise, the President may to a large extent control the find-
ings and sentence of courts-martial. The Articles of War ex-
pressly provide that the approval of the appointing officer or of
his successor in command is a condition precedent to the execu-
tion of any sentence, and that the appointing authority may ap-
prove or disapprove the finding, or approve or disapprove the
whole or any part of the sentence. 18 The President acts as the
reviewing authority in all cases tried by courts-martial convened
by himself, either under his general authority as Commander-
in-Chief, or as expressly provided by statute, in cases of sen-
tences respecting general officers, in cases of sentences of death
or dismissal adjudged in time of peace, and in all cases submit-
ted to him for action in time of war. He may approve or dis-
approve in whole or in part the findings or the sentence, or he
may mitigate the punishment. 19
Also, by custom of the service, the President or other appoint-
ing authority may return the record in any case for reconsidera-
tion and revision, whether the finding is guilty or not guilty.
A rule of procedure prescribed by President Wilson, effective
August 10, 1919, modified this in so far as it abolished the power
to return a finding of acquittal for reconsideration or any sen-
tence for revision upward,20 but of course another President or
ie E. M. Morgan, in Tale Law Jour., XXIX, 60-61.
" See 38th Article of War, in Manual for Courts-Martial, 314.
is 46th and 47th Articles of War. Ibid., 315-316.
19 Dig. Ops. J. A. G., 568-569. But when such approval or disapproval
has once been given and the accused duly notified, it is beyond the power
of the President to change his decision, even though his action may after-
warda be found to have worked an injustice. 15 Op. Atty. Gen., 290, 297.
Of course the President may still pardon the accused, if punishment is
unexecuted.
20 G. O. 88, W. D., sec. 1, July 14, 1919, quoted in Tale Law Jour.
XXIX, 63, n.
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President Wilson himself might revoke this order and thus re-
store the former practise. While the Executive has thus almost
complete control over the findings and sentences of courts-mar-
tial, Congress has no power whatever either to revise or reverse
their judgments. 21
As in the case of the convening of courts-martial, so the action
of the President respecting their procedure, findings, and sen-
tence, while it should be the result of his own judgment, 22 need
not be under his own hand, 23 any action of authorized subordi-
nates, such as the Secretary of War and the Secretary of the
Navy, being presumed in law to be the act of the President.24
But confirmation of findings and sentence by some Executive
authority being required in all cases before execution of sentence,
courts-martial can hardly be considered as anything but advisory
bodies, with the power of making recommendations or of report-
ing findings of fact and conclusions of law to a non-judicial
superior, whose principal function is that of an executive.25
"The system then is clearly one of review by superior military
authority, which may, but need not, ask or follow the opinion of
legal advisers, and is in no respect judicial. . . The principle
at the foundation of the existing system is the supremacy of
military command. To maintain that principle, military com-
mand dominates and controls the proceeding from its initiation
to the final execution of the sentence. ' ' 26
Courts-martial differ widely, therefore, from civil courts. The
latter are created by statute, which also describe their composi-
tion, define their jurisdiction and procedure, and determine the
times and places of their sessions. Courts-martial, tho au-
thorized by statute, are created and dissolved in every case by
executive authority ; the Executive likewise determines their com-
position, defines their procedure, and controls their findings and
21 Am. State Papers, Mil. Affairs, V, 17-18.
22EunTcle v. United States, 122 U. 8., 543, 557 (1887).
23United States v. Fletcher, 148 U. 8., 84, 88-89 (1893).
z* Ibid., 91; United States v. Page, 137 U. 8., 673, 679-680 (1891) ; Bish-
op v. United States, 197 U. 8., 334, 341-342 (1905).
25 Glenn, The Army and the Law, 35-42.
26 E. M. Morgan, op. cit., 65, 66. The opinion of the Judge Advocate
General is in some cases required before execution of sentence, but only
by General Order. His advice is generally followed by the reviewing au-
thority, but not necessarily, and it has been disregarded.
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sentences. It therefore seems correct to say, as do most authori-
ties, that courts-martial are no part of the judiciary of the United
States, but simply agencies or instrumentalities of the
Executive.27
Military commissions as contrasted with courts-martial, are of
comparatively recent origin in the United States, having been
initiated by General Scott in Mexico in 1847.28 Courts-martial,
as has already been noted, are instituted for the trial of offend-
ers against military law, that is, their jurisdiction is restricted
by statute to military persons and to certain specific offences
defined by law. Hence other tribunals have been found neces-
sary for the trial of civilians as well as military persons, who are
accused of criminal acts contrary to the common laws of war and
under martial law, and for this purpose the military commissions
have been established. Thus the military commission initiated
by General Scott was mainly for the punishment of murder, rob-
bery, and other violent crimes, committed either by civilians or
military persons, and not at that time cognizable by a court-
martial. At the same time another tribunal, called the
' '
council
of war," was inaugurated for the punishment of offenses pecu-
2T Davis, op. cit., 15; Dig. Ops. J. A. G., 283; Willoughby, Constitutional
Law, II, 1197. S. T. Ansell, recently Acting Judge Advocate General,
admits this conclusion, but criticizes severely the system that makes such
a conclusion necessary. See his article, "Military Justice," in Cornell
Law Quar., V, 11-17 (Nov. 1919), esp. 5-7. But compare the Supreme
Court opinion approving the following statement by Attorney General
Bates: " The whole proceeding from its inception is judicial. The trial,
findings, and sentence are the solemn acts of a court organized and con-
ducted according to the prescribed forms of law. It sits to pass upon
the most sacred questions of human rights that are ever placed on trial
in a court of justice; rights which, in the very nature of things, can never
be exposed to danger nor subjected to the uncontrolled will of any man, but
which must be adjudged according to law." Bunkle v. United States, 122
U. S., 543, 558 (1887). For an excellent review and criticism of the present
court-martial system, see an article, already occasionally referred to, by
E. M. Morgan, "The Existing Court-Martial System and the Ansell Ar-
ticles," Yale Law Jour., XXIX, 52-74 (Nov., 1919). For a defense of the
present system, see an article by G. G. Bogert, professor of law in Cornell
University and recently Judge Advocate of the 78th Division, "Courts-
Martial: Criticisms and Proposed Reforms," in Cornell Law Quar., V, 18-
47 (Nov., 1919).
28 See Gen. Scott's G. O. No. 287, Sept. 17, 1847, in Birkhimer, op. cit.,
581-583 (Appendix I, Par. 10, 11.).
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liar to war, and especially crimes by members of guerilla bands.
Early in the Civil War these two tribunals were, by practise of
the military commanders and sanctioned by the War Depart-
ment, united into the one court called the "military com-
mission. ' ' 29
The authority for the creation of military commissions may
therefore be said to be the same as that for the prosecution of
war and for the exercise of military government and martial
law they are "merely an instrumentality for the more effi-
cient execution of the laws of war,
' ' 30 and as such are but an-
other agency of the Executive. Tho derived from the common
law of war, the authority of military commissions has been rec-
ognized in statutes,31 in executive proclamations,
32 in opinions
of Attorneys-General,
33 and in rulings of the Supreme Court,34
so that it is now "as well known and recognized in the laws of
the United States as a court-martial. ' ' 35
The President has practically complete control over the mili-
tary commissions. There is no statute prescribing how or by
whom they are to be constituted, or how they are to be composed.
In practise, however, they have been created by the same authori-
ties as are empowered to order courts-martial, which means the
President himself at his discretion or his military commanders
acting under his authority. Attorney-General Speed in 1865
upheld the right of the President to create such military tribun-
als even for the trial of non-military persons in this case the
assassins of President Lincoln: "I do not think," he said,
"that Congress can, in time of war or peace. . . create mili-
tary tribunals for the adjudication of offences committed by
persons not engaged in, or belonging to, such forces. . . But
it does not follow that because such military tribunals cannot be
29Winthrop, Abridgment of Military Law (2nd ed.), 331-332.
so Ibid., 331.
si Acts of Mar. 3, 1863 (sec. 30) ; July 2, 1864 (see. 1) ; July 4, 1864
(sees. 6, 8) ; Mar. 2, 1867 (sec. 3); and several later appropriation acts.
32 Proclamations of Sept. 24, 1862 and Apr. 2, 1866. Kichardson, Mes-
sages and Papers of tlie Presidents, VI, 98-99, 429-432.
335 Op. Atty. Gen., 55; 11 ibid., 297; 12 ibid., 332; 13 ibid., 59; 14
ibid., 249.
**Ex parte VallandigJiam, 1 Wall., 243 (1863); Ex parte Milligan, 4
Wall., 2 (1866).
35 Davis, Treatise on Military Law, 308, n.
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created by Congress, . . that they cannot be created at all.
' '
The Attorney-General held that under the laws of war, which
constitute the greater part of the law of nations and therefore
are a part of the law of the land, military commanders are au-
thorized to create and establish military commissions or other
tribunals for the trial of offenders against the laws of war,
whether these offenders are active or secret participants, that
"obedience to the Constitution requires that the military should
do their whole duty ; they must not only meet and fight the ene-
mies of the country, in open battle, but they must kill or take the
secret enemies of the country, and try and execute them accord-
ing to the laws of war.
' ' 3e
The composition of military commissions is entirely within the
authority of the President to determine. There being no statu-
tory maximum or minimum as to the number of members, as in
the case of courts-martial, the discretion of the President is even
wider than for those tribunals. Military commissions have, how-
ever, usually been composed of five members; less than three
would be contrary to precedent; but any number would be
legal.
37
The jurisdiction of military commissions is not defined by
statute, but extends in practise to violations of the laws of war,
whether by civilians or military persons, in occupied enemy ter-
ritory or in territory under martial law.38 The power of the
President to institute military government over occupied terri-
tory is exclusive,
89 and in that respect he controls the jurisdic-
tion of military commissions. The power to institute martial
law, while more doubtful, is generally held to belong properly, in
time of war, to the Executive, as Commander-in-Chief. "The
power of the Executive to prosecute a war precipitated upon the
country carries with it by necessary implication," says one au-
thority, "the incidental power to make use of the necessary and
customary means of carrying it on successfully. If he deems the
as 11 Op. Atty. Gen., 297, 298, 299, 308, 316.
37 Winthrop, op. cit., 333; Dig. Ops. J. A. G., 463. The military commis-
sion convened by order of President Johnson for the trial of Lincoln's
assassins was composed of 9 members. See Special Orders No. 211 and 216,
May 6 and May 9, 1865, in Eichardson, op. cit., VI, 335-336, 336-337.
ss Winthrop, op. cit., 333; Dig. Ops. J. A. G., 464.
39 Infra, Ch. IX.
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placing any district under martial law a proper measure, it is
difficult logically to deny him the right to do it. " 40 In practise,
martial law is always instituted by Executive authority,41 and
hence military commissions are dependent upon the action of the
President for their jurisdiction in that respect also. The viola-
tions of the laws of war that come under the jurisdiction of the
military commissions in these cases have been held to include all
cases which do not come within the jurisdiction conferred by
statute on courts-martial,
42 and in practise have included almost
every conceivable offense, from the slightest sort of intercourse
with the enemy to espionage and murder.43
In addition to the jurisdiction conferred under the common
law of war and martial law, military commissions may be used
as a temporary substitute for the local civil courts, when those
courts, under the stress of circumstances, have ceased to func-
tion, tho in such cases their jurisdiction should properly be
regulated by the local statutes governing the courts for which
they are substitutes.
44 But whether exercising jurisdiction
under the laws of war or as a substitute for the local courts,
there is practically no limit to that of the military commissions
if they have jurisdiction of the person and the offence, they
may proceed with the trial of offences committed even before the
initiation of military government or martial law.45
The procedure of military commissions, not being prescribed
by statute, is likewise under the control of the Executive.
In practise, the rules of procedure laid down for courts-martial
40 Birkhimer, op. cit., 378. He admits, however, that martial law may
be invoked "either by the executive or the law-making power, although
the former generally will be the case." Ibid., 390. But Pomeroy criticizes
the position of the dissenting justices in Ex parte Milligan (4 Wall., 2)
that Congress may, under certain circumstances, declare martial law, as
"utterly indefensible." Constitutional Law, 594. Cf. Glenn, The Army and
the Law, 185.
*i Instances of the proclamation of martial law by Executive authority
are given in Winthrop, op. cit., 329-330.
42 Ex parte Vallandigham, 1 Wall., 243, 249 (1863).
43 See list of offences charged as ' ' violations of the laws of war '
' dur-
ing the Civil War, in Dig. Ops. J. A. G., 465; also in Davis, op. cit., 310, n.
44 Dig. Ops. J. A. G., 468.
*5 Ibid., 464 ; Birkhimer, op. cit., 533. But violations of the laws of war
cannot legally be tried after the war or emergency has terminated. Win-
throp, op. cit., 334.
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are generally observed, and authorities hold that these rules
should apply as consistently as possible. That is not obligatory,
however, and the powers of military commissions not being de-
fined by law, their proceedings are legal even if details that are
required in courts-martial or in civil courts are omitted, such as
the administering of a specific oath to members of the court, or
giving the accused the opportunity of challenge.46
There are likewise no statutes governing the power of the mili-
tary commissions to inflict punishments, hence it is a power
practically without restriction. These tribunals are not limited
to the penalties known to courts-martial, nor are the strictly
military penalties dismissal from the service, dishonorable
discharge, and the like generally appropriate, since the per-
sons to be punshied are usually civilians. The punishments of
death, imprisonment, or fine are those usually inflicted by mili-
tary commissions, but, especially during the Civil War, have
included also confiscation of property, forfeiture of licenses to
trade, expulsion from certain sections of the country, furnishing
bonds for good behavior, and taking the oath of allegiance. 47 In
no case are the proceedings or sentences of military commissions
subject to appeal to, or reversal by, any civil court.48
Military commissions, deriving their authority and jurisdic-
tion from military usage and the common law of war, and their
creation, composition, procedure, and decisions being subject to
the complete control of the Executive, are therefore, even more
than courts-martial, merely agencies of the Executive in his ca-
pacity as Commander-in-Chief. Through the courts-martial, as
has been noted, the President is enabled to control the discipline
of the armed forces and enforce military law. Through the mili-
tary commissions he controls the administration of justice in war
time, not only in the theater of active operations, but also in
places declared by him to require the institution of martial law,
and extending to all classes of civilians as well as to military
persons.
49 By means of these tribunals, the President's powers
to carry on the vigorous prosecution of a war are considerably
Birkhimer, op. cit., 533-534; Winthrop, op. cit., 334.
47 Winthrop, op. cit., 335.
48 Ex parte Yallandigham, 1 Wall., 243, 251-252 (1863).
49 There are said to have been nearly 150 cases of women tried by mili-
tary commissions during the Civil War. Davis, op. cit., 309, n.
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extended
;
he is through them enabled to deal effectively with that
class of persons who, while not engaged in open acts of hostility,
may in one way or another be interfering with the success of the
military operations.
Another power of the President, which should be noted as of
some importance in this discussion, is his power to grant re-
prieves and pardons. Tho finally vested in the President with-
out limitation, except in cases of impeachment,50 the debates
over the adoption of the Constitution reveal considerable fear of
the wartime use of this power, that is, its use especially in cases
of treason. Luther Martin expressed this fear when he said to
the Maryland legislature: "The power given to these persons
[i. e., the President and Vice-President] over the Army and Navy
is in truth formidable, but the power of Pardon is still more
dangerous, as in all acts of Treason, the very offence on which
the prosecution would possibly arise, would most likely be in fa-
vor of the President 's own power.
' ' 51 The New York ratifying
convention of 1788 also showed its fear of this Executive power
by proposing the following amendment: "That the executive
shall not grant pardons for treason, unless with the consent of
the Congress ; but may, at his discretion, grant reprieves to per-
sons convicted of treason until their cases can be laid before the
Congress.
' ' 52
The reason for vesting this power in the President was, how-
ever, well stated by Hamilton when he wrote: "But the prin-
cipal argument for reposing the power of pardoning in this case
[i. e., in case of treason] in the chief magistrate is this : in sea-
sons of insurrection or rebellion there are often critical moments
when a well-timed offer of pardon to the insurgents or rebels may
restore the tranquillity of the commonwealth, and which, if suf-
fered to pass unimproved, it may never be possible afterward to
recall. The dilatory process of convening the legislature, or one
of its branches, for the purpose of obtaining its sanction to the
measure would frequently be the occasion of letting slip the
golden opportunity.
' ' 53
so Constitution, Art. II, Sec. 2, Cl. 1.
siFarrand's Records, III, 158; see also ibid., 218.
52 Elliot's Debates, I, 330.
ss The Federalist, No. 73 (74) (Goldwin Smith ed., p. 411). But Hamil-
ton's own draft of a constitution contained this clause: "He shall have
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Tho Congress has on occasion attempted to assert some author-
ity and to exercise some control with respect to the granting of
pardons, particularly in cases of rebellion and treason,54 the
courts have uniformly held that the power of the President is
complete and exclusive, and can in no way be restricted or lim-
ited in its effects by Congress. 55 A pardon may thus be granted
by the President before or after conviction, absolutely or upon
conditions, and the ground for its exercise is wholly within the
discretion of the President. 56
Pardon may also be granted, in the form of a proclamation of
amnesty, to a whole class of offenders, without any special con-
gressional authority.
57 President Washington in this way par-
doned the participants in the Whiskey Rebellion of 1794 ; 58 Presi-
dent Adams the Pennsylvania insurgents of 1799 ;59 President
power to pardon all offences, except treason, for which he may grant re-
prieves, until the opinion of the Senate and Assembly can be had; and,
with their concurrence, may pardon the same." Elliot's Debates, V, 587.
s* See Acts of July 17, 1862 and July 12, 1870. 12 Stat. at L., 589, 592
(See. 13) ; 16 ibid., 230, 235.
ss Ex parte Garland, 4 Wall., 333, 380 (1866); United States v. Klein,
13 Wall., 128, 139-140 (1871). See also Taft, Our Chief Magistrate and His
Powers, 119-120; Bascom, Growth of Nationality, 120-122; Glenn, The
Army and the Law, 111.
66 A striking instance of pardon before conviction is the case of Maj.
Gen. Gaines in 1846. Altho found guilty by a Court of Enquiry of
having violated orders and acted illegally in calling out large bodies of
militia and volunteers without authority, and by these acts having greatly
embarrassed the government and cost the treasury
' '
many hundreds of
thousands of dollars," as the President himself said, nevertheless Presi-
dent Polk refused to convene a court-martial but ordered all further prose-
cution stopped. Diary of James K. Polk, I, 450, 480; II, 82-83. The
President has also frequently used his power of pardoning before con-
viction as a means of securing the return to duty of deserters from the
military service. See, for example, General Orders Nos. 43 and 102, July 3,
1866, and Oct. 10, 1873, issued by the direction of the President, cited in
20 Op. Atty. Gen., 345; also executive proclamations in Eichardson, op. tit.,
VI, 163, 164, 233, 278. For instances of the exercise of the pardoning
power after conviction for treason, see McKinney,
' ' Treason under the
Constitution of the United States," Illinois Law Eev., XII, 381-402 (Jan.,
3918).
57 20 Op. Atty. Gen., 330.
ss Proclamation of July 10, 1795. Eichardson, op. cit., I, 181.
59 Proclamation of May 21, 1800. Ibid., 303.
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Madison the so-called Barataria pirates who operated during the
War of 1812.60 President Lincoln also used this means of offer-
ing conditional pardon to the rebels in the Civil War;61 while
President Johnson issued four separate proclamations of amnesty
and pardon, at first excluding a large number of classes, and
finally granting a full and general pardon to all participants in
the Rebellion.62
The chief significance of the power of pardon lies not only in
this that it permits the President to offer clemency at his dis-
cretion and to correct acts of injustice done under the stress of
war,
63 but that it also enables him practically to neutralize the
effect of statutes passed by Congress for a very definite pur-
pose. Thus the Confiscation Acts of the Civil War 64 provided
for the confiscation of all property used in aid of the rebellion,
and of the property of certain classes in the Confederacy, wheth-
er used in aid of the rebellion or not; while the Captured and
Abandoned Property Act 65 turned over to the Treasury the pro-
ceeds of all property picked up by Federal troops, leaving it to
the owner to assert his claim in the Court of Claims on establish-
ing his loyalty. For all these Acts, the Supreme Court held
that a pardon operated to purge the claimant of disloyalty,66 and
hence by granting a general pardon the President was enabled
to overrule completely the intent of Congress in passing these
acts.
Likewise with respect to such acts as the Espionage Act, pass-
eo Proclamation of Feb. 6, 1815. Kichardson, op. tit., I, 558-560.
ei Proclamations of Dec. 8, 1863 and Mar. 26, 1864. Ibid., VI, 213-215,
218.
62 Proclamations of May 29, 1865 ; Sept. 7, 1867 ; July 4, 1868 ; and Dec.
25, 1868. Ibid., VI, 310-312, 547-549, 655-656, 708.
es The Clemency Board appointed by the President to review court-
martial cases adjudged during the recent war passed upon 2,857 cases
from Feb. 25 to Apr. 25, 1919, and made a partial or complete remission
of the sentences in 91 per cent of the cases considered. N. Y. Times Cur-
rent Hist. Mag., X, 62 (July, 1919). President Lincoln's generous use
of the pardon toward soldiers convicted of purely military offenses is
well known.
e* Acts of Aug. 6, 1861 and July 17, 1862. 12 Stat. at L., 319, 589.
es Act of Mar. 12, 1863. Ibid., 820.
ee United States v. Padelford, 9 Wall., 531, 542-543 (1869) ; United
States v. Klein, 13 Wall., 128, 142 (1871).
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ed during the recent war with Germany, the President might, by
a general pardon, overcome the purpose of Congress and restore
those convicted of disloyalty and obstruction to their full rights
as loyal citizens.
67
67 Shortly after the signing of the armistice, a strong movement de-
veloped for the pardon of the so-ealled
' '
political prisoners
' '
convicted dur-
ing the war. See, for example, a pamphlet, "Political Prisoners in Fed-
eral Military Prisons," published by the National Civil Liberties Bureau,
Nov. 21, 1918. See also The Dial, Jan. 11, 1919, and N. T. Times, Dec.
26, 1919. In March, 1920, Senator France (Md.) introduced a joint reso-
lution asking that these political prisoners be pardoned. United States Bul-
letin, Mar. 15, 1920. President Wilson did not issue any such general
pardon.
CHAPTER IX
POWERS OF MILITARY GOVERNMENT
Military government, or the government of occupied territory
is defined as "that dominion exercised in war by a belligerent
power over territory invaded and occupied by him and over the
inhabitants thereof. ' ' 1 Military government in this sense must
be carefully distinguished from martial law, in that the former
is exercised only in time of war over the inhabitants of an occu-
pied enemy country; while the latter may be instituted during
any emergency, whether in time of war or peace, over the citizens
at home. Martial law also requires a formal proclamation or
declaration before it can be put into effect, while military gov-
ernment exists "simply as a consequence of conquest and occupa-
tion." 2
The authority to institute and exercise military government
arises from the right and obligation of the invading belligerent,
under the laws of war, to protect his own forces and to guaran-
tee order and security to the inhabitants of the conquered terri-
tory.
3 In the United States, that right and that obligation are
vested in the President, as Commander-in-Chief, and are exer-
cised under his direction and by his subordinates.4 "The effic-
iWinthrop, Abridgment of Military Law (2nd ed.), 322; Cf. Birk-
himer, Military Government and Martial Law (2nd ed.), 45; Pomeroy,
Constitutional Law in the United States (Bennett ed.), 595; Magoon's
Eeports, 12.
aWinthrop, op. cit., 322-323.
3 See Bgulations of Hague Convention respecting the Laws and
Customs of War on Land, Art. 43, in Scott, Texts of the Peace Con-
ferences at The Hague, 225.
4 "Acts of military commanders in conducting the operations of war,
and especially in territory in military occupation are by the presumed au-
thority of the commander-in-chief . ' ' Finley & Sanderson, The American
Executive and Executive Methods, 192; cf. Mechanics Sank v. Union
BanTc, 22 Wall., 276, 297 (1874).
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lent prosecution of hostilities in war being devolved upon the
President as Commander-in-Chief
,
"
says Winthrop, "it will be-
come his right and duty (unless Congress otherwise provide) to
exercise military government over such portion of the country of
the enemy as may pass into the possession of his army by the
right of conquest.
' ' 5
Chief-Justice Chase has likewise defined military government
as military jurisdiction "to be exercised in time of foreign war
without the boundaries of the United States, or in time of rebel-
lion and civil war within states and districts occupied by rebels
treated as belligerents; ... by the military commander
under the direction of the President, with the express or im-
plied sanction of Congress.
' ' 6
The powers of the President with respect to military govern-
ment are practically absolute, being limited, neither by the Con-
stitution and laws of the United States nor by the laws of the
country under occupation, but solely by the laws and usages of
war.
"
It is not the civil law of the invaded country ; it is not the
civil law of the conquering country ; it is military law the law
of war" that governs a military occupant. 7 As Commander-
in-Chief, it is within the jurisdiction of the President to deter-
mine when the conquest of an enemy territory has been suffi-
ciently completed to warrant or require the institution of a mili-
tary government ; 8 and, in the absence of congressional action, he
s Abridgment of Military Law, 324.
*Ex parte Milligan, 4 Wall., 2, 141-142 (1866).
7 Dow v. Johnson, 100 U. 8., 158, 170 (1879). "In such cases the laws
of war take the place of the Constitution and laws of the United States
as applied in time of peace.
' ' New Orleans v. The Steamship Company,
20 Wall., 387, 394 (1874). "The right of one belligerent to occupy and
govern the territory of the enemy while in its military possession, is
one of the incidents of war, and flows directly from the right to conquer.
We, therefore, do not look to the Constitution or political institutions
of the conqueror for authority to establish a government for the terri-
tory of the enemy in his possession, during its military occupation, nor
for the rules by which the powers of such government are regulated and
limited. Such authority and such rules are derived directly from the
laws of war . . ." Dooley v. United States, 182 U. 8., 222, 230-231
(1901).
sHornsby v. United States, 10 Wall., 224, 239 (1869). Occasional-
ly attempts have been made to set up a military government over territory
not actually under occupation and control. For example, Andrew John-
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may likewise determine the duration of such military occupation
and government.9
The President may also determine the character of the govern-
ment to be established over occupied territory; that is, he may,
under the laws of war, set up such political institutions and cre-
ate a government with such powers as he thinks best suited for
carrying out the purposes of the military occupation. Thus,
during the war with Mexico, President Polk, altho he had
instructed General Kearney to establish temporary civil govern-
ments in the regions conquered by him,10 disapproved and re-
pudiated his action in organizing a government for New Mexico
which gave to that region the status of a permanent territory of
the United States and which recognized the inhabitants as Uni-
ted States citizens.11
However, in spite of this expressed disapproval of the prin-
ciple upon which the military government had been organized in
New Mexico, the President apparently made no change in the
machinery or institutions set up there by General Kearney. More-
over, he expressed no disapproval of the similar territorial gov-
ernment organized in California by Commodores Sloat and
Stockton;
12 and certainly approved that established in March,
son was appointed military governor of Tennessee in March, 1862, when
a considerable portion of the state was still unconquered by the Union
forces
;
and General Banks, remarking that ' ' the city of New Orleans is
in reality the State of Louisiana," ordered an election held in January,
1864, for governor and other officers for the entire state. See A. H. Car-
penter, "Military Government of Southern Territory, 1861-1865," in
Beport, Am. Hist. Assn. 1900, I, 465-498, esp. 477, 478. President Mc-
Kinley took for granted that the capture of Manila and the surrender
of the Spanish forces there
' '
practically effected the conquest of the
Philippine Islands," and therefore, on Dec. 21, 1898, ordered the ex-
tension of the military government theretofore maintained only in the
city of Manila to the entire archipelago. Richardson, Messages and Papers
of the Presidents, X, 219.
*Neely v. Herikel, 180 U. S., 109, 124 (1901); Birkhimer, op. tit.,
21, 368.
10 Thomas, History of Military Government in Newly Acquired Terri-
tory of the United States, 101-102.
11 Message to Congress, Dec. 22, 1846. Richardson, op. cit., IV, 507;
see also Diary of James K. Polk, II, 282. For description of the govern-
ment set up by Gen. Kearney in New Mexico, see Thomas, op. cit.,
103-105.
12 Thomas, op. cit., 160-162, 165, 181. However, the President was not
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1847, by General Kearney, which, altho not a territorial govern-
ment in name, in fact practically annexed California to the Uni-
ted States as permanent territory, the inhabitants having been
absolved from all allegiance to Mexico and considered as citizens
of the United States.13
During the Civil War, military governments were also estab-
lished by the President in the occupied portions of the South,
and his right to do so was upheld by the Supreme Court on the
ground that the conflict,
"
though not between independent na-
tions, but between different portions of the same nation, was ac-
companied by the general incidents of an international war.
' ' 14
In fact, one writer has well described the Civil "War as "a broad-
ening drama of military occupation, successive governments be-
ing established as the Confederacy gave way.
' ' 15
The governments established were of a peculiar character, how-
ever, in that they were not strictly military governments in the
sense in which that term is used in international law, instituted
to afford protection for the occupying forces and a temporary au-
thority for the enemy inhabitants. They involved the creation
of an office not previously known in American constitutional law
that of military governor ;
16 and they were instituted not for
the ordinary purposes of a military occupation, but with the
avowed purpose "to re-establish the authority of the Federal
aware of the action taken in California when he sent his message to
Congress; and his disapproval of the Stockton government may be as-
sumed from his ignoring that regime in his later instructions to Gen.
Kearney to take charge in California.
is Thomas, op. cit., 193-195. In October, 1847, the President expressed
himself as favoring an open avowal that New Mexico and California should
be retained by the United States, and that permanent territorial govern-
ments should be established. Diary of James K. Polk, III, 190.
i* Dow v. Johnson, 100 U. S., 158, 164 (1879); cf. Coleman v. Ten-
nessee, 97 U. S., 509, 517 (1878).
!5 Glenn, The Army and the Law, 97.
is The ' ' military governors
' '
appointed during the Civil War were
commissioned as such, and were distinct from the commanding officer of
the occupying forces. They were generally selected from civil life, but for
the occasion were given military rank, commonly that of Brigadier Gen-
eral. Previous to this, no "military governor" had ever been appointed,
the commanding officer of the occupying forces merely assuming the
duties of governor by virtue qf his rank as the superior officer in the
territory concerned.
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Government . . . and to provide the means of maintaining the
peace and security to loyal inhabitants . . . until they shall
be able to establish a civil government.
' ' 17 With this end in
view, the old state governmental machinery was gradually re-
stored and placed in the hands of the loyal inhabitants of the oc-
cupied districts, new institutions were created where thought
necessary, and new state constitutions, designed to be permanent,
were required to be framed and adopted all of which was up-
held by the Supreme Court as a legitimate exercise of the Presi-
dent 's power, under the laws of war, to institute military gov-
ernments.18
During the Spanish-American "War, military governments
were, by order of President McKinley, established in the Philip-
pines, in Porto Rico, and in Cuba, at first of the general
character contemplated by the laws and usages of military occu-
pation; that is, merely temporary governments set up by the
military commander for the protection of the occupying forces
and the security of the inhabitants.19 In Porto Rico, however,
some changes were made in the political and judicial system that
were not required by military necessity, and the government is
said to have been administered, even before the treaty of peace
was signed, "as though the island were a permanent possession
of the United States
;
" 20 while the later anomalous government
for the Philippines was presaged by the sending of a commission
to the islands, appointed after the signing but before the final
ratification of the treaty, with instructions to "study attentively
the existing social and political state of the various populations,
particularly as regards the forms of local government, the ad-
ministration of justice, the collection of customs and other taxes,
if Statement of Secretary of War Stanton, quoted by A. H. Carpen-
ter, op. cit., 478.
18 " So long as the war continued it cannot be denied that he might
institute temporary governments within insurgent districts, occupied by
the national forces, or take measures, in any state, for the restoration of
State governments faithful to the Union, employing, however, in such ef-
forts, only such means and such agents as were authorized by constitu-
tional laws." Texas v. White, 7 Wall., 700, 730 (1868).
is See instructions of President McKinley to the Secretary of War,
issued May 19, July 13, and Dee. 21, 1898. Richardson, op. cit., X, 208-
211, 214-216, 219-221.
20 Thomas, op. cit., 307.
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the means of transportation, and the need of public improve-
ments. ' ' 21
Having therefore the power, as Commander-in-Chief, to insti-
tute such a temporary government for occupied territory as he
may see fit, the President may also perform all the necessary
functions of that government, whether executive, legislative, or
judicial.22 He has, in the first place, complete control over the
appointment and removal of officers for that government. He
may continue in office such of the local officials as he sees fit, or
he may remove them at his discretion and appoint a new set of
officials, who, upon the sole authority of the President, supersede
the existing officials and administer the government under his
direction.
Thus, President Polk, in his instructions to General Kearney
with regard to the governments to be established by him in New
Mexico and California, urged him "to continue in their employ-
ment all such of the existing officers as are known to be friendly
to the United States, and will take the oath of allegiance to
them
;
" 23 and President McKinley similarly instructed the Sec-
retary of "War in 1898, that judges and other officials of justice
in the occupied territories should continue in office, if they ac-
cepted the authority of the United States and the supervision of
the American commander. He reminded the Secretary, how-
ever, that under the laws of war, "if the course of the people
should render such measures indispensable to the maintenance of
law and order,
' '
the commander of the occupying forces had the
power "to replace or expel the native officials in part or alto-
gether, to substitute new courts of his own constitution for those
that now exist, or to create such new or supplementary tribunals
as may be necessary.
' ' 2*
In the military governments established during the Civil War,
on the other hand, the power of removal was exercised exten-
21 The commission consisted of Jacob G. Schurman, Admiral Dewey,
Maj. Gen. Otis, Charles Denby, and Dean C. Worcester. See the Presi-
dent's instructions to the Secretary of State, Jan. 20, 1899. Richardson,
op. tit., X, 222-223.
22 Cross v. Harrison, 16 How., 164, 190 (1853); Leitensdorfer v. Webb,
20 How., 176, 177-178 (1857) ; The Grapeshot, 9 Wall., 129, 133 (1869) ;
Boot, Military and Colonial Policy of the United States, 252.
23 Instructions of June 3, 1846. Thomas, op. cit., 102.
24 Richardson, op. cit., X, 209-210, 215, 220.
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sively, being applied not only to public officials of low and high
degree, such as state officers, judges, and mayors; but also to
officers of semi-public and even private concerns, such as library
officials, officers and professors at state universities, and officers
of chambers of commerce. Where they were not removed, the
officials were "little more than figureheads," strictly subordin-
ate to the military commander, and holding their positions only
by his permission. 25
The officials appointed may be either civilians or military per-
sons, within the discretion of the appointing authority. Thus,
the principal officials appointed by General Kearney in New
Mexico were all civilians, including a governor, secretary, and
three members of the supreme court, altho the duties of governor
were later performed by military officers ; 26 while in California,
under similar conditions, the principal officials were military men
under both the Stockton and Kearney regimes. 27 The "mili-
tary governors" appointed by President Lincoln were all civ-
ilians, given military rank for the occasion,28 and there seemed
to be a conscious effort to fill most of the subordinate offices also
with civilians. However, many of the commanding officers ex-
ercised the functions of a military governor, by virtue of their
rank, in the territory occupied by the forces under their com-
25 A. H. Carpenter, op. tit., 481.
26 Charles Bent, appointed governor by Gen. Kearney, was killed in
an insurrection, Jan. 19, 1847. Secretary Vigil, who thereupon became
acting governor, was appointed governor Dee. 17, 1847, by the military
commander, Col. Price, and served till Dec. 11, 1848, when the duties of
' '
civil and military governor ' ' were assumed by Col. J. M. Washington,
by virtue of his rank as commanding officer. He was in turn succeed-
ed Oct. 23, 1849, by Col. John Munroe, who served till the end of the
military regime. Thomas, op. tit., 115-116, 128.
27 Col. John C. Fremont acted as governor for a short time under ap-
pointment from Stockton; while under Kearney the principal offices were
fiDed as follows: governor, Col. E. B. Mason; secretary of state, Lt. H.
W. Halleck (later famous as a Civil War general and as a writer on in-
ternational law) ; collector of customs, Capt. J. L. Folsom. Col. Mason
was succeeded by Brig. Gen. Biley, who served till the organization of
the state government. Thomas, op. tit., 181; Winthrop, op. tit., 324-325.
28 Andrew Johnson was commissioned military governor of Tennes-
see, with rank of Brigadier General; likewise John S. Phelps of Arkan-
sas; Edward Stanly of North Carolina; and George F. Shepley of
Louisiana.
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mand. During the period of the war with Spain, President Mc-
Kinley placed the military governments established by him in
charge of the commanding officers and their military subordin-
ates, gradually supplanting them with civilians after the United
States had acquired permanent possession.29
These powers of appointment and removal may be exercised, as
has been noted, either by the President directly, or through the
commanding officer or other subordinate with due authority in
the occupied district. Usually the commanding officer assumes
the duties of a military governor by virtue of his rank, without
any special appointment as such. In other cases, as in the mili-
tary governments established in the South, a military governor
was appointed by the President for each particular occupied dis-
trict, distinct from the commanding officer in that region ; while
again, as in New Mexico and California, the functions of com-
manding officer and military governor have been performed,
sometimes by different persons, sometimes by the same person.
As a general rule, where the government is presumed to be
strictly military in character the President has left the appoint-
ment of the officials in active charge to the commanding officer,
who may then select either civilians or military officers. Thus
when Secretary Vigil became acting governor in New Mexico
after the death of Governor Bent, and besought the Washington
authorities to appoint a successor, Secretary of War Marcy re-
plied that the government being purely military, the appoint-
ment of a governor would be left to the commanding officer
(Colonel Price).30
29 Maj. Gen. Wesley L. Merritt set up a military government in the
city of Manila immediately upon its capture and occupation on Aug. 13,
1898, which military government was later extended to the whole archi-
pelago by his successor, Maj. Gen. E. S. Otis, acting under the direct
order of the President. Gen. Otis was succeeded on May 5, 1900, by
Maj. Gen. Arthur MacArthur, who was in turn succeeded on July 4, 1901,
by Maj. Gen. A. E. Chaffee. Porto Rico was occupied by forces under
Gen. Nelson A. Miles, July 25, 1898, but a military government was first
formally established Oct. 18, by Maj. Gen. John R. Brooke. He was
succeeded on Dec. 9, 1898, by Maj. Gen. G. V. Henry, and on May 9,
1899, by Brig. Gen. G. W. Davis. In Cuba, a formal military govern-
ment for the whole island does not appear to have been set up till Dec.
13, 1898, when a Division of Cuba was created, with Maj. Gen. Brooke
as commander and military governor. He was succeeded in Dec., 1899,
by Maj. Gen. Leonard Wood.
so Thomas, op. tit., 123.
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While the President 's power with regard to the government of
occupied territory is therefore justly said to be "necessarily
despotic," it has been held that this applied only to his execu-
tive or administrative power, and not to his power to legislate
for that territory.
' ' His power to administer would be absolute,
' '
says the Supreme Court, "but his power to legislate would not
be without certain restrictions in other words, they would not
extend beyond the necessities of the case.
' ' 31
However, it seems
to be within the power of the President, as Commander-in-Chief ,
to judge of the "necessities of the case," hence the restriction
amounts in practise to very little.
The President has the power, directly or through his subor-
dinates, to issue orders for the government of a conquered terri-
tory, at least until Congress has acted, and these orders have the
force of law.32 Altho definite affirmative action on the part of
the President or the military commander is required in order
to change the local municipal law of the conquered territory, he
may, if he thinks necessity demands such a step, abolish entirely
the laws of that territory and substitute laws and regulations of
his own making, or he may supplement the local municipal law
with such regulations as he may deem necessary and proper.33
President Polk in 1846 thus defined the principles to which the
laws adopted for a conquered territory should conform, when he
declared to Congress that "such organized regulations as have
been established in any of the conquered territories for the se-
curity of our conquest, for the preservation of order, for the pro-
tection of the rights of the inhabitants, and for depriving the
enemy of the advantages of these territories while the military
possession of them by the forces of the United States continues,
aiDooley v. United States, 182 U. S., 222, 234 (1901); cf. Moore's
Digest, 271; Eaymond v. TJwmas, 91 U. S., 712, 716 (1875).
32 Cross v. Harrison, 16 How., 164, 190 (1853).
33 ' < Until he acts, it is presumed that he intends to leave it of full
effect." Glenn, The Army and the Law, 101, n. ; Coleman v. Tennessee,
97 U. S., 509, 517 (1878). President McKinley, in 1898, ordered that
the rule of international law which required that the municipal law
of the conquered territory should be considered as remaining in force, so
far as compatible with the new order and until suspended or superseded
by the occupying belligerent, be adhered to as far as possible. Richardson,
op. cit., X, 209. Cf. Winthrop, op. tit,, 323; Davis, Treatise on the Mili-
tary Law of the United States, 300-301.
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will be recognized and approved.
' ' 34
Accordingly, altho at that
time he disapproved the attempt to give New Mexico the status
of a permanent territory of the United States, as has been noted,
the President apparently accepted and approved the action of
General Kearney in adopting an organic law for that region,
copied from the organic law of Missouri Territory,35 and in put-
ting into effect numerous other laws, compiled from neighboring
state and territorial laws and from the laws of Mexico.36 In
California, on the other hand, the legislative council established
under the Stockton government was ignored and omitted in the
government set up by General Kearney under instructions from
the President,
37 and the orders of the military governor there-
fore continued there to be the only source of law.
In the occupied districts of the South, elections were conduct-
ed under regulations prescribed by the military governor, con-
ventions were held under his supervision, and the constitutions
and governments created thereby were inaugurated under his
authority. For example, General Banks ordered an election held
in Louisiana in January, 1864, for governor and other officers,
with the regulation that those entitled to the rights of United
States citizens would be required to participate, "indifference"
to be treated as a crime and "faction" as treason. Governor
Shepley, in the same state, later ordered an election for dele-
gates to a constitutional convention, for which he decreed the
registration of all loyal citizens, determined the ratio of repre-
sentation in the convention, and supervised the registration and
election officers in their work. In Arkansas, elections held under
the revised constitution were set aside under authority from
President Lincoln, new elections were held, and new officers in-
augurated ; while in Tennessee also, the confirmation and approv-
al of the military governor was apparently necessary, not only
for the holding of elections, but in order that persons duly chosen
might act. 38
s* Message of Dec. 22, 1846. Eichardson, op. cit., IV, 507.
35 It was, for example, under the provisions of this
' '
organic law
that Secretary Vigil became acting governor of New Mexico upon the
death of Governor Bent in January, 1847.
se Thomas, op. cit., 103-105.
^Ibid., 181.
ss A. H. Carpenter, op. cit., 478, 482.
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This military supervision and control of elections extended
during the Civil War even to the occupied districts in the border
states which were, strictly speaking, not subject to military gov-
ernment and whose constitutional rights were pronounced as
"theoretically equal to the rest of the Union." Thus, in various
places in Kentucky orders and proclamations were issued by the
military authorities, by which army officers were required to
see that none but loyal persons voted or were candidates at the
elections, or acted as election officers; in Missouri "voting con-
trary to orders" was declared to be a military offense; and in
Maryland provost-marshals were ordered to "assist" election
judges in administering the oath of allegiance and in reporting
those who failed to carry out the regulations. "In this way the
military became the judge and interpreter of the civil author-
ities and even of the laws themselves. ' ' 39
The President may likewise exercise complete control over
the municipalities within the occupied territory. He may, through
the proper subordinates, "change or modify either the form or
the constituents of the municipal establishments; may, in place
of the system and regulations that formerly prevailed, substitute
new and different ones. ' ' 40 Thus, during the Civil War, this
municipal control extended to the founding of courts, legislation
concerning property, the establishment of bureaus in charge of
various city activities, the enforcement of a system of licenses,
the appointment and removal of officials, the creation of police
forces, and the censorship of newspapers.41
Numerous other powers with regard to the government of
occupied territory that are legislative in character may also be
exercised by the President. He may provide the finances neces-
sary for the support of the occupying forces and the expenses of
the administration of the territory by the levying of military
contributions, the collection of the regular taxes, and the
imposition of customs duties,
42 his judgment as to the propriety
39 A. H. Carpenter, op. cit., 482-483.
* Attorney-General Griggs to the Secretary of War, July 10, 1898.
22 Op. Atty. Gen., 527, 528.
A. H. Carpenter, op. cit., 493-496; cf. Garner, Reconstruction in Miss-
issippi, 38.
42 Lawrence, Principles of International Law, 445; Eichardson, op. cit.,
IV, 570-572, 672-678; Winthrop, op. cit., 326; Dooley v. United States,
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of such measures being necessarily arbitrary and absolute. 43 He
may likewise promulgate measures for the regulation of trade
and intercourse with the occupied territory ;44 establish and main-
tain telegraph and railroad lines, even tho their business con-
flict with the vested rights of private companies ;45 grant licenses
and enter into contracts whose provisions are binding even after
the termination of the military occupation;40 and restrict the
right of private ownership.47
The judicial powers of the President in occupied territory are
also extensive. He has complete control over the establishment,
jurisdiction, and functioning of the military courts, such as
courts-martial, provost courts, and military commissions.48 In
addition, the President may exercise supervision over civil courts
already in existence,49 or he may create such civil courts as he
deems necessary, displacing or supplementing those already ex-
isting. Thus, in New Mexico General Kearney established a com-
plete judicial system, consisting of a superior or appellate court
and district courts, and defined their jurisdiction.50
During the Civil War, provost courts were established by the
military commanders in New Orleans and elsewhere, with civil
and criminal, as well as military jurisdiction, and supplanting
in many cases the lower state courts and the local police courts.
President Lincoln himself, by executive order of October 20,
182 U. 8., 222, 231-233 (1901). For view that the President does not
have these powers, see Kent's Commentaries, I, 292, quoted in Moore's
Digest, VII, 270.
**Dow v. Johnson, 100 U. S., 158, 165 (1879); Herrera v. United
States, 222 U. S., 558, 571 (1912). During the Mexican War, President
Polk at first gave Scott and Taylor discretionary authority to exact con-
tributions, but neither having done so, he later made his orders "per-
emptory and stringent" that such exactions should be made. Diary of
James K. Polk, III, 156. Gen. Scott is said to have collected contribu-
tions of about $22,000 from 19 Mexican states. Winthrop, op. cit., 326.
Birkhimer, op. cit., 272; Fleming v. Page, 9 How., 603, 615 (1849);
cf. A. H. Carpenter, op. cit., 489-493.
4523 Op. Atty. Gen., 425; Magoon's JReports, 391-407.
**New Orleans v. Steamship Company, 20 Wall., 387, 394-395 (1874);
23 Op. Atty. Gen., 551, 559-563.
47 Moore's Digest, VII, 264; For. Bel. 1901, App., 97.
48 Supra, ch. VIII.
49 See A. H. Carpenter, op. cit., 484-485.
6 Winthrop, op. cit., 325.
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1862, created a provisional court for Louisiana, which has been
described as "the Alpha and Omega of justice for Louisiana."
In this order the President appointed the judge (Charles A. Pea-
body), and gave the court jurisdiction over "all causes, civil and
criminal, including cases in law, equity, revenue, and admiralty,
and particularly all such powers and jurisdictions as belong to
the district and circuit courts of the United States." He also
prescribed the rules of procedure; made the decisions of the
court "final and conclusive," with appeals forbidden; and vest-
ed in it the power to appoint the prosecuting attorney, marshal,
and clerk. While the state laws in force were to be administered
by this court
' '
as far as possible,
' '
the orders of the military com-
manders were recognized as of
"
paramount authority.
' ' 51
All of these acts of the President were upheld by the Supreme
Court in several decisions,
52 and his power, as Commander-in-
Chief, to organize and practically to control the judiciary in
territory under military occupation, was clearly affirmed, 53 with
only the limitation that neither the President nor any military
commander can establish a court in such occupied territory to
adjudicate prize cases or to administer the law of nations.5*
Since all the powers and functions of military government are
therefore concentrated in the hands of the President, with scarce-
ly any limitation, it would not seem to be an exaggeration to char-
acterize such government as "an absolutism of the most com-
plete sort."
55
si A. H. Carpenter, op. tit., 485-486.
52 Leitensdorfer v. Webb, 20 How., 176 (1857); The Grapeshot, 9
Wall., 129 (1869) ; Burke v. Miltenberger, 19 Wall., 519 (1873) ; Mechan-
ics Bank v. Union Bank, 22 Wall., 276 (1874).
ss ' ' When enemies ' territory is occupied, or territory to which the
rules of law assign that name, though it be that of a State of the Union,
the President can replace its courts by courts of his own, exercising both
civil and criminal jurisdiction, and disposing of life, liberty, and prop-
erty, not as instruments of the judicial authority of the United States,
but as instruments of the executive authority." Baldwin, Modern Polit-
ical Institutions, 103.
B*Jecker v. Montgomery, 13 How., 498, 515 (1851).
55 A. H. Carpenter, op. tit., 496 ; Willoughby, Constitutional Law, I, 390.
III. Civil Powers in Time of War

CHAPTER X
CONTROL OF ADMINISTRATION
It has been pointed out by a distinguished authority how the
original American conception of executive power was to the effect
that the President had been vested with military and political
rather than administrative power; and further, how that con-
ception has changed, so that now the President is generally rec-
ognized, through powers conferred by statute and derived from
the Constitution itself, as "not merely the political head of the
United States national government but as well the head of its
administrative system.
' ' *
This position of the President naturally becomes especially im-
portant in time of war, when the exigencies of the situation re-
quire the creation of additional governmental agencies and a
vast expansion in the general field of administration. Through
his constitutional powers of appointment, removal, supervision,
and direction, the scope of the President's administrative author-
ity is at such a time automatically extended, if his specific powers
are not actually increased.
In addition, Congress at such a time is inclined to recognize
the wisdom of Hamilton's arguments for a vigorous and unified
Executive,
2 and to entrust exceptional administrative control to
the President. That is particularly true with regard to ad-
ministrative agencies created to meet the special military needs
of the country. Thus the actual administration of the Draft
Acts of the Civil War 8 was given over to the President, altho
hedged about with such an amount of statutory detail as to
1 Goodnow, Principles of the Administrative Law in the United States,
73-82.
2 See The Federalist, No. 69 (70), (Goldwin Smith ed., p. 386ff.).
s Acts of Mar. 3, 1863, Feb. 24, 1864, and July 4, 1864. 12 Stat. at L.,
731; 13 ibid., 6, 390.
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leave him with little discretionary authority. The work
of administering the provisions of the draft was carried out
through a Provost Marshal General, and through enrollment
boards, one for each district into which the United States was
divided. Each such board was to be composed of the provost-
marshal for the district, a licensed physician, and one other per-
son, to be appointed by the President. Their duties, however,
were definitely defined by statute, hence the President's author-
ity was principally such as resulted from his control over the
personnel of the administrative machinery and from his general
powers of supervision.
The Selective Service Act of the recent war 4 went much fur-
ther in entrusting the President with large powers of adminis-
tration. The Act provided for the registration of all male per-
sons between the ages of 21 and 30 (later extended to include all
between the ages of 18 and 45 5 ) , but gave the President com-
plete authority to designate the time and place for such registra-
tion, and to prescribe the rules and regulations in accordance
with which it should be held. Under this provision, President
Wilson issued no less than thirteen separate proclamations, desig-
nating the various times and places for the registration.6 He
likewise issued detailed regulations for the execution of the reg-
istration provisions of the act.
These regulations created an administrative system, consisting
of the Provost Marshal General as the chief administrative offi-
cer
;
the governor and adjutant general of each state as his prin-
cipal assistants ; a board of registration for each county or cor-
responding subdivision, consisting of three members named by
4 Act of May 18, 1917. Public No. 12, 65 Cong., in Wigmore, Source-
Boole of Military Law and War-time Legislation, 460-468.
s Act of Aug. 31, 1918. Public No. 210, 65 Cong., ibid., 471-474.
Proclamations of May 18, June 27, June 30, July 2, 1917; May 20,
June 11, June 17, June 18, Aug. 13, Aug. 31, Sept. 18, Oct. 10 (2),
1918. U. S. Stats., 65 Cong., 1 Sess., Procs., 20, 30, 35, 36; ibid., 2
Sess., 137, 149, 152, 155, 190, 196, 207, 212, 216. So many proclamations
were issued for the reason that different registration dates were designat-
ed for the various parts of the territory of the United States. Thus June
5, 1917, was named as the first registration day in continental United
States (execept Alaska), July 5 in Porto Rico, July 2 Sept. 2 in Alaska,
and July 31 in Hawaii; similarly with respect to the days later named
under the amendatory acts of 1918.
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the governor (or by the mayor in cities of over 30,000 popula-
tion), none of whom were to be in any way connected with the
military establishment; and one or more registrars for each vot-
ing precinct. These Presidential regulations further defined the
jurisdiction and duties of these various officials in connection
with the registration; prescribed the compensation of the regis-
trars
;
and outlined in detail the forms and methods under which
the registration should take place. 7
The local administration of the conscription provisions of the
Selective Service Act was carried out through local and district
boards, appointed by the President; the former, one for each
county or corresponding subdivision, consisting of three or more
members, none of whom was to be connected with the military
establishment
;
8 the latter, one or more for each federal judicial
district, composed of such number of members, likewise civilians,
as the President might determine. The duties of these boards
were outlined in the act; but the President was authorized to
prescribe the rules and regulations under which the boards should
operate, to make rules and regulations governing their organiza-
tion and procedure, and to make
' '
all other rules and regulations
necessary to carry out the terms and provisions of this section.
' ' 9
Accordingly, President Wilson, on June 30, 1917, issued regu-
lations, describing in detail the organization, duties, and proced-
ure of the local and district boards
;
10 and on November 8, 1917,
further regulations, covering in detail the jurisdiction of the
official boards and auxiliary organizations, the rules and prin-
ciples governing the classification of the men, the process of selec-
tion, the procedure of induction and mobilization, forms to be
observed, and the like. 11 The boards were subject to the immed-
7 See Registration Regulations, issued as a separate pamphlet by the
Government Printing Office, 1917.
8 As a general rule, the registration boards were reconstituted as the
local boards.
9 Selective Service Act, Sec. 4, in Wigmore, op. tit., 463-465.
10 Rules and Regulations Prescribed by tJie President for Local and
District Boards, issued by the Government Printing Office, 1917.
11 Selective Service Regulations. A second edition of these, revised
and enlarged, was issued Sept. 16, 1918, in which was included, for ex-
ample, the famous "work or fight" rules. It is worthy of note that the
Selective Service Act itself covers only 8 pages; while the Registration
Regulations constitute a pamphlet of 30 pages, the Rules and Regula-
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iate supervision of the Provost Marshal General and, finally, of
the President, who was empowered to
' '
affirm, modify or reverse
' '
any decisions made by them. It is thus clear that while the ad-
ministrative machinery of conscription was provided for and
barely outlined by statute, its creation, supervision, method of
operation, and control were in the hands of the President.
With regard to the field of general administration, no addi-
tional powers of importance were given to the President in pre-
vious wars, beyond his ordinary powers of supervision and direc-
tion over the various executive departments and agencies. On
the other hand, something was done during the Civil War to
provide a congressional check on the President's administration
of the war through the committee of Congress known as the Joint
Committee on the Conduct of the War.12
The nature and extent of the recent World War, however, call-
ed for the creation of numerous new administrative agencies,
and it is worthy of note that Congress, in providing for these,
in almost every instance gave the President blanket authority to
work out the administrative details to create the necessary of-
fices, to prescribe the character of their organization, and to de-
termine upon the administrative methods to be used. Thus, the
Espionage Act, altho providing for the control of exports from
the United States, created no administrative agency to exercise
such control, but merely specified that the export trade be car-
ried on "under such regulations and orders, and subject to such
limitations and exceptions as the President shall prescribe.
' ' 13
Likewise, the Food and Fuel Control Act set up no admin-
istrative machinery, but authorized the President "to make such
tions for Local and District Boards one of 84 pages, and the two editions
of the Selective Service Regulations booklets of 254 and 432 pages, re-
spectively.
12 Hosmer, The Appeal to Arms, 80. See also W. W. Pierson, ' ' The
Committee on the Conduct of the Civil War," in Am. Hist. Eev., XXIII,
550-576 (Apr., 1918). During the recent war, an attempt was made to
set up a similar committee. The Senate added a provision to the Food
and Fuel Control bill, establishing a joint committee on war expenditures
to be composed of 5 Senators and 5 Representatives, "to safeguard the
expenditure of the appropriations bearing upon the war as made by Con-
gress.
" The vigorous protest of President Wilson against the embarrass-
ment of such a committee forced its abandonment in conference. Pol. Sci.
Quar., XXXII, Supp., 37, 38.
is Act of June 15, 1917 (Title VII, Sec. 1). Wigmore, op. cit., 493.
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regulations and to issue such orders as are essential effectively
to carry out the provisions of this Act,
' '
and further,
' '
to create
and use any agency or agencies, . . " for the same purpose.14
The Trading with the Enemy Act provided for the regulation
and control of trading with an enemy or ally of enemy and of the
import trade, and for the censorship of foreign communications
and foreign-language publications, but empowered the President
to
"
exercise any power or authority conferred by this Act
through such officer or officers as he shall direct ;
" 15 while the
Kailway Control Act provided,
' ' That the President may execute
any of the powers herein and heretofore granted him with rela-
tion to Federal control through such agencies as he may deter-
mine . . ." 16
By virtue of these provisions, President Wilson vested the
executive administration of his instructions and proclamations
concerning the export trade in the Secretary of Commerce, and
established an Exports Council, composed of the Secretaries of
State, Agriculture, and Commerce, and the Food Administra-
tor,
17 ' ' to direct exports in such a way that they will go first and
by preference where they are most needed and most immediately
needed, and temporarily to withhold them, if necessary, where
they can best be spared.
" 18 As the administrative agencies for
carrying out the purposes of food and fuel control, the President
created the Food and the Fuel Administrations and the United
States Grain Corporation;19 to administer the provisions of the
Trading with the Enemy Act concerning censorship and the reg-
ulation of imports, he set up the Censorship Board and the War
Trade Board
;
20 while for the administration of the railroads, he
i* Act of Aug. 10, 1917 (Sees. 1, 2). Wigmore, op. tit., 504.
is Act of Oct. 6, 1917 (Sec. 5a). Ibid., 548.
"Act of Mar. 21, 1918 (Sec. 8). Ibid., 580.
IT Executive order of June 22, 1917. Official Bulletin, June 26, 1917.
18 Statement of President Wilson. Ibid. By executive order of Aug.
21, 1917, the Exports Council was enlarged by adding the Chairman of
the Shipping Board, and continued as an advisory body; but superseded
in its control of exports by the Exports Administrative Board, com-
posed of representatives of the Secretaries of State, Agriculture, and
Commerce, the Food Administrator, and the Shipping Board. Willoughby,
Government Organisation in War Time and After, 128; War Cyclopedia
(1st ed.), 90.
is Infra, 204-208.
20 Infra, 201, 210.
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established the Railroad Administration, with Secretary of the
Treasury McAdoo as Director General of Railroads.21
Of all the important administrative agencies established dur-
ing the recent war to carry on some phase of war activity, very
few were expressly created by statute,22 Congress thus appar-
ently recognizing the importance of entrusting the details of war
administration to the President. On the other hand, several war
agencies, such as the Committee on Public Information and the
War Industries Board, were created by the President without
authority of statute, but by virtue of his powers as Chief Execu-
tive and Commander-in-Chief. 23
The establishment of all these new administrative agencies for
the carrying on of particular war activities, as well as the tre-
mendous expansion in functions and personnel of the depart-
ments and agencies already in existence, soon raised the problem
of how to avoid duplication and waste and provide for the proper
coordination of effort. It finally came to a point where, in the
words of Senator Wadsworth (New York), "It must be appar-
ent to every sensible man that it is utterly impossible to get any
teamwork out of this conglomeration of ambitious and scattered
agencies, official and unofficial, unless we create some agency
that shall guide and control them all in those matters in which
team work is essential for the accomplishment of great results.
' ' 24
This general feeling culminated in a proposal by Senator
Chamberlain (Oregon), approved by the Senate Committee on
Military Affairs, for a war cabinet, to be composed of "three
distinguished citizens of demonstrated ability," who were to be
21 Infra, 215-216.
22 The Alien Property Custodian was thus created by law. See Trad-
ing with the Enemy Act (Sec. 6). Wigmore, op. tit., 548-549. See infra,
212-213. Other administrative agencies of particular importance during
the war, such as the Council of National Defense, the War Bisk Insur-
ance Bureau, and the Shipping Board, were expressly created by statute,
but before the United States entered the war and not anticipating that
event. For the account of the work of the first two of these, see Wil-
loughby, Government Organization in War Time and After, 9-21, 339-351 ;
for that of the Shipping Board in relation to this study, infra, 217.
23 Infra, 197-199, 211-212.
24 Speech in U. S. Senate, Feb. 5, 1918. Cong. Eecord, 65 Cong., 2
Sess., 1809. See also charts, included in the address, showing the or-
ganization and proposed reorganization of the war-making machinery.
Ibid.. 1808-1810.
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appointed by the President with the consent of the Senate, and
through whom the President was to exercise ' ' such of the powers
conferred upon him by the Constitution and the laws of the
United States, as are hereinafter mentioned and described."
This war cabinet was to have complete jurisdiction and authority
to initiate plans and policies for the prosecution of the war; to
direct and procure the execution of these plans and policies;
and "to supervise, coordinate, direct, and control the functions
and agencies of the Government, in so far as, in the judgment of
the war cabinet, it may be necessary or advisable so to do for the
effectual conduct and vigorous prosecution of the existing war."
The war cabinet was further to be authorized to make the rules
and regulations governing its own procedure; to require infor-
mation from and utilize the services of any or all executive de-
partments, agencies, and officials of the United States and of
the several states
;
and to make all the orders and decisions neces-
sary to carry out these provisions. Besides the right to name its
members, the President was to be given over this war cabinet,
only a very limited power of review.25
The bill thus proposed to confer powers under which this new
war cabinet, as one Senator said, "could take absolute charge of
the conduct of the war. The President would not have the au-
thority to initiate or formulate any plans or policies for its prose-
cution. His power as Commander-in-Chief would be destroyed.
He would be subject to the orders of the War Cabinet." 28 Presi-
dent Wilson therefore vigorously opposed this proposal, saying
that it "would involve long additional delays and turn our ex-
perience into mere lost motion,
' ' 27 and instead he secured the
introduction, and finally the passage, of a bill containing his
ideas for meeting the situation. 28
25 The war cabinet bill was introduced by Senator Chamberlain, Jan.
21, 1918. See text of bill in Cong. Record, 65 Cong., 2 Bess., 1077-1078.
28 Senator Shields, in U. S. Senate, Apr. 22, 1918. Cong. Record, 65
Cong., 2 Sess., 5836.
27 Statement of Jan. 21, 1918, quoted in Am. Pol. Sri. Rev., XII, 377
(Aug. 1918).
28 The administration bill was introduced by Senator Overman, Feb.
6, 1918, and became law May 20, 1918. Senator Overman stated very
frankly: "The bill was advocated by the President and sent to me by
the President, and I have no hesitation in saying so." Cong. Record, 65
Cong., 2 Sess. (Apr. 3, 1918), 4883. The fight between the advocates of
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This so-called Overman Act authorized the President "for the
national security and defense, for the successful prosecution of
the war, for the better utilization of resources and industries, and
for the more effective administration by the President of his pow-
ers as Commander-in-Chief of the land and naval forces," to
make such redistribution of functions among the executive
agencies as he might deem necessary; to utilize, coordinate, or
consolidate any existing executive or administrative agencies ; to
transfer any duties or powers, together with any portion of the
personnel and equipment, from one such agency to another ; and
to make whatever regulations and issue whatever orders might
be necessary to carry out these provisions. The President was
further authorized to establish an executive agency for exercis-
ing such control over the production of aeroplanes and aircraft
equipment as he might consider advantageous. He had no pow-
er, however, to abolish any bureau or eliminate its functions al-
together, but was authorized to make such recommendations to
Congress in that regard as he might deem proper. Moreover,
the act was strictly a war measure, in that it was expressly pro-
vided that the authority granted was to be exercised "only in
matters relating to the conduct of the present war ;
' '
and furth-
er, that the act was to remain in force no longer than "six months
after the termination of the war by the proclamation of the treaty
of peace," all executive agencies and functions at that time re-
verting to their former status under existing law.29
The President was thus, by the terms of this act, given com-
plete control over the administrative machinery of the nation as
used for the purposes of the war.30 The act met with consider-
able opposition as an unwarranted and dangerous extension of
the President's power;
31
while at least one distinguished au-
thority held that it was entirely unnecessary, claiming that the
the Overman Bill and Senator Chamberlain's War-Cabinet bill, and the
probable motives behind the latter, are described by J. M. Leake, "The
Conflict over Coordination," in Am. Pol. Sci. Sev., XII, 365-380 (Aug.,
1918).
29 See text of act in Wigmore, op. cit., 586-587.
30 See an excellent summary by Senator Fletcher of what might be
accomplished under this act. Cong. Record, 65 Cong., 2 Sess. (Apr. 22,
1918), 5842.
81 Especially from Senators Cummins (Bep.), and Eeed and Hoke
Smith (Dems.).
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President already had full constitutional power to make such
transfers of functions and consolidations of agencies on his own
initiative. "I think," said this former Attorney-General and
Secretary of State, "the President has the authority to require
every executive officer and every department of the Government
to do anything that he directs to be done in order to prosecute
this war to a successful conclusion. I think he has the power to
delegate from one Cabinet officer to another the discharge of any
particular duty that he thinks such a Cabinet officer can dis-
charge better than the one upon whom it would normally be in-
cumbent. I do certainly think that the President has all those
powers. . . As I have read the Overman bill, in so far as it
proposes to authorize the President to utilize and coordinate ex-
ecutive agencies, . . I would not hesitate a second to advise
the President of the United States that he now possesses that
power.
' ' 32
The majority in Congress felt, however, that the act was
not only justified in order to avoid the suspicion or necessity of
the President setting himself up as a dictator and doing the same
things without definite authority of law,33 but also that it was
necessary to secure the proper coordination of effort on the part
of the agencies entrusted with carrying on the various war ac-
tivities of the government, and was not to be considered as war-
ranting any abuse of power by the President.34
32 Senator Knox (Rep.), in IT. S. Senate, Apr. 3, 1918. Cong., Record,
65 Cong., 2 Sess., 4898; see also ibid., 4903. A well known journal also held
that the President's power over administration was practically absolute,
and that if he had exercised this power, it would probably not have been
questioned in Congress or by public opinion. It said, however, that the
Overman Act "would dramatize the President's powers so effectively that
no one could question them." The Nation, May 4, 1918.
33 See Senator Harding 's suggestion concerning the need of a dictator.
Supra, ch. I, note 29. Senator Overman frequently emphasized the point
that instead of exercising questionable powers without authority of law,
as was done by President Lincoln, President Wilson had been careful to
ask Congress for specific authority to exercise such necessary powers.
34 Senator Nelson (Rep.) probably best expressed the sentiment of
the majority when he said: "This opposition is founded on the assump-
tion that the President from first to last will do nothing but wrong; that
he will discontinue and dismantle all the departments instead of the proper
assumption that he will utilize them to the best of his ability to carry
on the war successfully. . . In order to carry on the transportation
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Moreover, there were several precedents for granting such au-
thority as was done by the Overman Act. An act of February
14, 1903,
35 had authorized the President "to transfer at any time
the whole or any part of any office, bureau, division, or other
branch of the public service engaged in statistical or scientific
work from the Department of State, the Department of the Treas-
ury, the Department of War, the Department of Justice, the Post
Office Department, the Department of the Navy, or the Depart-
ment of the Interior, to the Department of Commerce and La-
bor." The Act of April 28, 1908,36 authorized the President
"for any special occasion" to transfer to the head of another
department certain authority conferred upon the Secretary of
Commerce
;
the Act of June 24, 1910,37 authorized the Secretary
of the Navy, with the approval of the President, to transfer the
duties of the Bureau of Equipment to the other bureaus and of-
fices of the Navy Department
' ' in such manner as the Secretary
of the Navy shall consider expedient and proper ;
' '
while by the
Act of March 3, 1917,38 the Bureau of Efficiency was required to
investigate duplication of service in the various executive depart-
ments and establishments of the Government and make a report
to the President, who was authorized, "after such report shall
have been made to him, whenever he finds such duplications do
exist, to abolish the same." Apparently there was no exercise
of the power authorized by this last-mentioned act, for the rea-
son that the Bureau of Efficiency was employed during the war
to devise a system for the work of the War-Risk Insurance Bu-
reau and hence had never been able to make the required report
to the President.39
In addition to the statutes above mentioned, others have been
passed applicable to emergencies only, under which the Presi-
dent is authorized at such times to transfer important functions
and services. Thus he is empowered, in time of threatened or
of food and supplies to Europe it is necessary to have all these branches
of the Government function and work together. That is all there is in
this bill, and there is no use of slandering it. ' ' Cong. Record, 65 Cong.,
2 Sess. (Apr. 3, 1918), 4886.
3532 Stat. at L., 830 (sec. 12).
3635 ibid., 69 (sec. 3).
37 36 ibid., 613.
3839 ibid., 1122 (sec. 8).
39 See Cong. Eecord, 65 Cong., 2 Sess. (Apr. 3, 1918), 4891.
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actual war, to utilize the Public Health and Marine Hospital
Service "to such extent and in such manner as shall, in his judg-
ment, promote the public interest;" the Coast Guard, ordinarily
a branch of the Treasury Department, may be transferred to the
Navy, "in time of war or when the President shall so direct;"
and the vessels, equipment, stations, and personnel of the Light-
house Service and the Coast and Geodetic Survey are subject to
transfer by the President to either the War or Navy Department,
"whenever in his judgment a sufficient national emergency
exists." Numerous acts relating to transfers of employees and
officials within the Civil Service have long been on the statute-
books
;
so also regarding the detail of military and naval officers
to service with other departments or agencies.40
The Overman Act, while going considerably further in its
grant of power than anything before enacted, was therefore not
entirely novel in its essential principles, especially when consid-
ered as a purely war-time measure. Its passage, however, arous-
ed considerable speculation as to the probable action of the Presi-
dent under its authority. Suggestions were thrown out of pos-
sible radical changes, such as the setting up of a "War Super-
Cabinet" or war council, to consist of such Cabinet members
and heads of newly established bureaus as were more immediately
concerned with the conduct of the war. Others did not look for
any great changes, holding that the Overman Act was to be con-
sidered "more as a resource, to be ready at hand as need
arises, . . . more as a club than anything else, to bring
about better team work, and thus to increase efficiency.
' ' 41
As a matter of fact, no startling changes, transfers, or con-
solidations were made by the President as a result of the Over-
man Act, and in no way was the regular Cabinet superseded, or
the position of any of the executive departments in the field of
administration impaired. President Wilson's first order under
the authority of this act, issued on the very day the act went into
effect, was perhaps one of the most important. This order pro-
vided for the reorganization of the Air Service, which, as a part
of the Signal Corps of the Army, had up to this time been under
the direction of the Chief Signal Officer.
40 See complete list of such acts in Cong. Record, 65 Cong., 2 Sess. (Apr.
3, 1918), 4901.
41 See article in N. Y. Times, May 5, 1918.
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The powers and functions of that officer were now redistribut-
ed as follows: (1) The Chief Signal Officer was left in charge
of telegraph and telephone operations. (2) A Director of Mili-
tary Aeronautics was created and placed in charge of the Avia-
tion Section of the Signal Corps, with the duty of "operating
and maintaining or supervising the operation and maintenance
of all military aircraft, . . . and of training officers, en-
listed men, and candidates for aviation service in matters per-
taining to military aviation ;
' '
and to that end there was trans-
ferred to his jurisdiction every function, power, and duty of the
Chief Signal Officer in reference to such military aviation, as
also all property and personnel used in connection with that ser-
vice. (3) A Bureau of Aircraft Production was established as
an executive agency to exercise complete jurisdiction and con-
trol over the production of aircraft and aircraft equipment, with
the Chairman of the Aircraft Board (which had been created by
the Act of October 1, 1917) as its executive officer. He was now
designated the Director of Aircraft Production, and was to have
complete charge of the activities, personnel, and properties of
the said Bureau.42
By another executive order of May 28, 1918, the War Indus-
tries Board, which had been originally formed as one of the ad-
visory committees of the Council of National Defense,43 was es-
tablished as a separate administrative agency to act for the
President and under his direction. The functions, duties, and
powers of the board were by this order continued as they had
been outlined by the President in his letter of March 4, 1918, to
the chairman, Bernard M. Baruch ;44 and in its new capacity the
War Industries Board became one of the most important fac-
tors in coordinating the industrial resources of the nation and
thus contributing to the successful conclusion of the war.
The war having been won, President Wilson ordered the War
Industries Board to be dissolved January 1, 1919, and certain of
its functions transferred to other executive agencies. Thus the
powers and functions of the Division of Planning and Statistics
42 Executive order of May 20, 1918. Official Bulletin, May 21, 1918.
43 Under authority of the Army Appropriations Act of Aug. 29, 1916.
U. 8. Stats., 64 Cong., 1 Sess., 619, 650.
44 Official Bulletin, May 31, 1918. For the letter referred to as out-
lining the functions of the board, see ibid., Mar. 31, 1918.
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were transferred to the War Trade Board, as also the powers
of the War Industries Board with respect to any orders, direc-
tions, regulations, or functions that could not, in the opinion of
the chairman, be abrogated, complied with, or fulfilled by the 1st
of January; while those of the Wool Division were transferred
to the Bureau of Markets in the Department of Agriculture. The
powers and functions of the Price Fixing Committee were order-
ed to continue until the prices fixed by the committee should
have expired, whereupon all the papers and records should be
delivered to the liquidating officer of the War Industries Board,
and the committee should stand dissolved. The order further
specified that the War Industries Board, or any number of its
members and officials might be continued for a limited period
after January 1st, if the chairman found that to be necessary for
the proper performance of any duty entrusted to him or to the
board, but only for the purpose of performing that duty and
liquidating the affairs of the board.
45
Other particularly important orders issued under the Overman
Act were those affecting the natural resources of the country.
Thus, by executive order of July 3, 1918, the records, personnel,
and powers of the Federal Trade Commission relating to the pro-
duction and distribution of coal and coke were taken from that
body and transferred to the Fuel Administration.46 By another
order of July 31, 1918, the President likewise placed the control
of the petroleum supply in the hands of the Fuel Administrator,
directing, however, that such control should be exercised through
a Committee on Standardization of Petroleum Specifications, the
composition of which was prescribed in the order.47 Of a similar
s Executive order of Dec. 31, 1918. Official U. S. Bulletin, Jan. 29,
1919. While this executive order dissolving the War Industries Board
was specifically based on the Overman Act, the order of May 28, 1918,
establishing that board as an administrative agency contained no reference
to that act or any other statute, tho that authority was evidently
presumed. Another executive order apparently issued under authority of
the Overman Act, but making no specific reference to it, was that of
June 25, 1918, transferring the gas experiment station at American Uni-
versity (Washington, D. C.) from the jurisdiction of the Bureau of
Mines to that of the War Department. Official Bulletin, June 28, 1918.
Ibid., July 10, 1918.
"Ibid., Aug. 7, 1918. This committee was to be composed of 7 mem-
bers, as follows: a chairman appointed by the Fuel Administrator, one
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nature was a later order conferring the control of the mineral
resources of the country upon the Secretary of the Interior. 48
Numerous other executive orders were issued under the au-
thority of the Overman Act, transferring and coordinating va-
rious functions and services. On May 31st, all the law officers
of the government were ordered to "exercise their functions un-
der the supervision and control of the head of the Department
of Justice," excepting only those officers in the Philippines, the
Comptroller of the Treasury, and the Judge Advocates General
of the Army and Navy;49 on June 18th, the war housing activ-
ities were placed under the control of the Secretary of Labor ; 50
and on July 1st, all the sanitary and public health services were
concentrated under the supervision of the Secretary of the Treas-
ury, excepting those health functions military in character, ex-
ercised by the Surgeons General of the Army and Navy and by
the Provost Marshal General.51
Finally, to show the great variety in the actions taken under
the Overman Act, mention may be made of the executive order
of October 3, 1918, transferring $120,000 from the appropriation
of $1,620,000 for the censorship of foreign mails under the Post
Office Department, and allotting that amount to the Secretary
of War for the censorship of the mails in the Panama Canal
Zone
;
52 and of the executive order of October 22, 1918, by which
the President tranferred a single individual (W. F. Sloan,
of the Division of Program and Statistics) from the Bureau
of Aircraft Production to the Post Office Department for such
duties as might be assigned to him by the Postmaster General in
connection with the control and operation of the telegraph and
telephone services.
53
The excellent results of the "blanket authority
" thus conferred
on the President with regard to administration in time of war,
member appointed by the Secretary of War, one by the Secretary of the
Navy, one by the chairman of the Shipping Board, one by the Director
General of Railroads, one by the Director of the Bureau of Mines, and one
by the Director of the Bureau of Standards.
48 Official Bulletin, Nov. 18, 1918.
Ibid., June 4, 1918.
eo Hid., June 20, 1918.
si Ibid., July 2, 1918.
62 Ibid., Oct. 10, 1918.
53 Ibid., Nov. 13, 1918.
181] CONTROL OF ADMINISTRATION 181
may be considered to have set a precedent for the future, which
will undoubtedly be followed in case of another emergency. As
a result, therefore, of his duty to administer and enforce the
laws, of his power to nominate, appoint, and dismiss the chief
administrative officers, and of the administrative powers confer-
red by statute, it may fairly be said that the President, in time
of war especially, "has become in effect the administrator-in-
chief of the Government. ' ' 5*
54 Cf. Willoughby, Government Organization in War Time and After,
5-6.
CHAPTER XI
POWERS OF POLICE CONTROL
The Bill of Rights is generally considered the most sacred part
of the Constitution, especially those portions of it guaranteeing
freedom of speech, of the press, and of assembly ; security from
arbitrary arrest and deprivation of property ; and a speedy trial
by jury. 1 One of the most important, as well as one of the
most perplexing questions that arise in time of war is that of the
extent to which these ordinary civil rights of the individual may
be restricted in the interest of the public safety and the na-
tional defense. Clearly the Constitution is not merely a peace
instrument, but was intended to protect the individual in time
of war as in time of peace. The doctrine of inter armas leges
silent can have no place in a constitutional government ; 2 never-
theless it must also be recognized that the guaranty of civil rights
cannot apply in the same fashion, nor to the same extent, in time
of war as under normal conditions.
One distinguished authority says that "war is a negation of
1 Amendments, Arts. I, IV, V, VI.
2 < ' The Constitution of the United States is a law for rulers and
people, equally in war and in peace, and covers with the shield of its
protection all classes of men, at all times, and under all circumstances.
No doctrine, involving more pernicious consequences, was ever invented
by the wit of man than that any of its provisions can be suspended dur-
ing any of the great exigencies of government.
' ' Ex parte Milligan, 4
Wall., 2, 120-121 (1866). However, a committee of the N. Y. Bar Asso-
ciation, at its meeting in Jan., 1917, reported as follows : "In time of
war the laws are silent j during the war civil rights may be suspended at
the will of the Commander-in-Chief. The Constituton does not inure to
the benefit of the public enemy, of spies, or of enemy sympathizers.
' '
This position was severely criticized by Dean H. W. Ballantine, of the
College of Law in the University of Illinois, in an article, "The Effect
of War on Constitutional Liberty," in Case and Comment, XXIV, 3
(June, 1917).
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civil rights," and holds that in its control over the life, liberty,
and property of those whom it recognizes as public enemies, Con-
gress is limited "only by the dictates of humanity and a respect
for the practice of nations.
' ' 3 Another writer contends that the
amendments guaranteeing these rights were intended " as dec-
larations of the rights of peaceful and loyal citizens, and safe-
guards in the administration of justice by the civil tribunals ; but
it was necessary, in order to give the government the means of
defending itself against domestic or foreign enemies, to maintain
its authority and dignity, and to enforce obedience to its laws,
that it should have unlimited war powers; and it must not be
forgotten that the same authority which provides those safeguards
and guarantees those rights, also imposes upon the President and
Congress the duty of so carrying on war as of necessity to super-
sede and hold in temporary suspense such civil rights as may
prove inconsistent with the complete and effectual exercise of
such war powers and of the belligerent rights resulting from
them. . . The rights enjoyed under the constitution in time
of peace are different from those to which he is entitled in time
of war." 4
Even if we do not fully accept the contention of these writers
that civil rights may be suspended in time of war, still it would
seem to be apparent that at such a time these rights must be
subject to some modification, restriction, or at least, very care-
ful supervision, in order that the government may contend suc-
cessfully with sedition and disloyalty from within as well as
against the enemy without; the principle justifying this view
being that the rights of the individual must yield to those of the
state in the time of the state 's peril from a public enemy.
6 Hence
there have been developed what may be called the police powers
of the President in time of war, that is, the powers exercised by
him in restraining and controlling the actions of individuals,
3 W. A. Dunning, in Pol. Sci. Quar., I, 178.
* Whiting, War Powers under the Constitution, 51. But in his dissent-
ing opinion in the recent case of Abrams v. United States, Justice Holmes
declared that the right of free speech is the same in war as in peace, say-
ing, "It is only the present dangers of immediate evil or an intent to
bring it about that warrants Congress in setting a limit to the expression
of opinion where private rights are not concerned." 250 U. S., 616
(1919).
5 Cf. Glenn, The Army and the Law, 144.
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whether they be citizens or aliens, within the limits of the coun-
try, during a period of war or similar emergency.
The relation of this war power to the rights of enemy aliens
who are found within the country after the outbreak of a war
is comparatively simple. International law from its very begin-
ning recognized the right of a state to arrest such enemy aliens
immediately upon the outbreak of war and detain them as cap-
tives during the period of hostilities. Later long-continued prac-
tise brought about the rule that a reasonable time for departure
should be given before arrest, developing finally into the rule
that such aliens should be permitted to remain during the entire
period of the war, unless military considerations required their
expulsion.
6 The right to arrest or otherwise restrict and govern
the conduct of enemy aliens, has, however, never been formally
abandoned, and was indeed revived on a wholesale scale by each
belligerent during the recent World War.
In the United States, the right of a state under international
law thus to regulate and restrict the conduct and movements of
enemy aliens has been definitely vested in the President. An
act of Congress passed nearly a century and a quarter ago, 7
designated as alien enemies all male natives, citizens, denizens,
or subjects of a hostile nation or government, who were at least
fourteen years of age and not actually naturalized; and in 1918
the scope of this act was enlarged so as to include women.8 The
President, by virtue of these acts, is authorized to direct the con-
duct to be observed on the part of the United States towards these
enemy aliens, the manner and degree of the restraint to which
they shall be subject, and in what cases and upon what security
their continued residence in the United States may be permit-
ted; to provide for the removal of those who are not to be per-
mitted to remain; and "to establish any other regulations which
shall be found necessary in the premises for tiie public safety."
In case of removal being ordered, the President is further au-
thorized, at his discretion, to give such reasonable time for de-
6 Lawrence, Principles of International Law, 387-389 ; Hershey, Es-
sentials of International Public Law, 362.
7 Act of July 6, 1798. Annals of Cong., 5 Cong., Ill, App., 3753; U. 8.
Sev. Stats., sees. 4067-4070.
8Act of Apr. 16, 1918. U. S. Stats., 65 Cong., 2 Sess., 531.
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parture "as may be consistent with the public safety, and ac-
cording to the dictates of humanity and national hospitality.
' '
In other words, the President is, impliedly by the rules of
international law and expressly by statute, vested with full pow-
er to restrict and control the conduct and movements of alien
enemies as he may see fit. He may permit them to stay in the
United States during the course of a war, with such restrictions
upon their conduct as he may deem proper, or with no restric-
tions; he may order them to depart from the country, and if
they refuse or neglect to go, may compel their removal; or he
may arrest and intern them for the period of the war. His ac-
tions under these powers are final, and in no way subject to ju-
dicial review. 9
Until recently little use seems to have been made of this pow-
er. During the war of 1812, aliens were ordered to report their
names and obtain ' ' certificates ' ' once a month.10 Otherwise they
have apparently been permitted to remain in the United States
with no harrassing regulations governing their conduct and
movements. During the recent war with Germany and Austria-
Hungary, however, the magnitude of the struggle, involving as
it did practically every resource and industry of the nation, and
the great number of citizens or subjects of those countries resi-
dent in the United States, made the danger from such enemy
aliens considerably more serious than ever before.
President Wilson, acting under the authority of the Act of
1798, therefore took precautionary measures immediately upon
the entry of the United States into the war, and in the very
same proclamation announcing the existence of a state of war,
11
he established a set of twelve regulations governing the conduct
of such enemy aliens within the United States. Under these regu-
lations, the possession by enemy aliens of any sort of fire-arm
or signal apparatus was prohibited; a barred zone was created
around every fort, arsenal, and other government property; at-
tacks or threats of any sort against the government, its meas-
ures, policies, or personnel, were not allowed; their residence
within any prohibited area that might be designated by the Presi-
8 Glenn, The Army and the Law, 87.
10 Life and Works of John Adams, X, 42.
11 Proclamation of Apr. 6, 1917. U. S. Stats., 65 Cong., 1 Sess., Procs.,
6.
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dent was not permitted ; their departure from and entry into the
United States was allowed only under such restrictions as the
President might prescribe; hostile acts, or acts giving "infor-
mation, aid, or comfort
' '
to the enemy were of course forbidden ;
and they were subject, upon suspicion, to summary arrest and
internment.
These regulations of April 6, were supplemented by eight ad-
ditional regulations established in the proclamation of November
16, 1917,
12 which absolutely excluded enemy aliens from such
regions as the territorial waters of the United States, the Dis-
trict of Columbia, and the Panama Canal Zone; required them
to register ; and ordered them to obey such restrictions and regu-
lations upon their residence, occupation, and travel, as the At-
torney General might make from time to time. Upon the dec-
laration of war against Austria-Hungary, the scope of these regu-
lations was extended to include the citizens and subjects of that
country ;
13 and finally, to include the alien women of both Ger-
many and Austria-Hungary. 14
While the Act of July 6, 1798, supplemented by the Act of
April 16, 1918, therefore conferred extensive powers of police
control upon the President, there can be no question but that
such powers are strictly in line with the accepted rules of in-
ternational practise, and even without these statutes, might be
said to have been vested in the President as the Chief Executive
and as Commander-in-Chief.
Somewhat more doubtful are the powers conferred by the
famous Alien Act of 1798, 15 which was passed during the stress
of the expected war with France and applied to all aliens, wheth-
er from an enemy or a friendly country. By the provisions of this
act, the President was authorized to order out of the country
"such aliens as he shall judge dangerous to the peace and
safety of the United States, or shall have reasonable ground to
12 U. S. Stats., 65 Cong., 1 Sess., Procs., 72.
is Proclamation of Dec. 11, 1917. Ibid., 2 Sess., 85.
i* Proclamation of Apr. 19, 1918. Ibid., 128. On Christmas Day of
1918, these regulations were rescinded, in their entirety as extended to
women, and also as applied to men, excepting only the restrictions as to
departure from and ertry into the United States. Proclamation of Dee.
23, 1918. Ibid., 3 Sess., 274. This proclamation is unique in being done
"at the city of Paris, in the Republic of France."
is Act of June 25, 1798. Annals of Cong., 5 Cong., Ill, App., 3744.
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suspect are concerned in any treasonable or secret machinations
against the Government thereof.
' ' A license to reside within the
United States at any place designated by the President might
be secured, if the alien concerned could prove, "to the satisfac-
tion of the President," that he was not dangerous to the public
safety; but any alien returning to the United States after his
removal, unless by permission of the President, was to be inn-
prisoned "so long as, in the opinion of the President, the public
safety may require."
This measure thus gave the President practically unlimited
police control over all aliens within the United States. Tho en-
acted during a time of technical peace, the Alien Act was de-
signed (together with the Sedition Act) as a war measure, "to
afford the President of the United States an effective weapon
against what seemed an especially pernicious and dangerous form
of domestic opposition in time of war."
16 A great many of the
recently admitted foreigners were extreme radicals who "ex-
pressed their opinions by speech or pen with a venomous facility
that has few counterparts in these milder times," condemned
every magistrate in power in the United States, and whose out-
pourings could not be looked upon as altogether harmless. 17
There might even be said to have been a precedent for the Alien
Act in a similar act passed in Virginia in 1785 and reenacted in
1792, but which, as Madison pointed out, differed in that the Vir-
ginia act expressly applied only to enemy aliens in time of actual
war. 18
The powers conferred by the Alien Act were upheld as a legi-
timate exercise of the war power, in the report of a House com-
mittee submitted February 21, 1799, as follows: "The right of
removing aliens, as an incident to the power of war and peace,
according to the theory of the Constitution, belongs to the gov-
ernment of the United States. . . Congress is required to
is F. M. Anderson, in Eeport, Am. Hist. Assn. 191$, 115. "French
spies then swarmed in our cities and in our country; some of them were
intolerably impudent, turbulent, and seditious. To check them, was
the design of the law." Adams to Jefferson, June 14, 1813. Life and
Works of John Adams, X, 42. The limitation of the act to two years is
also an indication that it was designed purely as a war measure.
"Channing, History of the United States, IV, 220.
is Writings of James Madison, VI, 369.
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protect each state from invasion ; and it is vested . . . with
powers to make all laws which shall be proper to carry into effect
all powers vested by the Constitution in the government of the
United States, or in any department or officer thereof; and to
remove from the country, in times of hostility, dangerous aliens,
who may be employed in preparing the way for invasion, is a
measure necessary for the purpose of preventing invasion, and,
of course, a measure that Congress is empowered to adopt. . .
Although the committee believe that each of the measures adopt-
ed by Congress [referring also to the Sedition Act] is suscept-
ible of an analytical justification, on the principles of the Con-
stitution and national policy, yet they prefer to rest their vindi-
cation on the true ground of considering them as parts of a gen-
eral system of defense adapted to a crisis of extraordinary diffi-
culty and danger.
' ' 19 Even the bitterest critics of the Alien
Act questioned its constitutionality only as it applied to friendly
aliens, admitting frankly that "the removal of alien enemies is
an incident to the power of war.
' ' 20
Apparently the power given to the President by the Alien
Act was not actually exercised in a single instance ;
21 altho
in a couple of cases final action by the President was probably
forestalled only by the voluntary departure of the person con-
cerned, and a considerable number of foreigners are said to have
left the country, anticipating the enforcement of the act.
22 On
the whole, it is probably correct to say that this law was "neith-
er unjustifiable in purpose nor administered with special harsh-
ness.
' ' 23
The power of the President to deal summarily with citizens
whom he may consider dangerous to the public safety is not so
clear. The provision in the Constitution permitting the sus-
pension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus "when in
is Am. State Papers, Misc., I, 182, 183; Elliot's Debates, IV, 441.
20 See Madison 's famous Report of 1800 on the Virginia Resolutions.
Writings of James Madison, VI, 366-367.
21 Life and Works of John Adams, X, 42. President Adams, in at least
one instance, expressed a willingness to apply the act. Ibid., IX, 5.
22 See article by F. M. Anderson, ' ' The Enforcement of the Alien and
Sedition Laws," in Beport, Am. Hist. Assn. 1912, 115-126, esp. 116-117.
23 Bascom, Growth of Nationality in the United States, 24. See also
Channing, op. oit., IV, 223-224.
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cases of rebellion or invasion the public safety may require it,
' ' 24
shows that the taking of extraordinary measures in cases of such
emergency was clearly recognized as necessary and proper.25
Altho the Constitution itself does not expressly state by what au-
thority the privilege of the writ may be suspended, it had been
the general opinion, up to the time of the Civil War, that Con-
gress alone had the power to judge of the exigency requiring
that action. This opinion had been induced, not only by the
position of the habeas corpus clause in that part of the Consti-
tution devoted to the legislative department,28 but also by pre-
cedent,
27 by the practise under the Constitution,28 and by the
weight of authority.29
2* Art. I, Sec. 9, 01. 2.
25 There was some objection to this clause at the time. Thus Jeffer-
son in a letter to Madison, July 31, 1788, protested as follows: "Why
suspend Hab. Corp. in insurrections & rebellions? ... If publick
safety requires that the government should have a man imprisoned on
less probable testimony in those than in other emergencies; let him be
taken & tried, retaken & retried, while the necessity continues, only
giving him redress against the government for damages. Examine the
history of England. See how few of the cases of the suspension of the
Habeas Corpus law have been worthy of that suspension. They have
been either real treasons wherein the parties might as well have been
charged at once, or sham plots where it was shameful they should ever
have been suspected. Yet for the few cases wherein the suspension of
the hab. corp. has done real good, that operation is now become habit-
ual, & the minds of the nation almost prepared to live under its con-
stant suspension.
' '
Writings of Thomas Jefferson, V, 46-47.
28 In the state ratifying conventions it was taken for granted that
Congress alone could suspend the writ. The following amendment, for
example, was proposed by the New York convention of 1788: "That the
privilege of the habeas corpus shall not, by any law, be suspended for a
longer term than six months, or until twenty days after the meeting of
the Congress next following the passing of the act for such suspension."
Elliot's Debates, I, 330.
27 In England, Parliament, not the Crown, suspends the writ.
28 President Jefferson's message of Jan. 22, 1807, on Burr's con-
spiracy, was followed by the passage in the Senate of a bill suspending
the writ of habeas corpus in certain cases for three months. In the House
the bill was rejected by an overwhelming majority. Neither in the mes-
sage of the President nor in the discussion in Congress was there any
suggestion of the President's right to exercise that power. Annals of
Cong., 9 Cong., 2 Sess., 39-43, 44, 402-425.
29 Ex parte Bollman, 4 Cr., 75, 101 (1807); Story, Commentaries on
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With the outbreak of the Civil War, this settled opinion was
disregarded by President Lincoln, acting on his own initiative
or through his subordinates, and upon the advice of his Attorney
General. 30 On April 27, 1861, he authorized General Scott to
suspend the writ of habeas corpus by the following order :
' ' You
are engaged in suppressing an insurrection against the laws of
the United States. If at any point on or in the vicinity of any
military line which is now or which shall be used between the
city of Philadelphia and the city of Washington, you find re-
sistance which renders it necessary to suspend the writ of habeas
corpus for the public safety, you personally, or through the of-
ficer in command at the point at which resistance occurs, are
authorized to suspend that writ.
' ' 31
On May 10, the President by proclamation also authorized the
commander of the United States forces on the coast of Florida,
"if he shall find it necessary, to suspend the writ of habeas cor-
pus and to remove from the vicinity of the United States for-
tresses all dangerous or suspected persons ;
" 32 on June 20, he
directed General Scott to suspend the writ in the case of a single
officer charged with treason ; 33 on July 2 and October 14, he ex-
tended his order of April 27 to cover the military line from
Washington to Bangor, Maine ;34 and on December 2, he empow-
ered General Halleck to suspend the writ at his discretion in
the state of Missouri. 35 Finally, by proclamation of September
24, 1862,
36 the President declared that all persons aiding or abet-
ting the rebellion, discouraging enlistments, resisting drafts, or
guilty of "disloyal practices," should be subject to trial by court-
martial or military commission, and ordered the suspension of
the writ of habeas corpus in their cases a proclamation which
the Constitution, II, 208. Cf. Chambrun, The Executive Power, 241; Win-
throp, Abridgment of Military Law (2nd ed.), 330-331.
so Attorney General Bates, July 5, 1861. 10 Op. Atty. Gen., 74.
si Richardson, Messages and Papers of the Presidents, VI, 18. Only
two days before, Lincoln declined to permit Gen. Scott to arrest or dis-
perse members of the Maryland legislature suspected of favoring seces-
sion, before the legislature should meet. Ibid., 17.
32 Ibid., 17.
ss Ibid., 19.
3* Ibid., 19, 39.
so Ibid., 99.
as Ibid., 98-99.
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an eminent authority has characterized as "a perfect platform
for a military despotism."
37
While the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas
corpus does not of itself authorize arbitrary arrests or any un-
usual procedure in trial, it has that practical effect, since those
suffering arbitrary arrest would have no remedy to prevent the
continuance of their confinement during the suspension of the
writ. 38 Arbitrary arrests were made from the very beginning of
the war. Members of the Maryland legislature, the mayor of
Baltimore, and several other prominent citizens were arrested
by order of the Secretary of War, in order to prevent the pass-
age of an ordinance of secession. Later, wholesale arrests were
made all over the country, especially in the West, some by direct
authority of the President,39 some by order of the Secretary of
State, some by that of the Secretary of War, sometimes merely
by virtue of a simple telegram, and in no case with the warrant
required by the Constitution, the only justification being that
the persons so arrested were, by treasonable speaking and writ-
ing, giving aid and comfort to the enemy, and that their im-
prisonment was necessary for the public safety.40
In March, 1863, Congress expressly authorized the President
to suspend the writ of habeas corpus and legalized his past
37 W. A. Dunning, in Pol. Sri. Quar., I, 188. "Discouraging enlist-
ments and disloyal practices were offences unknown to the law, and the
phrase disloyal practice was large enough to include anything." 8.
G.
Fisher, in Pol. Sci. Quar., Ill, 457. The elastic interpretation of the
lat-
ter term is indicated by the following contemporary definition: "He is
a public enemy who seeks falsely to exalt the motives, character, and
capacity of armed traitors, to magnify their resources, to encourage
their efforts by sowing dissension at home, or by inviting intervention
of foreign powers in our affairs. He who overrates the success, increases
the confidence, and encourages the hopes of our adversaries, or under-
rates, diminishes, or weakens our own, and he who seeks false causes of
complaint against the officers of our government, or inflames party spirit
among ourselves, . . . gives to our enemies that moral support which
is more valuable to them than regiments of soldiers, or millions of dol-
lars. " Whiting, War Powers under ihe Constitution, 197-198.
ss Cf. Burgess, The Civil War and the Constitution, II, 216.
39 See Executive order of Aug. 8, 1862. Eichardson, op. tit., VI,
121.
Rhodes, History of the United States, III, 553-556; S. G. Fisher,
"The Suspension of Habeas Corpus during the War of the Rebellion," in
Pol. Sci. Quar., Ill, 454-488, esp. 457.
192 WAR POWERS OF THE EXECUTIVE IN UNITED STATES [192
acts,
41 but for two years Lincoln had suspended the writ of his
own accord, and had made arrests without warrant, holding the
suspects as long as he pleased,
42
not only without express author-
ity and contrary to the prevailing opinion of his power up to
the time of the Civil War, but in direct oppostion to the author-
itative ruling of Chief Justice Taney.43 He was, however,
clearly supported by public opinion,44 and if any constitutional
principle can be deduced, it is "that the President may in an
emergency exercise the right to arrest and detain individuals
until Congress acts.
' ' 45 There is scarcely any doubt, as is as-
serted by an eminent authority, that the practises of the admin-
istration in the Civil War would be repeated under like circum-
stances, and that they are to be considered as the precedents of
the Constitution rather than the opinion of the Supreme Court.46
With regard to the freedom of speech and press, some re-
strictions on both have always been considered warranted in spite
of the constitutional guaranties, even in time of peace.47 In time
41 Act of Mar. 3, 1863. 12 Stat. at L., 755.
42 By executive order of Feb. 14, 1862, he ordered the release of all
political prisoners on their parole to render no aid or comfort to the
enemies of the United States, granting annesty for their past disloyalty
to those who should keep their parole, and declaring that ' ' extraordinary
arrests will hereafter be made under the direction of the military au-
thorities alone." Eichardson, op. tit., VI, 102-104.
43 # parte Merryman, Fed. Cases No. 9487 (1861).
44 Cf. 8. G. Fisher, op. cit., 483.
45 See W. A. Dunning, "The Constitution in Civil War," in Pol. Sri.
Quar., I, 163-198, esp. 189; cf. Bascom, Growth of Nationality, 112-114.
The most notable assertion of the President's power was the pamphlet by
Horace Binney, "The Privilege of the Writ of Habeas Corpus under the
Constitution," well summarized by S. G. Fisher, op. tit., 459-465. For
Lincoln's own defense of his actions, see his message to Congress, July
4, 1861, and his replies to communications from New York and Ohio
Democrats, June 12 and June 29, 1863. Eichardson, op. tit., VI, 25; Mc-
Pherson, History of the Eebellion, 163-167, 170-172.
46 " It may therefore be claimed that it is the precedent of the Con-
stitution in Civil War that the President may suspend all the safeguards
of the Constitution in behalf of personal liberty anywhere within the
country, taking upon himself the responsibility therefor to Congress, and
that subsequent authorization by Congress fo do the like things in future
works indemnification, and makes the preceding Presidential assumptions
legitimate and lawful, if they lacked anything of being so before.
' '
Burgess, The Civil War and the Constitution, II, 217.
47 "What is the liberty of the press? Who can give it any definition
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of war, these may be considerably extended so as to prevent in-
terference with the successful prosecution of the war by stirring
up disloyalty or sedition, by encouraging disobedience to the
laws, or by giving aid or comfort to the enemy in any way.48 In
fact, it has been officially asserted that the freedom of the
press in war time rests largely with the discretion of Congress.49
Such war time restrictions may take the form of penalizing
certain kinds of speech or writing. This was the nature of the
famous Sedition Act of 1798,50 which, designed, like the Alien
Act already referred to, as a war measure,
51
attempted to curb
the spread of sedition during the crisis with France by punishing
false, scandalous, and malicious writings against the Govern-
ment, either house of Congress, or the President, written with
intent to stir up sedition. Of a similar nature, but even more
clearly designed as a war measure, is the Espionage Act of
1917,
52
of which it has been said that "few more sweeping meas-
ures have ever found their way to the national statute book.
' ' 5S
which would not leave the utmost latitude for evasion? I hold it to be
impracticable; and from this, I infer that its security, whatever fine
declarations may be inserted in any constitution respecting it, must al-
together depend on public opinion and on the general spirit of the people
and of the government." The Federalist, No. 84 (Goldwin Smith ed., p.
476).
48 In its decisions upholding the constitutionality of the Espionage
Act of 1917, the Supreme Court declared that the first amendment affords
no protection to an individual convicted under that act for printing and
distributing in time of war a document calculated to cause insubordination
in the military and naval forces and obstruction to recruiting; that it
likewise is no protection against conviction for publishing and circulating
newsapers or articles attempting to cause disloyalty and mutiny; and
that it is no valid defense against conviction for delivering a speech op-
posing the war, so expressed that the natural effect is to obstruct re-
cruiting. Schenclc v. United States, 249 U. S., 47 (1919) ; Frohwerk v.
United States, ibid., 204; Debs v. United States, ibid., 211.
War Cyclopedia (1st ed.), 101.
oo Act of July 14, 1798. Annals of Cong., 5 Cong., Ill, App., 3776.
si See report of House Committee, Feb. 21, 1799. Am. State Papers,
Misc., I, 182, 183. That the act was designed purely as an emergency
measure is further indicated by the fact that it was to continue in effect
only until Mar. 3, 1801.
52 Act of June 15, 1917. Public No. 24, 65 Cong., in Wigmore, Source-
Boole of Military Law and War-Time Legislation, 484-500.
53 War Cyclopedia (1st ed.), 88.
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As amended in 1918,54 this act is especially stringent, making
it a penal offense, not only to hinder the success of the United
States and promote that of the enemy by making false reports,
by inciting or attempting to incite disloyalty or mutiny, or by
obstructing recruiting and enlistment, but also to "willfully
utter, print, write, or publish any disloyal, profane, scurrilous,
or abusive language about the form of government . . , or the
Constitution . .
,
or the military or naval forces . . ,
or the flag . . , or the uniform of the Army and Navy of the
United States," or any language intended to bring these into
"
contempt, scorn, contumely, or disrespect." Through his con-
stitutional power to "take care that the laws be faithfully exe-
cuted,
' '
it was of course largely within the discretion of the Presi-
dent to interpret these provisions in such a way as to make them
instruments of oppression or genuine attempts to suppress dis-
loyalty and sedition.55
Another method of placing war time restrictions on the press
is through censorship in advance of publication. This method
is largely executive. The President, as Commander-in-Chief,
has the undoubted power to suppress or censor such newspapers
or other publications in occupied territory as he may deem in-
jurious to the public interests.56 At least one writer asserts that
the President also has this power within the United States as well.
He says that the power necessarily exists somewhere to prevent
disclosures useful to the enemy, should such disclosures be threat-
ened or undertaken, and maintains that
"
it is of the very essence
of all things which lie between success and failure in war that
this power should be reposed where it can be exercised instantly,
as the exigencies of the situation may develop the need," and
that therefore the President is not dependent upon Congress in
order to exercise the power of censorship, but has the right, as
Commander-in-Chief, to prevent and suppress such publications.
5* Act of May 16, 1918. Public No. 150, 65 Cong., in Wigmore, op. tit.,
500-501.
55 For a vigorous criticism of these Espionage Acts and the manner of
their enforcement, as well as for a complete discussion of the subject of
the freedom of speech in war time, see Chaffee, Freedom of Speech, esp.
chs. 1-2. For the enforcement of the Sedition Act of 1798, see F. M. An-
derson, op. cit., in Report, Am. Hist. Assn. 1912, 118-122. For opinion as to
its constitutionality, see Story, Commentaries on the Constitution, II, 619, n.
5 Dig. Ops. J. A. G., (ed. 1901), 426.
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"To deny the power is to deny the right of the Commander-in-
chief to protect his armies against a danger as obvious as would
be the danger of allowing armies to organize and drill and ac-
cumulate arms and ammunition behind the lines. ' ' 57
This power of censorship was both asserted and exercised dur-
the Civil "War. Postmaster General Blair stated it as his opinion
"that a power and duty to prevent hostile printed matter from
reaching the enemy, and to prevent such matter from instigating
others to cooperate with the enemy, by the aid of the United
States mails, exist in time of war, and in the presence of treas-
onable and armed enemies of the United States, which do not
exist in time of peace, and in the absence of criminal organiza-
tions
;
" 58 which view was sustained in a report of a committee
of Congress,
59 and a way thus opened for placing the press "at
the mercy of the Government in time of war.
' '
In accordance with these views, a censorship of some sort exist-
ed from the outset of the war, tho it was apparently never very
effective. Government control of the telegraph lines was estab-
lished as early as April, 1861, and a censor (H. E. Thayer) was
appointed, with instructions from Secretary Seward to prevent
the issue from "Washington of telegraphic messages relating to
the civil or military operations of the government, containing
anything more than a bare statement of essential facts.
60 In Au-
gust of the same year, an attempt was made to reach a "gentle-
men's agreement" between the government and the press, where-
by the newspapers were to refrain from publishing information
giving aid or comfort to the enemy, while the government was to
afford facilities for the transmission of suitable information.
This proved to be a failure, due to the unscrupulous character
of some correspondents and newspapers, and finally resort was
had to an administrative policy of news control. The censoring
57 T. J. O
'Donnell,
' '
Military Censorship and the Freedom of the
Press," in Va. Law Eev., V, 178-179.
58 Quoted in Burgess, op. cit., II, 222-223.
59 Report of House Judiciary Committee, Jan. 20, 1863. Ibid., 223.
eo For example, no mention was permitted of the criticism of Gen. Stone
for the Ball's Bluff disaster; nor of the fact that some senators had
urged the removal of Gen. Sherman; nor of the Cabinet's objections to
Secretary Cameron's report. See J. G. Randall, "The Newspaper Prob-
lem in Its Bearing upon Military Secrecy during the Civil War," in
Am. Hist. Eev., XXIII, 303-323, esp. 303-304 (Jan., 1918).
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function was transferred from the State to the War Department ;
military supervision of the telegraph lines was ordered by au-
thority of Congress, beginning in February, 1862 ; and a special
officer was appointed for the general supervision of the telegraph
business, with the title of Assistant Secretary of War and Gen-
eral Manager of Military Telegraphs. 61 Under the direction of
this officer, regulations were drawn up governing the transmis-
sion of news over the telegraph wires,
62 and a general policy of
news control was instituted, tho the fact that the mails remain-
ed open and uncensored made these but half-way measures to-
wards effectively closing the news channels.
There were also some attempts at suppression of newspapers
and discipline of correspondents. In August, 1861, Postmaster
General Blair ordered certain New York and Brooklyn papers
excluded from the mails, and the United States marshal seized
copies of one of them these papers having been indicted for
rebellious utterances
;
63 the Baltimore Transcript, the Metropoli-
tan Record, and the Cincinnati Enquirer were each suppressed
for short periods by generals commanding in the departments in
which they circulated ; while the New York World and the Journ-
al of Commerce were seized and suppressed for three days in
May, 1864, under orders of President Lincoln, for publishing a
bogus proclamation implying the admission of a Union disaster.
The editor of the Baltimore Exchange, openly sympathetic with
secession, was arrested and confined in Fort La Fayette, but re-
leased after some months by order of the War Department ; the
Chicago Times was suppressed in 1863 by General Burnside, but
his action was revoked by the President. Several of the gener-
als, particularly Grant and Sherman, attempted at various times
61 See order of Feb. 25, 1862, taking possession of the telegraph lines
and naming Edward S. Sanford as military supervisor of telegraphic
messages. The same order specifically forbade telegraphic communications
concerning military operations not erpressly authorized by the War De-
partment, the commanding general, or the generals commanding in the
several departments; newspapers publishing such military news without
authority to be excluded from the telegraph service and from the rail-
roads. Eichardson, op. tit., VI, 108-109.
2 For these regulations, see J. G. Randall, op. tit., 305.
63 These were the Journal of Commerce, the Daily News, the Freeman's
Journal, and the Brooklyn Eagle. Burgess, op. tit., II, 222; Cong. Eecord,
65 Cong., 2 Sess. (Feb. 19, 1918), 2557.
197] POWERS OF POLICE CONTROL 197
to discipline newspaper correspondents within their lines with
varying degrees of success. 64
While the actual governmental interference with the freedom
of the press during the Civil War was, on the whole, compara-
tively slight,
65 the precedent was established that "this part of
the Constitution [the first amendment] may be suspended by or-
der of the Administration, when in the judgment of the Presi-
dent the public safety demands it.
' ' 66
With the entry of the United States into the recent world war,
the problem of news control again became acute, and on April
13, 1917, Secretary of State Lansing, Secretary of War Baker,
and Secretary of the Navy Daniels addressed a joint communica-
tion to the President, setting forth their views on the subject.
They pointed out the danger in premature or ill-advised an-
nouncements of policies, plans, and specific activities, and sug-
gested the need for some authoritative agency to assume the pub-
lication of all the vital facts of national defense. "While there
is much that is properly secret in connection with the depart-
ments of the Government, the total is small compared to the vast
amount of information that it is right and proper for the people
to have. . . It is our opinion that the two functions censor-
ship and publicity can be joined in honesty and with profit,
and we recommend the creation of a Committee on Public In-
formation. . . We believe you have the undoubted authority
to create this Committee on Public Information without waiting
for further legislation, and because of the importance of the task,
and its pressing necessity, we trust that you will see fit to do so.
The committee, upon appointment, can proceed to the framing
of regulations and the creation of machinery that will safeguard
all information of value to an enemy, and at the same time open
every department of government to the inspection of the peo-
ple as far as possible.
' ' 67
In accordance with this recommendation and this opinion as
to his powers with regard to censorship, President Wilson, by
executive order of April 14, 1917,68 created such a Committee on
*Cong. Eecord, 65 Cong., 2 Sess. (Feb. 19, 1918), 2557; J. G. Randall,
op. tit., 318-321.
es J. G. Randall, op. cit., 322-323.
66 Burgess, op. cit., II, 223.
67 See text of letter in Official Bulletin, May 10, 1917.
es Official Bulletin, May 10, 1917.
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Public Information, "to be composed of the Secretary of State,
the Secretary of War, the Secretary of the Navy, and a civilian
who shall be charged with the executive direction of the commit-
tee." George Creel was appointed as the civilian chairman, and
the Secretaries were authorized to detail an officer or officers to
the work of the committee.
Under the direction of the committee so created, a system of
voluntary censorship was established. The committee at various
times issued "requests" to the press to suppress news with re-
spect to certain matters of military and naval value. 69 These
were supplemented from time to time by similar "requests'" to
the press from the Secretary of War and the Secretary of the
Navy,
70 to all of which the press of the country apparently re-
sponded to the general satisfaction of the government officials. 71
In addition to its direction of this voluntary censorship, the
policy of news control was further carried out by the Commit-
tee on Public Information through its organization of various
kinds of publicity services. A daily paper was published, be-
ginning May 10, 1917, in no sense in competition with the regu-
lar news journals, but containing '
'
all proclamations and Execu-
tive orders issued by the President; rules and regulations pro-
mulgated by the Federal departments; official bulletins and
statements
;
statutes bearing on the war and their construction ;
and all other subjects related to the prosecution of the war, to
which publicity may properly be given. ' ' 72 Other pamphlets
6 Especially information concerning the train and boat movements of
troops, the assembling of transports and convoys, or any information from
which inference might be drawn of embarkation for over-seas service. The
suppression of the names of armed merchant ships which had engaged
U-boats was also requested, in order to save the captains, if later captured,
from the fate of Capt. Fryatt. Official Bulletin, June 14, June 15, 1917;
May 10, June 10, 1918. On July 30, 1917, the committee published an
extended list of matters concerning which it requested secrecy, which list
was revised and again strongly urged upon the press on Dec. 31, 1917.
Ibid., July 31, Dee. 31, 1917.
TO Ibid., Apr. 3, May 27, Aug. 2, 1918.
71 See statements of Secretary Daniels praising the spirit of the Ameri-
can press in adhering to the voluntary censorship. Ibid., Feb. 12, Aug. 2,
1918.
72 See statement in first number, May 10, 1917. The paper was named
the Official Bulletin, later changed to Official U. S. Bulletin. It was sus-
pended as a government publication Mar. 31, 1919, but was continued as a
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were compiled and issued under the direction of this committee,
giving information as to the causes and purposes of the war;73
news was gathered and disseminated to the newspapers of the
country; motion pictures were made and distributed under its
supervision; staffs of lecturers were organized; and agencies of
various sorts were used to stimulate public opinion and spread
information on the issues of the war. All this was done on the
sole authority of the President, the committee even operating
for a considerable time on the executive budget, but later secur-
ing some appropriations from Congress.74
Besides this system of voluntary censorship and news control
under the direction of the Committee on Public Information, a
rigid censorship of letters and other matter sent out from the
camps and fields was maintained by the military authorities. In
January, 1918, this censorship was by General Order lightened
so as to permit soldiers in camp in this country to write freely
for publication, subject to censorship by designated officers who
were to "delete all references capable of furnishing important
information to the enemy." Attention was, however, called to
the fact that "criticism of superiors and the spreading of false
reports which would tend to injure the military service consti-
tute breaches of military discipline." Matter written by regu-
lar newspaper correspondents not in the military service was
not subject to any sort of censorship, but the order directed camp
commanders to instruct these correspondents "that they must
rigidly adhere to the requests for secrecy with respect to informa-
tion of value to the enemy, as defined ... by the Commit-
private enterprise, under the name United States Bulletin, published bi-
weekly by Roger W. Babson.
73 The so-called War Information and Bed, White, and Blue series.
74 The work and organization of the Committee on Public Information
are outlined in Willoughby, Government Organisation in War Time and
After, 35-39; also in a pamphlet compiled under the direction of H. H. B.
Meyer, Chief Bibliographer of the Library of Congress, The United States
at War; Organizations and Literature, 79-81. According to a statement by
Mr. Creel, the committee received from the President $5,600,000, while from
Congress it received but $1,250,000. N. Y. Times, Nov. 1, 1919. There was
much severe criticism of the Committee on Public Information and especial-
ly of its chairman, both during and since the war; but for a vigorous
defense of its work, see Creel, How We Advertised America, New York,
1920.
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tee on Public Information," violations of these instructions to
cause a denial of the privileges of the camp.
75
In addition to the voluntary and military censorship of news-
papers and other publications thus established within the United
States on the sole authority of the President, steps were taken
early in the war to establish a rigid censorship over the telephone,
telegraph, and cable systems. By executive order of April 28,
1917, President Wilson prohibited all companies pperating tele-
graph and telephone lines and submarine cables from transmit-
ting messages to points without the United States and from de-
livering messages received from such points, except such mes-
sages as might be permitted under regulations established by the
Secretary of War and the Secretary of the Navy. 76 This sweep-
ing order was based on no other authority than the power vested
in the President "under the Constitution and by the joint reso-
lution of April 6, 1917, declaring the existence of a state of
war
;
" in other words, solely upon his authority as Commander-
in-Chief.
Under this order, a particularly stringent cable censorship was
established. The office of Director of Naval Communications
and Chief Cable Censor was created, under whose direction a
number of cable censorship regulations were issued May 1, and
amended May 31, 1917, with the avowed intention "to ease the
situation of the American trader and correspondent abroad, con-
sistent with the objects of military censorship.
' ' 77 On July 18,
the censorship was extended to all Atlantic cables, and new regu-
lations were promulgated, effective on that date.78
Thus far the censorship was carried on solely by virtue of the
President's orders. However, the Trading with the Enemy Act
of October 6, 19 17,79 included among its provisions one author-
izing the President to cause all communications to and from for-
eign countries by mail, cable, radio, or any other means, to be cen-
sored under such rules and regulations as he might establish.80
75 Official Bulletin, Jan. 31, 1918.
76 Ibid., July 18, 1917. This order was supplemented by a similar order
of Sept. 26, 1918, extending the restrictions to messages on or near the
Mexican border. Ibid., Sept. 27, 1918.
77 Ibid., June 5, 1917.
78/fttflf., July 18, July 25, 1917. Up to that time, the cable censorship
had extended only to South and Central America, Mexico, and the Orient.
7 Public No. 91, 65 Cong., in Wigmore, op. cit., 543-561.
o See. 3, Cl. (d).
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President Wilson thereupon, by executive order based upon this
act, created a Censorship Board, composed of representatives of
the Secretaries of War and Navy, the Postmaster General, the
War Trade Board, and the chairman of the Committee on Public
Information, to control all such communications.81
Under the direction of this board, the cable censorship was
tightened, and a great many persons, including some American
citizens, were denied the use of the cables altogether. 82 The
work of the chief cable censor was still continued, however, new
regulations being issued by him in the spring of 1918.83
The censorship thus exercised seemed to be based in part on stat-
utory authority, but chiefly on the authority of the President
alone, acting in pursuance of his powers as Commander-in-Chief.
In addition to giving the President complete power to censor
all communications of every sort between this country and a
foreign country, the Trading with the Enemy Act vested him
with considerable power over the foreign language press of the
United States, requiring these newspapers, except by license
from the President, to file before publication a "true and com-
plete
' '
translation of ' ' any news item, editorial, or other printed
matter, respecting the Government of the United States, or of
any nation engaged in the present war, its policies, international
relations, the state or conduct of the war, or any matter relating
thereto.
' ' 84 Provisions of the Espionage Act had likewise de-
clared non-mailable every sort of publication "containing any
matter advocating or urging treason, insurrection, or forcible
resistance to any law of the United States.
' ' 85
To the executive authorities charged with the enforcement of
these provisions was left the exact determination of what was to
constitute such non-mailable matter, and Postmaster General
Burleson, in a public statement, defined the position of the Ad-
ministration as follows : ' 'We shall take care not to let criticism
which is personally or politically offensive to the administration
si Executive order of Oct. 12, 1917. Official Bulletin, Oct. 15, 1917.
sz See N. Y. Times, Nov. 9, 1917.
ss Official Bulletin, May 21, 1918. The cable censorship ceased July 23,
1919, by order of the President. N. Y. Times Current Hist. Mag., X, 410
(Sept., 1919).
s* Sec. 19.
ss Act of June 15, 1917 (Title XII, Sec. 2).
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affect our action. But if newspapers go so far as to impugn the
motives of the Government and thus encourage insubordination,
they will be dealt with severely. For instance, papers may not
say that the Government is controlled by Wall Street or muni-
tion manufacturers, or any other special interests. Publication
of any news calculated to urge the people to violate law would
be considered grounds for drastic action. We will not tolerate
campaigns against conscription, enlistments, sale of securities,
or revenue collections. We will not permit the publication or
circulation of anything hampering the war's prosecution or at-
tacking improperly our allies.
' ' 86
The President's powers of censorship appear therefore to be
based in part on his constitutional position as Chief Executive
and Commander-in-Chief
,
in part on definite statutory authority.
Through his power to interpret and enforce the statute law, the
President is enabled to exercise a considerable measure of con-
trol over the expression of opinion in time of war. When to this
is added the powers of censorship and control exercised by the
authority of the President alone, not only during the recent war
but previously as well, the President 's power in this regard would
seem to be limited in practise only by the extent of the neces-
sity, as judged by him.
se Statement of Oct. 9, 1917, quoted in War Cyclopedia (1st ed.), 163.
This was supplemented by another statement to the same effect, issued in a
letter of Oct. 22, 1917. See text in Willoughby, Government Organization
in War Time and After, 48-49.
CHAPTER XII
POWERS OF ECONOMIC CONTROL
' ' This is a war of resources no less than of men, perhaps even
more than of men,
' '
said President Wilson during the course of
the recent wai*;
1 and the extent to which the economic resources
of the belligerent nations- were placed under government con-
trol is one of the most striking and unprecedented features of
the World War.
In the United States, it has become a well-established principle
of constitutional law that businesses affected with a public inter-
est are subject to government regulation, even in time of peace. 2
It. has likewise been long recognized that the property rights of
private individuals must yield in time of war to the military
needs of the nation. Thus, during the Revolution, dictatorial
powers were at various times conferred upon General Washing-
ton ' ' to take, wherever he may be, whatever he may want for the
use of the army, if the inhabitants will not sell it, allowing a
reasonable price for the same.
' ' 3 There was some attempt at
price-fixing during the same war,4 and there were many resolu-
1 Statement on taking over the railroads, Dee. 26, 1917. Official Bulle-
tin, Dec. 27, 1917.
2 German Alliance Insurance Company v. Lewis, 233 U. S., 389, 411
(1914).
3 Resolve of Dec. 27, 1776. See also resolves of Sept. 17 and Nov. 14,
1777. Jour. Cont. Cong., VI, 1045; VIII, 752; IX, 905.
*A resolution of Nov. 22, 1777, recommended that the states enact
price-fixing legislation, "in order to introduce immediate economy in the
public expense, the spirit of sharping and extortion, and the rapid and
excessive rise of every commodity being confined within no bounds;
" and a
resolution of Jan. 15, 1778, empowered the Board of War to limit the
prices to be given for wheat and flour. The repeal of all such price-fixing
legislation was recommended June 4, 1778, the resolution declaring that
' ' it hath been found by Experience that Limitations upon the Prices of
Commodities are not only ineffectual for the Purposes proposed, but like-
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tions recommending and authorizing the " impressment" of sup-
plies of all kinds needed for the army, including "wheat in
the sheaf." 5
The entry of the United States into the World War, requiring
the mobilization, not only of the military and naval forces of
the nation, but of its every economic resource as well, emphasiz-
ed the fact that in time of war the constitutional principle of
government regulation and control may be extended to cover
practically every enterprise and activity within the country;
that "the extraordinary circumstances of war may bring par-
ticular businesses and enterprises clearly into the category of
those which are affected with a public interest and which de-
mand immediate and thoroughgoing public regulation. ' ' 6
Control of Food and Fuel. From the first, it was recognized
that the great contribution of the United States to the winning
of the war must be the supplying of food for itself and the Allies.
Hence a policy of food control was entered upon, centered al-
most entirely in the hands of the President. Immediately after
the declaration of a state of war with Germany, Herbert Hoover
was selected (on April 7) by the Council of National Defense as
chairman of its committee on food supply and prices, 7 and on
May 19 his appointment as Food Administrator and a program
of food administration were announced by President Wilson, 8
even tho the administration bills vesting the President with pow-
ers of food and fuel control had not yet been acted upon by
Congress.
9 President Wilson followed this action with a letter
to Mr. Hoover on June 12, 1917, in which he stated that the sav-
ing of food and the elimination of waste admitted of no further
delay, and therefore, without waiting for the legislation which he
considered desirable, he vested Mr. Hoover with "full authority
to undertake any steps necessary" for the proper organization
wise productive of very evil Consequences to the great Detriment of the
public Service and grievous Oppression of Individuals." Ibid., IX, 957;
X, 55; XI, 569, 570.
s Ibid., Ill, 323; VI, 1001; VIII, 741; IX, 774-775, 962, 1043; XX,
516, 598.
6 Statement of ex-Justice Hughes, quoted in War Cyclopedia (lsted.),96.
iPol. Sci. Quar., XXXII, Supp., 25.
*N. T. Times, May 20, 1917.
a These administration bills were introduced into Congress the latter part
of April.
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and stimulation of efforts along these lines.10 Accordingly,
conservation campaigns were organized throughout the country,
voluntary workers were enrolled, and a set of food rules were
promulgated and issued, 11 all on the authority of the President
alone.
Finally, in August, 1917, Congress passed the Food and Fuel
Control Act,
12
vesting the President with complete control over
the food and fuel resources of the nation. He was empowered,
whenever he should deem it essential, to license the importation,
exportation, manufacture, storage, and distribution of food,
feed, fertilizer, and fuel, and to prescribe regulations governing
the businesses so licensed; to fix prices of such food and fuel;
to requisition such food, fuel, and other supplies, or factories or
mines in which these are produced, "whenever he shall find it
necessary;" to buy and sell wheat, flour, meal, beans, and po-
tatoes, at prices to be fixed by him; to set a minimum guaran-
teed price for wheat (to be not less than $2 per bushel) ; to regu-
late the operations of boards of trade ; to limit, regulate, or pro-
hibit the use of foodstuffs in the production of beverages, wheth-
er alcoholic or non-alcoholic; and, finally, "to make such regu-
lations and to issue such orders as are essential effectively to
carry out the provisions of this Act.".
Under authority of these provisions, President Wilson on Au-
gust 10, 1917 (the day of the passage of the act), again formally
announced the appointment of Herbert Hoover as Food Admin-
istrator 13 (altho Mr. Hoover had been acting as such by execu-
tive authority since May 19), and turned over to him the immed-
iate administration of the act. Steps were also taken at once to
exercise the powers conferred by the act and to place the food
resources of the country under a more thoro system of control.
Through a series of proclamations, the President required li-
censes of practically every sort of business connected with the
production and distribution of food, including elevators and
l 0fficial Bulletin, June 18, 1917. For statement by Mr. Hoover con-
cerning the aims of the Food Administration, see ibid., June 20, 1917.
11 Ibid., July 7, 1917. These were aa yet, however, only for voluntary
observance.
12 Act of Aug. 10, 1917. Public No. 41, 65 Cong., in Wigmore, Source-
Book of Military Law and War-Time Legislation, 504-516.
13 Official Bulletin, Aug. 11, 1917.
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mills for the storage or distribution of wheat and rye; the im-
portation, manufacture, and refining of sugar, sirups, and mo-
lasses; the importation, manufacture, storage, and distribution
of more than twenty staple foods ; the dealing in bread, bakery
products, and green coffee; the arsenic, ammonia, and fertilizer
industries
;
the trading in farm equipment ; stockyards and con-
nected businesses.14
Besides inaugurating this system of regulation through li-
censing, the President empowered the Food Administrator to lim-
it profits,
15 and to requisition such foods and feeds, with their
storage facilities, as he might deem necessary "for any public
use connected with the common defense, other than the support
of the Army or the maintenance of the Navy.
" 16 He guaran-
teed a minimum price for the wheat crops of 1918 and 1919, 17
and ordered the organization of a Grain Corporation to purchase,
store, and sell this wheat, and make the guarantee effective.18
He limited the alcoholic content of malt and vinous liquors to
2.75 per cent, and finally brought about total prohibition by
forbidding the use of any foodstuffs in the production of such
malt liquors, whether alcoholic or non-alcoholic.
19
Altho most of these war-time restrictions were removed within
a few months after the signing of the armistice,20 some of them
were again revived and enforced about a year after that event,
when the powers of the Food Administration were transferred
i* U. 8. Stats., 65 Cong., 1 Sess., Procs., 45, 52 ; ibid., 2 Bess., 69, 92, 98,
107, 131, 133, 158, 202, 222; Official Bulletin, Oct. 11, 1917, Jan. 14, May
15, 1918; N. Y. Times, Oct. 10, Nov. 13, 1917.
is Executive order of Nov. 23, 1917. N. Y. Times, Dee. 1, 1917.
IB Executive order of Oct. 23, 1917. Official Bulletin, Nov. 1, 1917.
17 Proclamations of Feb. 21 and Sept. 2, 1918. U. S. Stats., 65 Cong.,
2 Sess., Procs., 105, 200.
is Executive orders of Aug. 14, 1917 and June 23, 1918. Emergency
Legislation, 174-176; Official Bulletin, June 24, 1918.
i Proclamations of Dec. 8, 1917 and Sept. 16, 1918. U. S. Stats., 65
Cong., 2 Sess., Procs., 84, 204. These must, of course, be distinguished
from the War-Time Prohibition Act, passed by Congress.
20 Most of the licensing requirements were canceled by the proclamations
of Jan. 7, Jan. 25, and Feb. 11, 1919. U. S. Stats., 65 Cong., 3 Sess., Procs.,
275, 285, 287. The prohibition regulations were modified so as to permit
the manufacture of near-beer and other non-intoxicating beverages, by the
proclamations of Jan. 30 and Mar. 4, 1919. Ibid., 286, 293.
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by executive order to the Attorney General in an attempt to
avert the sugar famine and to lower the high cost of living. 21
Similar steps to control the fuel resources of the nation were
taken by the President under the provisions of the Food and
Fuel Control Act. Doctor Harry A. Garfield was appointed Fuel
Administrator by executive order of August 23, 1917,22 and em-
powered to carry out the fuel provisions of the act. He ex-
plained the purposes of the Fuel Administration to be "to se-
cure the largest possible production of fuel at prices just to the
producer and reasonable to the consumer.
' ' 23
As with regard to the food resources, so the President likewise
inaugurated a system of licenses for controlling the distribu-
tion of coal and coke and the various other fuel products, such
as fuel oil and natural gas ;24 and fixed the prices to be charged.25
The Fuel Administrator, with the approval of the President,
issued several very drastic orders for the purpose of conserving
fuel, such as those for the elimination of electric advertising signs
and for certain ' ' lightless nights ;
" 26 and the sensational order
of January 17, 1918, suspending the operation of practically all
industry east of the Mississippi River for a period of five days
beginning January 18, and making the following nine Mondays
"heatless days." This order was promulgated in spite of pro-
tests from every part of the country, opinions that the order
exceeded the authority of the Executive, and an official resolu-
tion of the Senate asking for delay and an explanation,27 all
of which illustrates clearly the vast war-time power of the Presi-
dent.
As with regard to the powers of the Food Administration, so
those of the Fuel Administration were revived by the President
after the signing of the armistice and the virtual ending of the
war, in order to meet a particular situation. After having pro-
nounced the coal strike called for November 1, 1919, unjustifiable
21 N. T. Times, Nov. 22, 1919.
22 Official Bulletin, Aug. 24, 1917.
23 Ibid., Sept. 6, 1917.
2* Proclamations of Jan. 31, Mar. 15, and Sept. 16, 1918. U. S. Stats.,
65 Cong., 2 Sess., Procs., 99, 113, 205.
25 Official Bulletin, Aug. 24, Sept. 6, Oct. 29, 1917.
26 Ibid., Nov. 14, Dec. 15, 1917.
27 See N. Y. Times, Jan. 17, Jan. 18, 1918.
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and unlawful, and having requested, without success, that the
strike be called off,28 President Wilson, by executive order of
October 30, restored the war-time powers of Fuel Administrator
Garfield and gave him full authority to use these powers in ap-
plying such regulations as he should deem necessary to avert a
coal famine. Accordingly, the priority list of May 25, 1918,
was restored, the Railroad Administration was vested with pow-
er to divert coal shipments, the Department of Justice was charg-
ed with the enforcement of the maximum price list, drastic re-
strictions on the use of coal by "non-essential" industries were
put into effect, railroad service was curtailed, and rigid regula-
tions were applied concerning the distribution of coal to con-
sumers, until the strike was called off December 10.29
It should be noted that all these restrictions and regulations
concerning both the food and fuel resources, were established by
order of the President, even after the signing of the armistice,
by virtue of the "war powers" conferred upon him by the Food
and Fuel Control Act, a war measure which had not yet expir-
ed.
Control of Trade and Industry. Congress, by virtue of its
power over interstate and foreign commerce,30 may make such
regulations with regard to both foreign and domestic commerce
as it may deem necessary or helpful towards the crippling of an
enemy and the success of a war. It chose to exercise this power
during the events leading up to the War of 1812 and during the
war itself by passing several embargo and non-intercourse acts. 31
During the Civil War, Congress exercised the same power by
forbidding all intercourse between citizens of the loyal states
and of those in rebellion, except by license from the President.32
28 See President Wilson's statement concerning the strike. N. T. Times,
Oct. 26, 1919.
29/feid., Nov. 1, Dec. 2, Dec. 9, Dec. 11, 1919. The restrictions were
only gradually lifted after the calling off of the strike.
so Constitution, Art. I, Sec. 8, Cl. 3.
si Acts of Mar. 1 and June 28, 1809 ; Apr. 4, Apr. 14, and July 6, 1812 ;
Dec. 17, 1813; Feb. 4, 1815. Annals of Cong., 10 Cong., 2 Sess., App.,
1824; 11 Cong., II, App., 2508; 12 Cong., II, App., 2262, 2269, 2354; 13
Cong., II, App., 2781; 13 Cong., 3 Sess., App., 1899. Eegarding the purpose
of these as war measures, see Writings of James Madison, VIII, 185-186,
n., 188.
32 Act of July 13, 1861. 12 Stat. at L., 255, 257 (Sec. 5). President
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Even without authority from Congress, however, the Presi-
dent is also vested with considerable power in regard to the con-
trol of trade in time of war. By virtue of his position as Com-
mander-in-Chief, he may declare a blockade of the enemy's
ports,
33 and thus cut off completely both the import and export
trade with the enemy nation. President Polk exercised this
power by ordering a blockade of the Mexican ports in 1846,34
President Lincoln of the Southern ports in 1861,35 and President
McKinley of certain Cuban ports in 1898.36 It has also been held
that the President may, at least in the absence of congressional
action to the contrary, permit a limited commercial intercourse
with the enemy in time of war, and impose such conditions as
he sees fit.37
During the recent war with Germany and Austria-Hungary,
President Wilson never declared a blockade of those countries,
as he might have done, for the reason that such action would not
have cut off the supplies slipping through neutral countries.
Since the United States was practically the only source of supply
for these neutral countries, the problem was more effectively
solved by giving the President blanket authority to regulate
the foreign trade of the United States. Under the provisions of
the Espionage Act, the President was empowered, whenever in
his opinion the public safety should require, to forbid the ex-
portation of any articles to any country except under such regu-
lations as he might choose to make.38 Under the Trading with
the Enemy Act, he was given similar power with respect to im-
ports.
39
Lincoln, by order of Feb. 28, 1862, permitted such intercourse under rules
and regulations prescribed by the Secretary of the Treasury. Worlcs of
Abraham Lincoln, (Federal ed.), V, 438. The removal of the restrictions
so placed was begun immediately after the cessation of hostilities (Apr.
29, 1865), and completed by June 24, 1865. Dunning, Eeconstruction :
Political and Economic, 27.
S3 Prise Cases, 2 Black, 635 (1862).
s* Eichardson, Messages and Papers of the Presidents, IV, 492, 493.
35 Proclamations of Apr. 19 and 27, 1861. Ibid., VI, 14, 15.
36 Proclamations of Apr. 22 and June 27, 1898. Ibid., X, 202, 206.
^Hamilton v. Dillin, 21 Wall., 73, 87 (1874) ; cf. Glenn, The Army and
the Law, 69-70.
ss Act of June 15, 1917. Public No. 24, 65 Cong. (Title VII), in
Wigmore, op. cit., 493.
39 Act of Oct. 6, 1917. Public No. 91, 65 Cong. (Sec. 11), in Wigmore,
op. cit., 557.
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By virtue of this authority, President Wilson at various times
during the war proclaimed an embargo on long lists of articles,40
and prohibited the importation of other articles,41 except under a
system of licenses which he placed under the supervision of the
War Trade Board.42 In this way he was able to exercise com-
plete control over the foreign trade of the United States during
the period of the war, and thus to prevent supplies from reach-
ing the enemy, either directly or through neutral channels.
In time of war the President also exercises a large measure
of control over business within the United States, his power in
that regard being apparently based largely on statutory provi-
sions, but also being exercised in some instances by virtue of no
specific authority. For example, President Wilson immediately
upon the declaration of a state of war with Germany and on later
occasions placed restrictions upon the German insurance compan-
ies doing business in the United States and made regulations
with regard to German letters patent, his action in each case be-
ing based, not on statute, but solely on "the authority vested in
me as such. ' ' 43
Considerable power was vested in the President by the Na-
tional Defense Act of 1916, which authorized him in time of war
or when war is imminent, to order any individual or firm having
the facilities to comply, to furnish supplies or equipment for
the Army in preference to any other commitments, at prices
named by him; and in case of default, to seize and operate the
plant.
44 Similar power to requisition shipyards and factories for
the manufacture of supplies needed for the Navy was vested in
the President by the Naval Emergency Fund Act of 1917.45
40 Proclamations of July 9, Aug. 27, Sept. 7, Nov. 28, 1917; Feb. 14,
1918. U. S. Stats., 65 Cong., 1 Sess., Procs., 39, 47, 50; ibid., Z Sess.,
76, 102.
41 Proclamations of Nov. 28, 1917; Feb. 14, 1918. Ibid., 2 Sess., 77, 103.
42 Created under authority of the Trading with the Enemy Act, and com-
posed of representatives of the Secretaries of State, Treasury, Agriculture,
and Commerce, and of the Food Administrator, the Shipping Board, and the
War Industries Board. See executive orders of Oct. 12, 1917 and Aug. 20,
1918. Official Bulletin, Oct. 15, 1917, Sept. 3, 1918.
43 Proclamations of Apr. 6, May 24, and July 13, 1917. U. 8. Stats.,
65 Cong., 1 Sess., Procs., 10, 25, 40.
44 Act of June 3, 1916. Public No. 85, 64 Cong. (Sec. 120), in Wigmore,
op. tit., 439-440.
45 Act of Mar. 4, 1917. Public No. 391, 64 Cong. Ibid., 458.
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On July 28, 1917, the War Industries Board was created by
the Council of National Defense, with the approval of the Presi-
dent, to serve as "a clearing house for the war industry needs
of the Government
;
" 48 and in March, 1918, its functions were
by a mere letter of the President continued, expanded, and vest-
ed almost exclusively in the chairman, Bernard M. Baruch.47 Fi-
nally, by executive order of May 28, 1918, the President formally
made the War Industries Board an independent administrative
agency acting directly under his authority, and thereby created
what one writer says was "in effect an Industries Administra-
tion analogous in all essential respects to the Food and Fuel Ad-
ministrations previously created. . . The Board derived its
legal powers directly from the President. It therefore had the
power to exercise, within its field, all the powers of the President
over industry entrusted to him by statute or possessed by him in
virtue of his position of head of the armed forces of the Na-
tion." 48
Under the direction of its chairman and upon the sole author-
ity of the President, the board assumed a very large control of
the industrial resources of the nation. It acted as an agency for
centralizing the war demands of the several government services ;
purchased supplies for the Allies ; created new facilities and new
sources of supply; determined priorities of production and de-
livery; fixed prices; and sought to secure the elimination of
waste and unnecessary effort, and the securing of economy of
time and materials. The chairman was in general required to
act as the "general eye of all supply departments in the field
of industry," to be a sort of "industrial chief of staff."
While the various orders and decisions of the board were
legally only "requests," they were backed by the President's
powers to requisition factories, to withhold fuel and transporta-
tion facilities, and in other ways to compel compliance ; so that
War Cyclopedia (1st ed.), 293.
See President Wilson 's letter of Mar. 4, 1918, to Mr. Baruch, outlin-
ing the functions of the board and the duty of the chairman. Official Bul-
letin, Mar. 31, 1918.
48 Willoughby, Government Organization in War Time and After, 76-77;
see also C. N. Hitchcock, "The War Industries Board; Its Development,
Organization and Functions," in Jour. Pol. Econ., XXVI, 545-565 (June,
1918), esp. 547, 563.
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the War Industries Board was well described as being able to
"mold the country's industrial system almost as it will," and as
"a notable demonstration of the power of war to force concert of
effort and collective planning with centralized responsibility.
' ' 49
Through these various means, the President was enabled to ex-
ercise a complete control over all businesses having any relation
to war needs, which in modern times includes practically the en-
tire business life of the nation.
Control of Property. The President likewise has considerable
power in time of war with regard to private property. In the
United States it has been held that a state of war justifies the
seizure and confiscation of enemy property found within the
borders of the country,
50 in accordance with which theory the
Confiscation Acts of the Civil War 51 were passed, providing for
the seizure of rebel property under certain conditions. The gen-
eral practise of nations has, however, brought about the modern
rule of international law that such enemy property is no longer
subject to confiscation, but only to sequestration for the period of
the war. 52
The power of such sequestration might be presumed to rest
with the President by virtue of his executive authority, without
any further statutory authorization. All doubt was removed,
however, during the recent war, by inserting in the Trading with
the Enemy Act provisions which empowered the President,
through the Alien Property Custodian created by that act, to
take over and administer for the period of the war such enemy
property as he might require. 53 President Wilson carried out
these powers through various executive orders, which fixed the
49 C. N. Hitchcock, op. cit., 565, 566.
so Brown v. United States, 8 Or., 110, 122 (1814); Miller v. United
States, 11 Wall., 268, 305 (1870) ; cf. Glenn, The Army and the Law,
112, 115.
si Acts of Aug. 6, 1861, July 17, 1862, and Mar. 3, 1863. 12 Stat. at
L., 319, 589, 820.
52 Lawrence, Principles of International Law, 424-429.
63 See esp. Sees. 6, 7. Wigmore, op. cit., 548-552. The seizure of prop-
erty by the Alien Property Custodian could not be enjoined by the courts,
his decisions as to what constituted enemy character being held to be
unreviewable preceding the transfer of the property. Salamandra Insur-
ance Company v. New York Life Insurance Company, 254 Fed. Rep., 852
(1918).
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salary of the Alien Property Custodian and defined his powers
and duties, and which entrusted him with the management, ad-
ministration, and disposition of enemy property of all kinds,
including such things as real estate, personal property, seats on
stock exchanges, and businesses of all descriptions. 5 * In short,
the Alien Property Custodian was authorized "to step into the
shoes of the enemy and exercise all the rights and powers with
respect thereto which the enemy could exercise if no state of war
existed." 55
Other powers with regard to the control of property were also
vested in the President. Several acts of Congress authorized the
taking of land for military or naval purposes,56 under which
President Wilson seized such property as the Jamestown Exposi-
tion site and large tracts of land in Maryland, and ordered the
residents to vacate immediately, the compensation to be deter-
mined later. 57 Finally, by the Act of May 16, 1918,58 the Presi-
dent was empowered during the war to seize private property of
any kind, whether real estate, buildings, furnishings, or im-
provements,
' '
as he may determine to be necessary for the prop-
er conduct of the existing war," with compensation to be fixed
later. Altho under this act nothing was exempt from being
commandeered, its chief purpose was to facilitate the seizure of
housing for war workers and government offices, 59 in accordance
with which the President created a Housing Corporation as an
agency through which the Secretary of Labor might carry out
the provisions of the act.60
By these means the President was enabled to exercise a com-
e* Executive orders of Oct. 29, 1917 ; Feb. 26, Apr. 2, July 15, July 16,
Aug. 29, Sept 12, Sept. 13, Nov. 12, 1918. Official Bulletin, Oct. 31, 1917 ;
Mar. 2, July 18, July 23, Aug. 31, Sept. 17, Sept. 20, 1918; Jan. 3, 1919.
ss Statement of the Alien Property Custodian (A. Mitchell Palmer), in
Official Bulletin, Mar. 2, 1918.
56 Acts of June 15 and Oct. 6, 1917; Apr. 26, 1918. Public Nos. 23,
64, 140, 65 Cong.
57 Proclamations of June 28, Oct. 16, Dec. 14, 1917; June 10, 1918.
U. 8. Stats., 65 Cong., 1 Sess., Procs., 30; ibid., 2 Sess., 63, 87, 146.
58 Public No. 149, 65 Cong.
59 See statements of Assistant Secretary of War Crowell, in N. . Times,
Mar. 21, Mar. 22, 1918.
eo Executive order of Oct. 29, 1918. Official U. S. Bulletin, Jan. 21,
1919.
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plete control of all private property within the United States,
whose use might in his opinion benefit the enemy or which he
might consider essential to the war needs of the country.
Control of Transportation and Communication. The import-
ance of the transportation and communication services in the suc-
cessful prosecution of war is perhaps second only to that of the
actual fighting service. The close relation between the operation
of these lines of communication and the military operations, and
the necessity of securing their absolute control by the military
authorities, in order to insure the regular and systematic trans-
portation of troops and supplies, were recognized quite early
during the Civil War. Congress, by Act of January 31, 1862, 61
authorized the President, when in his judgment the public safety
should require it, to take possession of any or all telegraph and
railroad lines within the United States, together with all their
equipment and personnel ; to prescribe rules and regulations for
the use of these lines
;
and to place them under military control.
Accordingly, President Lincoln, by order of February 11,
1862, appointed D. C. McCallum as Military Director and Su-
perintendent of Railroads, giving him full authority to take pos-
session of the railroads and to do "all things that may be neces-
sary and proper" for the transportation of troops and sup-
plies ;
62 and on May 25, 1862, the President took formal military
possession of all the railroads in the United States.63 More
than 2,000 miles of railroad were operated, mostly in Southern
or border states,64 which were turned back to their owners under
certain regulations on August 8, 1865.65
During the first months of the recent war, an attempt was
made to meet the transportation needs of the nation by leaving
the operation of the railroads under private control, but as one
system under the the direction of the Railroads War Board,
a special committee of the American Railway Association,
ei 12 Stat. at L., 334. By joint resolution of July 14, 1862, this act was
declared not to authorize the President to engage in any work of railroad
construction. Ibid., 625.
2 Richardson, Messages and Papers of the Presidents, VI, 101.
63 Ibid., 113. See also orders of May 28 and July 11, 1862. Ibid.,
113, 116.
**Cong. Eecord, 65 Cong., 2 Sess., 2556, 6923 (Feb. 19, May 13, 1918).
*s Ibid., 2556; Fleming, Documentary History of Eeconstruction, I, 205-
206.
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cooperating with Mr. Daniel Willard, chairman of the Trans-
portation and Communication Committee of the Council of Na-
tional Defense.66 This did not prove satisfactory, however, and
before the end of 1917, suggestions were made from authoritative
sources that the President should take control of the railroads
and operate them for the period of the war, 67 authority for which
he already possessed by virtue of the Army Appropriations Act
of 1916.68
Acting under this authority, President Wilson, by proclama-
tion of December 26, 1917,69 took possession of all the rail and
water transportation systems in the United States (excepting
street-car and interurban lines 70 ), and vested their administra-
tion in Secretary of the Treasury McAdoo, who was designated
Director General of Railroads. Later the President confirmed
and continued the authority of Mr. McAdoo as Director Gen-
eral,
71 under the provisions of the Railway Control Act, 72 passed
by Congress in order that the President's authority might be
complete and undoubted. 73 This act confirmed the President's
power to take over, control, and operate the railroads under the
act of 1916, authorized him to compensate the owners and initiate
rates, and provided that he might relinquish such control at his
discretion, but that he might in no case exercise it longer than
one year and nine months after the declaration of peace.
Acting under the authority so conferred upon him by the
o War Cyclopedia, (1st ed.), 229, 273.
67 See report of Interstate Commerce Commission, in N. T. Times, Dec.
6, 1917.
es Act of Aug. 29, 1916. U. S. Stats., 64 Cong., 1 Sess., 619, 645.
6 U. S. Stats., 65 Cong., 2 Sess., Procs., 89.
TO By act of Apr. 22, 1918, the President was also authorized to take over
and operate such of these as might be necessary for the transportation of the
employees at the shipyards and plants. Official Bulletin, May 7, 1918.
71 Proclamation of Mar. 29, 1918. U. S. Stats., 65 Cong., 2 Sess.,
Procs., 119.
72 Act of Mar. 21, 1918. Public No. 107, 65 Cong., in Wigmore, op. cit.,
575-583.
73 Senator Cummins and others held, for example, that the President's
scheme of compensation to the owners required additional legislation, and
it was doubted by many whether he had the power to fix rates under the
act of 1916. That the President doubted his own authority on some of
these points is indicated by his statement that he intended to recommend
additional legislation. See N. Y. Times, Dec. 27, 1917.
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President, Director General McAdoo immediately assumed active
charge, unified the railroads of the country into one system,
made regulations concerning their operation, named his subor-
dinate officers, fixed both interstate and intrastate rates,74 in-
creased the wages of employees, provided for the adjustment of
labor disputes, and in general exercised complete control, 75 not
only of the railroads, but also of the coastwise steamship lines,
ship canals, and express companies, control of which had later
been taken over by the President.78
Upon the resignation of Mr. McAdoo a short time after the
armistice, the President appointed Walker D. Hines-to succeed
him as Director General, 77 and continued through him to exer-
cise control of the transportation systems of the United States
with the view of rendering adequate service at a reasonable
cost.78 In his message to Congress, May 20, 1919, President
Wilson announced his intention to return the railroads to their
owners at the end of the year,79 but no legislation on the subject
of future railroad control having by that time been enacted by
Congress, he postponed the date of return, setting it by formal
proclamation at March 1, 1920. 80 Congress having finally en-
acted railroad legislation by that date, 81 the railroads were then
returned as promised. Thus, for more than two years, more than
half of that time after the virtual end of the war, the President
exercised complete control of the transportation systems of the
country, a control which he might have extended considerably
7* The right to fix intrastate as well as interstate rates was upheld in
Northern Pacific Eailway Company v. North Dakota, 250 U. S., 135 (1919).
75 A considerable number of orders issued by the Director General are
listed in Emery and Williams, Governmental War Agencies Affecting .Busi-
ness, 44-49.
76 Proclamations of Apr. 11, July 22, Nov. 16, 1918. U. S. Stats., 65
Cong., 2 Sess., Procs., 125, 164, 245.
77 Proclamation of Jan. 10, 1919. Ibid., 3 Sess., 278.
78 ' < Until the signing of the armistice the Government 's first railroad
duty was to run the railroads to win the war, but now that the war is won,
the Government's railroad job is to render an adequate and convenient
transportation service at reasonable cost." Statement of Mr. Hines on
assuming office, Jan. 11, 1919. Official U. 8. Bulletin, Jan. 13, 1919.
7 See his message in United States Bulletin, May 26, 1919.
so Proclamation of Dec. 24, 1919. N. . Times, Dec. 25, 1919.
si The Esch-Cummins Railroad bill was signed by the President Feb. 28,
1920. Ibid., Feb. 29, Mar. 1, 1920.
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longer, on account of the delay in the ratification of the peace
treaty and the formal declaration of peace.
With regard to shipping, a large measure of control was ex-
ercised by the President during the recent war through the Ship-
ping Board and the Emergency Fleet Corporation, created by
the Act of September 7, 1916.82 Acting under the direction of
the President, this board and this corporation had as their war-
time task the providing of an adequate merchant marine to meet
the extraordinary transportation demands of the war and the
losses from submarine attacks. The Shipping Board controlled
directly the operation of all American ocean vessels; and by
means of authority delegated to it by executive order, requisi-
tioned all American ships completed or building during the war,
fixed freight rates, and determined terminal charges. 83 The
Emergency Fleet Corporation, acting as the construction agency
of the Shipping Board (and, through it, of the President), added
a vast amount of tonnage to the shipping in use during the war.84
Additional shipping was secured through the seizure of enemy
and neutral vessels lying within United States ports at the out-
break of the war. International law and practise allow a bel-
ligerent to requisition and utilize such vessels, if needed for war
purposes,
85 and the presumed authority of the President to act
under this rule was further strengthened by the Joint Resolution
of May 12, 1917,86 expressly authorizing him to take over enemy
vessels for use and operation during the war, and by a provision
in the Emergency Shipping Fund Act of June 1, 1917,8r em-
powering him similarly to requisition any vessel within the jur-
isdiction of the United States. Acting therefore under author-
ity both of international law and of statute, President Wilson
seized the German and Austrian vessels interned in the ports of
82 Public No. 260, 64 Cong., in Wigmore, op. tit., 447-454; amended by
Act of July 15, 1918. Public No. 198, 65 Cong., ibid., 455-457.
83 See, for example, its announcement requisitioning on Oct. 15, 1917, all
American vessels of not less than 2500 tons capacity. Official Bulletin,
Oct. 13, 1917. See also executive orders of June 18 and Dec. 3, 1918.
Ibid., June 20, Dec. 16, 1918.
s* Figures for the early months of the war may be found in War Cyclo-
pedia (1st ed.), 253.
ss Lawrence, Principles of International Law, 456, 626-628.
sa Public Ees. No. 2, 65 Cong., in Emergency Legislation, 18.
87 Public No. 23, 65 Cong., in Wigmore, op. cit., 482-484.
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the United States,88 and likewise requisitioned the Dutch ships
lying idle within its jurisdiction. 89 The docks and terminal
equipment of the German steamship companies were also taken
over,
90 under express statutory authority, 91 the compensation
therefor being determined by the President after the signing of
the armistice.92 .
It has already been noted that the Act of Congress authoriz-
ing military control of the railroads during the Civil War, also
authorized the President to assume such' control of the telegraph
lines. 93 Acting under this authority, the President, on February
26, 1862, took military possession of all the telegraph lines in
the United States, and appointed Anson Stager Military Super-
intendent of these lines, exercising military control during the
remainder of the war. It was expressly ordered, however, that
such control was "not intended to interfere in any respect with
the ordinary affairs of the companies or with private busi-
ness." 94
During the recent war, a much more comprehensive control
was established over all the means of communication. As early
as 1912, Congress had authorized the President, "in time of
war or public peril or disaster," to close, control, or take over
and use all the radio stations within the jurisdiction of the Uni-
ted States;
95 and by joint resolution of July 16, 1918, he was
further empowered to take possession of and to operate, in time
of war, any telegraph, telephone, marine cable, or radio system,
such control not to extend beyond the date of the declaration of
peace.
96
ss Executive orders of May 14, May 16, May 22, June 12, June 30, July
3, Sept. 27, Nov. 2, 1917. Emergency Legislation, 169-170, 171-173, 179,
189; N. Y. Times Current Hist. Mag., VI, 237.
89 Proclamation of Mar. 20, 1918. U. S. Stats., 65 Cong., 2 Sess., Procs.,
117. The 87 Dutch vessels thus seized were returned in the early part of
1919. Official U. 8. Bulletin, Feb. 3, 1919.
o Proclamation of June 28, 1918. U. S. Stats., 65 Cong., 2 Sess., Procs.,
160.
i Urgent Deficiency Act of Mar. 28, 1918. Public No. 109, 65 Cong.
2 Proclamation of Dec. 3, 1918. U. S. Stats., 65 Cong., 3 Sess., Procs.,
270.
3 Supra, 214.
94 See order of Feb. 25, 1862. Richardson, op. cit., VI, 108-109.
5 Act of Aug. 13, 1912. 37 Stat. at L., 302 (Sec. 2).
96 Public Res. No. 38, 65 Cong. U. S. Stats., 65 Cong., 2 Sess., 904.
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Acting therefore under express statutory authority, President
Wilson, immediately upon the entry of the United States into
the World War, directed the Secretary of the Navy to assume
control of all the means of radio commninication within the jur-
isdiction of the United States.97 On July 22, 1918, he took over
the telegraph and telephone systems, vesting their administration
in the Postmaster General;98 and shortly before the armistice
was signed, he likewise assumed control of the marine cables.99
The war-time control thus assumed of the wire services differ-
ed from that assumed in the Civil War in that it was not strict-
ly for military purposes, but to overcome the difficulties of a
competitive system arising out of the war, and "to broaden the
use of the service at the least cost to the people.
' ' 10 The seiz-
ure of the cables, tho vigorously assailed as an undue exercise of
executive power,
101 was explained by the President to have been
necessary in order "to keep an open wire constantly available
between Paris and the Department of State, and another be-
tween France and the Department of War,
' ' 102 and was upheld
by the courts as a legitimate exercise of his war power. 1*3
Complete control over these various systems of communica-
tion was exercised by the Postmaster General, acting under the
direction and authority of the President, extending to the uni-
fication of the various competing companies, the ousting of the
old officers in many cases, and the fixing of rates, both inter-
state and intrastate, 104 until the systems were returned to pri-
vate control. 105
87 Executive order of Apr. 6, 1917. Willoughby, Government Organisa-
tion in War Time and After, 40.
98 Proclamation of July 22, 1918. U. 5. Stats., 65 Cong., 2 Sess., Procs.,
163.
9 Proclamation of Nov. 2, 1918. Ibid,, 228.
100 Statement of Postmaster General Burleson on assuming control. Of-
ficial Bulletin, July 24, 1918.
101 See argument of ex-Justice Hughes. N. Y. Times, Dec. 28, 1918.
102 Address to Congress, Dec. 2, 1918. Ibid., Dec. 3, 1918.
^Commercial Cable Company v. Burleson, 255 Fed. Eep., 99 (1919).
10* The President's right to fix both interstate and intrastate rates for
the wire services was upheld in Dakota Central Telephone Company v. South
Dakota, 250 U. S., 163 (1919).
105 The cables were, by order of Apr. 29, 1919, returned to their owners
on May 2, 1919; the telegraph and telephone systems on August 1, 1919.
United States Bulletin, May 1, 1919; Pol. Sri. Quar., XXXIV, Supp., 25
(Sept., 1919).

IV. Powers Relating to the Termination
of War

CHAPTER XIII
POWER OF TERMINATING WAR IN THE
UNITED STATES
There are generally said to be three different ways in which a
war may be terminated: (1) there may be a simple cessation
of hostilities on the part of the belligerents; (2) there may be
a complete subjugation of one of the belligerents by the other,
involving the conquest and annexation of its territory and the
extermination of its government; and (3) there may be a form-
al re-establishment of peaceful relations between the belliger-
ents through an agreement embodied in a special treaty. 1
Instances of the first method are rare, and have never occur-
red in the case of wars to which the United States has been a
party. The second method is more common in the history of na-
tions,
2 but would seem to be precluded as a possibility on the
part of the United States, because of the doctrine laid down by
the Supreme Court that wars of conquest and aggrandizement
by the United States are unconstitutional. 3 A treaty of peace is
1 Oppenheim, International Law, II, 275 ; Lawrence, Principles of Inter-
national Law, 568.
2 For examples of each of these methods, see Oppenheim, op. tit., II,
275-276, 279.
s ' ' The genius and character of our institutions are peaceful and the
power to declare war was not conferred upon Congress for the purpose of
aggression or aggrandizement, but to enable the general government to
vindicate by arms, if it should become necessary, its own rights and the
rights of its citizens. A war, therefore, declared by Congress can never
be presumed to be waged for the purpose of conquest or the acquisition of
territory; nor does the law declaring the war imply an authority to the
President to enlarge the limits of the United States by subjugating the
enemy's country. . . He may invade the hostile country, and subject it
to the sovereignty and authority of the United States. But his conquests
do not enlarge the boundaries of this Union, nor extend the operation of
our institutions and laws beyond the limits before assigned to them by
223
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therefore not only
' ' the normal method of terminating war,
' ' *
and the only method heretofore employed in the case of wars in
which the United States has been a belligerent (excepting, of
course, the Civil War) , but has also apparently been considered
throughout our entire history as the only possible method under
the Constitution.
Recently, however, strong opinions have been expressed that
wars may be terminated by the United States in other ways than
by a formal treaty of peace. Thus, in an address before the
Washington Commercial Club, March 18, 1919, Senator Lenroot
(Wisconsin), speaking against the proposed constitution for the
League of Nations and protesting particularly against the in-
corporation of that constitution into the peace treaty, made this
statement: "We have accomplished the purpose we had when
we declared war and, while it would be desirable to have a form-
al treaty of peace with Germany, it is not necessary. We can
declare the war ended and go about our business, and I confi-
dently predict that this is what will be done if the treaty is not
ratified by the Senate. " 5 A statement by Senator Poindexter
(Washington), issued on the same day, was to the same effect
but even more explicit : "If the American delegation refuses to
make peace with Germany, let the Entente make peace with
Germany, and let Congress assemble and declare peace and pass
a law to bring the American army home. Congress has the same
power to declare peace that it has to declare war, and has full
control over all movements of the army and navy, including the
Commander-in-Chief. " 6 A well known journal likewise expres-
sed the opinion that
' '
Congress could at any time by simple reso-
lution declare the state of war at an end,
' ' 7 and at least one dis-
tinguished jurist has concurred in these views, saying that
' '
peace
could, no doubt, also be restored by an Act of Congress.
' ' 8
Moreover, serious attempts have recently been made in Con-
gress to assert the power of that body to declare peace independ-
the legislative power." Fleming v. Page, 9 How., 603, 614-615 (1849).
Cf. also S. E. Baldwin, in Am. Jour. Int. Law, XII, 14 (Jan., 1918) ;
Memoirs of John Qui/ncy Adams, XII, 144 (Jan. 10, 1845).
4 Oppenheim, op. tit., II, 280.
o N. Y. Times, Mar. 19, 1919.
Ibid., Mar. 18, 1919.
7 The Nation, May 31, 1919.
sS. E. Baldwin, in Am. Jour. Int. Law, XII, 13-14 (Jan., 1918).
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ently of a formal treaty. Thus, Senator Knox, on June 10, 1919,
declared that any attempt on the part of the Peace Conference
so to intertwine the peace treaty and the covenant of the League
of Nations as to prevent their separation by the Senate, would be
met with a resolution in Congress declaring the war formally at
an end. 9 On June 23, Senator Fall (New Mexico) and Senator
Edge (New Jersey) each offered joint resolutions in the Senate
declaring the state of war between Germany and the United
States terminated; and on September 15, Representative Mason
(Illinois) submitted a concurrent resolution in the House declar-
ing peace "with all the world." 10
These resolutions were all allowed to die in committee, but
immediately after the first rejection of the treaty on November
19, Senator Lodge, Republican floor leader and chairman of the
Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, offered a concurrent
resolution ' ' that the said state of war between Germany and the
United States is hereby declared to be at an end,
' '
while Senator
Knox, on December 13, offered a joint resolution declaring
simply, "That peace exists between the United States and Ger-
many." These two resolutions were taken under serious consid-
eration by the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, and on
December 20, Senator Knox reported from that committee a sub-
stitute joint resolution, repealing the joint resolution of April
6, 1917, which declared a state of war with Germany, and pro-
viding that such repeal should be effective, with certain stated
conditions upon Germany, "upon the ratification of a treaty of
peace between Germany and three of the principal allied and
associated powers.
' ' "
The expressions of opinion noted, the presentation and serious
consideration of these resolutions by the responsible leaders of
the majority party in Congress, and the later unprecedented
action in actually pressing a similar resolution to a vote,
12 would
Press report in Chicago Tribune, June 11, 1919.
10 S. J. Res. 60, Mr. Fall; S. J. Res. 61, Mr. Edge; H. Con. Res. 32,
Mr. Mason. Cong. Record, 66 Cong., 1 Sess., 1629, 5808.
"S. Con. Res. 17, Mr. Lodge; S. J. Res. 136, Mr. Knox; S. J. Res.
139, Mr. Knox. Cong. Record, 66 Cong., I Sess., 9321; ibid., 2 Sess., 540,
981.
12 Immediately after the second rejection of the peace treaty by the
Senate on Mar. 19, 1920, Senator Knox moved consideration of his resolu-
tion repealing the declaration of war, and several proposals were again
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seem to make pertinent a brief examination into the subject of
the power, in the United States, to terminate war and declare
peace.
Passing over the obviously unsound inference of Senator Poin-
dexter that Congress might assemble in special session on its
own motion, without a call from the President,13 it might seem
evident that since Congress has the power to bring about a state
of war by means of a declaration, which has in every case taken
the form of an act of Congress or of a joint resolution,14 it
could also, by a mere repeal of such declaration, terminate the
state of war and bring about a state of peace. 15 It should be point-
ed out in the first place, however, that Congress does not have an
absolute power of repeal ; that is, it cannot repeal each and every
made in the House for terminating the state of war and declaring peace
by action of Congress. On April 9, the House, by a large majority (242-
150), passed the Porter resolution (prepared by the House Committee on
Foreign Affairs), which declared that "Whereas, the President of the Uni-
ted States in the performance of his constitutional duty to give to Congress
information of the state of the Union, has advised Congress that the war
with the Imperial German Government has ended, . . . the state of war
declared to exist between the Imperial German Government and the people
of the United States ... is hereby declared at an end." This reso-
lution also provided for the repeal of all the war emergency legislation,
and gave Germany 45 days in which to declare a like termination of the war
under the conditions imposed, with a penalty of an economic boycott in case
of refusal. The Knox resolution, repealing the declarations of war against
both Germany and Austria-Hungary, and declaring the state of war with
those countries at an end, was substituted in the Senate, passed by that
body on May 15, by a vote of 43-38, and accepted by the House on May 21.
It failed of repassage over the President's veto, the final vote in the House
being 219-152. It seems likely, however, that some such resolution may
be passed after the inauguration of the new Republican admin-
istration. See texts of the Porter and Knox resolutions in N. . Times
Current Hist. Mag., XII, 209-210, 372-373 (May, June, 1920). For Presi-
dent Wilson's veto message, see ibid., XII, 707-709 (July, 1920).
MSupra, 224.
!* The declarations in the cases of the War of 1812, the war with Mexico,
and the war with Spain were in the form of acts of Congress; those in
the recent wars with Germany and Austria-Hungary in the form of joint
resolutions.
is This is the particular point emphasized by Judge Baldwin, op. cit.,
note 8. The same view is also held by Professor Corwin. See his article,
"The Power of Congress to Declare Peace," in Mich. Law Eev., XVIII,
669-675 (May, 1920), esp., 673, 674.
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legislative enactment and thereby restore the status quo ante.
For example, states are admitted to the Union by means of an
enabling act passed through the ordinary legislative channels;
but no state can be deprived of its place in the Union by a
subsequent repeal or nullification of that earlier legislative act
of admission.16 Hence, it does not necessarily follow that Con-
gress can, by an act of repeal, terminate a state of war and de-
clare a state of peace, merely because it can, by a legislative
declaration, bring about such a state of war.
In the second place, it should be noted that such an act of re-
peal is subject to the approval or veto of the President, just as
the original declaration, and hence its enactment would not be
so simple a matter as these senators seem to conclude. If such
an act were passed over the President 's veto, the President could
still prevent the complete restoration of a normal state of peace
by declining to resume diplomatic relations with the former
enemy or to perform other acts that are strictly within his juris-
diction but which presuppose a state of peace. A declaration of
peace by Congress through a concurrent resolution, such as that
proposed by Senator Lodge, would clearly be unconstitutional,
since it would deprive the President of his constitutional right to
approve or disapprove every act of legislative effect.
17 At the
most, such a resolution would amount to nothing more than an
expression of opinion, and could be entirely disregarded by the
President.18 Apparently Senator Lodge and the Foreign Re-
lations Committee of the Senate recognized the impossibility of
any attempt by Congress to declare peace without the coopera-
tion of the President, when the Lodge concurrent resolution was
dropped and a substitute joint resolution was proposed.19
Finally, while the Constitution specifically gives Congress the
power to declare war, it does not anywhere expressly confer the
power of declaring or making peace. Hence it is by no means
certain that Congress has any power, either by a repeal of its
original declaration, or by an independent act, resolution, or
declaration, to terminate a state of war and bring about a state
is See Willoughby, Constitutional Law, I, 426.
IT Constitution, Art. I, Sec. 7, 01. 3.
is Cf. Quincy Wright, in Columbia Law Eev., XX, 128-139, 131 (Feb.,
1920).
i Supra, 225, note 12.
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of peace. A study of the debates in the Convention of 1787 will
throw some light on the intention of the makers of the Constitu-
tion in that regard.
When the power of declaring war was under consideration on
August 17, Mr. Pinkney opposed vesting the power in the Leg-
islature but favored the Senate as the best depository, saying
that "it would be singular for one authority to make war, and
another peace." Mr. Ellsworth, on the other hand, thought there
was a material difference between the cases of making war and
declaring peace, adding that "war also is a simple and overt
declaration, peace attended with intricate and secret negotia-
tions." After the power of declaring war had been definite^
voted to Congress, Mr. Butler, evidently agreeing with Pinkney
that the power of making war and peace should be in the same
hands, moved to add the words "and peace" after the word
"war," thus giving to the Legislature the power over both.
Gerry seconded the motion, remarking that the
' ' Senate are more
liable to be corrupted than the whole Legislature." However,
the motion was lost by unanimous vote of the States, the Con-
vention thus taking a definite stand against giving Congress the
power to make peace. 20
The intention of the Convention as to the proper location of
the power to make peace is further shown in the debates and in
the actions taken concerning the treaty-making power. The
clause regarding treaties as reported to the Convention read as
follows : ' ' The President by and with the advice and consent of
the Senate shall have power to make Treaties, but no treaty shall
be made without the consent of two thirds of the members pres-
ent.
" When this came up for consideration on September 7,
Mr. Wilson attempted to have the concurrence of the House of
Representatives added to that of the Senate, but his motion was
lost, receiving only two affirmative votes.
21 Madison's motion
to except treaties of peace from the two-thirds provision,
' '
allow-
ing them to be made with less difficulty than other treaties, ' ' was
adopted unanimously, whereupon he moved to authorize two-
thirds of the Senate to make treaties of peace without the con-
currence of the President. "The President," he said, "would
necessarily derive so much power and importance from a state
20 Madison's Journal (Hunt ed.), II, 188-189.
21 Ibid., 327-328.
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of war that he might be tempted, if authorized, to impede a
treaty of peace." Mr. Butler seconded this motion and argued
strenuously for it ''as a necessary security against ambitious
and corrupt Presidents." Mr. Gorham and Gouverneur Morris
opposed the motion, the latter holding "that no peace ought to
be made without the concurrence of the President, who was the
general Guardian of the National interests.
' ' 22 Madison 's mo-
tion failed,
23 but the next day the whole clause was reconsider-
ed, and another distinct effort was made, under the leadership
of Mr. Sherman, to require the sanction of the Legislature to
"rights established by a treaty of peace." Tho seconded by
Mr. Morris, Sherman 's motion does not appear even to have been
acted upon, the final action of the Convention being to adopt the
clause as originally reported, the exception of treaties of peace
from the two-thirds provision being stricken out. 24
The discussion throughout shows very clearly that an over-
whelming majority in the Convention thought, as did Ellsworth,
"that there was a material difference between the cases of mak-
ing war and declaring peace,
' ' 25 that it did not consider Con-
gress as vested with the power to make peace unless given ex-
press authority. The Convention declined emphatically to give
Congress this express authority, but, on the other hand, did con-
sider the power of making peace as belonging under the treaty-
making power to the President and Senate. This is also the view
expressed by Justice Story, when he said that the proposal to add
the power "to make peace" to the power already given to Con-
gress "to declare war" was unanimously rejected, "upon the
plain ground that it more properly belonged to the treaty-mak-
ing power.
' ' 26 Ex-Justice Hughes recently made practically the
same statement,
27 and other well known authorities on American
22 Madison's Journal (Hunt ed.), II, 330.
23 Ibid.
24 Ibid., 333-334.
25 Ibid., 188. "It is not at all necessary that the power of declaring
war and that of making peace are vested by a Constitution in the same
hands." Oppenheim, International Law, II, 283-284. "The power to de-
clare war does not necessarily include that of making a treaty of peace. . .
They are generally associated together, though not always.
' '
Baker, Hal-
leek's International Law, I, 329.
2 Story, Commentaries on the Constitution, II, 88.
27 In Central Law Jour., LXXXV, 206 (Sept. 21, 1917).
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constitutional law likewise hold that the Constitution vests the
power of making peace, not in Congress, but in the President and
the Senate.28
It is significant in this connection, not only that the recent
claims to a power in Congress of declaring peace are entirely
without precedent and contrary to the best interpretations of
the Constitution, but also that such claims are refuted by specific
declarations by Congress itself. Thus, every important legisla-
tive enactment of Congress during the recent war which contain-
ed any reference to the conclusion of peace, shows that Congress
itself contemplated no possibility of terminating the state of
war through its own action alone. Two of the measures the
Food and Fuel Control Act and the Trading with the Enemy
Act apparently considered the President alone vested with
considerable authority in that regard, the former declaring that
zs For example, Schouler says that the power of Congress under the Con-
federation "embraced clearly the determination of both war and peace,
while that of the Congress of our Constitution is in expression confined to
war alone, since the full treaty-making power is lodged by the latter in-
strument (which makes no mention of declaring peace at all) with the new
branch of government, the Executive, subject to a two-thirds ratification in
the Senate." Constitutional Studies, 137.
Likewise, the opinion of such distinguished authorities as ex-President
Taft and ex-Attorney-General Wickersham is well known. For a careful
statement by the latter of the constitutional question, see N. T. Times Cur-
rent Hist. Mag., XII, 367-372 (June, 1920). And Senator Sterling of South
Dakota (Hep.), tho he voted for the Knox resolution, made the following
significant statement shortly after the presidential election: "I believe,
from the Harding campaign speeches, that the first step will be the passage
of a peace resolution similar to the Knox resolution. I am, however, a little
hazy as to just where we will be left when we have passed the resolution.
We declare a state of peace with Germany and Austria. But without a
similar declaration on their part, I do not see that peace will have been for-
mally established. The passage of a peace resolution by Congress is not
the method of making peace contemplated by the Constitution of the Uni-
ted States." Chicago Tribune (Staff Correspondence), Nov. 22, 1920. For
the contrary view, see especially the opinions of Senator Knox and Profes-
sor Corwin, in N. Y. Times Current Hist. Mag., XII, 372-376 (June, 1920),
and Mich. Law Rev., XVIII, 669-675 (May, 1920), respectively.
It is worthy of note in this connection that President Wilson, in his veto
of the Knox resolution, ignored the constitutional question entirely, basing
his veto rather on the grounds that the passage of the resolution meant the
abandonment of our allies and of the objects for which we had fought the
war.
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the provisions of the act should cease to be in effect "when the
existing state of war . . . shall have terminated, and the
fact and date of such termination shall be ascertained and pro-
claimed by the President;" the latter that "the words 'end of
the war,' as used herein, shall be deemed to mean the date of
proclamation of exchange of ratifications of the treaty of peace,
unless the President shall, by proclamation, declare a prior date,
in which case the date so proclaimed shall be deemed to be the
'end of the war' within the meaning of this Act." 29
Other measures specifically contemplated the termination of
the war by means of a treaty of peace. Thus, the Emergency
Shipping Fund Act provided that the authority granted in that
act to the President should cease "six months after a final treaty
of peace is proclaimed between this Government and the Ger-
man Empire;" the Kailway Control Act required that Federal
control should not continue longer than "one year and nine
months next following the date of the proclamation by the Presi-
dent of the exchange of ratifications of the treaty of peace ;
' '
the
Overman Act was to terminate "six months after the termina-
tion of the war by the proclamation of the treaty of peace, or at
such earlier time as the President may designate;" and the Con-
trol of Communications Act provided that control of the tele-
graph and telephone systems "shall not extend beyond the date
of the proclamation by the President of the exchange of ratifi-
cations of the treaty of peace.
' ' 30
It seems clear, therefore, that a formal treaty of peace is the
only method contemplated by the Constitution for the termina-
tion of a foreign war and the restoration of peace, as it has here-
tofore been the only method ever suggested or actually employed
in practise. The conclusion of peace rests therefore, in the Uni-
ted States, with the President and the Senate, as the treaty-mak-
ing power.
29 Act of Aug. 10, 1917 (Sec. 24); Act of Oct. 6, 1917 (Sec. 2). Wig-
more, Source-Boole of Military Law and War-Time Legislation, 512, 544.
so Act of June 15, 1917; Act of Mar. 21, 1918 (Sec. 14); Act of May
20, 1918 (Sec. 1) ; Joint Resolution of July 16, 1918. Wigmore, op. cit.,
484, 583, 586, 602.
CHAPTER XIV
POWERS WITH REGARD TO A TREATY OF PEACE
Since the conclusion of a treaty of peace is the only method by
which a foreign war may be terminated by the United States, 1
it is necessary to note the powers of the President in that connec-
tion. In the first place, while the Senate shares the treaty-mak-
ing power with the President and therefore enjoys considerable
power in connection with the definitive conclusion of peace, cer-
tain preliminaries may be undertaken that are within the prov-
ince of the President alone. These are the armistice and the pre-
liminary protocol.
An armistice, strictly speaking, merely provides for a tempor-
ary suspension of hostilities, but, if general in its scope, it is
usually entered into "with a view to negotiations for peace;" 2
while a preliminary protocol is a preliminary settlement indicat-
ing the lines along which the peace negotiations are to be con-
ducted. 3 The two cannot always be clearly differentiated, how-
ever, in that the latter may also provide for the suspension of
hostilities, and both are generally used ''as devices of the execu-
tive department for reaching a basis of negotiations without
awaiting the difficult and delayed conferences necessary for the
final treaty.
' ' * Neither requires the ratification of the Senate
before going into effect, each being considered as "a proper ex-
ercise of his war powers by the President.
' ' 5 Both illustrate also
the power of the President to enter into important international
agreements without the consent of the Senate, in that through
1 See preceding chapter.
2 Lawrence, Principles of International Law, 564-567 ; Davis, Elements
of International Law (4th ed.), 341.
s Cf. Benton, International Law and Diplomacy of the Spanish-American
War, 226-228.
* Ibid., 227.
5 Foster, Practice of Diplomacy, 318.
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them he may not only determine as to the continuance or term-
ination of hostilities, but may also lay down the conditions to
be imposed upon the hostile power and practically commit the
nation to a particular line of policy in the final peace confer-
ence.
President Madison sought in this way to bring about a ter-
mination of the war of 1812 almost as soon as it was begun. Jona-
than Russell, the American charge d'affaires in London, acting
under instructions from Secretary of State Monroe issued only
a few days after the declaration of war by Congress, 6 made two
attempts to arrange an armistice in the early fall of 1812.
7 Altho
these attempts were unsuccessful, the British government declin-
ing to consent to an armistice on the conditions named, they
were useful in clarifying the issues of the war, in that Monroe
selected from among the
' '
many just and weighty causes of com-
plaint against Great Britain,
' '
the orders in council and the im-
pressment of seamen as those "considered to be of the highest
importance.
' ' 8
The power of the Executive thus to define the issues of the war
and to determine how far to yield in the interests of peace, was
further illustrated when the counter-proposal of the British
Government for a cessation of hostilities was rejected, on the
ground that it was based on the repeal of the orders in council
alone and disregarded the question of impressment. 9 "It will
be seen from this," says an eminent historian, "that Madison
and Monroe continued the war on the question of impressment
alone." 10
The power of the President, as Commander-in-Chief, not only
to terminate hostilities by arranging an armistice, but also to
formulate such conditions for the armistice as to bind the nation
to a particular policy in the peace conference, was clearly demon-
strated in 1898, when in response to the Spanish request for
e Monroe to Eussell, June 26, 1812. Am. State Papers, For. Bel, III,
585-586; see also instructions of July 27. Ibid., 586.
7 Russell to Lord Castlereagh, Aug. 24, Sept. 12, 1812. Ibid., 589, 591.
s Ibid., 585.
a Warren to Monroe, Sept. 30, 1812; Monroe to Warren, Oct. 27, 1812.
Ibid., 595-597.
loChanning, History of the United States, IV, 480; cf. Updyke, Diplom-
acy of the War of 1812, 136-139.
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terms of peace, President McKinley embodied his conditions in
the protocol of August 12, which he authorized the Secretary of
State to sign on the part of the United States. 11
This protocol not only provided for an immediate suspension
of hostilities and a subsequent peace conference to arrange the
final terms, but stipulated that Spain should relinquish her claim
to sovereignty over Cuba, cede Porto Rico and an island in the
Ladrones to the United States, and evacuate these places im-
mediately. The final disposition of the Philippines was to be
left to the peace conference, the United States meanwhile to oc-
cupy and hold the city, bay, and harbor of Manila. 12 The pro-
tocol thus took on the character of much more than a preliminary
agreement governing the termination of hostilities, but commit-
ted the United States to a certain very definite policy in the peace
conference and approached very closely to a definitive treaty of
peace.
13
Similarly, the armistice conditions imposed upon Austria-
Hungary and Germany by President Wilson in 1918,14 not only
laid down terms which safeguarded the victory of the Allies in
a military and naval sense, but, as embodying the famous
' ' four-
teen points," were generally understood to have committed the
United States to a definite political policy in the peace confer-
ence, for his supposed departure from which in that conference
the President has since undergone the bitterest criticism.
Having the power, through the armistice and the preliminary
protocol, thus to terminate hostilities and to a considerable ex-
tent define the future peace conditions, the President may also,
on his own authority alone, undertake measures which presume
the virtual ending of the war and the existence of a state of
peace. President McKinley, having proclaimed the suspension
of hostilities with Spain in accordance with the protocol of Au-
gust 12, 1898, immediately raised the blockade of the ports of
Cuba and Porto Rico, and on August 18 ordered 100,000 of the
volunteers, or as near that number as practicable, to be mustered
11 For. Eel. 1898, 825.
12 See text of protocol. Ibid., 828-830.
is Cf. J. B. Moore, in Pol. Sci. Quar., XX, 391-392; Moore's Digest,
V, 213; Crandall, Treaties: Their Making and Enforcement, 103-104.
i* The texts of these may be conveniently found in N. Y. Times Current
Hist. Mag., IX, 364-368, 396-397 (Dec., 1918).
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out. 15 President Wilson likewise ordered a general demobiliza-
tion immediately after the signing of the armistice, 18 and lifted
many of the war-time restrictions before the definitive conclu-
sion of peace,
17 thus assuming, as he might, that the armistice
was something more than a mere suspension of hostilities.
It might seem that the President, through such exercise of
power as has been noted, could, of his own authority alone, not
only terminate hostilities, but bring about an actual termination
of the state of war. Thus, in 1898, many neutral powers treated
the protocol of August 12 as practically ending the war between
the United States and Spain, and permitted public vessels of the
United States to enter and use their ports freely as in time of
peace.
18 So also it was reported in March, 1919, that the Amer-
ican peace delegation at Paris was considering bridging over the
period between the signing of the peace treaty and its ratification
by the Senate, by a modus vivendi declaring the war ended as
of date of signature, so as to terminate the war legislation and
enable an earlier return to normal conditions.19
It was even solemnly held in a court decision rendered at about
the same time, that the "war was brought to a close when the
armistice was signed,
' ' because President Wilson, in announcing
the armistice to Congress, used the words,
' ' The war thus comes
to an end. " 20 In numerous other cases involving war-time legis-
lation eminent counsel argued that the state of war was terminat-
ed by the signing of the armistice and other acts of the Presi-
dent; and on June 10, 1919, Representative Dyer (Massachus-
etts), a member of the House Judiciary committee, cabled the
President to "exercise the authority which I am sure you pos-
15 Message to Congress, Dec. 5, 1898. Eichardson, op. cit., X, 174-175.
IB Demobilization was virtually completed by Oct. 14, 1919, the army
having by that time been reduced to less than 300,000 men. N. Y. Times
Current Hist. Mag., XI, 230 (Nov., 1919).
IT Such as restrictions on the use of food and fuel, on trade and industry,
and on the manufacture of beverages. Supra, 206, note 20.
is Moore's Digest, VII, 335.
19 Associated Press dispatch, Mar. 15, 1919.
20 Federal Judge Walter Evans, in a decision handed down in Louis-
ville, Ky., Mar. 24, 1919. Reported in Chicago Tribune, Mar. 25, 1919. The
peace resolution passed by the House, Apr. 9, 1920, likewise referred to
these words of the President as authority for declaring the war ended.
Supra, 226, note 12.
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sess" to proclaim the war ended and demobilization completed,
and thereby prevent war-time prohibition from going into ef-
fect.21
However, the better opinion is that the President alone can-
not, by a protocol, proclamation, or other act, bring about the
termination of a state of war and the existence of a state of
peace. Thus, Attorney-General Griggs in 1898 held that the
signing of the protocol of August 12 and the suspension of hos-
tilities did not terminate the state of war between the United
States and Spain;22 Attorney-General Palmer likewise ruled in
1919 that a state of war could not be terminated by act of the
President alone, but only by a treaty of peace; 23 and President
Wilson himself declined to attempt any such exercise of power,
declaring "not only that in my judgment I have not the power
by proclamation to declare that peace exists, but that I could
in no circumstances consent to such a course prior to the ratifi-
cation of a formal treaty of peace.
' ' 24
Finally, the courts have definitely decided that the signing
of an armistice is not equivalent to the termination of a state of
war. Judge Hand, of the United States District Court of New
York, pointed out that "so long as the treaty of peace is not
ratified, there is some chance of the resumption of hostilities,"
even tho that chance might be very slight; 25 while the Supreme
Court likewise unanimously held that the cessation of hostilities
in the recent war by means of the armistice did not mean the
' '
conclusion of the war,
' '
and pointed to various
' ' facts of public
knowledge" which showed the war emergency to be still in exist-
ence.
26
In the definitive conclusion of peace through a formal treaty,
the President, altho he is of course required to obtain the
' '
advice
21 Chicago Tribune, June 11, 1919.
22 22 Op. Atty. Gen., 190, 191.
23 See his ruling on the War-Time Prohibition Act, in N. T. Times, Aug.
28, 1919; also his telegram to Judge Evans, in case cited in this chapter,
note 20.
2* Letter to Senator Fall, Aug. 20, 1919. N. T. Times, Aug. 22, 1919.
25 See decisions rendered by him, in cases involving the validity of war-
time prohibition and wartime cable control, Jan. 20 and Aug. 20, 1919.
N. r. Times, Jan. 21, Aug. 21, 1919.
26 Hamilton v. Kentucky Distilleries and Warehouse Co., 251 U. S., 146
(1919).
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and consent" of the Senate before putting a treaty into effect,27
has practically complete control of all the other functions and
processes of treaty-making.
28 In the first place, the President
alone may appoint the commissioners who are to negotiate the
treaty of peace, and he is not required to submit their nomina-
tions to the Senate for confirmation. This power rests upon the
now well-recognized right of the President to use, at his discre-
tion, special agents of a diplomatic or semi-diplomatic "charac-
ter a right which one writer 29 points out has four bases: (1)
a presumptive legal basis in the acts of Congress giving the Presi-
dent a contingent fund which he may expend for foreign inter-
course without specific accounting; 30 (2) the recognized right
of the President to take the initiative in foreign affairs;31 (3)
the general practise of governments under international law;32
and (4) necessity. 33
Prior to 1815, the names of such special agents or commission-
ers chosen to negotiate treaties were generally submitted to the
27 Constitution, Art. II, Sec. 2, Cl. 2.
28 " As for making and declaring peace, the power . . . pertains no
longer to Congress, but is lodged for negotiation and conclusion in the
President." Schouler, Constitutional Studies, 140. "As the war power
is shared between the President and Congress, but Congress does not share
in the executive power, the breadth of the President's prerogatives as to
the closing of war becomes of special importance. The limits imposed
directly by the Constitution are few, its main one being the requirement of
the consent of the Senate ... To make a declaration of war requires
the assent of Congress as well as of the President. To end a war, it is
enough for him to obtain the assent of the Senate, if he acts under the
treaty-making power." S. E. Baldwin, in Am. Jour. Int. Law, XII, 13.
29 H. M. Wriston, "Presidential Special Agents in Diplomacy," in Am.
Pol. Sei. Rev., X, 481-499, esp. 482-488.
so As the earliest acts of this sort may be mentioned the acts of July
1, 1790; Feb. 9, 17&3; May 1, 1810. Annals of Cong., I Cong., II, App.,
2232; 2 Cong., App., 1411; 11 Cong., II, App., 2585.
31 Supra, ch. II.
32 < ' There seems to be no reason why the government of the United
States cannot, in conducting its diplomatic intercourse with other coun-
tries, exercise powers as broad and general or as limited and peculiar, or
special, as any other government. . . In fact, there has been no limit
placed upon the use of a power of this kind, except the discretion of the
sovereign or ruler of the country.
' '
Report of Senate Committee on For-
eign Relations, 1893, quoted by H. M. Wriston, op. cit., 486-487.
as See H. M. Wriston, op. cit., 487-488.
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Senate for confirmation.34 According to this practise, President
Madison even summoned the Senate in special session in May,
1813, to consider his course in accepting the Russian offer of
mediation, and to confirm the peace commissioners he had al-
ready appointed and sent on their way. The Serate confirmed
the nominations of John Quincy Adams and Senator James Bay-
ard, but rejected that of Secretary of the Treasury Albert Gal-
latin, on the ground that
' ' in the opinion of the Senate, the pow-
ers and duties of the Secretary of the Department of the Treas-
ury and those of an Envoy Extraordinary to a Foreign Power,
are so incompatible that they ought not be and remain united in
the same person.
' ' 35 Upon the failure of this attempt to open
peace negotiations, the President appointed another peace
commission in January, 1814, again submitting the names to the
Senate for confirmation.36
Since 1815, however, it has been very unusual to submit the
appointments of treaty negotiators to the Senate at all, 37 and
especially so with regard to peace commissioners. President
Polk even felt it necessary to keep secret for a time his selection
of Nicholas Trist as peace commissioner in 1847,38 altho he vest-
ed Trist with unusual powers, not only to accompany the army
and negotiate peace at a favorable opportunity, but also to con-
trol the military and naval operations.39 His later appointments
of Sevier and Clifford to negotiate the final treaty were, how-
ever, submitted to the Senate for confirmation, tho it should be
noted that Sevier was in reality selected for the permanent post
s* Crandall, Treaties: Their Making and Enforcement, 75-76.
SB Updyke, Diplomacy of the War of 1812, 146-148.
36 This commission consisted of John Quincy Adams, James Bayard,
Henry Clay, Jonathan Russell, and Albert Gallatin, the first four names being
submitted to the Senate on Jan. 14 and confirmed Jan. 18. Gallatin 'a
name was added on Feb. 8, and confirmed the next day without serious op-
position, he being no longer in the Cabinet. Ibid., 167-168.
37 For instances of such appointments without the consent of the Senate,
see Moore '& Digest, IV, 453-457.
SB Diary of James K. Polk, II, 468, 483; cf. II, 262, 268, 273.
SB "Should he (Trist) make known to you in writing that the contingency
haa occurred in consequence of which the President is willing that further
active military operations should cease, you will regard such notice as a
direction from the President to suspend them until further orders from
this department." Secret orders to Gen. Scott and Commodore Perry,
quoted by H. M. Wriston, op. cit., 495.
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of minister to Mexico with authority to complete the peace
treaty negotiations, and that Clifford was added merely because
of Sevier's illness.40 President McKinley likewise appointed
the peace commissioners of 1898 without consulting the Senate ;41
while President Wilson, in 1918, altho Congress was in session,
merely
"
announced" the peace delegation in a White House
statement, and took the unprecedented step of including him-
self.42
Having the power to appoint peace commissioners with or
without the consent of the Senate, the President is not restrict-
ed in his choice, but may select whom he will, without qualifica-
tion. Public opinion seems to expect, however, that distinguish-
ed men of both parties should be chosen, and one of the severest
criticisms of President Wilson was his apparent selection of men
who would reflect merely his own personal views. President
Polk likewise found great difficulty in selecting a commissioner
satisfactory to the country, probably one reason for the choice of
a person in a somewhat obscure position.43
40 Diary of James K. Polk, III, 378-383, 389-391. The treaty had been
ratified by the Senate, Mar. 10, 1848, with amendments that required new
negotiations.
41 However, the commissioners were appointed and the treaty of peace
completed during a recess of Congress. But in 1901, President McKinley,
without consulting the Senate, altho it was then in session, appointed W.
W. Rockhill as special commissioner to China, invested with full power to
negotiate with the representatives of the other allied powers and of China
concerning a settlement of the questions arising out of the Boxer Eebellion.
42 Together with Secretary of State Lansing, Henry White, Edward M.
House, and Gen. Tasker H. Bliss. Official U. S. Bulletin, Nov. 19, Nov. 30,
1918. President Wilson's decision to participate personally in the peace
negotiations at Paris raised again the interesting, tho purely academic
question as to the President's constitutional right to leave the jurisdiction
of the United States during his term of office. It is worthy of note that
Hamilton's plan for a constitution definitely contemplated the consent of
Congress for the absence of the President from the United States and
even then for the exercise of his powers by the Vice- President during such
absence. See Elliot's Debates, V, 587. The law and precedents governing
the President's right to leave the country are discussed by Park Benjamin,
in The Independent, Mar. 29, 1919. See also opinion of ex-Attorney Gener-
al Wickersham, in N. Y. Times, Nov. 27, 1918; and Taft, Our CUef Magis-
trate and His Powers, 50-51.
43 Diary of James K. Polk, II, 466. Nicholas Trist was Chief Clerk of
the Department of State when appointed peace commissioner.
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There seems also to be a considerable body of opinion that,
since the Senate is constitutionally a coordinate part of the
treaty-making power, it should be represented on the commis-
sion to negotiate peace. President Madison probably deferred
to this sentiment in appointing Senator Bayard, a Federalist,
and Henry Clay, formerly in the Senate but at that time Speak-
er of the House, to the peace commission of 1814.43a President
McKinley went so far in that respect as to give the Senate a ma-
jority on the peace commission of 1898 ;44 and President Wilson 's
entire disregard of the Senate in making up the peace commis-
sion in 1918 called forth especially severe criticism, as tho it
were an utter contempt for the constitutional position and rights
of that body.
As a matter of fact, tho senators have been quite commonly
appointed on commissions to negotiate treaties, including the
peace treaty of 1898, there is excellent authority for the view
that their appointment to such missions is not only inexpedient
and improper, but also contrary to the constitutional principle
that no civil officer of the United States shall at the same time
be a member of either house of Congress.45 President Monroe,
for example, stated in 1818 that he "did not approve the prin-
ciple of appointing members of Congress to foreign missions, but,
as it had been established in practice from the first organization
*3aBoth Bayard and Clay, however, evidently considered it improper
to combine the functions of peace commissioner and member of Congress,
as both resigned their respective seats immediately upon appointment to
the peace commission. In fact, Bayard wrote to Gov. Haslett of Delaware,
under date of May 3, 1813, that "the acceptance of the appointment is on
my part an implied and virtual resignation of my seat in the Senate. . . "
See Report, Am. Hist. Assn. 1913, II, 221 ; Clay & Oberholtzer, Henry Clay,
75.
4*Cushman K. Davis (Minn.), Eepublican, chairman of the Senate Com-
mittee on Foreign Relations; Wiliam P. Frye (Me.), Republican; and
George Gray (Del.), Democrat. The other members of the commission were
William R. Day, who resigned as Secretary of State in order to head the
commission, and Whitelaw Reid, former minister to France.
' ' No senator or representative shall, during the time for which he was
elected, be appointed to any civil office under the authority of the United
States, which shall have been created, or the emoluments whereof shall have
been increased during such time; and no person holding any office under
the United States shall be a member of either House during his contin-
uance in office." Constitution, Art. I, Sec. 6, Cl. 2.
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of the present Government, and, as the members of Congress
would not be satisfied with the opposite principle, he did not
think it proper to make it a rule for himself. '
' 46
The Senate itself has upon occasion taken a positive stand
against the participation of members of that body in treaty nego-
tiations. Thus, in 1898, the Senate declined to confirm the nom-
inations of Senators Hoar, Cullom, and Morgan to the Hawaiian
Commission "upon the ground that it would no longer consent
to the selection of members of this body to negotiate important
treaties that were to be reported to the Senate."47 In fact, the
feeling in the Senate was at that time so strong against that prac-
tise that the Judiciary Committee "almost unanimously" con-
templated reporting a bill or resolution prohibiting it for the
future, and only refrained from doing so because it was thought
that such action might be construed as a discourtesy to those
senators who had acted under such appointments. The com-
mittee instructed Senator Hoar, however, to see the President
and say that it hoped the practise would be discontinued; to
which suggestion the President responded by assuring Senator
Hoar that it would not pccur again, altho he called attention to
the difficulty of getting suitably qualified men outside of the
Senate or House.48
In 1903 the question again came before the Senate, and the
judgment was almost unanimously as before. Senator Tillman
said: "We had the Paris treaty or the Spanish or Philippine
treaty negotiated by Senators whose votes, no doubt, were influ-
enced by the fact that they were on that commission. I do not
see why we should palter with this thing any longer. Probably
we cannot convince the Executive that this practise is improper
46 Memoirs of John Quincy Adams, IV, 72. Compare the attitude of
Bayard and Clay in 1813. Supra, note 43a.
47 Statement of Senator Hale, in U. S. Senate, Feb. 26, 1903. Cong. Rec-
ord, 57 Cong., 2 Sess., 2695. The senators nevertheless served, their posi-
tion being stated by Senator Cullom as follows : ' 'We went out by appoint-
ment of the President; but there was a doubt about it, and the Judicial
Committee of the Senate, in view of the doubtful attitude which we occu-
pied as receiving appointments from the President while being members of
the Senate, thought it best not to act upon our confirmation at all; and
they were not acted upon. We were never confirmed by the Senate as a
matter of fact." Ibid., 2695.
48
Ibid., 2695, 2698.
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and contrary to the will of the Senate, unless it is forbidden by
law. ' ' He therefore offered an amendment to the provision un-
der discussion providing, "that in making appointments to any
such commission no Senator or Member of the House shall be
eligible."
49
Altho the amendment was stricken out on a point of order,
Senator Hale protested vigorously against the practise ; Senator
Bacon said it was ' ' distinctly in opposition to the express policy,
if not the express command of the Constitution of the United
States;" Senator Hoar concurred in this view, and in addition
stated that "hardly a more dangerous practice can be conceiv-
ed than this one
;
' '
and Senator Allison said, ' ' I am in sympathy
with the general suggestion. . . I do not believe a Senator or
Representative should be appointed.
' ' 50 Senators Foraker and
Teller were not ready to restrict senators from serving on such
commissions under all circumstances, but thought the practise
as a rule ' ' reprehensible.
" 51 Of all those who participated in
the discussion, only Senators Aldrich, Platt (Connecticut), and
McComas defended the practise, and opposed any limitation on
such service by members of the Senate.62
It would therefore seem that the recent outbursts of criticism
against President Wilson, in the Senate and elsewhere, for his
failure to appoint members of that body to the peace commission,
have had little substantial basis, and that, as a matter of
fact, while criticism of the personnel of the commission might
be justified on other grounds, that based on any constitutional
or inherent right of the Senate to representation on such com-
mission is condemned, both by the Constitution and by the un-
prejudiced opinion of the Senate itself.
In the second place, the President has entire control of the
peace negotiations on the part of the United States. He lays
down the principles that are to form the basis of negotiation, he
49 Cong. Eecord, 57 Cong., 2 Sess., 2696. The provision under consid-
eration was one in the Sundry Civil bill authorizing the appointment of a
commission to negotiate concerning rates of exchange between silver and
gold using countries.
so Ibid., 2695, 2696, 2697, 2698.
5i7&Z., 2696, 2697.
52 Ibid., 2696, 2698. Apparently the positive assurance by Senator Aid-
rich that no such appointments would be made in the case under considera-
tion had a great deal to do with the abandonment of a specific prohibition.
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determines whether to yield or to stand firm on a disputed point,
and he decides the wisdom and expediency of compromises. The
power and responsibility of the President in these respects are
the same, whether he directs the negotiations from Washington,
as did McKinley in 1898, or himself participates in the peace
conference, as did Wilson in 1919. His power is only the more
strikingly apparent in the latter case.
President McKinley was constantly in touch with the peace
commissioners at Paris in 1898, and did not hesitate to make new
demands and impose additional conditions during the progress of
the negotiations, even tho he was not personally present. With
regard to the disposition of the Philippines, for example, con-
cerning which the Spanish commissioners had expected an op-
portunity to negotiate, President McKinley 's original instruc-
tions were to demand the cession of the island of Luzon only.
Later, however, additional instructions were sent that "the ces-
sion must be of the whole archipelago or none. The latter is
wholly inadmissible, and the former must therefore be required.
' '
The American commission was divided as to the wisdom and jus-
tice of this demand, 53 and sought, moreover, to rest the claim of
the United States to any part of the Philippines on the grounds
of indemnity, the welfare of the islands, the "broken power of
Spain,
' '
and the ' ' anarchy
' ' that would result from our complete
withdrawal
;
while the President apparently desired to press the
claim "by right of conquest," holding that the conquest of the
entire archipelago had been accomplished by Dewey's destruc-
tion of the Spanish fleet in Manila Bay. In both matters, the
commission yielded, of course, to the views of the President.
54
President Wilson's "domination" of the peace commission of
1919 was not more complete, nor is there anything improper about
sa See For. Eel. 1898, 932-935, 945-948.
s* Benton, International Law and Diplomacy of the Spanish-American
War, 241, 243; See For. Eel. 1898, 935, 937, 940, 941. A recent interesting
explanation of President McKinley 's demand for the whole of the Philip-
pines is to the effect that while his mind was not yet made up on the point,
he received a communication from Lord Salisbury warning him that Ger-
many was preparing to take over the islands if the United States with-
drew, that such a step would probably precipitate a world war, and that
in the interests of peace and harmony it would be best for the United
States to retain the whole group. Latane, From Isolation to Leadership,
85.
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such domination, since it is the President who is alone respon-
sible for the results of the negotiations.
The Senate has, of course, the right to "advise and consent"
to all treaties, and that has sometimes been interpreted to mean
that the Senate has a right to "advise" and to be consulted be-
fore or during the course of the negotiations. There have been
a few occasions upon which the President has sought the pre-
vious advice of the Senate, or has informed that body as to pend-
ing negotiations.
55 President Polk in 1846 referred to that prac-
tise as "eminently wise," and said that since the Senate is a
branch of both the treaty-making and war-making powers, "it
may be eminently proper for the Executive to take the opinion
and advice of that body in advance upon any great question
which may involve in its decision the issue of peace or war.
' ' 56
That practise has, however, been only rarely resorted to in
later times,
57 and generally the "advice" of the Senate, as well
as its
' '
consent,
' ' has been given only after the negotiations have
been completed and the final treaty laid before it by the Presi-
dent. There has been even less disposition to interpret that
phrase ("by and with the advice and consent of the Senate")
as giving the Senate any right to participate as a body in the
negotiations, or to offer its advice as to the course and subject-
matter of the negotiations. The determination of those has been
generally held to be the function of the President alone, and only
recently has there been any serious attempt to assert power on
the part of the Senate to interfere or to interject its "advice"
during the course of important treaty negotiations, especially
those for the conclusion of peace.
Such an attempt was made, however, during the recent treaty
negotiations at Paris, when Senator Knox, on June 10, 1919, in
an attempt to force the separation of the covenant of the League
of Nations from the treaty of peace then being negotiated, pro-
posed a resolution declaring, among other things, that the Senate
55 For a list of these, see Finley and Sanderson, The American Execu-
tive and Executive Methods, 28Q-282.
se Message to Senate, June 10, 1846. Richardson, op. cit., IV, 449.
57 It is significant that President Wilson, in announcing his famous
"fourteen points" as the necessary conditions of peace, addressed Con-
gress as a whole, and not the Senate alone. Address to Congress, Jan. 8,
1918. McKinley, Collected Materials for the Study of the War, 20-22.
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of the United States, "being a coequal part of the treaty mak-
ing power of this government and therefore coequally responsible
for any treaty which is concluded and ratified,
' '
was '
'
deeply con-
cerned ' ' over the treaty under negotiation ; that it would regard
a treaty confined to
' ' the attainment of those ends for which we
entered the war," as "fully adequate for our national needs;"
that the conclusion of a "full and complete peace" was the para-
mount, if not the sole duty of the peace conference; that the
question of a League of Nations should be reserved for "future
separate and full consideration" by the people of any nation;
and that the adoption by the peace conference of
' ' the foregoing
reasonable limitations and positions" would facilitate the early
acceptance of the treaty by the Senate. 58
This attempt to inject the advice of the Senate into the peace
conference at Paris, and to influence the course of the negotia-
tions, was directly contrary, not only to the traditional view that
treaty negotiation is a function belonging solely to the Presi-
dent, but also to the expressed views of Senate leaders on former
occasions that the Senate should hold itself distinctly apart from
these negotiations, and only take action when the treaty is com-
pleted and laid before it, or when its advice is sought by the
President.
Thus, Senator Spooner, generally considered to be one of the
best constitutional lawyers of his time, said with regard to this
point :
' ' The Senate has nothing whatever to do with the nego-
tiation of treaties or the conduct of our foreign intercourse and
relations save the exercise of the one constitutional function of
advice and consent which the Constitution requires as a preced-
ent condition to the making of a treaty. . . From the foun-
dation of the Government it has been conceded in practice and
in thepry that the Constitution vests the power of negotiation
and the various phases and they are multifarious of the
conduct of our foreign relations exclusively in the President. And
he does not exercise that constitutional power, nor can he be
made to do it, under the tutelage or guardianship of the Senate
or of the House or of the Senate and House combined." 5fr
Likewise, Senator Lodge, who recently has bitterly criticized
ss See text of resolution in Cong. Record, 66 Cong., 1 Sess., 935. The
resolution was, however, never acted upon.
so Cong. Record, XL, Pt. 2 (59 Cong., 1 Sess.), 1418 (Jan. 23, 1906).
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President Wilson for "ignoring" the Senate in negotiating the
Treaty of Versailles, had this to say in 1906: "No one, I think,
can doubt the absolute power of the President to initiate and
carry on all negotiations. . . The action of the Senate be-
comes operative and actually effective only when a treaty is act-
ually submitted to it. . . We (the Senate) have no possible
right to break suddenly into the middle of a negotiation and de-
mand from the President what instructions he has given his rep-
resentative. That part of the treaty making is no concern of
ours. . . It is a mere invasion of the powers and rights of the
President if we are to plunge in at a stage of the negotiations
where we have no business whatever and demand from him the
instructions which he has given to his properly appointed rep-
resentatives. When the treaty made by those representatives
comes before us, then is the time, and not before, in which we
can properly ask for information in regard to all that has led
up to it." 60
In the light of these strong expressions of opinion, it would
seem that much of the recent criticism of President Wilson
by Senator Lodge and his followers is unjustified, especially in so
far as it is based on the relative constitutional position and
powers of the Senate and the Executive in regard to the making
of treaties. However overbearing and tactless the President
may have been in his relations to the Senate, clearly he has at
no time in his negotiation of the Treaty of Versailles exceeded
the traditional view of his constitutional powers nor encroached
on those of the Senate.
The power of the President with regard to the conclusion of
peace does not end with the negotiation and signature of the
treaty.
61 The Senate must give its consent before the treaty
can become fully effective and the state of war be actually ter-
minated, but the fact that the Senate "advises and consents"
to the ratification of a treaty is not conclusive, as the President
alone can perform the final act of ratification. The Senate may
amend a treaty, but the President may decline to accept these
*o Cong. Record, XL, Pt. 2 (59 Cong., 1 Sess.), 1470.
si The mere signing of the treaty is of some importance, since it operates
to bring about a suspension of hostilities, if that has not already been done
by a separate armistice or protocol. Hall, International Law, 554-555; cf.
Haver v. Taker, 9 Wall., 32 (1869).
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changes and refuse to ratify the amended treaty. He may with-
draw a treaty from the Senate at any time during its consider-
ation, and he may, if he chooses, even decline to ratify a treaty
that has been approved by the Senate in its .original form. In
other words, while the
"
advice and consent" of the Senate is a
condition precedent to ratification, it is not mandatory the
President has the final word.62
It is therefore within the power of the President to determine
the actual date for the termination of a war and the conclusion
of peace. That is done by means of a proclamation, announcing
the effectiveness of the treaty or the exchange of ratifications,
in the case of a foreign war, or merely announcing the termina-
tion of armed resistance, in the case of a civil war. The actual
exchange of ratifications, or the actual suppression of rebellion,
apparently are not enough ; there must be an official declaration
of the event by the President. ' ' The war commences when gov-
ernment officially says it has commenced, and it ends when
government officially says it has ceased to exist ;
" 63 and
"government" in the latter case means the President.64
Thus, the War of 1812 was officially terminated on February
18, 1815, the war with Mexico on July 4, 1848, and the war with
62 Crandall, Treaties : Their Making and Enforcement, 97. ' ' The Presi-
dent is so supreme under the Constitution in the matter of treaties, exclud-
ing only the Senate's ratification, that he may negotiate a treaty, he may
send it to the Senate, it may receive by way of 'advice and consent' the
unanimous judgment of the Senate that it is in the highest degree for the
public interest, and yet the President is as free when it is sent back to the
White House with resolution of ratification attached, to put it in his desk
never again to see the light of day as he was free to determine in the first
instance whether he would or would not negotiate it. That power is not
expressly given to the President by the Constitution, but it inheres in the
executive power conferred upon him to conduct our foreign relations, and
it is a power which inheres in him as the sole organ under the Constitution
through whom our foreign relations and diplomatic intercourse are con-
ducted." Senator John C. Spooner, in U. 8. Senate, Jan. 23, 1906. Cong.
Record, XL, Pt. 2 (59 Cong., 1 Sess. ), 1419.
63 Glenn, The Army and the Law, 64.
e* " It is necessary to refer to some public act of the political depart-
ments of the government to fix the dates; and for obvious reasons, those of
the executive department. . . must be taken.
' ' The Protector, 12 Wall.,
700, 702 (1871). Of course the Court was here referring particularly to a
civil war.
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Spain on April 11, 1899, because of the President's proclamation
of that date in each particular case. Only in the case of the war
with Spain did that date correspond with the date of the actual
exchange of treaty ratifications.65 So also the Civil War is de-
clared by the courts to have ended on April 2, 1866, with respect
to all the insurrectionary states except Texas, and on August
20, 1866, with respect to Texas, because of the proclamations of
the President declaring armed resistance at an end as of those
dates, altho the last rebel army surrendered in May, 1865.66
Recent war legislation also shows clearly that Congress con-
templated that the date for the termination of the state of war
with Germany and Austria-Hungary should be determined by
proclamation of the President. Thus, there were express pro-
visions declaring that "the fact and date of such termination
shall be ascertained and proclaimed by the President," or that
the end of the war "shall be deemed to mean the date of proc-
lamation of exchange of ratifications of the treaty of peace.
' ' In
other cases, it was provided that the acts should terminate a cer-
tain time ' ' after a final treaty of peace is proclaimed,
"
or
"
fol-
lowing the date of the proclamation by the President of the ex-
change of ratifications of the treaty of peace," or similar lan-
guage.
67
The powers of the President with regard to the conclusion
of peace are therefore very extensive and quite definite. He may,
on his own authority, undertake preliminary measures and en-
ter into preliminary agreements for the termination of hostil-
ities
; through these preliminary measures, he may to a consider-
able extent lay down the conditions of permanent peace and
commit the nation to them. With regard to the definitive treaty
of peace, the President has entire control of the personnel of the
peace commission, and entire control of the peace negotiations;
65 For the proclamations, see Richardson, op. tit., I, 560; IV, 627; For,
Eel. 1898, 831. In the first case, the treaty was signed Dec. 24, 1814, and
ratifications exchanged Feb. 17, 1815; in the second, the first treaty was
concluded Feb. 2, 1848, and ratifications of the amended treaty exchanged
May 30; in the last case, the treaty was signed Dec. 10, 1898, and approv-
ed by the Senate Feb. 6, 1899.
ee The Protector, 12 Wall., 700, 702 (1871) ; Lamar v. Browne, 92 U. 8.,
187, 193 (1875) ; Birkhimer, Military Government and Martial Law, 367-
368; Richardson, op. tit., VI, 429-432, 434-438.
67 Supra, 231.
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he is required to obtain the "advice and consent" of the Senate
before putting a treaty of peace into final effect, but when that
is obtained, he is again absolute as to the final acceptance of the
treaty, and as to the time for its becoming effective.
CHAPTER XV
POWERS WITH REGARD TO RECONSTRUCTION
With the termination of the emergencies of war, it might be
expected that the exercise of the "war powers" should imme-
diately cease. Ex-Justice Hughes thus expressed the view, shortly
after the signing of the armistice at the close of the recent war,
that in the harnessing of our strength for war we were acting
' '
under the Constitution and not in violation of it,
' ' but that to
use the war powers to control peace conditions was a proceed-
ing
' '
essentially vicious and constituting the most serious offense
against our institutions.
' ' x Elihu Root, in his argument before
the Supreme Court in the recent prohibition cases, likewise con-
tended that the right to exercise the war powers no longer existed
when the war emergency had passed. "The question," he said,
"is much confused by a certain vague and colloquial use of the
term ' war powers.
' War confers no powers upon Congress. The
powers are all in the Constitution of the United States. The con-
dition of war does create exigencies which make appropriate the
exercise of powers not otherwise existing. . . On the other
hand, when the war has progressed to an extent that the enemy
has been forced into submission and there is no longer an army
or navy to be raised and maintained the power ends because the
exigency no longer exists.
' ' 2
It is generally recognized, however, that the return to normal
peace conditions can be made only gradually, that there must
be a period of readjustment and reconstruction during which cer-
tain of the war powers must of necessity continue to be exer-
cised. Thus Mr. Hughes admitted, in the speech quoted above,
that "whenever, during the war, extraordinary powers were fit-
tingly exercised and governmental control was assumed for war
1 N. Y. Times, Nov. 29, 1918.
2 Ibid., Nov. 19, 1919.
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purposes, the readjustment to conditions of peace must of course
be effected gradually and with the circumspection essential to
the protection of all the public and private interests involved."
Professor Willoughby also remarks that
' ' the power to wage war
carries with it authority not only to bring it to a full conclusion,
but, after cessation of active military operations, to take meas-
ures to provide against its renewal ;
" 3 and the Supreme Court
long ago held that "the power (to carry on war) is not limited
to victories in the field. . . It carries with it inherently the
power to guard against the immediate renewal of the conflict,
and to remedy the evils which have arisen from its rise and
progress."
4
Altho this opinion of the court referred particularly to the
conditions resulting from the Civil War, there would here seem
to be some warrant for the belief that the President, who as Com-
mander-in-Chief has the power of waging war, is also entrusted
with such powers as may be necessary to effect a complete return
to the normal conditions of peace.
Some of these powers, such as the resumption of friendly re-
lations with the opposing belligerent, may result from an ordin-
ary constitutional function, whose exercise in this case is made
necessary in order to completely restore the status of peace.
5 In
other cases, however, the termination of war and the consequent
problems of reconstruction may bring about new situations which
can only be met by the assumption of unusual authority and the
exercise of extraordinary powers. Thus, the measures under-
taken by Presidents Lincoln and Johnson in reorganizing and
reconstructing the governments of the insurrectionary states of
the South by executive orders and through military com-
manders,6 were upheld by the Supreme Court as a legitimate
exercise by the President of his powers as Commander-in-Chief,
subject to final determination by Congress. 7
3 Constitutional Law, II, 1212.
4 Stewart v. Eahn, 11 Wall., 493, 507 (1870).
s That is, the appointment and reception of accredited diplomatic agents.
6 See Dunning, Reconstruction: Political and Economic, 35-39.
7 Texas v. White, 7 Wall., 700, 730-731 (1868). However, the claim as-
serted by both Lincoln and Johnson, that the President had a right to de-
termine the conditions upon which these reconstructed states might be fully
restored to their former place in the Union, was successfully disputed by
Congress. Hosmer, Outcome of the Civil War, 135-144, 225-227 Dunning,
op. cit., esp. chs. 4, 6.
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The successful conclusion of a war frequently results in the ac-
quisition of additional territory, and the determination of the
status, rights, and government of such acquired territory is one
of the problems of the reconstruction period. It is a well-rec-
ognized constitutional principle in the United States that, when
territory is annexed by the United States or comes in any man-
ner under its jurisdiction, Congress has an absolute right, from
the moment of such acquisition, to determine the political rights
and governmental organization of that territory.8 In the case of
territory acquired by purchase or other peaceful means, Congress
has generally seen fit to exercise that right by conferring tem-
porary but complete governmental power on the President, until
it can itself provide for a definite system of government.
Thus, after the cession of Louisiana, an act was passed provid-
ing that, until Congress should otherwise provide,
' '
all the mili-
tary, civil, and judicial powers exercised by the officers of the
existing government of the same, shall te vested in such person
or persons and shall be exercised in such manner as the Presi-
dent of the United States shall direct. ' ' 9 Under this provision,
the President exercised complete governmental authority over
Louisiana until October 1, 1804, when the territorial government
created by Congress went into effect. 10 In almost identical lan-
guage, Congress likewise vested the temporary government of
Florida in the President,11 all the powers of which were exer-
cised by him through General Jackson as governor and through
other subordinates until Florida was made a territory in 1822.12
Alaska, acquired in 1867, was governed under the sole authority
of the President until 1900, when Congress adopted a civil code
and provided a form of civil government for that region ; 13
sWilloughby, op. tit., I, 403.
Act of Oct. 31, 1803. Annals of Cong., 8 Cong., 1 Sess., App., 1245.
Objections were made to this grant of power on the ground that the com-
bination of all governmental powers in one man was unconstitutional, and
that it made the President a despot. Thomas, Military Government in
Newly Acquired Territory of the United States, 30-31; McMaster, History
of the People of the United States, III, 9-10.
10 Act of Mar. 26, 1804. Annals of Cong., 8 Cong., 1 Sess., App., 1293.
11 Acts of Mar. 3, 1819 and Mar. 3, 1821. Ibid., 15 Cong., 2 Sess., 11,
App., 2534; 16 Cong., 2 Sess., App., 1809.
12 Act of Mar. 30, 1822. Ibid., 17 Cong., 1 Sess., II, App., 2578; cf.
Thomas, op. tit., 65-70, 95, 98.
is Act of June 6, 1900. 31 Stat. at L., 321. The President exercised his
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while Hawaii was governed by the President for more than two
years under the authority of the joint resolution of annexation. 14
The government of the Panama Canal Zone, established and car-
ried on by the President at first under the authority of Con-
gress,
15
was, upon the failure of Congress to continue that au-
thority, nevertheless continued by authority of several executive
orders,
16
until congressional sanction was again given in 1912. 1T
' '
Beginning with a government which might be termed political,
it ended as a government by executive order, controlled by one
man answerable only to the President of the United States,
through the Secretary of War.
' ' 18
While the status and government of acquired territory are
clearly subject to the jurisdiction and control of Congress, it
would seem that another constitutional principle may be derived
from these examples, namely, that in the absence of congres-
sional legislation, the President may exercise temporary govern-
mental power on his own authority. In fact, the presumption
seems to have existed from the time of the acquisition of Lousi-
ana that the President could exercise such authority by virtue
of his powers as Commander-in-Chief.19
authority in Alaska principally through the army commanders and through
the Secretary of the Treasury (Alaska having, by executive order, been
made a revenue district). Thomas, op. tit., 279-280. Alaska was definitely
organized as a territory by Act of Aug. 24, 1912. 37 Stat. at L., 512.
i* Joint Eesolution of July 7, 1898. 30 Stat. at L., 750. A territorial
government was established Dec. 3, 1900, by Act of Apr. 30, 1900. 31 ibid.,
141.
is Acts of June 28, 1902 (Spooner Act) and Apr. 28, 1904. 32 Stat.
at L., 481; 33 ibid., 429. The former authorized the President to estab-
lish judicial tribunals in territory acquired for the canal, in order to en-
force the rules and regulations which he might deem necessary and proper
for the preservation of order and public health; which authority was con-
sidered sufficient to permit the establishment of
' ' such form of govern-
ment as the President might determine. ' ' The latter act provided that the
President should be vested with all the powers of government until the ex-
piration of the 58th Congress, unless other provisions for a government
were sooner made. See Goethals, Government of the Canal Zone, 11-20.
is Executive orders of Apr. 1, 1905; Nov. 17, 1906; April, 1907; Jan.
8, 1908. Goethals, op. tit., 43-50. The 58th Congress adjourned without
making any further provision for the government of the Canal Zone.
IT Panama Canal Act of Aug. 24, 1912. 37 Stat. at L., 560.
i 8 Goethals, op. tit., 51.
is Willoughby, op. tit., I, 390; Thomas, op. tit., 31-32.
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In the case of territory acquired after conquest and occupa-
tion in war, the power of Congress likewise constitutionally
attaches from the moment of acquisition. However, the problem
of the temporary government of such territory, in the absence of
provision by Congress, is somewhat different from that in the
case of territory acquired peacefully. It involves the question
of the continuance of the military government already existing
under the authority and direction of the President, or of the
power to set up some other form of government under other
authority.
President Polk, after the ratification of the treaty of peace
with Mexico in 1848, at first held that he had no power to con-
tinue the governments established by him over New Mexico and
California during the war, but that upon the definitive conclu-
sion of peace, these governments "necessarily ceased to exist."
He also held that he had no power to establish other temporary
governments without the sanction of Congress.
' ' The war with
Mexico having terminated," he said, "the power of the Execu-
tive to establish or continue temporary civil governments over
these territories, which existed under the laws of nations whilst
they were regarded as conquered provinces in our military oc-
cupation, has ceased. By their cession to the United States
Mexico has no longer any power over them, and until Congress
shall act the inhabitants will be without any organized govern-
ment. " 20 In order to prevent anarchy and confusion, the
President therefore recommended the immediate establishment
of territorial governments in New Mexico and California, he
himself proposing in the meantime merely to maintain a small
military force in those regions in order to "hold the country
and protect the inhabitants against Mexican, Indian, or other
enemies who might disturb them. ' ' 21
The failure of Congress to provide for these newly acquired
territories before adjournment, seemed to make necessary the
establishment of a government by some other authority. Sen-
ator Benton, in a letter of August 27, 1848, addressed to the
people of California, advised them to meet in convention, form
a "cheap and simple" government, and take care of them-
20 Messages of July 6 and July 24, 1848. Bichardson, Messages and
Papers of the Presidents, IV, 589, 596.
21 Richardson, op. cit., IV, 589; Diary of James K. Polk, IV, 136.
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selves until Congress should act. President Polk, considering
this move "offensive" and "arrogant," and principally intend-
ed to make Colonel John C. Fremont (Benton's son-in-law) gov-
ernor of an independent government of California, felt that some
greater exercise of Executive power was necessary, if confusion,
anarchy, and possible revolution were to be avoided. He there-
fore summoned his Cabinet to consider the "question of diffi-
culty," namely, "what Government existed over the country
until Congress should act, and what power to govern it the Exe-
cutive possessed," and an agreement was reached that the tem-
porary military governments established during the war should
be regarded as governments de facto, still existing by the pre-
sumed consent of the people, and to which the people should be
advised to submit. 22
Accordingly, Secretary of State Buchanan, in a letter of Oc-
tober 7, 1848, drew up instructions to the people of California,
in which he expressed the position of the Administration as fol-
lows : ' ' The termination of the war left an existing Government,
a Government de facto, in full operation ; and this will continue
with the presumed consent of the people, until Congress shall
provide for them a territorial Government. The great law of
necessity justifies this conclusion. The consent of the people is
irresistibly inferred from the fact that no civilized community
could possibly desire to abrogate an existing Government, when
the alternative presented would be to place themselves in a state
of anarchy beyond the protection of all laws , and reduce them
to the unhappy necessity of submitting to the dominion of the
strongest.
' ' 23
Similar instructions were drawn up for the people of New
Mexico by Secretary of "War Marcy,24 and President Polk him-
self announced the new policy to Congress in December, stating
that "the very limited power possessed by the Executive has
been exercised to preserve and protect them from the inevi-
table consequences of a state of anarchy. The only government
22 See Thomas, op. tit., 130; Diary of James K. Polk, IV, 136-137, 140-
143.
23 Buchanan to Mr. Voorhies, agent of the Post-Office Department in
California. Moore, Works of James Buchanan, VIII, 211-216, esp. 213;
cf. Diary of James K. Polk, IV, 143, 146-149.
24 Thomas, op. cit., 132-133.
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which remained was that established by the military authority
during the war. Regarding this to be a de facto government,
and that by the presumed consent of the inhabitants it might be
continued temporarily, they were advised to submit to it for the
short intervening period before Congress would again assemble
and could legislate on the subject.
' ' 25
The same doctrine concerning the governmental power of the
President was asserted also by the succeeding administration, 26
but there seemed to be a distinct effort on the part of the Presi-
dent in each case to emphasize the civil rather than the military
authority of the governments so recognized as existing by neces-
sity and presumed consent. The authorities apparently believed
that "at the conclusion of the war the military government be-
came merged into a sort of de facto civil government." Thus,
President Polk selected General P. F. Smith as commander in
California, because he was
' '
a man of education and intelligence
and possessed of much knowledge of civil government as well as
of military command, and it was desirable to have such an offi-
cer in chief command in California in the present anomalous
state of that country.
' ' 2T
During the administration of President Taylor, General Riley,
then commanding officer in California, issued a proclamation
(June 3, 1849), in which he sought to correct the impression
that the de facto government was still military in character.
"The military government ended with the war," he said, "and
what remains is the civil government, recognized in the existing
laws of California. Although the command of the troops in this
department and the administration of civil affairs in California
are, by the existing laws of the country and the instructions of
the President of the United States, temporarily lodged in the
hands of the same individual, they are separate and distinct."28
President Fillmore likewise held that the civil and military de-
partments in these temporary governments should be kept sepa-
rate and distinct, and ordered the military governor of New
25 Message of Dec. 5, 1848. Richardson, op. tit., IV, 638.
26 Thomas, op. tit., 211.
2T Diary of James K. Polk, IV, 149. Apparently Gen. Smith never acted
as civil governor, however, but only as the senior commanding officer for
a short time. Thomas, op. tit., 212.
28 Thomas, op. tit., 211-212.
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Mexico not to interfere with civil and political affairs. "Tem-
porary departure from this principle may be required occasion-
ally, but it should close with the passing of the necessity. No
necessity now seems to exist in New Mexico. ' ' 29
While the President himself in these early cases based his claim
to temporary governmental power upon the doctrine of neces-
sity and the presumed consent of the people rather than upon
his "war powers," the Supreme Court seemed to take the view
that the war powers might continue to be the basis for the exer-
cise of such governmental power even after the conclusion of
peace. The Court held that the restoration of peace did not, as
a matter of course, terminate a military government established
over conquered territory, but that an inference that it was to
continue subsequent to the conclusion of peace arose from the
failure of the President or Congress to dissolve it. It therefore
sustained the right of the President, in the exercise of his pow-
ers as Commander-in-Chief, not only to establish governments
over conquered territory, but also to continue these govern-
ments in existence after the termination of the war, until Con-
gress should act.30
Whether acting as civil or military governor, however, the
military commander, as the President's most immediate repre-
sentative, apparently may exercise as absolute powers in these
de facto governments as in the military governments during the
war-time occupation.31 In New Mexico, Governor Vigil con-
tinued in office as civil governor for some time after the ratifi-
cation of the treaty of peace, but Colonel John Price, the mili-
tary commander, exercised the real authority. He approved,
by special order, the acts passed by the legislature elected under
Kearney's organic law, and even abolished the offices named in
the statutes (secretary, district attorney, and marshal).
32 Col-
onel John Munroe, when he became military commander in New
Mexico, assumed both the title and functions of "civil and mili-
tary governor," and continued to act as such until New Mexico
became a territory in 1851.33 Likewise in California, the mili-
29 Thomas, op. cit., 146.
so Cross v. Harrison, 16 How., 164, 190, 193, 195 (1853); Leitensdorfer
v. Webb, 20 How., 176, 178 (1857).
31 Cf. supra, ch. IX.
sz Thomas, op. cit., 129 ; cf. supra, 161.
ss Thomas, op. cit., 147.
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tary commander issued orders and decrees having the force of
law
; appointed special tribunals ; defined the jurisdiction of the
courts
; organized a supreme court ; appointed and removed offi-
cials; and, finally, ordered an election for delegates to a consti-
tutional convention, submitted the constitution to the people,
and declared it ordained and established nearly a year before the
state was actually admitted by Congress.34
In the case of the territories acquired as a result of the Span-
ish-American War, Congress likewise failed to make immediate
provision for their government, and the President therefore con-
tinued to exercise all the powers of government over those terri-
tories for some considerable time after the definitive conclusion
of peace with Spain. Thus, in Porto Eico the military govern-
ment instituted on October 18, 1898, continued to operate under
the sole authority of the President until May 1, 1900, when it
was superseded by the civil government established under the
provisions of the Foraker Act.35 The military governor, during
that period, exercised absolute power over the affairs of the
island, maintaining law and order, reorganizing the judiciary,
reforming the criminal procedure, providing a new system of
taxation, and gradually introducing free and self-governing in-
stitutions.38 In the words of a native writer, the military gov-
ernor, as the representative of the President, "had absolute and
complete control, not only over the army, but also over the civil
population of the island, and whatever orders he saw fit to issue
had the force of law. ' ' 37
s* Thomas, op. cit., 229-234, 264-265, 269, 273-275. Gen. Riley yielded his
authority on Dec. 20, 1849, to Peter Burnett, the governor elected under this
constitution, altho California was not admitted till Sept. 9, 1850.
36 See Bowe, The United States and Porto Eico, 118-128, 190-191, 206-
208.
37 Pedro Capo-Rodriguez, in Am. Jour. Int. Law, IX, 904. In connec-
tion with the transfer of the government from the military to the civil
authorities, there occurred an interesting illustration of the power of the
military governor to meet an extraordinary situation. The civil officials
provided for in the Foraker Act not having all been able to qualify by the
time set for the transfer, and the military officers being forbidden by
statute to hold civil office, the military governor on April 30 simply re-
organized the military government so as to conform to the plan of the
Foraker Act and appointed civilians to fill the offices until those selected
by the President could qualify. See Rowe, op. tit., 134-136; Thomas, op.
cit., 310.
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Cuba, tho not ceded to the United States by the treaty of
peace, was likewise kept under military occupation from the
time of its seizure in 1898 until the inauguration of the republic
on May 20, 1902 ; and during that time the President, through
the Secretary of War and the military governor, administered
the affairs of that island at his discretion. The suffrage quali-
fications were determined upon by "general agreement" of the
military governor with "leading Cubans," while election laws
and other statutes were promulgated, and the self-governing
powers of the municipal governments were enlarged or the muni-
cipalities suppressed altogether by military order.38 Finally,
when the Executive deemed the time ripe for complete self-gov-
ernment, the military governor summoned a constitutional con-
vention, determined the number and distribution of delegates,
carefully instructed them as to their duties,39 and saw to it that
the provisions suggested by the Secretary of War as the basis
for the future relations between Cuba and the United States,40
were adopted by the convention.41 He also passed upon the
38 Of the 138 municipalities in Cuba, 56 were suppressed
' ' on the ground
that they had neither the resources nor population sufficient to maintain
a well organized municipality." Gen. Leonard Wood, "The Military Gov-
ernment of Cubsi,"Ann. Am. Acad., XXI, 160-161.
as See order of July 25, 1900, calling the election for delegates ; also
the opening statement of the military governor to the convention, Nov.
5, 1900, in which he said: "Under the order pursuant to which you have
been elected and convened you have no duty and no authority to take part
in the present government of the island. Your powers are strictly limited
by the terms of that order." Boot, Military and Colonial Policy of the
United States, 195, 196.
40 Instructions of Secretary of War Boot to Maj. Gen. Wood, Feb. 9,
1901. Root, op. tit., 208-212. With regard to these provisions, Secretary
Boot instructed Maj. Gen. Wood as follows: "These provisions may not,
it is true, prove to be in accord with the conclusions which Congress may
ultimately reach when that body comes to consider the subject, but as,
until Congress has acted, the Executive must necessarily within its own
sphere be controlled by its own jlidgment, you should be guided by the
views above expressed. ' ' Ibid., 212. These provisions were, however, em-
bodied in the famous Platt Amendment to the Act of Mar. 2, 1901. 31
Stat. at L., 895, 897.
41 " On receipt of the instructions by cable I immediately assembled the
Committee on Relations to Exist between Cuba and the United States and
made known to them the five articles or provisions which, in the opinion of
the Executive branch of the Government, represent the wishes of the Uni-
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constitution adopted by this convention, and not before it had
been treated by him ' ' as an acceptable basis for the formation of
the new government" was the transfer to that new government
permitted to take place.42 In effect, the President not only ex-
ercised all the powers of government over the island of Cuba
while it was under military occupation, but himself determined
when and under what conditions such military occupation should
cease and the troops and authority of the United States be with-
drawn, the assumption of this authority being upheld by the Su-
preme Court as a legitimate function of the "political branch"
of the Government, in this case the Executive.43
In the Philippines, the President likewise carried on the gov-
ernment for about two years after the definitive conclusion of
peace,
' '
untrammeled or unaided by any word from Congress."
Altho Secretary of War Root announced that all formal and
open resistance to the authority of the United States had termi-
nated in the spring of 1900,44 President McKinley, by virtue
of his authority as Commander-in-Chief,45 continued the mili-
tary governor as the executive authority in the islands, but
vested the legislative power in a civilian Commission.46 He out-
lined the duties of this Commission and the general policy to-
wards the Philippines in elaborate instructions, which came to
be considered the ' ' organic act of the Philippines,
' ' " and under
ted States in all that pertains to the proposed relations between the Gov-
ernment of the United States and the people of Cuba. I was particularly
careful to impress upon them that Congress might in its wisdom insist
upon different conditions or relations, but that the proposition submitted
embodied those which in the opinion of the Executive branch of the Govern-
ment should exist and that they were the only ones which they could at
present consider." Maj. Gen. Wood to Secretary of War Boot, Feb. 19,
1901. Boot, op. tit., 186.
I6td., 215.
*3Neely v. Eenlcel, 180 U. 8., 109, 124 (1901).
44 Boot, op. tit., 238.
45 ' ' The sole power which the President was exercising in the Philip-
pine Islands was a military power derived from his authority under the
Constitution as Commander-in-Chief of the Army and Navy." Ibid., 252,
295.
* The second Philippine Commission, appointed Mar. 16, 1900, and com-
posed of William H. Taft, Dean C. Worcester, Luke E. Wright, Henry C.
Ide, and Bernard Moses. For the first Commission, see supra, 157, note
21.
47 Instructions of Apr. 7, 1900. Boot, op. tit., 287-294.
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which more than 400 laws were enacted "by authority of the
President of the United States" and subject only to the approval
of the Secretary of War.48
In 1901, however, the President was given express authority
by Congress to govern the Philippines temporarily,49 and was
thus no longer forced to base his actions on his "war powers."
Under this new authority, the Philippine Commission was con-
tinued as before, but the military and civil authority in the
islands were still further separated, the military governor being
relieved of all his civil duties, and the president of the Commis-
sion, Mr. Taft, being appointed civil governor, with power to
exercise the executive authority in civil affairs heretofore exer-
cised by the military governor.50 The organization of separate
executive departments and the creation of the office of vice-gov-
ernor, were further steps in the development of civil govern-
ment undertaken by the President by virtue of his general pow-
er as Chief Executive and the authority vested in him by Con-
gress.
51
Finally, the last insurgent leaders having surrendered in
April, 1902,
52 and the Philippine Commission created by the
President having been given express legislative sanction and au-
thority,
53 the President, on July 4, 1902, terminated altogether
the office of military governor in the Philippines, made the mili-
tary forces subject to the call of the civil authorities "for the
48 Root, op. tit., 294-295.
' ' While the President vested and could vest in
it no greater legislative authority than the military commander previously
held, it has exercised that authority in accordance with legislative forms."
Ibid., 254.
4 By the so-called Spooner Amendment to the Act of Mar. 2, 1901. 31
Stat. at L., 895, 910.
50 See order of June 21, 1901. Root, op. cit., 262. Taft was inaugurat-
ed civil governor on July 4, 1901. On the same day Maj. Gen. Chaffee
succeeded Maj. Gen. MacArthur as military governor, but with duties ap-
plying only to the unpacified regions of the Philippines.
si Ibid., 262-2S7. Luke E. Wright was appointed vice-governor, the
order reading
' ' by virtue of the authority vested in me as President of the
United States. ' ' Ibid., 264.
52 Ibid., 316-317.
53 Philippine Government Act of July 1, 1902. 32 Stat. at L.,
691. From
this time the laws passed by the Philippine Commission were enacted "by
authority of the United States," instead of "by authority of the Presi-
dent." Root, op. tit., 295.
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maintenance of law and order and the enforcement of their
authority," M and thus, in the words of Secretary Root, "a com-
plete system of civil government, built up under the authority
of the President, was in operation, ready to go on under the au-
thority of Congress.
' ' 55
In other matters, also, the President may be said to have con-
siderable power with regard to reconstruction after war. Sever-
al of the most important war enactments of Congress, conferring
large powers upon the President during the recent war with
Germany and Austria-Hungary, show that Congress contemplat-
ed a period of reconstruction during which the President might
continue to exercise those war powers and gradually bring about
an adjustment to the normal conditions of peace.
Thus, by the terms of the Emergency Shipping Fund Act and
of the Overman Act, the President was expressly authorized to
exercise the powers therein granted for a period of six months
after the termination of the war by the proclamation of a final
treaty of peace; while, by the Railway Control Act, he was em-
powered to continue his control of the railroads for a period of
one year and nine months after that event.56 The long delay
in securing the final termination of the state of war made the
armistice period virtually a period of reconstruction, during
which President Wilson exercised his war powers as he deemed
such exercise necessary to bring about the readjustment to nor-
mal conditions. The control of the railroads was thus continued
until March 1, 1920, frankly not as a war measure, but
" to
render an adequate and convenient transportation service at
reasonable cost. ' ' 57
Similarly, the President revived and exercised his war powers
under the Food and Fuel Control Act at various times during
this reconstruction period. Thus, some of the war-time food re-
strictions, which had been lifted shortly after the signing of the
armistice, were revived about a year later, and the powers of the
Food Administrator transferred by executive order to the At-
5* Order of July 4, 1902. Boot, op. cit., 317-318.
ss Ibid., 318.
se Acts of June 15, 1917; Mar. 21, 1918 (Sec. 14); May 20, 1918 (Sec.
1). Wigmore, Source-Book of Military Law and War-Time Legislation, 484,
583, 586.
57 Statement of Director General Hines. Supra, 216, note 78.
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torney-General in an attempt to avert a sugar famine and lower
the high cost of living.58 The war-time powers of the Fuel Ad-
ministration were likewise revived by executive order of October
30, 1919, and exercised to meet the situation caused by the coal
strike of that time, and later (December 10), in that connection,
virtually transferred to a wage commission of three men.59 By
executive order of February 28, 1920, the President again for-
mally continued the Fuel Administration, "because of the pres-
ent emergency, and in order to insure an adequate supply and
equitable distribution, and to facilitate the movement, and to
prevent locally or generally, scarcity of coal;" and vested its
powers in a commission of four men.60 Finally, only a month
later (April 1), President Wilson accepted and affirmed the
majority report of the commission appointed in December to fix
miner's wages, and at the same time removed all governmental
control over the fuel industry, except as to export coal.
61
The exercise of these war powers by President Wilson is in
every instance clearly warranted by the fact of the continuance
of the state of war. However, but for the unusual and unex-
pected delay in terminating that state of war, these same prob-
lems and situations would have arisen during a time of technic-
al as well as virtual peace, and they seem to demonstrate the
necessity for an extension of the President's war powers into
the period of reconstruction and readjustment, in order to meet
effectively just such problems that arise out of war conditions.
Except in the extraordinary cases mentioned, where the courts
have held that necessity and the failure of Congress to act are
a sufficient justification, the exercise of such power is dependent
upon definite statutory authority. The grant of such authority
during the recent war is likely to have set a precedent that will
be followed without much question in case of similar emergencies
in the future.
ss N. T. Times, Nov. 22, 1919; cf. supra, 206-207.
59 Supra, 207-208 ; see statement of the former Fuel Administrator, Dr.
Garfield, before the Senate Committee on Interstate Commerce, Dec. 13,
1919. N. . Times Current Hist. Mag., XI, Pt. 2, 30 (Jan., 1920). The
commission was composed of Henry M. Eobinson, John P. White, and Rem-
brandt Peale.
60 N. Y. Times, Feb. 29, 1920. This commission was composed of A. W.
Howe, Eembrandt Peale, F. M. Whittacker, and J. F. Fisher.
61 See announcement in United States Bulletin, Mar. 29, 1920.
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The exercise of war powers during a period of reconstruction
cannot be a source of danger, since it is always subject to a
check by Congress. In no case can it be said that the President
has any absolute powers with regard to reconstruction problems,
as he has with regard to the actual conduct of the war. It has
been noted that any powers in this respect may be exercised by
the President only because of the failure of Congress to act, or
by virtue of express statutory authority. Hence, Congress may
at any time check any undue exercise of Executive power, either
by taking definite action itself in the one case or by repealing its
grant of power in the other.
CHAPTER XVI
CONCLUSION
j
In summing up the results of this study, it may be noted again
that the war powers of the President are derived principally
from the Constitution. There is only one clause in that instru-
ment, however, which expressly confers upon the President any
power relating directly to war, namely, the clause which makes
him Commander-in-Chief of the army and navy of the United
States and of the militia of the several states when called into
the actual service of the United States. Even the powers of the
President as Commander-in-Chief are undefined in the Consti-
tution, and hence it has been necessary to determine them more
exactly by reference to international law and practise, to the
statutes of the United States, to custom and usage, and to au-
thoritative opinion.
However, the Constitution vests in the President other pow-
ers and duties which do not necessarily or primarily imply the
existence of war for their exercise, but which may have a close
relation to the initiation and conduct of war, and must therefore
be considered in this discussion. The most important of these
are the powers of the President with regard to foreign relations
and the powers that may be derived from his position as the Chief
Executive of the nation. The scope of these powers is likewise
undefined in the Constitution, and must again be determined
through necessary implication and authoritative interpretation.
Other powers of the President that have been noted as bearing
upon the conduct of war are his powers of appointment and re-
moval, his power of pardon, and his power and influence with
regard to legislation.
Again, other clauses of the Constitution, while not expressly
conferring any power upon the President, have been taken into
account because they may, by necessary implication, add to his
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war powers. These are particularly the clauses which relate to
the suspension of the writ of habeas corpus, and guarantee to
the states a republican form of government and protection from
invasion, insurrection and domestic violence. 1 Those clauses of
the Constitution which confer powers relating to war expressly
upon Congress have also been taken into consideration.
From our study of these express powers, as interpreted and
applied in the various emergencies that have arisen, it may be
said, in the first place, that the President, through his control of
foreign relations, his power as Commander-in-Chief, and his in-
fluence and authority as Chief Executive, may virtually compel
or prevent a war, at his discretion. He may very largely in-
fluence a declaration of war by Congress, and he may even begin
a "defensive" war without such a declaration.
In the second place, it is the President, not Congress, who
wages war, his military powers as Commander-in-Chief making
him supreme in that respect and solely responsible for the actual
conduct of war. His constitutional powers in this regard are
customarily supplemented with considerable statutory authority,
so that he has large powers with regard to raising and organiz-
ing the armed forces ; he directs and controls all military opera-
tions
;
he exercises complete powers of military jurisdiction ; and
he establishes and carries on military government in fact,
when a war has been declared or begun, the President may do
practically anything, in a military sense, that he deems neces-
sary to carry on that war to a successful conclusion, subject only
to the rules of civilized warfare.
Thirdly, the civil powers of the President are greatly increas-
ed in time of war over those powers in time of peace. Principally
by virtue of statutory authority, but in part also by virtue of
his express constitutional power of appointment, and his im-
plied powers of removal and direction, together with his author-
ity as Commander-in-Chief, the President, during such a period
of emergency, is vested with almost complete control of the ad-
ministrative machinery of the government; he exercises exten-
sive powers of police control and supervision over individual
action and opinion; and he may even, as in the recent World
War, practically control the economic resources of the country.
i Cf. Supra, 20, notes 34-36.
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In the fourth place, the President, as Commander-in-Chief,
determines when and upon what conditions hostilities are to
cease; and, since a treaty of peace is the only constitutional
method provided for terminating a war on the part of the Uni-
ted States, he may also, by virtue of his treaty-making powers,
very largely determine the definitive conditions of peace and the
time for the final termination of the state of war.
Finally, it has been pointed out that the President may, in the
absence of congressional action, provide for and carry on the
government of territory that may have been acquired as a re-
sult of war, and in other ways exercise certain of his war powers
during the period of reconstruction following war, in order to
meet extraordinary situations that may arise during such a
period, and to bring about a gradual readjustment to the normal
conditions of peace.
At least one definite conclusion can be drawn from this study,
namely, that the so-called "war powers" of the Executive con-
stitute no isolated group of powers derived from a single source,
but that they are intimately connected with and indeed derived
from practically every phase of the President's authority. In
general, the war powers of the President cannot be precisely
defined, but must remain somewhat vague and uncertain. "The
Constitution," says President Wilson, "is not a mere lawyers'
document: it is a vehicle of life, and its spirit is always the
spirit of the age.
' ' 2 That statement is particularly true of that
portion of the Constitution dealing with the war powers. The
exigencies and circumstances of war can never be foreseen or
provided against in advance, to any appreciable extent. Hence,
the interpretation of what may actually be included within the
war powers depends very largely on the gravity of the particu-
lar occasion for their exercise and the peculiar necessities that
arise in connection.
Thus it was, for example, that the power to arm merchant
ships in defense was first asserted by President Adams as the
prerogative of the Executive, under the stress of the troubles
with France in 1798. Likewise, the power of the Executive with
regard to military government in occupied territory was firmly
established as a part of American constitutional law by Presi-
2 Constitutional Government in the United States, 69.
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dent Polk, because of the necessities of the war with Mexico.
Under President Lincoln and the stress of civil war were devel-
oped especially the powers of censorship and arbitrary arrest,
and of military government over territory within the United
States; while under President Wilson, probably the control ex-
ercised by the Executive over the administrative machinery of
the government and the economic resources of the country are
the outstanding features of the war powers, as exercised during
the recent World War.
Clearly, the tendency has been towards a great increase in the
war powers of the Executive as compared with those of Con-
gress, a tendency quite inevitable when one considers the grow-
ing complexity of war, with its consequent greater need for
singleness of direction, unity of command, and the coordination
of every resource of the nation. On the other hand, there is also
a tendency to pay more attention to constitutional forms in
bringing about this necessary concentration of power, rather
than to rely upon an arbitrary exercise of power when the oc-
casion may demand. Thus, while President Wilson undoubtedly
exercised a vastly greater power during the recent World War
than did President Lincoln during the Civil War, he was care-
ful to consult with Congress almost continuously during the war,
and to secure express authority from that body in almost every
case where there might be any doubt as to his own power to act
without such authority; while President Lincoln, in cases of
doubtful authority and even of undoubted lack of authority,
such as increasing the regular armed forces, suspending the writ
of habeas corpus, and issuing the emancipation proclamation,
usually acted first and secured the sanction of law afterwards,
if at all.
Altho, as has been noted, many of the President's war powers
are derived from express statutory grants rather than directly
from the Constitution, and are therefore subject to modification
at the discretion of Congress, it may safely be assumed that pow-
ers thus granted will, upon occasion, be granted again with more
readiness, the necessity for such exercise of power having been
too clearly demonstrated in the past. It is probable, for example,
that Congress would not hesitate, in case of a future war of sim-
ilar importance, to vest the President immediately with the
powers exercised by President Wilson under the Food and Fuel
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Control Act, the Railway Control Act, or the Trading with the
Enemy Act. A precedent of centralization of power and concen-
tration of effort in time of war is not apt to be ignored, but, on
the other hand, is more liable to be accepted as a principle to be
followed in the future, if occasion arises. It may be noted here
that, in the parliamentary governments of Europe, such as Great
Britain, where the direction of war is vested in a Cabinet of sev-
eral members rather than in a single Executive, the tendency, as
shown especially during the recent World War, has been distinct-
ly towards a concentration of the war powers in the hands of a
smaller group, approaching singleness of control. In the United
States, the experiences of a multiple direction of war through the
activities of the Congress during the Revolution and of the Joint
Committee during the Civil War, have not been forgotten, but
were sufficient to prevent the institution, during the recent war,
of any similar checks on single Executive authority.
While the President, in critical times, thus becomes practically
a dictator, that does not necessarily mean a disregard of the prin-
ciples of constitutional government nor require further limita-
tions of his war powers. One of the foremost students of con-
temporary American politics says that the ability to act prompt-
ly and energetically in the presence of emergency being of para-
mount importance, "no government can survive that excludes
dictatorship when the life of the nation is at stake," and he
points out that the real difference between a despotism and con-
stitutional government lies in the location of responsibility rather
than in the limitation of power. 8
Certainly the tendency in the United States has been to-
wards the concentration of the war powers in the hands of the
Executive. More and more, however, has that been done by ex-
press legal sanction; and more and more is the responsibility
for anything in the way of executive action being definitely
located in the President, so that, at the most, the President may
be said to be in time of war, a
' '
constitutional dictator.
' ' Even
so, the authority of the Executive under his war powers is so
extensive that one can only repeat the words of James Bryce
when he wrote about the President that "when foreign affairs
3H. J. Ford, "The Growth of Dictatorship," in Atlantic Monthly,
CXXI, 632-640 (May, 1918), esp. 634.
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become critical, or when disorders within the Union require his
intervention, . . everything may depend on his judgment,
his courage, and his hearty loyalty to the principles of the Con-
stitution." 4
* American Commonwealth, I, 67.
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ers as, 11, 17, 19, 115, 116-117,
265; executive agreements, 37, 40;
military measures short of war,
43; defensive war, 59, 60, 62, 75;
personal command, 115, 116, 118-
120, 135-137 ; direction of military
and naval operations, 117, 121-126,
266; appointment and dismissal of
officers, 126-130; control of mil-
itia, 130-135; military jurisdic-
tion, 139, 147; military govern-
ment, 152, 153, 157, 164; war ad-
ministration, 172, 174, 266; po-
lice control, 182, 186, 194, 200,
201, 202; control of economic re-
sources, 209; termination of war,
233, 267; reconstruction, 251, 253,
257, 260
Committee on Public Information,
172, 197-199, 201
Communication, control of, 231,
218-219
Confiscation Ac&; 16, 150, 212
Congress, war powers of, 16, 17, 18,
19, 58, 78, 79, 88, 95-96, 101, 117,
118, 121, 126, 127, 131, 138, 142,
149, 170, 183, 189, 191, 193, 208,
224, 226-230, 248, 251, 252, 254,
257, 264, 268
Conscription, in the Revolution, 105;
in Civil War, 106, 167-168; in
World War, 107-108, 169
Constitution, nature of executive, leg-
islative, and judicial clauses, 11;
Wilson-Boosevelt doctrine of con-
struction, 12-14; as source of war
powers, 20, 265-266; as war in-
strument, 182
Convention of 1787, on power to de-
clare war, 61, 78-79; on powers of
command, 115, 119; on control of
militia, 130; on power to make
peace, 228-229
Corwin, E. S., on control of foreign
policy, 29, 31; on power of de-
fense, 77; on power to declare
peace, 226
Council of National Defense, 172,
178, 204, 211, 215
Courts-martial, 138-143, 147, 163,
190
Creel, George, chairman of Commit-
tee on Public Information, 198,
199
Crowninshield, B. W., Secretary of
the Navy, 38
Cuba, recognition of, 32; filibuster -
ering expeditions against, 45; dif-
ficulties concerning, 91-92; mili-
tary government of, 156, 259-
260
Cullom, S. M., Senator, on senators
as treaty negotiators, 241
Cummins, A. B., Senator, on Over-
man Act, 174; on railway control,
215, 216
Dalmatia, use of troops in, 56, 57
Daniels, Josephus, Secretary of the
Navy, member of Committee on
Public Information, 197; on vol-
untary censorship, 198
Davis, Cushman K., Senator, peace
commissioner, 240
Davis, George B., Judge Advocate
General, opinion of, on use of
militia, 134
Day, William E., Secretary of State,
peace commissioner, 240
Declaration of war, 46, 58-64, 71-
76, 78-80, 82-98, 104, 226, 266
Demobilization, 234, 235, 236
288 WAR POWERS OF THE EXECUTIVE IN UNITED STATES [288
Denby, Charles, member' of Philip-
pine Commission, 157
Devens, Charles, Attorney General,
opinion on courts-martial, 139
Dewey, George, Admiral, member of
Philippine Commission, 157
Dick Militia Act, 133
Dictatorship, in war, 18, 19, 203,
269
Diplomatic relations, breaking of,
35-37, 93
Director General of Eailroads, 172,
180, 215, 216
District of Columbia, enemy aliens
barred from, 186
Draft, in Civil War, 106, 167-168;
see also Conscription
Dunning, W. A., on civil rights in
war, 183
Edge, W. E., Senator, resolution on
use of troops abroad, 124; resolu-
tion for termination of war, 225
Emancipation proclamation, 268
Embargo, 208, 210
Emergency Fleet Corporation, 217
Enemy aliens, control of in war, 184-
186
Enlistment, voluntary, 101, 104, 105
Esch-Cummins Railroad bill, 216
Espionage Act, 150, 170, 193-194,
201, 209
Executive agreements, nature of,
37; with, Great Britain, 37-39,
41; with China, 39-40; with Mex-
ico, 40; with Spain, 41; with
Panama, 41; with Japan, 41;
with Santo Domingo, 42
Executive orders, as forms of presi-
dential action, 20
Executive power, nature of consti-
tutional provision, 11; Eoosevelt
theory, 12-14; extent of, 14-15
Exports Administrative Board, 171
Exports Council, 171
Fairlie, J. A., on nature of war
powers, 20; on forms of presi-
dential action, 20-21; on delega-
tion of powers, 21; on war influ-
ence of President, 31
Fall, A. B., Senator, resolution for
withdrawal of recognition, 35;
resolution for termination of war,
225
Federal Trade Commission, trans-
fer of powers, 179
Fenian invasion, 44, 89
Filibuster, on arming of merchant
vessels, 69
Filibustering expeditions, 45
Fillmore, Millard, President, on con-
trol of militia, 131; powers of
reconstruction, 256
Fish, Hamilton, Secretary of State,
influence for peace, 89
Fisheries question, executive agree-
ment concerning, 41
Fletcher, D. IL, Senator, on Over-
man Act, 174
Florida, inchoate interest in, 45-46;
occupation of, 65, 66; government
of, 252
Florida claims, 89
Food control, 170, 171, 204-207, 210,
262
Food and Fuel Control Act, 170, 205,
207, 208, 230, 262, 268
Foraker, Joseph B., Senator, on
senators as treaty negotiators, 242
Ford, H. J., on dictatorship in war,
269
Foreign language press, control of,
201
Foreign policy, formulation of, 26-31
Foreign troops, entry of, executive
agreements concerning, 40-41
Fourteen points, 234, 244
France, difficulties with, 80, 83, 84,
103
France, J. I., Senator, resolution for
pardon of political prisoners, 151
Freedom of speech and press, 182,
183, 192-202
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Frelinghuysen, F. T., Secretary of
State, executive agreements, 40,
41
Fremont, John C., Colonel, military
governor of California, 158, 255
Frye, William P., Senator, peace
commissioner, 240
Fuel control, 170, 171, 179, 207-208,
263
Gallatin, Albert, on war influence of
President, 82; peace commissioner,
238
Garfield, H. A., Fuel Administrator,
207, 208, 263
Garner, J. W., on executive power
in war, 15
Gerard, James W., Ambassador, re-
call of, 37
Germany, war with, declaration of,
92, 95, 226; raising of forces dur-
ing, 105, 107-108 ; control of aliens
during, 185, 186; armistice con-
ditions, 234; reconstruction after,
262; termination of, 225, 226,
230-231, 235-236, 248
Goodnow, F. J., on nature of war
powers, 13, 19, 167
Grain Corporation, United States,
171, 206
Grant, U. S., President, inchoate in-
terest in Santo Domingo, 48; in-
fluence for peace, 88-89
Graves, William S., Major General,
commander of Siberian expedition,
122, 123
Gray, George, Senator, peace com-
missioner, 240
Great Britain, executive agreements
with, 37-39, 41; relations with,
62-63, 84-86, 88-90; see also War
of 1812
Great Lakes, limitation of naval
armaments on, 37
Gregory, Thomas W., Attorney Gen-
eral, opinion on arming of mer-
chant vessels, 69
Greytown (Nicaragua), bombard-
ment of, 50
Griggs, John W., Attorney General,
opinions of, on military govern-
ment, 162; on termination of war,
236
Habeas corpus, suspension of, 188-
192, 266, 268
Hague Convention, 61, 94, 95, 96
Hale, Eugene, Senator, on senators
as treaty negotiators, 241, 242
Hamilton, Alexander, on power to
receive and send diplomatic rep-
resentatives, 35; on neutrality,
44; on power of defense, 63-64;
on power of declaring war, 78,
94; on powers of command, 116,
119; on power of pardon, 148; on
executive war power, 167
Hand, Learned, Judge, on power to
terminate war, 236
Harding, Warren G., Senator, on
dictatorship in war, 18
Harrison, Benjamin, President, on
appointment of officers, 127
Hartford Convention, 132
Hawaii, government of, 253
Hayti, intervention in, 54
Helvidius letter, on neutrality, 44
Henry correspondence, 85, 86
Henry, Patrick, on dictatorship in
war, 18
Hines, Walker D., Director General
of Eailroads, 216, 262
Hitchcock, C. N., on control of in-
dustry in war, 211, 212
Hitchcock, Gilbert M., Senator, on
use of troops in Dalmatia, 57
Hoar, George F., Senator, on ap-
pointment of senators as treaty
negotiators, 241, 242
Holmes, O. W., Justice, dissenting
opinion on civil rights in war, 183
Honduras, intervention in, 55
Hoover, Herbert, Food Administra-
tor, 204, 205
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Horseshoe Eeef, executive agreement
concerning, 38
House, Edward M., peace commis-
sioner, 239
Housing Corporation, 213
Hughes, Charles E., on direction of
military movements, 121; on con-
trol of business in war, 204, 219;
on power to make peace, 229; on
powers of reconstruction, 250
Ide, Henry C., member of Philip-
pine Commission, 260
Inchoate interest, in Florida, 45-46;
in Texas, 47-48; in Santo Domin-
go, 48-49; in Panama Canal, 49
Industry, control of, 204, 210-212
International law, as limitation on
war powers, 15, 17; as source of
war powers, 20; control of enemy
aliens, 184, 185; treatment of
enemy property, 212; right of
requisition, 217
Internment, during World War, 185,
186
Interstate Commerce Commission,
215
Intervention, 53-57
Jackson, Andrew, General, occupa-
tion of Florida, 65, 66, 67; raising
of troops in Seminole War, 108-
109; President, recognition of
Texas, 33
Jefferson, Thomas, on arming of
merchant vessels, 67; on war in-
fluence of Adams, 80, 81; on sus-
pension of habeas corpus, 189;
Secretary of State, formulation of
foreign policy, 26; President,
power of defense, 63, 64-65; in-
fluence for peace, 84-85
Johnson, Andrew, military governor,
153, 158; President, limitation on
removal power, 128; convenes mil-
itary commission, 145; exercise of
pardon, 150; powers of reconstruc-
tion, 251
Johnson, Hiram, Senator, on Siber-
ian policy, 124
Judge Advocate General, opinions
of, 129, 134, 143
Judicial power, constitutional limi-
tation on, 11
Kearney, S. W., General, military
government by, 154, 155, 157, 158,
161, 163
Knox, P. C., Senator, on nature of
war powers, 16; on Overman Act,
175; peace resolution, 225, 226,
230; resolution for separation of
covenant and treaty, 244
Koszta incident, 50
Lansing, Robert, Secretary of State,
on arming of merchant vessels,
69; member of Committee on Pub-
lic Information, 197; peace com-
missioner, 239
Lansing-Ishii agreement, 41
League of Nations, 224, 225, 244,
245
Legion, as form of army organiza-
tion, 111-112
Legislative power, constitutional
limitation on, 11
Lenroot, I. L., Senator, on termina-
tion of war, 224
Lighthouse Service, transfer of, 177
Lincoln, Abraham, President, on na-
ture of war powers, 16; exercise
of arbitrary power, 18, 268; pow-
er of recognition, 32; blockade,
74, 125, 209 ; draft, 106 ; question-
able authority, 110, 175; powers
of command, 120; trial of assas-
sins of, 144, 145; exercise of par-
don, 150; military government,
158, 161, 163; suspension of
habeas corpus, 190, 192; regula-
tion of intercourse, 209; control
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of railroads, 214; powers of re-
construction, 251
Lodge, H. C., Senator, on Fall reso-
lution, 36; resolution for termina-
tion of war, 225, 227; control of
negotiations, 245, 246
Louisiana, government of, 252
McAdoo, W. G., Director General of
Eailroads, 172, 215, 216
McCallum, D. C., military director
of railroads, 214
McComas, J. B., Senator, on sena-
tors as treaty negotiators, 242
McCormick, Medill, Senator, resolu-
tion on use of troops abroad, 124
McKinley, William, President, or-
ders military force to China, 51;
war influence, 91-92; direction of
military operations, 120; block-
ade, 125, 209; military govern-
ment, 154, 156, 157, 159, 258-262;
preliminary protocol, 234; ap-
pointment of peace commissioners,
239, 240; control of peace nego-
tiations, 243
Madison, James, on neutrality, 44;
on arming of merchant vessels, 68 ;
on war influence of Adams, 81,
83; on power of declaring war,
94; President, war influence, 85;
proclamation of war, 97; use of
militia in war, 132; exercise of
pardon, 150; proposal for armis-
tice, 233; appointment of peace
commissioners, 238
Maine controversy, 91
March, Peyton C., General, 114, 126
Marcy, W. L., Secretary of War,
Koszta incident, 50; military gov-
ernment of New Mexico, 159, 255
Marine Hospital Service, 177
Marines, use of in Caribbean Zone,
55
Marshall, John, on control of for-
eign relations, 25
Martial law, 138, 143, 145, 146, 152
Mason, William E., Eepresentative,
peace resolution, 225
Mayes, James J., Acting Judge Ad-
vocate General, opinions of, 129
Merchantmen, armed, 67-70, 81, 198,
267
Mexico, Wilson's relations with, 30,
35-36, 52, 67; war with, as war
of defense, 70-74; beginning of,
86-88; declaration of, 88, 95, 226;
raising of forces during, 103; ap-
pointment of officers in, 126; use
of militia in, 132, 133; blockade,
209; termination of, 247
Military commissions, 138, 143-147,
163, 190
Military governor, 155, 158, 159
Militia, 61, 107, 130-137
Mines, Bureau of, 179, 180
Monroe, James, Secretary of State,
armistice proposal, 233; Secretary
of War, recommends conscription,
106; on control of militia, 132,
136, 137; President, power of rec-
ognition, 33; inchoate interest in
Florida, 46; power of defense,
65; appointment of officers, 127;
on appointment of members of
Congress to foreign missions, 240
Monroe doctrine, 30, 31, 54, 90
Moore, John Bassett, on executive
agreements, 37
Morgan, E. M., on courts-martial,
142
Morgan, John T., Senator, on sena-
tors as treaty negotiators, 241
Moses, Bernard, member of Philip-
pine Commission, 260
Murray, William Vans, on arming
of merchant vessels, 68
National Army, 106, 113
National Defense Act, 105, 107, 113,
132, 210
National Guard, 107, 113
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Navy, power to provide, 101; see
also Secretary of the Navy
Negotiations, control of, 25, 31, 242-
246
Nelson, Knute, Senator, on Over-
man Act, 175
Neutrality, enforcement of, 44-45,
70, 88
New Mexico, military government
of, 154, 157, 158, 159, 161, 163,
254, 255, 257
Newspapers, control of in war, 196,
198-199, 201-202
Nicaragua, bombardment of Grey-
town, 50; intervention in, 55
Official Bulletin, 198
Oregon question, 86
Otis, E. S., Major General, member
of Philippine Commission, Io7
Overman Act, 173-181, 231, 262
Pacificus letter, on neutrality, 44
Palmer, A. Mitchell, Alien Property
Custodian, 213; Attorney General,
opinion on power to terminate
war, 236
Panama, relations with, 41, 49, 51, 53
Panama Canal Zone, 180, 186, 253
Panama Congress, 27-30
Pardon, power of, 141, 148-151
Peace, power of Congress to declare,
224-231
Peace commissioners, appointment
of, 237-239; senators as, 240-242
Peace negotiations, control of, 237,
242-246
Peace resolutions, 225, 226, 227, 230
Peace treaty, 223-225, 228-231
Pershing, John J., General, 126, 127
Phelps, John S., military governor
of Arkansas, 158
Philippine Commission, 156, 157,
260, 261
Philippines, government of, 154, 156,
159, 160, 260-262; acquisition of,
234, 243
Pierce, Franklin, President, defends
bombardment of Greytown, 50
Platt, O. H., Senator, on senators as
treaty negotiators, 242
Platt Amendment, 259
Poindexter, Miles, Senator, on ter-
mination of war, 224, 226
Police supervision, 53-57
Polk, James K., President, enforce-
ment of neutrality, 45; inchoate
interest in Texas, 47-48; war in-
fluence, 70-72, 86-88; proclama-
tion of war, 97; direction of mili-
tary operations, 120, 126; exer-
cise of pardon, 149; military gov-
ernment, 154, 157, 160, 268;
blockade, 209; appointment of
peace commissioners, 238-239; con-
sultation with Senate, "244; pow-
ers of reconstruction, 254-256
Pomeroy, J. N., on use of militia,
134
Porter resolution, for termination of
war, 226
Porto Eico, government of, 156,
159, 258; acquisition of, 234
Posse comitatus, use of army as, 43
Postmaster General, control of wire
services, 180, 219; censorship by,
195, 196, 201-202
Preliminary protocol, 232, 234, 236
President, source of war powers, 20 ;
see also names of Presidents, and
passim
Press, control of in war, 182, 192-202
Price control, 179, 203, 204, 205,
206, 207, 210
Proclamations, as forms of presi-
denial action, 20; of state of war,
97-98; of amnesty, 149-150; fix-
ing registration days, 168; an-
nouncing enemy alien regulations,
185-186
; suspending habeas cor-
pus, 190; establishing food and
fuel regulations, 205-206, 207; an-
nouncing termination of war, 247-
248
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Prohibition, 206, 236
Property, control of, 182, 203, 212-
214
Protocol, preliminary, 232, 234, 236
Provost Marshal General, 168, 170,
180
Public Health Service, 177, 180
Punitive expeditions, 65-67
Eadio control, 218-219
Eailroads, control of, 172, 208, 214-
217, 262
Eailroads War Board, 214
Railway Control Act, 171, 215, 231,
262, 269
Ratification, power of, 246-248
Rayner, Isador, Senator, theory of
executive power, 13
Recognition, power of, 31-34, 35
Reed, James A., Senator, opposes
Overman Act, 174
Registration, under Selective Service
Act, 168
Regular Army, 105, 113, 122
Reid, Whitelaw, peace commissioner,
240
Reprieves, power of granting, 148
Requisition, power to, 203, 204, 206,
210, 211, 217, 218
Revolutionary War, dictatorship in,
18, 203; conscription in, 105;
direction of, 269
Rockhill, W. W., special commission-
er to China, 40, 239
Roosevelt, Theodore, President, the-
ory of executive power, 12-13; re-
lations with Santo Domingo, 41-
42, 49, 54; intervention in Pana-
ma, 49; command in war with
Germany, 105, 130
Root, Elihu, on nature of war pow-
ers, 16, 250; Secretary of War,
259, 260
Root-Takahira agreement, 41
Rush, Richard, Acting Secretary of
State, 38
Russell, Jonathan, charge d' af-
faires, 233; peace commissioner,
238
Russia, recognition of Omsk govern-
ment, 32; use of troops in, 123
Sanford, Edward S., military super-
visor of telegraphic messages, 196
San Juan (Nicaragua), city of,
bombardment of, 50
San Juan, island of, executive agree-
ment concerning, 39
Santo Domingo, executive agree-
ment with, 42; inchoate interest
in, 48; intervention in, 54, 56
Schouler, James, on power to make
peace, 230, 237
Schurman, Jacob G., member of
Philippine Commission, 157
Schurz, Carl, Senator, on inchoate
interest in Santo Domingo, 48
Scott, W. S., General, 126, 143, 190
Secretary of Agriculture, 171, 210
Secretary of Commerce, 171, 176,
210
Secretary of the Interior, 180
Secretary of Labor, 180, 213
Secretary of the Navy, 38, 56, 142,
176, 180, 197, 198, 200, 201
Secretary of State, 12, 40, 41, 48,
51, 66, 69, 87, 89, 171, 191, 195,
196, 197, 198, 210, 234, 239, 240,
255
Secretary of the Treasury, 112, 113,
172, 180, 209, 210, 215, 238, 253
Secretary of War, 41, 56, 62, 108,
109, 123, 125, 132, 142, 156, 159,
180, 191, 197, 198, 200, 201, 253,
255, 259, 260, 261
Sedition Act, of 1798, 187, 188, 193,
194
Selective Service Act, 105, 107, 113,
126, 127, 129, 168, 169
Seminole War, of 1818, 65-66, 108,
132, 133
Senate, on power of recognition, 32,
34; power regarding executive
agreements, 37 ; treaty-making
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power, 47, 228-230, 231, 232, 244-
246; filibuster in, 69; power re-
garding appointment and remov-
al of officers, 126-129; on fuel or-
der, 207; confirmation of peace
commissioners, 237-239; on sena-
tors as treaty negotiators, 240-
242
Sequestration, 212
Seward, W. H., Secretary of State,
censorship by, 195
Shepley, George F., military gover-
nor of Louisiana, 158, 161
Sherman, L. Y., Senator, resolution
on use of troops abroad, 57
Shields, John K., Senator, on War
Cabinet, 173
Shipping, control of, 217-218
Shipping Board, 171, 172, 180, 210,
217
Siberian expedition, 123, 124, 125
Signal Corps, reorganization of, 177-
178
Silesia, use of troops in, 56
Smith, Hoke, Senator, opposes Over-
man Act, 174
South, blockade of, 74, 125, 209;
military government of, 154, 155,
157, 158, 161, 162, 163-164; recon-
struction of, 251
Spain, war with, beginning of, 91-
92; declaration of, 95, 98, 104,
226; organization of forces in,
113; blockade, 125, 209; use of
militia in, 134, peace negotiations,
234, 243; termination of, 248;
acquisition of territories, 258
Speed, James, Attorney General,
opinion on military commissions,
144
Spooner, John C., Senator, on con-
duct of foreign relations, 25, 245,
247; on powers of command, 117
Sprigg resolution, negative declar-
ation of war, 83
Stager, Anson, military superintend-
ent of telegraphs, 218
Standards, Bureau of, 180
Stanly, Edward, military governor
of North Carolina, 158
Stanton, Edwin M., Secretary of
War, on military occupation of
South, 156
State, department of, peculiar stat-
us of, 25; see also Secretary of
State
Sterling, Thomas, Senator, on pow-
er to make peace, 230
Stockton, Commodore, military gov-
ernor of California, 154, 158, 161
Stone, William J., Senator, on arm-
ing of merchant vessels, 69
Story, Joseph, Justice, on power of
recognition, 34; on power to make
peace, 229
Sumner, Charles, Senator, on nature
of war powers, 15, 16, 17-18; on
inchoate interest in Santo Domin-
go, 48; hostility towards Great
Britain, 89
Supreme Court, on executive power,
13; on nature of war powers, 16-
17, 19; on power to begin war,
60; on wars of conquest, 223; on
power to terminate war, 236; see
also Table of Cases
Taft, W. H., theory of executive
power, 14; on formulation of for-
eign policy, 26; on power to make
peace, 230; Secretary of War, ex-
ecutive agreement with Panama,
41; member of Philippine Com-
mission, 260; governor of Philip-
pines, 261; President, intervention
in Caribbean Zone, 55
Taney, Eoger B., Chief-Justice, dis-
sent in Prize Cases, 75; on sus-
pension of habeas corpus, 192
Taylor, Hannis, on use of troops
abroad, 122
Taylor, Zachary, General, 48, 70, 71,
87, 126; President, powers of re-
construction, 256
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Telegraph and telephone, control of,
180, 185, 196, 200, 214, 218-219
Teller, Henry M., Senator, on sena-
tors as treaty negotiators, 242
Termination of war, 223-231, 232,
235-236, 247-248
Texas, annexation of, 31, 47; rec-
ognition of, 33; inchoate interest
in, 47-48
Thayer, H. E., censor in Civil War,
195
Tillman, B. E., Senator, on senators
as treaty negotiators, 241
Trade, control of, 208-210
Trading with the Enemy Act, 171,
172, 200, 201, 209, 210, 212, 230,
269
Transportation, control of, 214-218
Trau incident, 56
Treaty of peace, as method of ter-
minating war, 223-224, 228-229,
231,.232; negotiation of, 237, 242-
246
Tripoli, war with, 63
Trist, Nicholas, peace commissioner,
238, 239
Troops, reciprocal passage of, 40-41;
use of in aid of civil power, 43-
44; see also Army
Turkey, diplomatic relations with,
36, 93
Tyler, John, President, inchoate in-
terest in Texas, 47, 48
Upshur, A. P., Secretary of State,
on executive power, 12
Van Buren, Martin, Senator, on
Panama Congress, 28, 39
Venezuela affair, 30, 89-90
Vera Cruz, occupation of, 52
Versailles, treaty of, 246
Virginius incident, 30, 41
Voluntary enlistment, 101-105
Wadsworth, James, Senator, on con-
trol of administration, 172
Wage commission, 263
War, articles of, 138, 141; declara-
ation of, 46, 58-64, 71-76, 78-80,
82-98, 104, 226, 266; notification
of, 96-97; termination of, 223-
231, 232, 235-236, 247-248; see
also Austria-Hungary, Civil War,
Germany, Mexico, ^Revolutionary
War, Seminole War, Spain, Trip-
oli, and passim
War of 1812, beginning of, 85-86;
declaration of, 95, 226; militia in,
132, 133, 136; control of commerce
during, 208; armistice proposal,
233; termination of, 247
War Cabinet, 172-173, 177
War Industries Board, 172, 178, 179,
210, 211-212
War Eisk Insurance Bureau, 172, 176
War Trade Board, 171, 179, 201, 210
Washington, George, General, as dic-
tator, 18, 203; President, power of
defense, 62; army organization,
111; exercise of personal command
120, 135; exercise of pardon, 143;
Lieutenant General, 103
Whiskey Eebellion, 135, 149
White, Henry, peace commissioner,
239
Whiting, W., on defensive war, 59;
on civil rights in war, 183
Wickersham, George W., Attorney
General, opinion on use of militia,
133, 134 ; on power to make peace,
230
Willard, Daniel, direction of rail-
road operation, 215
Willoughby, W. W., on executive
power, 14; on declaration in civil
war, 76; on powers of reconstruc-
tion, 251
Wilson, Woodrow, on executive pow-
er, 12; on formulation of foreign
policy/. 26; President, relations
with Mexico, 30, 35, 52, 67; severs
relations with Germany, 36; arm-
ing of merchant vessels, 68, 69,
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70; war influence, 92-93; procla-
mation of war, 97; conscription,
105, 108, 169; direction of military
operations, 120, 123, 125; refusal
to appoint Roosevelt to command,
130; court-martial procedure, 141,
142; exercise of pardon, 151; con-
trol of war administration, 170,
171, 177, 178, 268; opposes War
Cabinet, 173; exercise of ques-
tionable authority, 175; control
of aliens, 185-186 ; censorship, 197,
200, 201; control of economic re-
sources, 203, 204, 205, 209, 210,
211, 212, 213, 215, 216, 217, 219;
termination of war, 226, 230, 236 ;
armistice, 234 ; demobilization,
235; peace negotiations, 239, 240,
242, 243, 244, 246; powers of re-
construction, 208, 262, 268
Wilson-Roosevelt doctrine, 12-13
Wood, Leonard, Major General, 43,
130, 159, 259
Woolsey, T. S., on breaking of dip-
lomatic relations, 36; on declara-
tion of war, 58
Worcester, Dean C., member of Phil-
ippine Commission, 157, 260
World War, administrative author-
ity of President in, 170; censor-
ship during, 197, 202, necessity
for economic control, 203, 204;
war powers in, 268, 269; see also
Austria-Hungary, Germany
Wright, Luke E., member of Phil-
ippine Commission, 260; vice-
governor, 261
X Y Z correspondence, 81, 82
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